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The Crossover o f New Media Im mersion and Site-Specificity; 
Contemporary Art and Spatial Experience
Anja Bock, Ph.D.
Concordia University, 2009
In the literature on contemporary installation art, a conceptual paradox 
keeps rearing its head: frequently artworks are described as immersive and  site- 
specifie. But how can the)- be both? Although both terms have solid foundations 
within art history, they tend to be regarded as mutually exclusive categories, 
pertaining to very different kinds of aesthetic experience: “immersion" draws on 
our relationship with new media and engages a long history of illusionism and 
simulation, while “site-speeifieity” focuses on actual places as a way to 
circumvent illusionism and reveal the material or ideological forces that define a 
particular site. Given this difference, my objective is twofold: first to discover 
their respective usefulness and limitations, and then to ask, what happens when 
we think of them together?
In answer to this question I propose that the discourses of new media 
immersion and site-specifieity have created a “crossover.” That is, the two 
discursive zones have neared each other to the point that they have created a 
force field between them, thereby generating a new zone altogether. I am using 
the figure to suggest the drastic Availing in prominence of new media immersion 
and site-speeifieity as discrete discourses within art history over the last decade: 
each falls away to the margins, falling by the wayside of validated art practices, 
leaving between them the expansive zone of the crossover.
This zone is explored through detailed analysis of five artworks: Olafur 
Kliasson’s installation Notion Motion (2005V. Philip Beesley’s interactive 
environment Hylo/.oie Soil (2007); Mike Nelson's tri-part stage-set Triple B luff 
Canyon (2004): Gregor Schneider’s labyrinthine WWsse Folter (2007): and 
Rafael Loznno-Hemmer’s augmented city square Under Sean (2005). I propose 
that each artwork helps build critical theory around the issues at stake in the 
crossover, particularly with regard to contemporary spatial experience and its 
implications for subjectivity. The case studies have been grouped into three 
chapters in order to allow certain issues pertinent to the crossover to come to the 
fore more forcefully: interactivity, spatial facsimiles and augmented places.
iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to extend my gratitude to mv thesis supervisor. Dr. Johan no 
Sloan, whose insight on sculpture and contemporary art guided me throughout 
this dissertation. I would also like to express special gratitude to Dr. Olivier 
Asselin, who put “immersion" and “site-specificitv" together in a seminar and 
whose research on Augmented Reality I’m indebted to. Also, my sincere thanks to 
Dr, Kristina Huneault, whose seminar on subjectivity allowed me to formulate 
many of these ideas. In addition to my committee, I would like to thank my 
external readers, Dr, Christine Ross and Dr. Chris Salter, for the ideas they 
shared with me at the very end. Furthermore ~ my dear friends, who helped with 
this project in various ways, Anna, Stephen. Kendra, and Andrew. Last but not 
least, I would like to thank my m other Almut for her ongoing support, and Roger 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
L IS T  O F  F I G U R E S ................................................................................................................................................ . i \
IN T R O D U C T IO N ........................................................................................................................................... ........... l
T hesis B reakdow n   .................................     mi
P A R T  O N E : T H E O R E T IC A L  C O N T E X T
C H A P T E R  1: T H E  “ C R O S S O V E R ” O F  IM M E R S IO N  A N D  S IT E -S P E C IF IC J T Y  3 3
N k w  M e d ia  Im m e r s i o n ..........................................................................   3 3
Im m ersion  in Art H isto ry ................................ ...... .................................................34
N ew  M edia Im m e rs io n ..............................................................................................38
T he Ideal o fV R „ ...................................................    42
"D isappearance" o f the F ra m e ....................................................................  47
S ub jectiv ity ....................     51
S it e -S p e c if ic t t y ..................................   6 0
M in im a lism ...........................................      <n
T he E xpanded  F ie ld ....................................................................................................65
In stitu tio n a l C ritiq u e   .............     08
R esonan t S ites................             72
T he Ideal o f Site S pecific ity ..................................   ......74
T he genre  in  c ris is .......................       79
S ub jectiv ity  ............................................................................................................85
T i ie  C r o s s o v e r  Z o n e  ..................................................................   *.......   8 9
The old new  /.one an d  M inim alism  re v is ite d   ......................................98
H o m ogeneity ....................    103
P A R T  T W O : C A SE  S T U D IE S
C H A P T E R  2 : IN T E R A C T IV E  S P A C E S ................................................................................................... 1 0 6




O i .a f t ir E i .ia.s s o n : N o t io n  m o t io n .  ..............   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I , . , . . . .  118
In teractiv ity , narcissism  am i lho sc re e n ............................................................. 121
L ig h t................................................................................................................................U’f)
WaU*r.............................................................................................................................. 1:1; j
P m u i*  B f.ksi f y : I lY E o /.o ic S o n .......................     144
In te rac tiv ity ................................ 1.(7
“N atu re" an d  n e tw o rk s ............................................................................................. i.}<)
“N a t u r e ” a n d  th h  Cu l t u r e  o f  Im m e r s io n  a n d / o r  In ter a c i iv it y  166
.SPATIAL F A C S IM IL E S .........................................................................  178
M ik e  N e l s o n : T r if l e  B i .o ff  Ca n y o n   ..................................     1 8 2
C in e m a .....................................................................................................   186
S tu d io ...................................   180
“The W o o d sh e d " .......................     m2
H istory , space a n d  su b jec tiv ity ..............................................................................up)
Gr e g o r  S c h n e id e r : W e isse  Fo i .t k k ...........................................................   2 1 4
Spatia l p r a c t ic e ................................................   219
A esthetic vocabu lary ...........................................................................   221
A rc h ite c tu re ................................................................................................................225
“Issu es"   .............................................  231
In stitu tio n a l C ritiq u e   .................   ..233
F a c s im ile .......................... 235
“Cr it iq u e ” a n d  “Ex p e r ie n c e ” .................................................     . .2 4 2
: A U G M E N T E D  P L A C E S ..............................   2 5 6
Ra f a e l  Lo z a n o -I Ikm m kk: U n d e r  S c a n .......................................      2 6 0
Surveillance an d  S im u la tio n .........................................     271
P artic ipa tion  an d  C om m unication   ............................................................  275
(P o sth u m an ) Public (A ugm ented) S p h e re   ........................................282
Kc o i .o o y  a n d  t u h  Rkti'RN o r S r n .n  c n v m . . . ........................................ 2 9 0
C O N C L U S IO N .................................. ...................           3 0 0
F I G U R E S   .................................................       3 0 9



















Diagram. Image from the author’s notebook. 309
Olafur Hliasson. Notion motion . 2005. (first room) 
Courtesy: San Francisco Museum of Modern Art. 310
Ibid. Images from the Internet. 311
Ibid.
Courtesy: San Francisco Museum of Modern Art. 312
Ibid. (second room)
Courtesy: San Francisco Museum of Modern Art. 313 
Ibid. Image from the Internet. 314
Philip Beesley. Ilylo/oic Soil. 2007.
Courtesy: Artist. 315
Ibid. (details) Images from the artist’s website: 
www.philipbeesIeyarehiteet.eom. 316
Mike Nelson. Triple B luff Canyon. 2004. (“cinema”) 
Images from the exhibition catalogue: .Jeremy Millar, 
Triple. Bluff Canyon: MikiylMson. Short story by Brian 
Aldiss. Oxford, UK: Modern Art Oxford, 2004. 317
Ibid. (“studio”) 318
Ibid. (“woodshed”)
Images from the museum’s website: 
www.modernartoxford.org.uk. 319
Ibid. (catalogue cover) 320
Ibid, (“woodshed”)
Image from the museum’s website. 320
Gregor Schneider. Weisse Bolter. 2007.
Image from the exhibition catalogue: Julian Heynen 
and Brigitte Kblle. Weisse Foiler: Gregor Schneider. 





F ig u re s  27-128: ibid. 324
F ig u re s  29 -30 : Ibid. 325
F ig u re  31: Ibid, Image from the Internet. 326
F ig u re  32: Ibid. Image from the exhibition catalogue. 326
F ig u re s  33-37: Images from the Internet of Camp V Delta, part of the
long-term detention facility at U.S. Naval Station, 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 327
F ig u re s  38-39 : Rafael Lozano-IIemmer. Under Scan. 2005.
Images from the Internet. 328
F ig u re  4 0 : Ibid. (database)
Image from the exhibition catalogue: Timothy 
Druckrey, Mirjam Struppek, Beiyl Graham et al.
Under Scan; Rafael I,ozano-Hemmer. Rafael Loza 110- 
Ilemmer and David Ilill, eds. Nottingham., UK: East 
Midlands Development Agency, 2007. 329
F ig u re  41: Ibid. 330
F ig u re s  42 -43 : Ibid. 331




In the lit<»rfiliirc* on contemporary art, a conceptual paradox keeps rearing its 
head: frequently artworks arc described as immersive anti site-specific. But how 
can they be both? Although both terms have solid foundations within art history, 
they tend to be regarded as mutually exclusive categories, pertaining to very 
different kinds of spatial experience. This thesis set outs to interrogate what is at 
stake in their pairing and how we might define the relation between them  as one 
of collusion rather than exclusivity.
“Immersion” is the buzzword of the new media environment, especially the 
virtual reality industry. It refers to experiencing computer-generated stimuli at 
the expense of an awareness of the actual world -  to the extent that the virtual 
world becomes the source of the real. At its most extreme, this ontological 
relocation is achieved by wearing gear, such as helmets and gloves, which sense 
the body’s movements and alter the data-wo rid depicted on the screen 
accordingly. Pre-computer immersive experiences include architectural trompe 
Voeils and panoramas, which equally stress the invisibility of the frame. 
Immersion is thus defined by the experiential breakdown of boundaries between 
actual and virtual emplacement, which is not new to, but taken to  new heights by 
digital interactivity. For this to happen, the interface must become so natural as
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to recode in awareness and effectively disappear. As Oliver Oran explains, 
immersion “is a history of frameless, even immeasurable images.”’
“Site-speeifieity,” by contrast, seeks to decorticate the meaning of a particular 
site - whether in literal, functional or discursive term s -  in the hopes of 
rendering the stakes more visible. It is profoundly anti-illusionistic in the sense 
that it focuses on the interface itself™ on the relationship between the viewer, the 
artwork, and the site. If immersion has us crawling through the computer screen 
to merge with the digital world, variants of site-speeifieity are inseparable from 
the actual site and do not constitute their own “world,” Instead, they make us 
investigate the site itself and how one significance of it nestles into, or competes 
with, another. Generally speaking, the objective is to break habitual patterns and 
conceptions of site -- to denaturalize it and stare reality in the  face. This so called 
“reality” can be concrete or immaterial, but in every case, it is determined by 
competing frames of reference, whether economic, social, political or historical. 
As such, in contrast to immersion, it is intended to be decoded as a medium, not 
experienced “immediately” as a site “proper” allegedly would be. That is, it 
emphasizes the physicality, historical resonance and /o r ideological underpinning 
of a specific site in order to open a discussion of its past, current or future uses 
and meanings.
Given their fundamental difference on the question of mediation, immersion and 
site-specifieity seem like unlikely bedfellows; yet their frequent public appearance
' O liver G ran . “Im m ersio n  an d  In terac tion :. From  C ircu lar Frescoes to In terac tive  Im age S p aces.” 
'Frans. G loria  C ustance. M edia A rt Net. n> [displays].
h ttp ://m e d ie n k im s tn e ty ..d e /lh e m e s /o v e n  iew o f n u H lin _ a r t/iin m e rs io n /lu /
together,suggests that a relationship has developed that breaks their respective 
exclusivities. Both term s appear consistently in recent writings on installation art. 
These texts, and the term “installation art” itself, unsuccessfully try to rein the 
plethora of disparate contemporary practices into a definable “genre.” 
Nevertheless, the over-simplified use of the rhetoric, of both new media 
immersion and site-speeifieity provides the first clue as to what might be at stake 
in this project. In his book Installation Art in the N ew  M illcnniwn, for example, 
Nicolas de Oliveira starts with the premise tha t contemporary art has moved 
from being “medium specific” to “debate specific” and asserts that this “predicts 
the shift from objective critique towards a new subjectivity.”2 According to de 
Oliveira, the main question to ask of art is not, what does it mean? But rather, 
how do I feel?- In a single manoeuver de Oliveira bypasses the importance of 
media competence and visual literacy in the analysis of art and undercuts its 
potential to address issues that extend beyond the viewer’s personal encounter 
with the work. As such, he aligns contemporary art with the idea that the medium 
disappears, as it does (rhetorically) in immersive experiences. Indeed, immersion 
is the operative word throughout his discussion. He writes, for example, that “the 
audience participates in the work by becoming fused with it.”4 This reveals his 
premise of framelessness; however, under th is large umbrella, he discusses 
artworks that operate within the very real boundaries of actual sites, such as 
museums, subway stations, trade centres, and government buildings. To gloss
- N icolas de Oliveira, N icola Oxley, an d  M ichael P etry . In s ta lla tio n  Art in the  New M illennium : 
T h e  F.mpire o f  the S enses. F o rew ord  J o n a th a n  Crary. L ondon: T h am es & H u d so n , 2 0 0 3 , 14, H ere 
“objective c ritiq u e” m e a n s  an asse ssm en t o f  the  art o b jec t itse lf ra th e r  th a n  an  a sse ssm en t of the  
view ing su b je c t’s re sponse  to  it. 
i Ib id . 28 .
1 1bid, 167.
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over this seeming contradiction, de Oliveira shifts the attention onto the 
interactive dimension of artworks operating within the immersive paradigm. For 
example*, lie writes, “Installation is thus seen as moving beyond the physical 
boundary of a single space into a realm of negotiated interactivity and 
sim ultaneity.”'*
In Understanding Installation Art fro m  Duchamp to Ilolzer Mark Rosenthal, 
like de Oliveira, bases his analysis of contemporary art on immersion. He writes, 
“there is no frame separating this art from the viewing context, the work and 
space having melded together into an approximation of a life experience.”6 His 
account is divided into two categories, which loosely align themselves with 
immersion and site-speeifieity as I am discussing them: “filled space” 
installations (including the subcategories “enchantm ents” and “im personations”), 
and “site-specific” installations (including the subcategories “interventions” and 
“rapprochem ents”). By throwing his net a little wider than de Oliveira, Rosenthal 
points to differences within the canon of installation art that are im portant to 
maintain if we want to avoid over-generalization. Instead of articulating these 
differences, however, Rosenthal, like de Oliveira, emphasizes that installation art 
has become hegemonic, that it “has become an everyday occurrence.”? In an 
admiring tone, he states, “Installation art threatens to become the predom inant
■> Ibid. 5.
0 M ark R osen thal. U n d e rs ta n d in g  In s ta lla tio n  A rt:.F rom  D ucham p  to Ilo lzer. M un ich : P reste l, 
2 0 0 3 . 25.
Ibid.
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mode of expression for the  m odern world as we know it, with its global character, 
desire for sensory overload, and demand for non-elitist practices.”8
De Oliveira and Rosenthal are far from alone in this effort to, first, define the 
commonalities that allegedly define installation art as a genre, and then establish 
this “genre” as hegemonic .9 The erasures and confusions that result from this 
melting pot are especially evident in Claire Bishop’s Installation Art: A  Critical 
H isto iy . On the one hand she echoes the discourse of immersion: “Instead of 
representing  texture, space, light and so on, installation art presents these 
elements directly for us to  experience.”10 As such, she approximates De Oliveira’s 
and Rosenthal’s assum ption that immersion is the underlying condition of 
installation art, in that there is no frame that signals the change of register from 
presentation to representation. Yet on the other hand Bishop avidly continues the 
rhetoric of viewer-engagement th a t site-speeifieity set in motion: “This activation 
is, moreover, regarded as emancipator}", since it is analogous to the viewer’s ... 
active engagement in the  social-political arena.”11 She suggests tha t these two 
approaches may be in conflict and addresses this in the conclusion by suggesting 
that it is an effect of the work, rather than  an effect of her analysis. She states,
“the majority" of examples discussed in this book are underpinned by a more 
traditional model of political activation”,12 a model, which, according to Bishop,
8 Ibid.
9 For exam ple , De O liveira s ta te s  (c iting  R o b erta  S m ith ): “T h e  fina l decade o f  th e  2 0 th c en tu ry  saw 
the  p assag e  o f In s ta lla tio n  a r t  fro m  a re la tive ly  m a rg in a l a r t  p rac tice  to  th e  e s ta b lish m e n t o f  its 
c u rre n t cen tra l ro le  in  co n te m p o ra ry  a r t .  ‘T hese  day s in s ta lla tio n  a r t  seem s to  be  everybody’s 
favourite  m ed iu m .' ...‘in s ta lla tio n  h as  b eco m e a se rie s  o f co n v en tio n s .”' 13.
111 C laire B ishop. In s ta lla tio n  A rt: A C ritical H is to ry . L ondon  a n d  New York: R outledge, 2 0 0 5 .1 1 .
11 Ib id .
12 Ib id . 131.
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cannot account for the decentred (poststructuralist) “self” on which her analysis 
is premised. Neither the potential for representation to “activate” the viewer, nor 
the potential for immersive presentation to demobilize the viewer, is explored.
As these recent survey books indicate, there is little precision within the 
scholarship on contemporary art about how the discourse of new media 
immersion and site-speeifieity interact in today’s art practices, and what is gained 
(or lost) in the process. Secondly, by reducing the spatial dimensions of 
contemporary art to simply an indicator of its allegiance to the genre 
“installation,” these texts fail to theorize the different ways in which these 
dimensions are articulated by artists and to what effect. “To install," after all, 
suggests a deployment of objects in space th a t is purposeful not arbitrary, and 
this spatial deployment implicates the viewer. W hether the viewer responds 
emotionally as de Oliveira suggests, or is “decentred” and “activated” as Bishop 
suggests, depends on the individual art project and cannot be taken for granted; 
different spatial/subjective dynamics need to  be accounted for in order to 
understand the particular salience of a particular installation. Lastly, painting 
these differences with the same generic brush not only bolsters the hegemonic 
stronghold of installation art but also lends credence to the idea tha t the medium 
is somehow1' irrelevant or “immediate.” Of course it is neither and media 
competence is as crucial for art historians as ever. For all of these reasons, the 
category “installation a rt” is of little use aside from signalling that one is 
contending with an artistic deployment of space.
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In light of this paucity of critical evaluation and rigour with regard to artw orks 
that implicate both new* media immersion and site-specificity, my objective in 
this thesis is twofold: first to discover the respective usefulness and limitations of 
these two key terms, and then to ask, what happens wiien wre think of them 
together? As both concepts suggest some form of spatialization, it is im portant to 
investigate the types of space that arise in this collision. This effort of defining 
these two term s and then questioning their interrelation constitutes the first part 
of this thesis, which is divided into three respective parts: new’ media immersion, 
site-specificity-, and their “crossover.” In the second part of this thesis I offer five 
case studies, each of which elaborates a different set of issues that are at stake in 
this collusion/confusion/collapse of newr media immersion and site-specificity.
More specifically, in the first part of the thesis I will argue that, although we have 
tended to think of the discourses of new media immersion and site-specificity’ as 
incompatible or even exclusive, the theoretical concerns circulating in each hold 
implications for each other. These implications become more apparent as the 
decades unfold: each discourse was established at approximately the same time 
(the late 1960s) and gained in prominence during the 70s and 80s. During the 
1990s, how’ever, both term s w’ere thrown into question and problematized by 
their respective key theorists. It is due to these internal debates, I suggest, that 
the implications of one discourse come to bear relevance on the other (and vice 
versa). Both, for example, struggle with questions of “presence” and the 
experience of imaginative spatial relocation.
For heuristic purposes, I have mapped this idea onto a diagram (fig. 1). When we 
think of new media immersion and site-speeifieity as discrete discourses, it is as if 
they form the mathematical figure "asymptote” in which two lines move toward 
convergence but never intersect. However, given their discursive instability 
during the 1990s, they have created a “crossover." Borrowed from mathematics, 
the figure “crossover” occurs when two zones get so close as to create a force field 
between them that generates something new altogether, and the lines diverge in 
different directions. I am using the figure to suggest the drastic wan- y 111 
prominence of new media immersion and site-specificity as discrete discourses 
within art history over the last decade: each falls away to the margins, falling by 
the wayside of validated art practices.1^ It is their respective internal arguments 
and the consequent breakdown of their respective diserosive boundaries that 
allowed for the issues integral to both to “cross over” and occupy a new inter-zone. 
Throughout this thesis, I will refer to this zone as “the crossover.”
My objective in this thesis is to interrogate the new artistic spatializations that 
have emerged in this expansive zone. As such, this thesis is not concerned with 
art objects that are strictly “new media" or “site-specific," bu t rather with art 
objects that have implications for both discourses at once. The day-to-day new 
media environment penetrates every aspect of contemporary life, including social 
relationships, travel, work efficacy, entertainment, education and the 
dissemination of information in general. As such, it constitutes the context of
u  Let it b e  c lear th a t th is  fa lling  out o f favour is no t a value ju d g m en t. O n the con trary , so m e of 
th e  m ost challeng ing  artw orks p ro d u ced  today  continue to w ork  in th e  vein  of e ith e r  new  m edia 
im m ersion  o r site-specificity  p roper. H ow ever, I ag ree w ith  th e  au tho rs on in sta lla tion  a rt th a t it 
h as  becom e hegem onic.
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production, dissemination and reception for almost every artist working today. 
Furthermore, almost all of the artworks that are currently validated by 
contemporary art institutions are ambitious in spatial terms: video installations 
and installations of (more or less) interconnected objects permeate every major 
biennale, while photography and painting are given relatively little attention in 
these mega-shows (though maintaining their centrality in the market), “new 
media” is cordoned off into its own area, and site-specific works take place mostly 
on the periphery of the institutionalized exhibition space. As such, the field from 
which my choice of corpus was made is fertile, to say the least.1'1
Let me state clearly that my intent is not to offer a survey of the art practices that 
occupy the  crossover but rather to investigate, in depth and detail, how the 
theoretical issues at stake in the crossover of new media immersion and site- 
specificity play out in particular artworks to provoke or problematize new spatial 
experiences; therefore, I make no attem pt to  catalogue or otherwise index this 
plethora of work. This is what the books on installation art sought to do, to little 
effect. On the contrary, this thesis is interested in recovering two of the key terms 
that have been rolled into this category -  new media immersion and site- 
specificity -  in order to discover what at stake in their crossover. I want to 
discover how the theoretical concerns, assumptions and prejudices embedded in 
each of these term s continue to function (or not) in contemporary art. Because 
both “immersion” and “site-specificity” are now often used as random adjectives,
'i  H ow ever, very early  on  in the p rocess o f •writing th is  thesis I n arrow ed  the field by choosing  not 
to co n ten d  w ith  black box video in sta lla tio n s. A lthough they frequen tly  em ploy new  m edia  and  
the ir sp a tia l dynam ics arguably ex ten d  beyond  the  p ro jec tion  screen. I chose to co n cen tra te  on 
works in  w hich  the  sp a tia l dynam ics are  physically actualized  by the v iew er's p eru m b u la to ry  body.
9
it is necessary to add precision to the vocabulary of contemporary art, not its 
categorizations.
More specifically, this thesis will address how theories ol‘space join theories of 
subjectivity. To borrow .Jacques Ranciere's words, I am "concerned with aesthetic 
acts as configurations of experience that create new modes of sense perception 
and induce novel forms of political subjectivity.”1"’ T h is  interest Lnplies a 
particular methodological framework (and informs my choice of corpus). The 
intellectual context for this thesis thus follows the lead of several important 
studies that share this concern. One of these, for example, is Michel Foucault’s 
influential study on Jeremy Rentham’s architectural Panopticon and its 
consequences for the incarcerated subject: the physical space of surveillance 
instated acute self-surveillance.16 Another is Michel de. Certeau’s widely read The 
Practice o f  Everyday Life in which he describes how a pedestrian’s movements 
through a city constitute a source of subversive agency against those who hold the 
power to define space and establish its rules of use.1? Perhaps Jacques Lacan’s 
famous account of the “m irror phase” is the most influential example of how 
subjectivity is formed as a result of spatial positioning: it suffers internal 
dehiscence.18 ’Phis list can of course be extended; I mention these authors here 
only to point to the interdisciplinary approach that a combined interest in space 
and subjectivity necessitates and the very plurality of ways in which space and
's Jacq u es  R aneiere . The Politics o f  A esthetics. T rans, and  In tro d u c tio n  by G abriel Roekhill. 
A fterw ord by Slavoj Zizek. London an d  New York: C on tinuum , 2 0 0 4 . 9.
M ichel Foucault. D iscipline and  pun ish : the b ir th  of the p rison . T rans. Alan S heridan . New York 
P an theon  Books, 1977.
’-M ichel De C erteau . The P ra c tic e o f  E v e r y d a y  Life. T rans. S teven R endall. Berkeley: It of 
California P, 1984 ,1988 .
18 Jacq u es  Lacan. Kents:. A Selection . L ondon am i New York: R outledge, (1977) 2001 .
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subjectivity have been defined. Alongside these three1 thinkers, this thesis also 
draws on the spatial/subjective issues raised by Jonathan Crarv, Elizabeth Grosz, 
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, and Fredrie Jameson.
Within art history there are also many examples of how artworks configure space 
in such a way as to establish a model of subjectivity. For example, Carol Duncan 
offers an account of the spatial layout of the Louvre and the construction of the 
post-revolutionary French subject in Civilizing R i t u a l s Craig Owens provides 
an analysis of Diego Velasquez’ Las Meninas (1656) in which he demonstrates 
ow the spatial dynamics within the painting position the viewer as subject to the 
King’s authority.-0 Mieke Bal has also taken the layout of museum exhibitions as 
her object of study and has demonstrated that they, too, “speak” to the viewer 
and thereby invite particular (and sometime peculiar) relationships.-1 This link 
between spatial deployment and subjectivity is also apparent in Michael Fried’s 
A rt and Objecthood, in which he discusses the contingency of both the art object 
and the viewing subject to the “theatrical” situation that Minimalism introduces 
(in contrast to the almost transcendental experience that a more resolutely 
modern artwork elicits).22
1,1 Carol D uncan . C ivilizing R ituals: Inside Public Art M useum s. London an d  New York; R outlcdge 
1995.
*" Craig O w ens. “ R epresen tation , A ppropria tion , and  Pow er." Beyond R ecognition: 
R ep resen ta tio n . Pow er, and C ulture. Scott Bryson. B arbara  Kruger, Lynne T illm an  et al. eds. In tro  
Sim on W nlney . Berkeley: U of California P, 19on. 88-113.
:!I Mieke Bal. “On G rouping: T he Caravaggio Corner." L ooking In: The A rt o f  Viewing. In tro . 
N orm an B ryson. [Critical Voices in  Art, T heory  an d  C ulture . Saul Ostrow, series e d .| L ondon and 
New York: R outlcdge. u o o i. 181-190,
M ichael F ried . “Art an d  O bjecthood.” A rtfo rum  (Ju n e  1987): 9 1 8 .
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By attending to the discursive consequences of a given form, artistic or otherwise, 
all such analyses establish ways of thinking that extend formalism. That is, they 
break formalism free1 from its association with “pure” form (in the1 reductive 
Greenbergian sense of the term ) .aid articulate its implications for various 
cultural debates. .Stated another way, such analyses enact a formalism that does 
not turn a blind eye to questions of context, but rather scrutinize the ways in 
which a particular form generates a model of viewership, such as the self- 
patrolling prisoner (Foucault) or the homo-erotic voyeur (Bal). Although the 
tenets of poststructuralism questioned the integrity of the link between a signifier 
and its signified, this understanding of form still holds: as Rosalind Krauss states, 
“the signifier is not just an empty, formal operation; it controls what sorts of 
meanings can arise in the work.”1-  It is in this way that an artwork’s “form” is 
integral to its “content.” My thesis follows on the leads of such analyses by 
insisting that artw'orks can articulate very specific ideas through their formal 
configurations. At every turn I execute a painstaking formalism: I offer a very 
close analysis of an artwork in order to define how the viewer’s spatial enactment 
of it constitutes a model of subjectivity.
With regard to my choice of particular artworks -  which I will introduce in a 
moment I am partly guided by my conviction that art, through its variety of 
forms, its material strangeness, its spatial demands, and its articulation of 
alternatives, can tem per the demands of ideology and establish modes of viewing 
that are more in line with the subjects we might wish to be. Christine Ross
":i Rosalind Krauss in Hal F oster, R osalind  Krauss, Silvia Kolbovvski, et al. "The Polities of th e  
Signifier: A C onversation" O ctober (m a s ) :  g ir/.
touches on this belief and on the concern that it is becoming evermore difficult to 
maintain today. She asks,
If o n e  considers that the  fram e, o r  any  staged scene  w hatsoever, was a m ean s to a rticu la te  
a d is tan ce  vis a vis the  social w orld in  o rd er to im ag ine  it o therw ise o r sim ply  to o ffe r a 
space  for though t, tilt' critical question  raised  by recen t m edia d evelopm en ts th e re fo re  
b ecom es the following: how  do new  m edia a rticu la te  th is  d istance? Do they  still a rticu la te  
it a t all?-'i
This question is equally pertinent to all artistic media: the crossover 
compromises long-held assumptions about presence and emplacement, tvs well as 
interactivity, the artist’s cultural role, and critical evaluation.
My choice of corpus is informed by this question. I am interested in how a wide 
range of spaces and subjects are envisioned by artists and to what effect. As Rosi 
Rraidotti states, “There is a noticeable gap between how we live... and how we 
represent to ourselves this lived fam iliarity....Filling this gap with adequate 
figurations is the great challenge of the present. And I cannot think of a bigger 
one for the future. ”--r> I have deliberately chosen artworks that are not only 
endemic to  and exemplary of the crossover but that also embrace this challenge. 
The art works in this thesis demonstrate five different attempts to establish such 
“adequate figurations” for the present , “adequate” in the sense of seriously 
engaging with contemporary issues: they are spatialized propositions for ways in
-u Ross, C hristine . “T he D isappearing  Screen: An Incom plete  M a tte r.” T rans. B ernard  Sehutze. 
P arachu te  113 (Jan .-M areh  n o o q ): ty.
Rosi B raidotti. M etam orphoses: T ow ards a M ateria list T h eo iy  o f Becom ing. C am bridge, UK: 
Polity, :>ooi>. 1, 6.
which we can represent ourselves to  ourselves and thereby participate in the 
construction of these “solves."
As such, the artists discussed in this thesis create models of “spatial experience,” 
neither of which term can be taken for granted: “space” is contested in 
philosophy and physics alike, and “experience" resounds with assumpt ions of an 
ontologieally secure “self-presence” that can do the experiencing. But as 
.Jonathan Crary stales, “There never was or will be a self-present beholder to 
whom a world is transparently evident. Instead there are more or less powerful 
arrangements of forces out of which the capacit ies of.an observer are possible.”11'1 
In his book Techniques o f  the Observer he demonstrates that optical devices 
“operate, directly on the body of the individual”2''7 to condition viewers for 
assuming a certain model of subject ivity. On a larger spatial scale this holds true, 
as well:
I f  o u r subjectivity  is im m ersed  in  the  w orld an d  th e re  is fundam en ta lly  a lack o f  c lear 
d is tin c tio n  betw een  the  p ro d u c tio n  of subjectiv ity  a n d  th e  bu ild ing  o f th e  env ironm en t, 
w e m ust be conscious o f  o u r  investm en t in o u r  built spaces.1"”
As Elizabeth Grosz states, “there is an historical correlation between the ways in 
which space (and to a lesser extent, time) is represented, and the ways in which 
subjectivity represents itself.
7(1 Jo n a th a n  (Vary. T echniques o f  the  O bserver: on V ision an d  M odernity  in the  N in e teen th  
C entury [O ctober Book], C am bridge, MA: MIT P, 1999. ft.
:’7 Ibid. 7.
:’H Charles Stankievech. “Sew ing/Sow ing: C ultivating R esponsive G eotextiles.” P h ilip  Beesley, 
C hristine  M acy, A ndrew  Payne et at. Ilyiozoie Soil: Creolexlile In sta lla tions 1 9 9 5 /2007 . T oron to : 
Riverside A rchitectural Press, 2 0 0 7 . 44.
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The corpus of this thesis consists of such “built spaces” or “optical devices.” The 
artworks I discuss an* powerful precisely because they challenge, reveal and 
establish the spatial “arrangements” by which contemporary culture* is 
experienced and understood, as well as our subjective investments in them:
Olafur Kliasson’s installation Notion Motion (2005) plays with the distinction 
between actual and virtual space and the viewer’s position relative to both; Philip 
Heeslev's interactive environment llylozoie Soil (2007) is suggestive of the 
eroding boundaries between the body and its environment and the consequent 
dispersal of subjectivity; Mike Nelson’s tri-part stage-set Triple B lu ff Canyon
(2004) investigates the overwhelming heterogeneity of objects and spaces that 
comprise everyday life and the difficulty of establishing meaningful 
conglomerations; Gregor Schneider’s labyrinthine Weisse Falter (2007) pushes 
the desire for polysensorial immersion within simulaeral sites to its (il)logical 
conclusion; and Rafael Lozano-1 Iemmer’s augmented city square Under Sean
(2005) addresses public participation and surveillance in urban centres,
Following through on my insistence on formal analysis, through the case studies I 
take great pains to describe* the artworks as propositions in their own right 
(rather than as illustrations of extrinsic propositions), that is, as “theoretical 
objects,” As Mieke Bal defines it, this “term refers to works of art that deploy their 
own artistic and, here, visual, medium to offer and articulate thought about 
art.”'*11 In a footnote she explains that the term “theoretical object” foregrounds
Elizabeth G rosz. Space, tim e, an d  perversion  : essays on  the politics o f bodies. L ondon a n d  New 
York: R outlcdge, 1995. 07.
:i<l M ieke Bal. “N arrative inside ou t: Louise Bourgeois' S p id e r as Theoretical O b ject.” O xford Art 
.Journal (ip p q ): 104.
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“both the theoretical thought and the visual articulation of that thought in visual 
objects.”'*1 Considering artworks as aesthetic articulations of theoretical ideas is 
also another way of ensuring that the old-fashioned “politics of the signifier” are 
adequately addressed, rather than jumping immediately to the register of 
im portant ideas to which it may or may not refer.;*1’ Theoretical objects propose 
and embody their own issues.
Furthermore, each of the theoretical objects I discuss in this thesis functions as a 
spatial model for subjectivity. Let me state clearly, however, that this thesis in not 
an exhaustive historical or theoretical account of how ideas of “space” or 
“subjectivity” have been manifest in the visual arts. Nor have I constructed or 
applied any comprehensive theory of “spatial experience.” Rather, I have chosen 
the approaches that seem most relevant to the interpretation of the contemporary 
artworks that comprise my corpus, approaches drawn from the discourses of new 
media immersion and site-speeifieity, as well as from the literature cin 1 Jbove. 
Regarding the art work as a “model” for space and subjectivity, it might be useful 
to  remember the distinction between “ideal” and “empirical” viewers that Mieke 
Bal and Norman Bryson define in “Semiotics and Art History:”
K’ opirical sp ec ta to rs  a re  th e  ac tual, living, an d  b re a th in g  view ers o f  th e  so rt we 
see,..w alk ing  th rough  the  exh ib ition  space, in  couples o r  in  groups, looking a t the  p ic tu res  
a ro u n d  th em  and  d iscu ssin g  w hat they see. T h e  ideal sp e c ta to r  is a m ore  a b s tra c t figure; 
b ro ad ly  speaking , th e  te rm  refers to  the v a rious roles ascribed  to  view ers by th e  p a in tin g
n Ibid.
1,2 See Hal Foster, R osalind K rauss, Silvia Kolbovvski et al. “T he Politics o f th e  Signifier: A 
C o n v ersa tio n .”
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th ey  see, th e  set o f p o sitio n s o f func tions p ro p o sed  a n d  assu m ed  by each  o f the  im ages on
display.*!
It is precisely this abstract, “ideal” viewer that I try to discern in the artworks that 
comprise my corpus in order to understand what types of subjectivity they 
encourage and how the roles and positions they ascribe viewers might crystallize 
or distil, mediate or transform  spatial experiences.
In this thesis I have deliberately chosen to include both artworks I have seen in 
person and those I have encountered in mediated form in order to actively signal, 
or demonstrate by example, that media competence is crucial, especially now that 
contemporary art is thought to be somehow “beyond” media. The current 
assumption that “you have to  experience it yourself’ undercuts the fact that an 
artwork is an act of communication that occurs within shared conventional 
param eters and can, therefore, be reiterated and translated. That is, artworks are 
never frameless and never immediate. They operate within legible conventions 
that allow the receiver to make sense of the artistic utterance. I am not interested 
in the inevitability that empirical viewers will bring personal memories and 
associations to the artwork. Rather, I am interested in the act of communication 
itself, in the art object as a theoretical object that puts in motion a set of 
propositions about the world we live in, that (to borrow Krauss’ words) controls 
the meanings that can arise in the work. Of course my analysis of these 
propositions is limited to my current context of interpretation, but such is the 
case with all art historical analyses and it is no reason to succumb to an extreme
m  Bill, M ieke and  N o rm an  Bryson, “S em iotics an d  A rt H is to ry .” The A rt Bulletin LX X III.c (1991): 
185.
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relativism where the artwork only means th is/that to mi', myself, an empirical 
viewer writing in 2008, On the contrary: as Michael Ann Holly argues in Pant 
Looking,
T o acknow ledge the  h o ld  that th e  past itse lf  exerts  on us, we need  to  focus o n  th e  way 
h isto rica l w orks of a r t  position  us as th e ir  ideal sp e c ta to rs , expect c e rta in  response 's  from  
us, an d  co n firm  in th e  exchange w hat th e y  a n tic ip a te d  all along. ' 1
That is, art exerts “an agency that compels viewers to respond in certain ways 
despite varying contexts of reception.
That being said, however, in art since Minimalism the viewer is on stage, so to 
speak, inextricable from the work (as Michael Fried so well articulated).^’ Thus, it 
is the nature of the work in question here and the nature of interpretation that 
these propositions I seek to  discern in the art object are in fact established 
somewhere between -  between subject and object, if you will, during and not 
before the act of communication. As Gavin Butt states, “the postm odernist critic 
found herself always already imbricated in the war}) and weft of the cultural 
text.”'*? As such, this thesis can also be read as an attem pt to define a specific 
position within  immersion rather than seeking a way out to an imagined exterior. 
In the crossover, artists and critics alike inhabit the a rt world as “outsiders
"•1 M ichael Ann Molly. Past 1,00king; H istorical Im agination and  the Rhetoric of the Im age. Ithaca 
and  London: Cornell U I\ 1990. y.
« I b i d .  11.
M ichael Fried. “A rt and O b jec th o o d .” A rtfo rum  (.June 1967): (ri-8 ,
■ v  G avin B utt. “In tro d u c tio n ; T h e  P aradoxes o f  C ritic ism .” A fte r C ritic ism : N ew  R e s p o n s e s  to  Art 
an d  P e rfo rm an ce . (lav in  Bull ed . M alden , MA: Blackwell P ub lish in g  Ltd., 2 0 0 4 .3 .
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within,” to use Braidotti’s phrase; “that is to say critically but also with deep
engagement.’^
With regard to the underlying structure of this thesis, I would like to note tha t it 
was through the effort of building an adequate interpretive context for my corpus 
that I arrived at the conclusion tha t the discourse of immersion and site- 
specificitv have crossed-over to create a new zone. As such, the artworks 
generated the crossover as much as the crossover seems to generate them. 
Although for heuristic purposes I initially set up my two key term s against one 
another, at the end of each respective section I focus on the issues that are central 
to both. As such, i establish a platform for the thesis in which the two discourses 
are no longer polarized bu t are mutually implicated. Although some of my case 
studies have more to do with one or the other of these term s, I have not suggested, 
and do not wish to  suggest, that artwrorks can be organized solely according to  
their relative proximity to  either term. For example, to consider Eliasson’s and 
Beesley’s installations as site-specific is too much of a stretch; nevertheless, these 
artworks have implications for a contemporary understanding of “site.” Similarly, 
Nelson’s and Schneider’s installations do not directly reference new- media in any 
wray; yet the paradigm of new media immersion is pertinent to understanding 
their cultural salience. As such, it is not a balance between immersion and site- 
speeificity that I am seeking to articulate, nor a quantifiable range between them . 
Rather, this thesis takes its cue from the pervasive appearance in writings on 
contemporary7 art of these twTo term s together and digs into the literature to find
88 Rosi B ra id o tti. 7.
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out why this might be and to what effect, especially considering that the artworks 
in question belong to neither category in any overt or predictable way.
Yet another reason for resisting the tem ptation to polarize my two key term s is to 
avoid falling into the "art” versus “technology” trap, with site-specificity aligned 
with the  former and new media immersion with the latter. My thesis is not trying 
to dem onstrate the widespread use of new' technologies in the production of 
contemporary' art. Artists have always used whatever technologies are available to 
them in order to expand their own creative practices and offer a celebratory,' or 
critical evaluation of the cultural impact of the technology in question. In  other 
words, there never was a neat divide between “a rt” and “technology'” for artists to 
now'break down. Furthermore, such a division also suggests others, such as 
human versus machine, or the  real versus the virtual. On all these counts I 
dem onstrate a less oppositional relationship between the two in order to  indicate 
their m utual imbrication.
I have grouped my case studies into three separate chapters -  two pairs and one 
solo. Although a pairing suggests the com pare/contrast model of interpretation 
integral to the two slide-projector a rt history- lecture, my intent is somewhat 
different: by working with two artworks I am able to compile an interrelated set 
of issues from tw'o different sources. Given my commitment to art objects as 
theoretical objects, it is first necessary to discuss each of the artworks 
independently in order to grant them  their proper (theoretical) weight. The 
difficulty' that subsequently arises is this: how' can I then set them  in relation with 
each other without externalizing the issues, without using the issues as an outside
2 0
set of measures by which each artwork is assessed and compared to the other? 
Because in fact the artworks have not only lent themselves to me in order to serve 
as an example but have also provided me with the very ideas that 1 seek to 
articulate. As such, my chc ' of corpus is theoretical: each of the artworks offers 
a different way to think about the crossover and how we, as viewers, are 
implicated within it. The artworks were grouped in order to allow certain issues 
to come into the fore more forcefully.
On this note, one could easily imagine a variety of pairings: Notion Motion  beside 
Under' Scan, for example, would emphasize the changing ways in which screens 
are sited and negotiated; similarly, Hylozoic Soil beside Weisse Folter would 
bring to the foreground their ambiguous structure as well as the military origins 
of virtual technologies. However, these are not the chapters I decided to write, as 
interesting as they, or others, might be. Instead, I chose to organize my case 
studies under the rubrics of “Interactive Spaces” (chapter 2), “Spatial Facsimiles” 
(chapter 3), and “Augmented Places” (chapter 4). These rubrics m ark the points 
at which the crossover of new media immersion and site-specificity is the most 
volatile, or should I say the m cst saturated with theoretical implications for art 
historical analyses.
And the implications are many. As my case studies will indicate, in the crossover 
zone the evaluation of an object gives way to the sensations of the subject ; 
accurate visual representation of a world is supplanted by kinaesthetic 
involvement in that w’orld as a measure of its reality; “passive” observation is 
superseded by “active” operation; and historical awareness and narrative
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development is compromised by an emphasis on simultaneity. Given that the 
discipline of art history, in its modern American incarnation, has been built on 
the visual analysis of discrete objects, Kantian disinterestedness, timelessness 
and critical distance, the crossover challenges its tools of analyses and the 
boundaries by which it demarks its object of study. In this light, we can speak of a 
“paradigm shift.” That is, we are witnessing a shift in focus within art history 
from representation to simulation, from the experience o f  art to aesthetic 
experience, from material to interface, from observation to interaction, from 
reference to utility, from semiotics to (faux-)phenomenology, and from discourse 
to sensation. Art history-, firmly grounded in the former term, now needs to 
contend with the latter, its nemesis, in order to sharpen and adapt its tools to the 
changing contexts of production and reception. It is to this end that I write this 
thesis.
Thesis Breakdown
Part One: Theoretical Context
#1 The “Crossover” of New Media Immersion and Site-Specificitv
This chapter is divided into three sections: I begin by discussing new media 
immersion and site-specificity as discrete discourses and then question the 
implications of their crossover. The first two sections function as both a literature 
review and as a critical evaluation of the key issues that are common to both 
discourses. As such they provide the platform for my assertion that it is crucial to 
contend critically with their crossover.
My primary objective in the first section ~ new media immersion -  is to trace the 
concept of immersion in writings on new media where it has been most 
rigorously theorized. I evaluate the ideas of the key theorists and put them in 
dialogue with each other in order to expose the issues that have not been resolved. 
Although new media practices are now widely accepted in contemporary art 
circles as “media art," they were marginalized within the discourse of art history 
until quite recently. As such, many of the issues raised in this section have not 
been taken up by “art” debates directly. For this reason, my references are drawn 
from other sources, specifically new media theorists, cultural critics, and science 
fiction. It is here, not in art history proper, that these ideas are explored most 
insightfully. I open this section by offering an account of how' the concept of 
immersion is positioned within art history. I then discuss immersion as it 
develops consequent to the use of computer and digital technologies and 
eventually becomes firmly entrenched as a technological -  and cultural ~ ideal. 
Lastly, I explore two key issues: the alleged “disappearance” of the frame that 
separates virtual and actual emplacement, and the implications of this 
experiential breakdown for theories of subjectivity.
This section draw's heavily on Oliver Grau’s Virtual Art: From Illusion to 
Immersion,w  Marie Laure-Ryaifs Narratives as Virtual Reality: Immersion and  
Interactivity in Literature and Electronic Media A" and Lev Manovich’s The
Oliver G rau. V irtual Art: F rom  Illusion to  Im m ersion [L eonardo. R oger F. M alina am i Sean 
Cubitt, eds.J. Trans*. G loria C ustance. C am bridge, MA: MIT P, 2003 .
i° M arie L aure-R yan . N arra tives as V irtu a l Reality: Im m ersion  and In te rac tiv ity  in L ite ra tu re  and  
Elec tro n ic M edia. Baltim ore: Jo h n s  H opk ins U P, 2001.
Iauujiuuh’ o f  Nmi> M ediaN  as well as the essays that are collected in various 
anthologies, such as Media Histories (edited by Oliver Oran). *1' Science fiction 
writers have also contributed to the cultural understanding of immersion, 
particularly William (Jibson’s N e u ro in a n e e rand Neil Stephenson’s Snow  
CrasliM  Lastly, cultural critics such as N. Katherine llayles have investigated 
these shifts in wider cultural terms. i'>
The next section -  site-spceijieili/ -  seeks to articulate the main issues at stake in 
the discourse of site-specificity. Unlike new media practices, site-specificity was 
born within the discourse of visual arts. Consequently, my sources are invariably 
art historians, I trace the propositions of site-specificity through four of its key 
practices, namely Minimalism, Earthwork, Institutional Critique, and what I am 
calling Resonant Sites. By reading both the authors and the art practices across 
one another, it is possible to discern what is of central importance to each of 
these movements, issues which form the “ideal” of site-specificity. This section 
also elaborates on the instability site-specificity faced as an artistic genre in the 
1990s and the fallout of this internal fracturing. To close, this section explores the 
implications of the ideal of site-specificity (and its collapse) for theorizations of 
space and subjectivity.
v  Lev M anovich. The Language o f  New M edia [L eonardo . R oger F. M alina an d  Sean C uhitt, ed s .|. 
C am bridge, MA: M IT I’, 2001.
r ’ O liver G rau , ed. M edia Art H istories. C am bridge, MA: M IT P, 2007 . 
a  W illiam  G ibson . N euro inaneer [Ace Book]. New York: Berkley P ublishing G roup, Penguin 
P u tm an , 19S4.
11 Neil S tep h en so n . Snow  Crash. New York: B antam  Books, 1002.
v. K atherine N. H ayles, How W e Becam e P o sth u m an : V irtual Bodies in..Cybernetics, L itera tu re , 
and  In fo rm atics . Chicago and  L ondon; U o f Chicago P, tqgq .
'I’llis section draws heavily on Miwon Kwon’s One Place After Another: Site- 
Specific Art and Locational Identity;*' .James Meyer's The Functional Site;*■ 
Rosalind Krauss’ Sculpture in the Expanded Field;-'* Benjamin Buehloh's 
Conceptual Art 1962-lgbg: from  the aesthetic o f  administration to the critique o f  
institutions;*' and Michael Kriod’s infamous Art andOhjeethoodF' Robert 
Smithson's conception of the “site” and “nonsite” is also invaluable to  this section 
as it proposes the inseparability of the actual site and the artistic representation ra
It is in this third section of my opening chapter the crossover - that the 
necessity of reading the theories of new media immersion and site-specificity 
together is first posited. As previously mentioned, art historians are now turning 
their attention to new media more frequently and rigorously; however, I have 
noticed a remarkable tendency in these accounts: they engage in sweeping acts of 
revisionism. In select writings by Hal Roster, Louise Puissant and Peter Weibel, 
for example, and exhibitions such as Super Vision at the ICA in Boston in 2006, it 
is as if the art movements of the sixties and seventies (such as Op Art, Kinetic Art, 
Minimalism and Happenings) foreshadowed or spawned today’s artistic use of 
interactive media and imaging technologies,f>2 Although their accounts contain
■ih M iwon Kwon. O ne Place a f te r  A nother: Site- Specific A rt an d  Locational Identity . C am bridge, 
MA: M IT P, 2 0 0 a .
v  Ja m e s  M eyer. "The F unctional Site." D ocum ents 7 (Fall 1990): 20 9.
•ts R o s a l i n d  K r a u s s .  “S c u l p t u r e  i n  t h e  E x p a n d e d  F i e l d . ” (1979) T h e  A n d  • A e s th e t i c :  E s s a y s  o n
P ostm odern  C ulture. In tro , H al Foster, ed. New York: Hay P, 198s. 31-42.
n B uchloh, B enjam in. “C onceptual Art 1902-69: From  tin 1 A esthetic  of A dm in istra tio n  to th e
C r i t i q u e  o f  I n s t i t u t i o n s . ” C o n c e p t u a l  A r t  : A  C r i t i c a l  A n t h o l o g y .  A l e x a n d e r  A l b e r r o  a n d  B l a k e
S t i m s o n ,  e d s .  C a m b r i d g e ,  M A :  M I T P ,  1 9 9 9 . 5 1 4 - 3 7 .
r>11 M i c h a e l  F r i e d .  “A r t  a n d  O h j e c t h o o d . ” A r t f o r u n i  ( J u n e  1967): 6 1 8 .
•'u R obert S m ith son . The C ollected W ritings. .lack Flam , ed. Berkeley: U o f California P, 1996. 
r>- Hal F oster. "Six P aragraphs 011 P an  F lavin .” A rtforuni (Feb. 2 0 0 5 ) :  160-1, 206 . Louise Poissan t. 
“The Passage from  M aterial to  In terface." M edia A rt H istories. O liver (Iran , ed. C am bridge, MA: 
M IT P, 2 0 0 7 . 229-50 . Peter W eibel. “It is Forb idden  N ' ; to T ouch: Som e R em arks 011 the
many valuable insights, my discussion of the crossover is an attempt to avoid 
such narratives of influence and offer an account of the collision of issues that 
inform the crossover. Rather than suggesting a clear lint* of evolution, 1 explore 
the interpenetration of sources and ambitions,
More specifically, this section argues that, although artworks that fall strictly into 
the paradigm of either new media immersion or site-specificity cont inue to be 
produced, the new “hybrid” or “m utant” it getting all the attention. As Benjamin 
Buchloh states,
if th e re  are a rtis tic  practices th a t still s tan d  ap art from  this process o f hom ogen ization , 
I 'm  less convinced th a n  ever th a t they  can survive, and  that we as critic's an d  h is to rian s  
a re  ab le  to su p p o rt an d  su sta in  th em  in a su b s tan tia l and  efficient m an n er, to p reven t 
th e ir  total m arg ina liza tion .1’f
Rather than  adding these marginalized practices to the newly formed canon, I 
seek to characterize the crossover in detail in order to find out its implications for 
our understanding of contemporary spatial expei icnce.
Part. Two: Case Studies
In light of the crossover of new media immersion and site-specificity, it is 
important to ask: how is it expressed or materialized in the artworks and in the 
interpretive context? And how' does art envision or challenge it in turn? I low are
(Forgo tten  Ports o f th e) H istory  of In te rac tiv ity  and  V irtua litv .” M edia Art H isto ries. O liver (Iran, 
ed. C am bridge, MA: M IT P, 2007 . m - .p .  N icholas B aum e, ed. S uper v is io n . C am bridge, MA: MIT 
P, 2 ooh .
->:1 In Hal Foster, R osalind K rauss, Yves A lain Bois et al. “R oundtab le: The P red icam ent o f 
C on tem porary  Art." Art Since ly o o . New  York: T ham es an d  H udson , eo o .p  673.
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the new media of immersion shaping what artists do and what audiences 
experience? What dot's it mean to make site-specific art in an era of telepresence? 
This part of the thesis explores these questions through a series of case studies.
#2 Interactive Spaces
The first set of case studies concerns the .Janus-faee of interactivity: interactivity 
implicates the viewer in the artwork and lends her some control over it, but 
simultaneously governs the rules of the game, so to speak. Interactivity goes 
hand-in-hand with new media immersion; in the discourse of site-specificity, by 
contrast, interactivity is often more a matter of reflection than action. That is, the 
viewer is physically implicated in the site in a way that framed artworks can only 
suggest but her interaction is often restricted to walking through the site and 
perceiving it sensorially; it leaves no permanent mark. Because theories of 
interactivity borrow more heavily from new media studies than site-specificity, 
this chapter also borrows more heavily from the discourse of new media. Indeed 
the term site-specificity almost falls from the pages altogether, although the 
issues it encapsulates linger.
In particular, this chapter will sharpen two different critical edges of the 
crossover by probing the implications of the models of interact ivity established by 
two different artworks: Olafur Eliasson’s Notion motion (2005) is a highly 
contradictory spatial experience: it demonstrates how the subject becomes 
immersed within a screen-based site while also suggesting that breaking out of 
this immersion is the premise of the “self." By contrast, Philip Beesley’s Ilylom ie
Soil (2007) does not offer a way for the “figure” to distinguish itself from the 
(technological) “ground;” rather, the subject is dispersed throughout a site that 
exceeds its ability to conceptualize as a whole. Although the difference* between 
them suggests a progression toward increased immersion and away from site- 
specificitv, in this chapter I highlight their simultaneity in order to suggest the 
radical heterogeneity of space's that we inhabit through technological meeliation 
on a day-to-day basis. In conclusion, I explore the imagery of nature that both 
installations evoke in order to launch their critiques e>f interactivity and discuss 
the debate between immersion and interactivity on a wider cultural scale.
# 3  Spatial Facsim ile's
The second point at which the crossover is particularly focalized is the point at 
which the artistic representation of a specific site slicks over into its replication, 
raising questions about the relationship between actual and virtual emplacement. 
As such, in contrast to the previous chapter, this chapter strikes a balance 
between immersion and site-specificity and allows for a nuanced discussion of 
the critical distance that does or does not result, as well as the m erits or demerits 
of all-encompassing polysensorial artistic experiences (as opposed to objective 
evaluations). As these case studies will exemplify, the discourses of site- 
specificity and new media immersion cannot be distilled one from the other. 
Furthermore, in the imaginative “trips” that these artworks structure for the 
visitor, it becomes clear how kinaesthetic involvement establishes itself as the 
measure of the facsimile’s “reality” (as opposed to visual accuracy). This chapter 
also explores the implications of emphasizing the “immediacy” of experience at
the' expense of the discursive' register of experience', implications to which these 
two artworks demonstrate two different attitudes, erne resistant and the other 
embrae'ing.
In particular, this chapter explorers two installations that are facsimile's e)f actually 
existing or once existing site's: Triple B luff Canyon (2004) by Mike Nelson and 
Weisse Falter (2007) by Gregor Schneider. In the ease of Nelson’s installation, 
viewers undertake an imaginative trip to a defunct cinema, to his former studio 
space in London, and to Robert Smithson’s Partially Buried Woodshed (1970) in 
Ohio. In Schneider’s installation, viewers “travel” to the prison cells of the 
American military detainment camp in Guantanamo Bay. Given the Partially 
Buried Woodshed's status as a political icon of resistance to the Vietnam war and 
Schneider’s blatant reference to a contemporary war, the thick layering of 
representation that constitutes today’s political mediaseape is of foremost 
concern in both of these works. In conclusion, I explore the efficacy of the  tactics 
that each artist adopts to launch his political critique by drawing on the 
difference in signification between the two German words for experience, 
Erlcbnis and Erfahrung.
# 4  Augmented Places
The last issue particular to the crossover that is under investigation in this thesis 
is how immersive technologies mediate specific actual sites to creative ends, 
prompting new understandings of place and civic engagement. Augmented space 
is a practical reality that is evinced in everything from cell phone use and
televisions to digital billboards, (IPS, and medical imaging technologies. More 
specifically, this chapter deals with how the urban environment is increasingly 
mediat ed by a plethora of screens large and small and “connected” by tele­
communication gadgets of all sorts. This chapter explores the marriage of 
surveillance and simulation technologies, the possibilities for connection and 
communication within the space of the media, and the consequences of 
augmented space for our understanding of historical narratives and “public” art.
In order to investigate these issues, this chapter focuses on a single artwork: 
Rafael Lozano-1 Iemmer’s Under Scan (2005). This interactive project was 
installed in five different public urban spaces across the East Midlands, UK and, 
in late 2008, was installed in Trafalgar Square. The work raises important 
questions about the possibilities (or lack thereof) of establishing a discursive 
“public” space with an immersive “private” space by way of personalized 
mediations of the city’s inhabitants. Lozano-I Iem m er has stated that the 
singularity  of experience -  what he calls “aura” -  is back with a vengeance.^ In 
the conclusion I tease out the implications of this “return” by exploring the 
concept of subjective experience as it was historically established in the discipline 
of art history.
r>i In .Jose Luis B arrios, M anuel D eL anda, B arbara London e t al. Rafael L o zano-Ilennner: Som e 
T hings H appen  M ore Often T han  All o f the T im e. Rafael Lozano-I Ien im er and  C ecilia G andarias, 
i'ds. T u rner/A & R  Press, 12007.143.
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Conclusion
Given its very contemporaneousness, all work in this area -  mine, as well as the 
artists and texts I draw upon is speculative. This is one of the ponderous things 
about doing contemporary research: it forces an acknowledgement that 
propositions and theories are always necessarily provisional. That is, they are 
never authoritative or proscriptive. Instead, as this thesis demonstrates, research 
into the art of “today” participates in an effort to make maps of the present that 
will hopefully illuminate possible avenues for the future, some of which may be 
more desirable than others.
In light of the hyper-mediated subjects we have become and the hyper-mediated 
spaces we navigate day-to-day, m edia competence is a necessary survival skill. As 
Joyce Culter-Shaw states,
V isual lite racy  takes tim e , tra in in g , p e rcep tu a l acuity , a n d  a critical p e rspec tive . I t is a 
n ecessa ry  ed u ca tiona l challenge, i f  we tru ly  va lu e  d e p th  in  o u r u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f  th e  w orld  
a ro u n d  us, o u r  place in  it, as well a s  the  ab ility  to  re sp o n d  critically  to  o u r  v isually  
sa tu ra te d , com m ercia lly  co -op ted  e n v ir o n m e n ts
It is in th is effort of honing media literacy -  which includes spatial, material and 
technological literacy alongside visual literacy -  th a t  I offer a very close reading 
of the five artworks mentioned above. In particular, this thesis dem onstrates how 
art contributes to the development of critical theory around two issues of the day 
-  space and subjectivity. Eliasson, Beesley, Nelson, Schneider and Lozano-
•w In D eborah  .1. H aynes. " In te rro g a tin g  N ew  M edia: A C onversation  w ith Joyce  C u tler-S haw  an d  
M argot Lovejoy.” E thics and  the  V isual A rts. Elaine A. King a n d  Gail Levin, eds. New York: 
A llw orth P, 2 0 0 6 . 183.
Ilem m er provide articulate “theoretical objects” that, in turn, provide an apt 
opportunity for art historians like myself to re-evaluate their own discipline. In 
total, these four chapters provide much-needed scholarship on the consequences 
of the artistic paradigm shift that has occurred over the last decade.
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CH APTER  l; TH E “C R O SSO VER ” OF IM M ER SIO N  A N D  SITE-
SPECIFICITY
Marie-Laure Ryan states, “The ocean is an environment in which we cannot 
breathe; to survive immersion, we m ust take oxygen from the surface, stay in 
touch with reality.”1 Site-specificity seeks to establish this contact while new 
media celebrates total immersion. But what happens when the two previously 
antagonistic approaches collude in a spectacular crossover? In this new zone, 
how do philosophies of space join theories of subjectivity-? As stated in the 
Introduction, th is chapter discusses new media immersion and site-specificity as 
discrete discourses before discussing the  implications of their crossover.
New  Media Im m ersion
Describing contemporary spatial experience, David Joselit states:
W h a t m ak es  o u r p re se n t m o m e n t d is tin c tiv e  is th e  deg ree  to  w h ich  dev ices such  as th e  
iP od , th e  cell phone, a n d  th e  p e rso n a l c o m p u te r  allow  o u r  b od ies to  occupy tw o sp aces  at 
once  w hile, conversely , o u r physical e n v iro n m e n ts  fu n c tio n  m ore  an d  m o re  as
1 M arie -L aure  R yan . N arra tiv es  as V irtu a l R eality: Im m ers io n  a n d  In te rac tiv ity  in  L ite ra tu re  and  
E lec tron ic  M ed ia . B altim ore; J o h n s  H opk in s U P, 2 .001.97.
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m ed iascap es co m p o sed  n o t only o f  su rfaces o f p r in t a n d  electron ic  signage b u t also  o f  the  
in h ab itab le  th re e -d im e n s io n a l signs o f a rch itec tu ra l b ra n d in g .2
What he is pointing to is the extent to which immersive technologies permeate 
the everyday environment: in today’s urban centres few people persist without 
daily engagement with the Internet, GPS, palm pilots, as well as access to medical 
digital imaging if need be, \ideo games and now Wii, on-line “worlds” and chat 
rooms, and various “infotainm ents.” All these technologies participate to some 
extent in the dream of immersing ourselves in the image/information space by 
way of its interactive interface.
Immersion in Art History
However the idea of “transposing viewers into an enclosed, illusionary rtsual 
space”s is not as new as new media: immersion is grounded in art traditions 
dating back to the classical world and “forms part of the core of the relationship 
of hum ans to images.”4 According to  Lev Manovich, VR is sits at the confluence of 
two distinct traditions: tha t of representations (framed images) and that of 
simulations (life-size images).
The history of representational immersive spaces is usually attributed to the 
discovery of perspective. As Marie-Laure Ryan explains, “Perspective painting 
immerses a virtual body in an environment that stretches in imagination far
2 David Jo se lit. “N avigating  th e  N ew  T errito ry : A rt, A vatars, a n d  th e  C o n tem p o ra ry  M ed iascap e .” 
A rtfo rum  (S u m m er 2 0 0 5 ): 276.
3 O liver G ra r  “In to  th e  Belly o f  th e  Im age: H isto rical A spects o f V irtua l R eality .” L eonardo  32 .5  
(1999): 365-
4 O liver G rau . V irtua l Aid: F ro m  Illusion  to  Im m ersio n  [L eo n ard o . R oger F. M alina  an d  Sean 
Cubitt, eds.]. T ran s , G loria C ustance. C am bridge, MA: M IT  P, 2 0 0 3 . 5.
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beyond the confines of the canvas.”s Richard Wollheim’s distinction between the 
observer o f  the painting and the observer in the painting6 is particularly useful in 
understanding how the viewer is transported into the representation: “she 
simultaneously exists in physical space and in the space of the representation ,”7 
split in two, as it were. According to Ryan, this tradition reached its high point in 
the trompe Voeil of the Baroqu e age and then m et its first serious challenge with 
Impressionism, winch disoriented the eye with visible brushstrokes, and 
subsequently with cubism and the increasingly abstract art of the early 20th 
century.8 However, as both cinema and computer screens depict three- 
dimensional space within the confines of a frame, the tradition of representation 
continues into the digital era. As Ron Burnett states, “Digital media are not 
seeking a different outcome from a painting or photograph, In all cases, the goal 
is to  recreate a variety of environments that situate people, actions, and 
landscapes within the confined frames of images.”?
The history of the second tradition -  simulation  -  is w'ell exposed by Oliver Grau 
in Virtual Art: From Illusion to Imm ersion. His research focuses explicitly on 
360° image spaces in which the viewer enters physically, thus excluding framed 
representations, which are entered psychologically. Grau’s primary historical 
example is the panorama, which is especially significant in the history of
s Ryan, M arie-L aure. 3.
6 D iscussed  in  M. C arleton  S im pson . T h e  C ultu ral C on tex t of P e rcep tio n , PhD D isserta tion . 
L ondon, O N : U of W estern  O n tario , 1996 .165 .
? Lev M anovich . The Language o f N ew  M edia [L eonardo . R oger F. M alina and  S ean  Cubitt, eds,]. 
C am bridge, MA: M IT P, 2001.113.
B M arie -L au re  Ryan. 3.
R on B u rn e tt. “P ro jecting  M inds.” M edia  A rt H is to rie s . O liver G rau, ed. C am bridge, MA: M IT  P, 
2007 . 326.
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simulation because it was the first to depict an image on a circular canvas in 
correct perspective, and because this image-space was no longer continuous with 
the physical space in which it was situated, as earlier wall paintings and mosaics 
had been. “The panorama installs the observer in the picture,” states Grau, albeit 
on a central platform at a particular elevation; “Building on the traditions and 
mechanisms of illusionistic landscape spaces, the panorama developed into a 
presentation apparatus that shut out the outside world completely and made the 
image absolute.”10
Already in the early 1800s, the immersive effects of the panorama were 
controversial: the discourse was polarized between technophiliacs and -phobics. 
One prom inent critic of the panorama states, "I feel myself trapped in the net of a 
contradictory dream-world... not even comparison with the bodies that surround 
me can awake me from this terrifying nightmare, which I must go on dreaming 
against my will.”11 According to Grau, the panoram a’s “game of deception was its 
chief fascination.”12 Through the course of its historical development, the 
panorama “sought to increase, or at least maintain, illusion by moving toward 
forms tha t addressed all the senses.”^  As Lev Manovich states, “From here we are 
one step away from VR, where physical space is totally disregarded, and all ‘real’ 
actions take place in virtual space.”1'!
10 Oliver G rau . V irtua l Art: F rom  Illu sion  to  Im m e rs io n . 59. 
n Ibid. 64.
I b i d .  7 0 .
1:1 Ibid.
u  Lev M anovich. 114. (‘‘In th e  n in e te e n th  cen tu ry  one  o f the  critic ism s o f p h o tog raphy  w as th a t it 
w as too rea l an d  th erefo re  ro b b ed  peop le  w ho w ere p h o to g rap h ed  of th e ir  in teg rity  an d  th e ir  sou ls. 
In the  sam e  way new  m edia are  often  described  as overw helm ing ," explains Ron B urnett: “Digital
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With the turn of the 20th century, inter-media projects continued to strive toward 
creating immersive spaces that sit between the traditions of representation and 
simulation. The various developments that eventually resulted in the technology 
of virtual reality are frequently cited in the literature: for example, the 
Stereopticon (1896) used sixteen slide projectors to project circular pictures, the 
Cineorama (1900) briefly united the panorama with the new technology of 
cinema, the Teleview (1921) introduced 3-D film to the United States, and the 
Stereokino (a 3-D stereoscopic cinema), according to Sergei Eisenstein, had the 
power “for the first time ever, to ‘involve’ the audience intensely in what was once 
the screen and to ‘engulf the spectator in a m anner no less real and devastating 
with what was formerly spread across the screen,”16 A 180° Cinerama eventually 
came to dominate its 360° prototype due to its commercial success.
In the same period radical futuristic visions of a cinema that could offer 
illusionary experiences to all the senses, including taste, touch and smell, were 
being developed by Morton Heilig, a Hollywood cinematographer who was the 
first to attem pt to create what is now called virtual reality. His Cinema of the 
Future remained a futuristic vision but in 1962 he developed the Sensorama 
Simulator, which in addition to 3-D images and stereophonic sound, subjected 
the audience'to vibrations and smells16: the objective was polysensorial 
experience and the Sensorama was quickly picked up by the entertainment
im ages seem  to have enough p ow er to overcom e th e ir  in h e re n t artificiality." In  "P ro jecting  
M inds.” M edia Art H istories. O liver G rau, ed. C am bridge, MA: MIT P, 2007 . 3,32.) 
v> O liver G rau . V irtual A rt: f r om  Illusion to Im m ersion . 154.
1,1 Ibid. 158.
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sector.1" Three decades later, in the ;;-D IMAX (image maximization) with its 
curved screens of up to 1000 1112, “spectators are literally in the images.”111
Now Media Immersion
With the advent of the computer, the development of immersive spaces took a 
significant turn from immersing the viewer imaginatively (as in the tradition of 
representation) and physically (as in the tradition of simulation) to also 
necessitating his or her interaction. In 1963 Ivan K. Sutherland developed the 
first graphical user interface (GUI), which “offered the option of manipulating 
images directly on the screen: the basic prerequisite for interaction in virtual 
realities.”111 “Sketchpad,” as he called it, replaced abstract morcZ-eommands with 
an interface of pointing at icons with a device -  a physical a c t i o n Now the GUI 
is commonplace: our virtual “desktops” are littered with “file folders” and other 
media objects that we can drag from one com er of the desk to another. Despite its 
current innocuousness, however, the development of graphical user interface 
marks an important turn from a concept of immersion that aims to sensually 
engulf the audience by the image to a concept of immersion *hat requires the 
audience to participate in the generation of the image. As Jeffrey Shaw states, 
interactive interfaces “achieve new levels of physical and imaginative assimilation 





21 Jeffrey Shaw . “In tro d u c tio n .” F u tu re  C inem a: th e  C inem atic Im aginary  after Film  [F.leclronie 
C ulture), Jeffrey  Shaw  and P e te r W eibel, eds. C am bridge, MA: MIT P, 2 0 0 3 .4 .
3 8
The next major innovation in technological immersion was also by Sutherland: in 
k)66 he developed a head-mounted display (HMD), a helmet with binocular 
displays in which the images on two monitors positioned directly in front of the 
eyes created a 3-D image.;’:’ When connected to an infrared camera, the HMD 
made it possible for military pilots, for whom the HMD was first developed, to 
“see” at night. Soon thereafter, Sutherland replaced the photographic film images 
with computer graphics that were updated many times per second, and, in 1968, 
he developed the first computer-aided HMD. It showed 3-t) computer images, 
and sensors inside the helmet tracked the user’s head movements, known as 
“headtraeking”: “The fundamental idea behind the three-dimensional display is 
to present the user with a perspective image which changes'as he moves.”1-* As 
Philippe Codognet explains, “with virtual worlds we are moving away from the 
metaphor of the map to that of the path, from the third-person point of view 
(“God’s eye”) to the first-person point of view.”- *
The next sense to be integrated into computer systems was touch. In 1981 
Thomas Zimmerman invented the prototype of t he data glove, which he later 
developed together with .Jaron Lanier and in cooperation with NASA. The data 
glove is basically a further development of the mouse: it is a “highly specialized 
sensor, which registers and transmits the position of the fingers, thus enabling 
movement and navigation in a virtual space.”-:; With the data glove, the user can
-1’ O liver G rau . V irtual Art: F rom  Illu.sion to Im m ersion . 16;*.
S u th e rlan d  in Ibid.
;>'i Philippe C odognet. “A rtificial N atu re  and N atu ra l A rtifice.” F u tu re  C inem a: the  C inem atic 
Im aginary  a fte r  Film  Jeffrey  Shaw  an d  Peter W eibel, cds. | E lectronic C ulture ). C am bridge, MA: 
M IT P, 2 0 0 3 .4 6 3 .
Oliver G rau . V irtual Art: F rom  Illusion to Im m ersion . 167.
touch or move computer-generated objects. As such, it pushed the connection 
between man and machine one step further. This is the typical and enduring 
dream of virtual reality: that by way of the HMD and data glows we (“an be 
experientially emplaeed in an alternative reality. In 1989, .laron Lanier coined the 
term “virtual reality,” and indeed this remains the predominant image: a person 
clad in a high-tech helmet and outfit that shuts out the “real” world and immerses 
them in the “virtual” world of the computer.
As we have seen, innovations in computer imaging technologies such as the HMD 
suggest that it is possible to “enter” the image and intervene in its generation. The 
more recent CAVK (cave automatic virtual environment) shares this technological 
goal “to give the viewer the strongest impression possible of being at the location 
where the images are,”'*’(> Unlike HMD immersion, however, the CAVK is a 
surround-sereen and surround-sound system that projects 3-D graphics into a 10’ 
cube of display screens rather than onto close, small screens set directly before 
the user’s eyes. Instead of a helmet, the user wears lightweight stereo glasses and 
she explores the virtual world by moving around inside the cube and “grabbing 
objects with a three-button, wand-like device.”2? This image, of a person 
enveloped in by screens and sounds, feeds directly into the home-entertainment 
and infotainment industry, albeit at a knver-teeh, less interactive level.
According to Michael Heim, HMD and CAVK establish two different relationships 
with the im m ersanf s body. As he explains,
Ibid. 14 .
M ichael Ilo iin . “T h e  Design o f  V irtual R eality.” ( ’y b e rsp a re /C y b erb o tlies / C yberpunk: C ultures 
of Technological K nibndim eut |T h eo ry , C ulture and Society). Mike F ea thcrstone  and  R oger 
Burrows, eds. London: Sage P ub lica tions, iqor,. yi.
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I 1MD im m ersion  resu lts  l'rom the p rim ary  body Riving way to th e  p riority  of the1 
eyherbody, an d  a tunneM ike percep tion  o f the v irtual w orld resu lts. [...] In the CAVIL..
[ t ]he user enjoys an  appercep tive  experience. [... | ( )u r  freedom  of bodily m ovem ent 
p e rm its  us to  rem ain  aw are o f ourselves alongside co m p u te r genera ted  en tities. [... ] To 
p u l it sim ply , HMD VR creates tunnel im m ersion , w hile apperceptive VR creates a spiral 
te lep resence  that allow s us to  go out and  identify  o u r  cyberbody and  th e  v irtual en titie s  it 
en co u n te rs  an d  then re tu rn  to  o u r k inaesthclie  an d  k ine tic  p rim ary  body, and th e n  go out 
again  to th e  eyberhody and  then  re tu rn  to o u r p rim ary  body, all in a deepen ing  
re ite ra tio n .;‘H
This “reiteration” not only implicates the user in the image-space but also 
implicates the image-space in the user. That is, the CAVE, even more so than the 
HMD, trains the viewer’s body and her sense of “self”: “apperception implies a 
reflectedness, a proprioception, a self-awareness of what we are perceiving.”2') 
Whereas Immanuel Kant in the late t8 lh century believed that apperception 
makes it possible to maintain a critical attitude toward what we perceive, in its 
technological t ranslation, i t more effectively enables “an experience of physical 
and imaginative relocation.'”'*° VII brings the enacted and the represented body 
into conjunction.:*1
New media artists have engaged these technologies to interesting ends and their 
projects help provide a more concrete picture of what the experience of 
immersion in VR might yield. Charlotte Davies’ Osmose. (1995) is an apt example 
that has received great amounts of critical attention and, according to Crau, “is
Ibid. 72-3.
Ibid. 72.
10 Jeffrey Shaw. 4.
!l N. K atherine H ayles. How W e Becam e P osthum an: V irtual Bodies in  C ybernetics, L itera tu re , 
and  Inform alics. Chicago an d  London: II of Chicago P, m om  xiii.
still unequalled.”-'*” lie describes it as “a technically advanced and visually 
impressive simulation of a series of widely branching natural and textual spaces: 
a mineral/vegetable, intangible sphere.”•'« It effectively offers viewers both HMD 
and CAVK immersion in a simulacrum of nature: a single user dons the helmet 
and thereby generates the imagery, while other users can watch (but not interact 
with) the resulting imagery on a large projection screen through polarized glasses. 
As Gran describes it, the images include “a boundless oceanic abyss, shimmering 
swathes of opaque clouds, passing softly glowing dewdrops and translucent 
swarms of computer-generated insects, into the dense undergrowth of a dark 
forest.”-”.! Osmose' offers the user a seamless transition from one “natural” sphere 
to another that defies gravity and Cartesian coordinates and immerses her in a 
synaesthetic imaginary elsewhere.
The Ideal of VR
As new media immersion is dependent on the user’s interaction with the imaged- 
space, the tw'o ideals the naturalness of the interface as well as control over it -  
need to be reconciled. Literary historian Marie-Laure Ryan establishes the ideal 
of VR.. which for Ryan functions “as a metaphor for the fullest art istic experience, 
since in the Platonic realm of ideas VR scores a double io .”« That is, ideally VR 
earns a 10/10 for interactivity and a 10/to for immersion. As Oliver Gran states, 
“The suggestive impression is one of immersing oneself in the image space,
Oliver ( tra il. V irtual Art: From  Illusion to Im m ersion . 193. 
Ibid. 
a ' Ibid.
:,r> M arie Laure Rvau. 20.
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moving and interacting lucre in ‘real time,’ and intervening creatively.”#1 
Similarly Don Ihde states, “The ultimate goal of virtual embodiment is to become 
the perfect simulacrum of full, multisensory bodily action .”'*7 It is because of VR’s 
ability to engage “the imagined or physical presence of the appreeiator’s body in 
the virtual world”’*8 that Ryan considers VR as a m etaphor for a “total a r t “in 
VR we act within a world and experience it from the inside.” i°
This, at least, is the ideal: VR models itself on the possibility of reconciliation 
between immersion and interactivity. Theoretically, however, this ideal cannot be 
achieved because immersion requires that we consider the text as a “world,” 
whereas interactivity requires that we consider the text as a “game,” and the two 
viewpoints cannot be occupied simultaneously, at least not as of yet. As Ryan 
explains, the world metaphor is based on a vertical conception of language in 
which words are to be “traversed” toward their referents. The sequence of 
signifiers is not ju st the superficial play of arbitrarily assigned meanings, but 
quite the opposite: “these meanings form a cosmos.”u Immersion is thus “in 
stark contrast to the Saussurian and poststructuralist view of signification as the 
product of a network of horizontal relations between the terms of a language 
system” t2 -  the “game” view of signification on which the ideal of interactivity is 
based. At its most basic, immersion focuses on the signifieds, while interactivity
^  O liver (»rau. V irtual Arl: F rom  Illusion to Im m ersion . 3 . (m y em phasis)
Don I lute. Bodies in  Technology [E lectron ic M ediations 5. K atherine Ilayles, M ark P o ste r and  
Sam uel W eber, series eds.J, M inneapolis: U of M inneso ta  P, noon . 7. 
sB M arie-L aure Ryan, lq -ao . 
w Ibid. 20 .
•i‘> Ibid.
■i* Ibid. p i .  
i- Ibid. p e .
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focuses on the signifiers, In immersion signs are said to disappear, while in 
interactivity signs are made visible. The immersive “world” is built on the 
transparency of representation, while the interactive “game” deconstructs it. In 
visual terms, the “world” offers a mirror-like image, while the “game” offers us a 
reeonfigurable “cubist” picture.
It was the latter, the text as game, that became the dom inant aesthetic and 
critical paradigm of the postmodern age,4^  and with it the ideal of interactivity 
rather than immersion. In VR, however, both are sought in equal measure. This, 
places the viewer in an ambiguous position relative to the imaged-world. As Mary 
Anne Moser explains (drawing on Timothy Druekery),
Im ages th a t im plicate  the v iew er in so m e w ay...as w ith in te rac tive  o r  im m ersive  m ed ia, 
are  u n b o u n d ed , 'th e y  req u ire  experien tia l cogn ition . T h e  la tte r  pu t th e  critical v iew er in 
an  u n s tab le  position : one m u s t ass im ila te  th e  im age to  co m p reh en d  it, yet it m u st also  be 
d ism a n tle d  in  o rd e r to reflect upon  it. i i
Similarly, Ryan states, “Immersion cannot be reflected upon from within 
immersion -  this would amount to destroying it.”if> According to Ryan, however, 
“the best compromise of all is simply to regard the concepts of game and world as 
complementary points of view on the same object.” We must engage both 
viewpoints because each reveals features that remain invisible from the other. 
Furthermore, each makes a different contribution to the aesthetic experience.
•<3 Ib id . 17b.
11 M ary A nne M oser. “In tro d u c tio n .” Im m ersed  in T echnology: A rt and  V irtual K nvironm enls 
LLeonardo. R oger F. M alina and  .Sean C ubitt, eds.j. M ary  A nne M oser, ed. C am bridge, MA: M IT P, 
199b. xix.
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According to Ryan, immersion is a corporeal experience; “it takes the projection 
of a virtual body, or even better, the participation of the actual one, to feel 
integrated in an art-world,” w On the other hand, interactivity is a "purely cerebral 
involvement.”'!8 It takes place “on the level of signs rather than t h i n g s ”-'1) and 
downplays emotions and personal memories.s0 As Ryan states, “What is at stake 
in the synthesis of immersion and interactivity is therefore nothing less than the 
participation of the whole of the individual in the artistic experience.”p>1
Maurice Benayoun’s interactive CAVE installation World Skin  (1997) explicitly 
plays with this ratio, shifting slowly from “bodily” immersion to “cerebral” 
interactivity. The 3-D colour imagery consists of a plethora of news pictures of 
many different armed conflicts, including buildings reduced to rubble, soldiers, 
tanks and the wounded. Users navigate this battleground with a joystick, entering 
various corners of the apocalyptic “world.” They are armed with a camera with 
which they can “take” pictures, literally removing whatever is “shot” from the 
image-space and leaving in its stead a monochrome area with black silhouettes. A 
print of the image is given the user when they leave, and eventually all that is left 
of the virtual space is the white of the screen. It is at this point, perhaps, tha t the 
depicted violence implicates the user the most: her act of shooting the camera 
annihilates the subject and thereby suggests the violence inherent in reducing the 
world to a “picture.”






More generally speaking, VR fails to achieve its ideal ratio both practically and 
theoretically: as Ryan quips, it “is still largely science fiction.”'1" Participants 
complain of high-tech vertigo and cyber-sickness due to a discontinuity between 
inner ear stimuli and sensory stim uli;^  the sense of smell is not yet successfully 
integrated; tactile feedback is still limited; and update rates are as of yet too slow 
-  they introduce a lag time, which diminishes the illusion by not offering quick 
enough feedback to the participant’s movement. Don Ihde deflates the ideal of 
VR and its novelty with a m atter of fact observation:
Yel phenom eno log ica lly , th is  ad m itted ly  m o re  ac tiona l technological sp ace  is b u t a sm all 
s te p  from  p rev io u s m o re  passive  aud iovisual s itu a tio n s . T h e  liv e r re m a in s  sea ted , a n d  th e  
sc reen  w orld  baek -p ro jee ts  th e  fram ed  action  to  the  v iew er. A ction rem a in s  m in im a l in 
the  m ovem en t an d  sy n es th c tie  am plifica tion  o f  th e  body  th ro u g h  the  jo y stick . It is all 
h an d -ey e  c o o rd in a tio n , en h a n c e d  in th e  co n tex t o f  h y p erg rap h ics , so u n d  effects, a n d  
sy n esth c tie  am plifieation.fti
Furtherm ore, as Murray and Sixsmith’s research reveals, there is still doubt as to 
how far it is possible to relinquish a sense of being in the physical environm ent 
and replace this with a sense of embodiment in an artificial environm ent.^
Nevertheless, the possibility of VR eclipsing th e  ROL (Sherry Turkic’s acronym 
for the rest of life) is a powerful cultural myth that brings with it a plethora of 
utopie and dystopie visions. Alluequere Rosanne Stone eloquently articulates the 
resulting ambivalence:
;w Ib id . i.
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[T his i t 1 th e  ad v en tu re  th a t  is o u r  fu tu re , as we im m erse  ourse lves ever m o re  deep ly  in  
o u r  ow n techno log ies; as  th e  b o u n d a rie s  be tw een  o u r tech no log ies a n d  ourselves 
co n tin u e  to  im plode; as  w e inexo rab ly  becom e c re a tu re s  th a t we c an n o t even now  
im ag ine . I t is a m o m e n t w hich  s im u ltan eo u sly  h o ld s  im m en se  th re a t a n d  im m en se  
p ro m ise . I d o n ’t  w an t to  lose s igh t o f  e ith e r , because  we n eed  to  gu ide  ourselves -  
re m e m b e r  cyber m e a n s  s te e r  -  in  all o u r  assem bled  fo rm s and  m u ltip le  selves r ig h t 
b e tw een  th e  tw o to w ers  o f  p ro m ise  a n d  danger, o f  d esire  a n d  technology.^6
Because the ideal of VR and the myths it propels can be more powerful than the 
facts in establishing cultural frames of reference, both the (alleged) 
disappearance of the interface in VR and the (liberated or determined) 
reformulation of subjectivity need to be addressed.
“Disappearance” of the Frame
The image of crawling through the frame that distinguishes the virtual world 
from the real world is frequently conjured (just think of the recent Fido ad in 
which a woman props herself up and out of the frame of the cell-phone screen in 
order to  give her lover a kiss). But we have to go even one step further: in ideal 
VR we are not aware of a frame at all. Oliver Grau states, “the central 
phenomenon of im m ersion arises when work of art and advanced image 
apparatus, when message and medium, converge in an almost inseparable unity 
-  the medium becomes i n v i s ib l e .”57 The merging of digital image and human 
consciousness features in much of the writing about VR. For this to be achieved, 
the interface m ust be imperceptible. Murray and Sixsmith put it th is way: “the
A lluquere  R o san n e  S tone. T h e  W ar o f  D esire  and  T echnology  a t th e  C lose o f  th e  M echanical 
A ge. C am bridge, MA: M IT P, 1996.
57 O liver G rau . V irtu a l A rt: F ro m  Illusion  to  Im m ers io n . 8 .
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hardware of virtual reality m ust recede and become transparent for this sense of 
presence (or “telepresence”) to occur... the body-as-I in VR calls for an 
assimilation of both technological peripherals and the virtual (rep resen ta tion .”s8 
In other words, the HMDs, data- and body-gloves become naturalized extensions 
of the hum an sensory apparatus and the participant enters the representation as 
if it were a live occurrence.59
This “disappearance >f the frame is of course heavily contested. Far from 
celebrating it, as do most VR engineers, Grau insists that “the intended abolition 
of the interface becomes a highly political question.”60 Under the interactive 
aesthetic paradigm of postmodernity, cultural critics prized the ability to 
decorticate all given media in search of hidden curriculums; however, in the 
rhetoric of VR, viewers are simply to abandon themselves to the im age without 
heed of the media that informs it. As Grau states, “If media competence results 
from the capability", or learned ability, to  objectify a given medium, then  this 
ability" is underm ined by virtual installations. The designers of this medium 
utilize all means at their disposal to banish this from the consciousness of the 
recipients.”61
Regarding mediation, Marie-Laure Ryan asserts, “The traversal of signs is to be 
deplored only when it causes signs to vanish permanently, wrhen immersion is so 
deep th a t it precludes a return to the surface.”62 An experience that rates 10 for
s8 Craig D. M u rray  an d  Ju d ith  S ixsm ith . 324.
59 This is freq u en tly  echoed  in  the  d isco u rse  o n  in s ta lla tio n  art.
60 O liver G rau. “In to  th e  Belly o f  th e  Im age: H isto rica l A spects o f  V irtual R eality .” 3 6 9 .
61 O liver G rau . V irtua l A rt: F rom  Illu sion  to  Im m e rs io n . 2 0 2 .
62 M arie-L aure  R yan. 176.
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immersion and o for interactivity would thus be deplorable. As such, in order to 
understand what is at stake in VR, it is necessary to characterize more specifically 
the interactivity that VR requires: does it only imply the body’s hand-eye 
coordination or does it also imply the negotiation of signs in the construction of 
meaning? Ryan states that, in order to maximize the immersive and the 
interactive at the same time, the interaction m ust be unselfconscious and 
immediate, not conceptual. But what kind of interaction is it if we are not aware 
of it? According to Grau, “Psychobiological tests show that the more the 
participants are involved, the less they are able to differentiate between the 
artificial world and personal experience;”^  therefore, the deeper their immersion. 
Thus a vicious cycle is set in motion: the user’s interaction increases the 
immersion, which deemphasizes the interaction in favour of fusion. As Grau 
argues, in VR the audience interacts with the work by becoming fused with it .64
And so the question remains: how can VR heighten intellectual interactivity 
without breaking the illusion of immersion entirely? M. Carleton Simpson’s 
research indicates that psychological participation is enhanced by an awareness 
of the props with which we “play the game,” bu t that in immersion, wre are not 
awere of the artwork, of the game, and so we are discouraged to im agine.^ As 
such, in order to heighten imaginative involvement, VR would need to 
reintroduce the “surface” to wreaken the illusion. There are clear reasons for 
insisting on this: media competency is perhaps the foremost concern. As Oliver
O liver G rau, “In to  th e  Belly o f  th e  Im age; H istorical A spects o f  V irtua l R eality .” 369 .
6-i O liver G rau . V irtual Art: F rom  Illusion  to  Im m ers io n . 13.
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Grau asserts, “Although today the audience can exert its creative powers over the 
image, this control is counterweighed by the highly suggestive powers of the 
image itself.”66 It is for this reason that participants m ust be aware of whose 
interests their immersion serves and selectively cooperate or resist. Grau states,
v irtu a l im m ersive spaces m u st be classed  as ex trem e v a rian ts  o f  im age m edia , w hich, 
b ecau se  th ey  rep re sen t a totality', offer an  a lte rn a tiv e  reality . O n th e  one h an d , th ey  m eet 
th e  d em an d s  of th e  m ed ia-m ak ers  fo r a sym bolic fo rm  o f an  a ll-em bracing  im age 
experience , w hich ad m its  no  co n trad ic tio n s o r  a lte rn a tiv es , and  on the  o th e r h an d , they 
offer th e  observers -  again because  o f th e ir  to ta lity  -  th e  option o f  sen su a l an d  
aw aren ess-a lte rin g  fusion  w ith  th e  im age m ed iu m .6?
Consequently, VR “enables us to regress, leading to an ecstatic symbiosis of 
onlooker and image.”68 W ithout cm awareness of the power dynamics implicit in 
our participation in virtual reality, we succumb to its tactics and are reformed in 
its image.
Unlike the “conscious recognition” of 2D and literary mimetic deceptions, in 
which the viewer follows the protocol of “suspending disbelief,” virtual reality and 
its historic precursors aim for “unconscious deception. ”69 They “maximize 
suggestion in order to erode the inner distance of the observer.”?0 As Grau states, 
“Aesthetic experience that requires distance or room for reflection tends to be
66 O liver G rau . “In to  the  Belly o f th e  Im age: H isto rica l A spects o f  V irtual R eality .” 370.
67 O liver G rau. V irtua l Art: F rom  Illusion  to Im m ers ion. 13.
68 G rau. “In to  th e  Belly of th e  Im age: H istorical A spects o f V irtua l Reality'.” 370.
f,9 O liver G rau. V irtual Art: F rom  Illusion  to  Im m ersio n . 16.
70 Ibid. 17.
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subverted by immersive strategies.”?1 He warns against the collapse of distance 
immersion implies:
T h e fu r th e r  the  illusionary  sym biosis betw een w ork  and  on looker progresses, the  m ore it 
will w eaken the  psychological d is tan ce  betw een th e  tw o . ... Yet the very experience o f the 
subject a s  sub ject d ep en d s on d istance . T rad itionally , as S erres w rites, th e  on looker 
m en ta lly  activates th e  e lem en ts  o f  fixed artw orks. V irtual Reality... seem  to tu rn  th is 
concept on its head: th e  ob jects m ove first, a p p a ren tly  ac tivating  the onlooker.""
As Ryan states clearly, VR “reconciles immersion and interactivity through the 
mediation of the body. Vs It is this enactment of the image’s dictates that puts 
subjective autonomy at risk in immersion. Viewers may determine the image 
through their interaction but, given the experiential “disappearance” of the 
screen, they also incorporate it.
Sub jectiv ity
In order to understand the implications of immersion for concepts of subjectivity 
it is im portant to stress that the disappearance of the screen is rhetorical: of 
course screens still exist, but now the viewer experiences both sides of the screen 
as if they were actual. In order for this to occur, subjectivity is -  to some extent -  
decoupled from the body, but to what extent is a matter of debate. Erkki 
Huhtamo describes an extreme position: “According to the technocultural master
~ l O liver G rau. “Im m ersion  and  In te rac tio n : From  C ircu lar Frescoes to  In terac tive  Im age S paces.” 
T rans. G loria C ustanee. M edia A rt N et. 13 [D ispositions o f th e  Observers}. 
h t tp : / /m e d ie n k n n s tn e t7..d e / th em e s /o v e rv iew of m edia a r t / im m e rs io n / is /
72 G rau. “In to  th e  Belly o f the  Im age: H isto rical A spects o f  V irtual Reality." 369 .
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narrative of the early 1990s, virtual reality represented a cultural and perhaps 
even an ontological break, announcing an era when bodies become obsolete and 
minds are freed to wander immersed into the immaterial realms of cyberspace.”7 i 
On this note, Vivian Sobehaek writes, “it is no historical accident that, earlier in 
our electronic existence, bodybuilder Arnold Schwarzenegger played the 
invulnerable, hard-body cyborg Terminator, whereas, much more recently and 
more in tune with the lived body’s dematerialization, the slightly built Keanu 
Reeves flexibly dispersed and diffused what little meat he had across The 
M atrix . ”75
Mark P o ster  exp resses  th is  ten d e n c y  tow ard  d em ater ia liza tion  dram atically:
In  th e  m ode o f  in fo rm ation  the sub jec t is no  longer located  in a p o in t in abso lu te  
t im e /sp a c e , enjoying a physical, fixed v an tag e  p o in t from  w hich rationally  to  calcu la te  its 
o p tio n s. In stead  it is m u ltip lied  by databases, d isp ersed  by co m p u ter m essag ing  an d  
con ferencing , deeontex tualized  a n d  re iden tified  by  TV ads, dissolved and  m ateria lized  
co n tin u o u sly  in  the e lectron ic  tran sm iss io n  o f sym bols,
P oster is  n o t a lo n e  in h is ev a lu a tio n  o f  su b jectiv ity  in  th e  “V irtual A ge ,” to  u se  
S ton e’s phrase . D avid  H ow es, for exam p le , ex c la im s “D o n ’t th in k  d isap p earan ce
I lu h tam o , Krkki. “M edia A rt in  the T h ird  D im ension: S tereoscopic  Im aging an d  C on tem porary  
Art." F u tu re  C inem a: th e  C inem atic Im aginary  a fte r  f i lm  [E lectron ic  C ulture). .Jeffrey Shaw  and  
Peter W eibel, eds. C am bridge, MA: M IT P, 2003 . 4 66 .
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California P, 2004 . 161.
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of reality in representation; think disappearance of the self! In post modernity it 
seems that simulation has become the existential ground of personality itself.”"?
Still today, William Gibson's description in Neuromancev (1984) of Gase’s 
experiences in cyberspace -  a matrix of spatially represented information in 
which the data cowboy’s disembodied consciousness can roam freely -  is the 
most prominent portrait of a dematerialized cyber-subject. Near the end of the 
novel, Case, the hacker, is confronted with a computer simulation of the body and 
personality of his beloved, Linda:
Then* w as a streng th  th a t ran  in her... so m eth in g  h e ’d found and  lost so m any tim es. It 
belonged , he knew - he  rem em bered  • as she pu lled  him  dow n, to the  m eat, the  flesh  the 
cow boys m ocked. It w as a vast th ing, beyond know ing, a sea of in fo rm ation  coded in  
sp iral a n d  pherom one, infin ite in tricacy tha t only th e  body, in  its s tro n g  b lin d  way, could 
ever r e a d ... [Yet ] even here, in  a place he knew  for w hat it was, a coded m odel o f so m e 
s tra n g e r’s m em ory, th e  drive held.?8
This citation suggests that even the secrets of the “meat” can be coded to generate 
a virtual simulation of personality. In other words, the body is thought to be one 
prosthetic extension among other possible prostheses. As Case discovers, the 
embodied way of “effecting the transmission of the old message”?1) can also be 
transmitted digitally.
David H ow es. “H yperesthesia , or, T h e  S ensual Logie o f  Late Capitalism ." E m pire  o f  the  Senses:, 
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“Virtual” thus aligns itself with the mind, while “reality” aligns itself with the 
body, with all the privilege's accorded to the mind in Western thought still 
operative. In such a “reality,” in the words of Duel and Clarke', “the real will 
connote the resistane'e and drag e>f matter I Gibson’s ‘meat’], whilst the virtual will 
connote the flight e>f the spirit: arelueuis voyage's versus me>tiemle'ss trips; 
ontological fixity versus hauntological elrifl; re'al bodies versus virtual ghosts.”80 
As Simon Fenny explains, “The meat body be'e'ome's only a machine te> pre'ss the 
appropriate buttons or to re-aim the viewpoint, driven by a desiring, controlling 
mind.”81 Or as the* ee>ver of Wired magazine stated in 2001, “Yemr body, (let over 
it. (Think mind over m atter.)”82
Craig Murray and Juelith Sixsmith, in their article The Corporeal Body in Virtual 
Reality, ask how it can be that, while we are physically sitting in a mom at a 
computer, we can also be phenomenally (not just imaginatively) embodied in 
virtual representations. As previously discussed, virtual reality implies a 
substitution of “actual” sensory information with information generated by a 
computer. This deprivation of physical reality, Murray and Sixsmith argue, is 
integral to VR because it functions to destabilize the experiential boundaries of 
the person’s body. Once destabilized, the tool whether it is a mouse, glove, or 
another sort of sensor can become part of the body’s experience as an extension
Ho M arcus A. Duel and  David 15. C larke. “V irtual W orlds: S im ulation , Supplelion , S (cd)uction  and 
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of itself. According to their research, the mind maps to this new body almost 
effortlessly: it can incorporate and control the prosthesis within m in u te s t
N. Katherine Ilayles asks, “If it is obvious that we can see, hear, feel, and interact 
with virtual worlds only because we are (unbodied, why is then1 so much noise 
about the perception of cyberspace as a disembodied medium?"81 Despite the 
precarious agency of the body, it is never abandoned as early euphoric 
pronouncements of virtual reality claimed it would be. According to Stone, “The 
“original” body is the authenticating source for the refigured person in 
cyberspace: no “persons” exist whose presence is not warranted by a physical 
body back in “normal" space.8-'* Furthermore, the terms used to describe 
cyberspace imply the “original” body: everything exists as a metaphor us (/‘it were 
inhabited by bodies,80 such as “meeting rooms” and “smiles.” Allucquere Rosaline 
Stone calls the desire to forget the body “an old Cartesian trick” that is politically 
fraught . Remembering the body, she asserts, may help us prevent virtual systems 
from becoming unwitting accomplices in new exercises of social control.87
Yet this reinvigoralod Cartesianism does not account for how the body is 
“determined” by immersive technologies. As Michael Ileim explains, “Virtual 
Reality in general immerses the user in the entities and events of the computer-
As Kli/.abeth (Jrosz .stales, “The lim its  o r  b o rd ers  of the body  im age a re  not fixed by n a tu re  o r  
confined to  the anatom ical ‘co n ta in e r,' the skin." In M iseha P e t e r s , S e e  also .Simon P enny’s 
extensive footnotes.
"■i N. K atherine Ilay les. “Kinbodied V irtuality : O r How to Put bodies Hack into th e  P ic tu re .'’ 
Im m ersed  in Technology: Art and  V irtual K nvironm enls. M arv A nne M oser, ed. C am bridge, MA: 
M IT 1>, w)96. i .
A llucquere R osanne S tone. “V irtual System s.” Inco rp o ra tio n s [Zone (i[. .Jonathan  Crary and  
Sanford  Kwinter, eds. New York: Z one, 1992. 609.
I b i d .  ( u H .
!t ’ Ibid. 6 2 0 ,
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generated world, and I ho innnorsion retrains the user’s aulomatie nervous 
system.”88 Similarly Philippe Codognet writes,
K xperim ents have show n  th a t senso ry  organs (in an im als  and  h u m an s) can be tra ined  to 
b e tte r  perceive expected  signals b efo re  the b ra in  co n sid ers  them . T here , by analogy, it 
w ould  not be u n reaso n ab le  to th in k  that a key issue in  u n d ers tan d in g  experiences in 
v irtual w orlds would be  the  ability to perform  actions an d  o b se n  e th e ir  consequences in 
o rd e r  to lea rn  the ru les governing, the  artificial en v iro n m en t m aybe sim ply by trial and  
e rro r . T h is is obviously easie r to d o  in a v irtua l w orld th an  in the real one, and  th is  
cognitive process is th e re fo re  pu t to  use in  m any co m p u te r gam es an d  now  in tu itively  
perfo rm ed  by v ideo -gam e-educa ted  kids.B‘>
Such kids exemplify N. Katherine l lavles’ concept of the “post hum an.” According 
to Ilayles, when the user’s sensory system is put into direct feedback loop with a 
virtual reality system, “the user learns, kinesthelieally and proprioeeptivelv, that 
the relevant boundaries for interaction are defined less by the skin than by the 
feedback loops connecting body and simulation in a lechnobio-integrated 
circuit.”‘,n Thus, she argues, “Questions about presence and absence do not yield 
much leverage in this situation, for the avatar both is and is not present, just as 
the user both is and is not inside the screen. Instead, locus shifts to questions 
about pattern and randomness.”'’1 Ilayles defines the postlmman as follows:
th e  postlm m an ... can be u n d e rs to o d  as the rea liza tions that aw ait us w hen  the dialectic  of 
p resen ce /ab sen ce  is in teg ra ted  w ith  the d ialeetie of p a tte rn /ra n d o m n e s s . Put a n o th e r
M ichael l le im . “T he Design o f  V irtual Reality." 08 .
H" Philippe C odognet. .(Og.
,,n N. K atherine Ilay les, “V irtual bodies a n d  flickering  S iguifiers." T he Visual C u ltu re  Reader. a»<i 
ed. N icholas M irzoeff, ed. London and  New York: R outledge, i<)‘)8, n o o n . i;,g.
Ibid. in<i.
w ay, Uu* p ostlm m an  rep resen ts  tin* construc tion  o f the body as p art of an  in teg ra ted  
in fo rm a tio n /m a te ria l circu it th a t includes h u m a n  and  non ln u n an  co m p o n en ts , silicon 
ch ip s  as well as organic tissue, b its  of in fo rm ation  as well as b its o f flesh an d  bo n e . The 
v irtu a l body p artakes b o th  of the ephem era lily  o f  in fo rm ation  and  the so lid ity  of 
phvsicalitv  or, d ep en d in g  on o n e 's  view point, th e  so lid ity  of in fo rm ation  and  th e  
eph em era lily  o f the flesh .1'1’
As such, due to interfacing with virtual technologies, “The posthuman subject is 
an amalgam, a collection of heterogeneous components, a material-informational 
entity whose boundaries undergo continuous construction and reconstruction.”iw
This “continuous construction and reconstruction” includes forever adapting to 
and developing new technologies that extend the body and its nervous system to 
unprecedented extents. 1 Iayles states,
...the  postlm m an  view configures h u m an  being  so  th a t it can  be seam lessly  a rticu la ted  
w ith  in telligen t m ach ines. In the  p o stlm m an , th e re  a re  no  essen tia l d ifferences o r 
ab so lu te  d em arca tio n s betw een bodily  ex istence  a n d  co m p u te r sim u la tio n , cybernetic  
m echan ism  anil biological o rgan ism , robo t teleology and  h u m an  goals.1' '
R ather th a n  partic ip atin g  in  the gen era l a cq u ie sc e n c e  to  id eas o f  tech n o lo g ica l  
d eterm in ism , or argu in g  a reactionary p o s itio n , I la y le s  carefu lly  a r ticu la tes  h o w  
post h u m a n ism  can  offer a v iable m od el o f  sub jectiv ity : the radical h e ter o g e n e ity  
that re su lts  from  “a m algam atin g” w ith  te c h n o lo g y  breaks o n ce  and  for a ll w ith  
the m yth  o f  a se lf-su ffic ien t and coh eren t “in d iv id u a l,” w h ile  the e m p h a s is  on
N. K atherine  Ilay les. “E m bodied  V irtuality: O r How to Put Bodies Back in to  the  P ic tu re .” ui. 
w N. K atherine  Ilayles. How W e Becam e Postlm m an: V irtua l Bodies in C ybernetics, L ite ra tu re , 
and In fo rm atics, g.
"i Ibid.
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b o d ies , in c lu d in g  its tec h n o lo g ic a l e x te n s io n s , e ffec tively  m ak es d isco u rse  
c o n ten d  w ith  th e  im m a n en t facts  o f  th e  m ateria l w orld  (th u s  cou n teractin g  
P oster’s  su b jectiv e  d isp ersa l an d  lack o f  lo ca tio n ).
If Ni'iiromancer captured the promise associated with the introduction of 
immersive technologies, Neal Stephenson’s novel Snow Crash (1992) captures 
the ambivalence associated with their ubiquity. When a pusher in the  Metaverse 
•*- “a computer-generated universe that his computer is drawing onto his goggles 
and pumping into his earphones”66 -  says, “Try it,” Iliro responds, “Does it fuck 
iip your brain? Or your com puter?” To which he receives the reply “Both. Neither. 
What’s the difference?”1’6 Later he inquires about a friend who is in the 
neurological ward of a (actual) hospital:
“Any d iag n o sis?”
J u a n ita  sighs, looks tired . “T h ere  w on’t be any  d iag n o sis ,” she  says. “I t’s a softw are, not
h a rd w are , p ro b lem .”
“H u h ?”
“T hey’re ro u n d in g  up  the  u su a l suspects. CAT scans, N M R  scans, PKT scan s, KKGs.
E very th ing’s fine. T h ere  is n o th in g  w rong  w ith  his b ra in  -  h is h a rd w are .”
“It ju s t h ap p en s  to  be ru n n in g  th e  w rong p rog ram ?"
“H is so ftw are  got po isoned . D agid had  a snow  crash  la s t n igh t, inside h is  head .”
"A re you try ing  to say  i t ’s a psychological p ro b lem ?”
“It kind o f  goes beyond th o se  estab lished  ca tego ries,” J u a n ita  says, “b ecause  it's  a  new
phen o m en o n .,."  [...]
“Daniil's n o t a co m p u te r. l i e  c an ’t read  b in a ry  code."
‘’s .Stephenson, N eil, Snovv C rash . N ew  York: b a n ta m  Books, m o n , 124. 
,|f' Ibid, 4 4 .
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“H e 's  a hacker. l ie  m esses  w ilh b in a ry  code for a liv ing. T h a t ability  is firm  w ired  in to  the  
d e e p  s tru c tu re s  of h is  b ra in . So h e ’s  su scep tib le  to  th a t fo rm  of in fo rm atio n . A nd so are  
yo u , home--boy.'
By Stephenson's pen, cyberspace is no longer a space that “data-cowboys" can 
roam while letting their “m eat” rot: computer and biological viruses have become 
one and the same. Unlike Case, Hiro trains diligently in order to be able to wield 
his katana sword in both virtual and actual reality. In the violent episodes that 
Iliro encounters, Snow Crash evinces the deep ambivalence that marks the 
discou rse of new media immersion at the end of the 1900s: virt ual reality had left 
the lab and become mainst ream but the oscillation between teehnophilia and - 
phobia had n o t e t  stilled into a comfort zone.1'8
To close this section and build a segue to the next, let me underline yet again that 
the objective of immersion is “to give the viewer the strongest impression 
possible of being at the location where the images are”<)t) -  of dislocating from the 
material and phenomenological conditions of actual emplacement and relocat ing 
to the virtual world. As Don Ihde remarks,
Ile ro  wo roach one h o rizo n  from  w hich  the  o rig in a l teohno-w orry  fed. Can VR rep lace RL? 
O nly  if  th e a tre  can  rep lace  actual life. O nly if  the  b u m p k in  ru shes to  th e  stage  to  rescue  
th e  m a id en  from  the  v illain , bu t th e  la te  tw en tie th  c en tu ry  is ap p a ren tly  filled w ith  w illing 
b u m p k in s !1011
"'■Ibid. 100-200 .
For exam ple , H iro  s ta le s  th a t th e  M elaverse  “b ea ts  the  sh it ou t o f  the IK S to r-lt"  (2 4 ) in  w hich  
he lives, b u t  w h en  faced w ith an  actual h e rd  o f h icks clad in baseb a ll caps an d  C onfedera te  Hags, 
“lie  tu rn s  off all o f  the techno  sh it in his goggles. All it does is confuse h im ." (404 -5 ).
','1 O liver G ram  V irtual Art: F rom  Illusion to  Im m ersio n . 14. 
u,n llu le, H on. b o d ie s  in T echnology . 11.
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Ihde, like (Iran, Manovieh and Ryan, stresses the  importance of media 
competence at a time when the media threatens to disappear: immersive 
technologies are premised on making the interface between virtual and actual 
emplacement as sea, dess as possible in order to  instantiate a full-body 
experience of telepresence. As subjectivity is not extrieable from the tools it uses 
to assert its agency, tools that rhe .orieally disappear are perhaps the most 
necessary to interrogate.
Site-S p cc ifie ity
Site-speeifieity was int roduced into contemporary art in the mid-1960s as a 
reaction against the idealist strictures of high-modernism. Douglas Crimp 
summarizes this turning point well:
T h e  idealism  of m o d ern is t a r t, in  w hich  the a rt ob ject i n  a n d  o f  i t s e l f  m m  seen  to  h av e  a 
fixed and  tran sh is to riea l m ean in g , d e te rm in ed  th e  ob jec t's  p lace lessn ess , its  b e lo n g in g  to 
n o  p a rticu la r  place, a n o -p laee  th a t w as in  rea lity  th e  m u seu m  -  the  ac tu a l m u se u m  and  
th e  m u seu m  as a re p re se n ta tio n  o f  th e  in s titu tio n a l system  o f c ircu la tio n  th a t a lso  
co m p rises  th e  a r t is t’s s tu d io , the  com m ercial gallery , the co llec to r’s hom e, the  sc u lp tu re  
g ard en , the  public plaza, th e  co rp o ra te  h e a d q u a rte rs  lobby, th e  h an k  vau lt. ...S ite 
specificity  o p posed  th a t idealism  a n d  unveiled  th e  m a te ria l sy stem  it o b scu red  by its 
refu sa l o f c ircu la to ry  m obility , its b e lo n g ingness to  a s p e c i f i c  s i t e , ' 1"
101 C rim p, D ouglas. On the M u seu m ’s R uins. C am bridge, MA: M IT P, iq og . 1 7 .
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The objectives of site-specificity are all apparent in th is citation: to be contingent 
rather than “of itself;” to be grounded rather than “transhistorical;” to bypass the 
“institutional system;” to  expose that system; and to resist commercial 
exchangeability' and mobility. This section will first explore various phases or 
factions of site-specificity' in order to elaborate on this list before tackling its 
theoretical (and practical) implications.
Minimalism
It is widely accepted in the literature tha t the “genealogy”102 of site-specificity 
begins with Minimalism. Robert Morris’ Notes on Sculpture are frequently cited 
to indicate the  challenge Minimalism posed to  the discrete m odern objet d ’art 
and homologous “independent” viewer:
T he b e t te r  new  w o rk  ta k e s  re la tio n sh ip s  o u t o f  th e  w ork  a n d  m ak es th e m  a fu n c tio n  o f  
space, lig h t, an d  th e  v iew er’s field o f  v ision . T h e  object is  b u t one  te rm  in  th e  n ew er 
esth e tic . I t  is in  so m e  w ay m o re  reflexive b ecau se  one’s aw aren ess  o f  o n e se lf  ex isting  in  
th e  sa m e  space  as th e  w o rk  is  s tro n g e r  th a n  in  p rev ious w ork, w ith  its m an y  in te rn a l 
re la tio n sh ip s . O ne is m o re  aw are  th a n  b efo re  th a t  he h im se lf  is e s tab lish in g  re la tio n sh ip s  
as he a p p re h e n d s  th e  o b jec t from  v ario u s  p o sitio n s  a n d  u n d e r  v ary ing  co n d itio n s  o f  lig h t 
a n d  sp a tia l c o n tex t.10^
That is, rather than pointing to some sort of transcendental realm, the meaning 
of Minimalist work is established in term s of the relation  it establishes with the 
surrounding space -  its contingency on scale, placement, dght, materiality and
102 See M iw on K w on. O ne Place a fte r  A n o th e r: S ite-S pecific A rt a n d  L ocanonal Id e ntify .
C am bridge , MA: M IT  P, 2 0 0 2 .
JQ3 In  M ichael F ried . “A rt an d  O b jec ih o o d .” A rtfo rum  (Vmne 1967): 62.
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the tim e it takes to make sense of these determ inants -  which affect the art object 
and the viewer alike. In brief, Minimalism “explored the possibilities of less 
object-based and more experientially-based a rt .”104
As Morris suggests, the  “better new work” implicates the viewer in the artistic 
“site.” A rt historian and critic Michael Fried vehemently resented this 
infringement: he railed against Minimalism in his 1967 article A rt and  
Objecthood, in which he describes Minimalism -  what he called litei'alist art -  as 
the negation of art. Fried states, “the experience of literalist art is of an object in a 
situation -  one which, virtually by definition, includes the beholder.”ms This 
inclusion, however, is not harmonious: “the things that are literalist works of art 
must somehow confront the beholder -  they m ust, one might almost say, be 
placed not ju st in his space but in his way.”106 According to Fried,
H ere  a g a in  the ex perience  o f  be ing  d is tan ced  by  th e  w ork  in  q u estio n  seem s crucial: th e  
b e h o ld e r  know s h im se lf  to  s ta n d  in an  in d e te rm in a te , o p en -en d ed  -  a n d  unex ac tin g  -  
re la tio n  a s  s u b j e c t  to  the  im passive  o b jec t on th e  w all o r floor. In  fact, be ing  d is ta n c e d  b y  
su ch  ob jec ts  is n o t, I suggest, en tire ly  u n like  b e in g  d is tan ced , o r  crow ded, by th e  silen t 
p resen ce  o f  a n o th e r  p e r s o n .10?
In other words, the viewer is implicated within the site but nevertheless 
maintains her distinction from it: “the situation itself belongs to the beholder -  it 
is his situation.”108 As such, Fried is among the first critics to rem ark on the art
1(>4 A nd rew  Cross. “Grey A reas: A ndrew  Cross n eg o tia te s  th e  b lu rred  b o u n d a rie s  o f  in sta lla tio n  
a r t.” A rt M o n th ly  205  (1997): 3.
1Q5 M i c h a e l  F r i e d .  6 2 .
106 Ibid.
1Q7 I b id .  6 3 .
108 I b i d .  6 2 .
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object’s dependency on the viewer’s participation: it is “incomplete without 
him.... And once he is in the room the work refuses, obstinately, to let him 
alone.”1D9 It is the duration  of the  beholder’s experience of the situation, which is 
“endless and inexhaustible,”110 tha t most perturbs Fried because it aligns 
Minimalism with theatre, with “what lies between the arts,”111 rather than with 
the “perpetual present 'th e  discrete disciplines of modern art.
In a m ore positive reading of Minimalism, this insistence on (stage-) presence 
and the contingency of perception marks a concerted effort to resist “a world of 
ubiquitous representation and intensive m ediation.”112 Drawing on the ideas of 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology o f Perception, Rosalind Krauss, 
Minimalism’s m ost vocal advocate, writes,
th e  m in im alis t su b jec t is in  th is  very  d isp lacem en t re tu rn e d  to  its  body , re g ro u n d ed  in  a 
k in d  of rich e r, d e n se r  subso il o f  experience.... A nd  th u s  th is  m ove is, w e cou ld  say, 
com p en sa to ry , an  a c t o f re p a ra tio n s  to  a sub jec t...w ho  lives u n d e r  th e  co n d itio n s o f 
advanced  in d u str ia l cu ltu re  as an  increasing ly  in s tru m en ta lized  b e i n g .»3
According to Krauss, Minimalism demonstrates the phenomenological tenet that 
the meaning of both the viewing subject and the  viewed object “arises only from 
this position, and this perspective. ”“ 4
1,j9 ib id . 66 .
110 Ibid. 67.
111 Ibid. 66 .
112 H al F o ste r. “T h e  Crux o f M in im a lism .” Ind iv iduals: A Selected H isto ry  o f  C o n tem p o rary  Art:
194S-1Q8 6 , Kate, L inker, D onald  K usp it et al. H ow ard  S ingerm an , ed. N ew  York: A bbeville P, 
1986.172.
us R o sa lin d  K rauss. “The C ultu ra l Logic o f th e  Late C apita list M u seu m .” O ctober 54 (1990): 9. 
“4 R o sa lin d  K rauss. Passages in  M o d e rn  S cu lp tu re. C am bridge, MA: M IT P, 1993. 2 4 0 .
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Thomas Crow counters both Fried’s emphasis on duration and Krauss’ emphasis 
on phenomenology:
T h e  cham pions of M in im alism  in th e  m id -1960- h ad  pu t fo rw ard  the id ea  th a t th e  
sp e c ta to r’s experience o f scu lp tu re  sh o u ld  en ta il aw aren ess  b o th  of the  real tim e o f th e  
en c o u n te r  a n d  of th e  physical an d  in s titu tio n a l sp aces  in  w hich it had  b een  in sta lled . But 
n o  actual tra jec to ry  o f  tim e w as bu ilt in to  th e  in sta lla tio n  o f a D an Flavin o r a Carl 
A ndre... F o r th a t reaso n , th e  experience o f  th e  w ork  rem ain ed  a m a tte r  o f  vo lu n ta ry  
in tro sp ec tio n  and se lf-aw areness on th e  p a r t  o f th e  sensitive, w ell-p rep ared  sp ec ta to r, 
ju s t  as it h a d  been u n d e r  m o d e rn ism ’s regim e; th e  ph ilosoph ical te rm s o f  phenom enology  
sim p ly  rep laced  th o se  o f  m o d e rn is t m etap h y sics .11'.
According to Crow, Minimalism is only “weakly” site-specific because it does not 
engage the  place, even if it is made for the place (unlike “strongly” site-specific 
work, which builds duration into the installation). In diametric opposition to 
Fried, duration is absent in Minimalism, according to Crow, and thus points to an 
absence of discourse.
However, a site is arguably always already discursive, “a point that is often lost in 
discussions of site-specificity that narrate too clean a break between an early 
model o f the phenomenologically based site and latter-day discursive 
practices.”116 As Craig Owens’ asserts, Minimalism’s emphasis on the specifics of 
a particular (artistic) situation can be understood as marking the m oment when 
language begins to disrupt the purely visual territory of modernist art. Fie states,
‘•s T h o m as Crow. “Site-Specific Art: T he S trong  an d  th e  W eak .” M odern  Art in  C; m m on  C ultu re . 
New H av en  and L ondon: Yale U P, 1996.135,
116 Jill D aw sey.'T he Site-Specificity o f  Everyday Life.” Art Journal (Fall 2005). 129-31. 
http ://fin d artic les.eom /p /artic les/m i m o425 / is  a 6 4 /a i 111570iq 7fi/ne i?tag=artBodv:coli . 3.
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W h at h is [F ried ’s] p o s t-m o rtem  actually  discloses,., is the em ergence o f d iscou rse : a fte r 
all, th e  pretex t for F ried ’s v io len t reaction against m in im alism  was an a r tis t’s t e x t  (Tony 
S m ith 's  in fam ous na rra tiv e  of a r id e  on an un fin ished  ex tension  to the  New .Jersey 
T u rn p ik e ). ...[T]he e ru p tio n  o f language in to  th e  aesthetic  field... is co inciden t w ith , if not 
th e  definitive index of, th e  em ergence  of p o s tm o d e rn ism ." '’
For Owens, the radical contingency of the Minimalist object on other sources of 
meaning, including duration, illustrates the splintering of the work of art into a 
fragmentary text. He states, “The work is henceforth defined by the position it 
occupies in a potentially infinite chain extending from the site itself and the 
associations it provokes.”118
The Expanded Field
Soon after this “eruption” artists increasingly sought to implicate their work/texts 
(and later themselves) in cultural sites in more discursively explicit ways. Owens’ 
primary example is the work of Robert Smithson, whose distinction between the 
“site” and the “non-site” is crucial to an understanding of site-specificity: the site 
is the actual place of the artist’s intervention as it is encountered in “real life,” 
whereas the non-site is a collection of various texts, images and material 
fragments as they are displayed in the gallery to represent the site. According to 
Smithson, site and non-site are never identical or fully commensurable (the non­
site can never represent the site as it “is”), nor are they separable (the site only
•v C raig O w ens. “E arth w o rd s.” Beyond Recognition: R ep resen ta t ion, P ow er, an d  C ulture . Scott 
Bryson, B arbara  Kruger, Lynne T illm an  e t al. eds. In tro . S im on W atney, Berkeley: U o f C alifornia 
P, 1992. 45 . Also see B enjam in  B uehloh. “C onceptual A rt 1962-69: F rom  the  Aesthetic, o f 
A d m in is tra tio n  to the  C ritique o f  In s titu tio n s .” Co n cep tual Art: A Critical A nthology. A lexander 
A lberro an d  Blake S tim son, eds. C am bridge, MA: M IT P, 1999.514-37.
118 Ibid. 47,
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registers as art due to the non-site). As Anne M. Wagner explains, the term “non­
site” “implicates the gallery as the locus of an inevitable return. So inevitable, in 
fact, that Smithson even suggests that landscape and gallery are coextensive.”111' 
Consequently, in Smithson’s formulation, a site-specific work can never be 
experienced as a site pure and simple: it is mediated by the non-site with which it 
is “coextensive.” As such he establishes a dia’ectical relationship between the two 
which is not resolved into a final synthesis but rather stays in perpetual 
oscillation: the non-site leads to the site and vice versa in such a way that neither 
can be experienced as a whole onto itself.
In Sculpture in the Expanded Field (1979) Rosalind Krauss is trying to make 
sense of artworks like Smithson’s, which have left the confines of the gallery 
space to work outdoors in relation to the natural and built environment. Like 
Fried, she eontextualizes it against the backdrop of modern sculpture; however, 
unlike Fried, she uses the negative condition of modern sculpture as “not- 
architectiu e” and “not-landscape” to open a more expansive “set of possibilities” 
for artists to negotiate. Krauss asks herself, if sculpture sits halfway between not- 
architecture and not-landscape, what sits between not-architeeture and 
architecture (axiomatic structures), between not-landscape and landscape 
(marked sites), and between architecture and landscape as positive values (site- 
construction)? Alongside “sculpture,” therefore, these new terms provide a 
historical context for the work without grasping for unlikely precedents like 
Constructivism or Stonehenge.
Amu* M .W agner. "Being T here: Art an d  the Politics o f  P lace.” A rtib n n n  (S u m m er 11005): 267.
66
H ow ever, d esp ite  both S m ith so n ’s d ia lectic  of" th e  s ite /n o n -s ite  and K rauss’ 
diagram m atic  d istin c tio n s , M ichael H eizer o n ce  sta led ; “the w ork  [o f  art | is not 
put in a p lace, it is that p la ce .”1"" A n ne M. W agner asks: “W hat d o es it m ean  for a 
w ork  o f  art to  be  a place? W hat th en  h ap p en s to  th e  w ork  o f art? E rasure or 
E xp ansion? Or both?”1"1 A s if an sw erin g  th is q u estio n , D ou glas C rim p w rites,
For m in im al .sculptors, the in terp o la ted  context o f the  w ork  of art generally  resu lted  only 
in an  e x t e n s i o n  of the  ■aesthetic dom ain  to the site  itself. Even if the  w ork could  not he 
relocated  from  place to  place, as is the case, for exam ple, w ith earthw orks, the  m ateria lity  
o f  the  site  w as nevertheless taken  to be generic arch itec tu re , cityscape, landscape  an d  
th erefo re  n eu tra l.|;,;'
T h is a lleged  “n eu tra lity” o f  th e  s ite , lik e  th e  “p h en o m e n o lo g ic a l” s ite  b efore  it, is 
o f  cou rse  not neutral at all, as th e  cou rt-ord ered  rem oval o f  R ichard S e m i's  
in fam ou s Tilted Arc  (1981) d em o n stra tes . As W agner p o in ts o u t, “T h e d em a n d s  
o f  any s ite  a lw ays translate in to  a polit ics s te e p e d  in th e  rea lities o f  p la ce .”1"'*
H ow ever C rim p’s p o in t is w ell taken; th e  s ite s  w ith in  th e  exp an d ed  fie ld  are 
freq u en tly  fla tten ed  to rep resen tin g  th e  “o u ts id e ” o f  th e  in stitu tion a l sy stem , 
so m ew h ere  o f f  th e  b ea ten  path (o n ly  to  b e  la ter ad d ed  to the circuit o f  art 
to u r ism ). It is from  th is  a lleged  “ex ter io r” p lace that artists lau n ch  th e ir  cr itiq u es  
o f  th e  “c e n te r ,” the art sy stem , th e  sta tu s  quo , and su bjectiv ity . P erhaps H eizer’s 




1;,;! Douglas C rim p. 17. (my italics) 
A nne M .W agncr, 269.
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H  consists  of two h I o I k ,  each lo lly  feet deep and  a h u n d red  feet long, dug  inlo the lop.s of 
two m esas, s ited  opposite  one  an o th e r and  sep a ra ted  by a dee]) ravine. Because o f  its 
en o rm o u s size, and its location , the only  m eans to experiencing  this w ork is to he in it 
to inhab it it the way we th ink  of ourselves as in h ab itin g  the space of o u r bodies. Yet the 
im age we h a w  of o u r  own rela tion  to  o u r  bodies is tha t we are c e n t e r e d  inside th em ,... In 
th is sense, D o u b l e  N e g a t i v e  does not resem ble the  p ic tu re  that w e have o f the w ay we 
in hab it ourselves. For, a lthough  it is sym m etrical and  has a cen ter... the  cen te r is one  we 
can n o t occupy. (...) By forcing on us th is  eccentric  position  relative to the cen te r o f  the 
w ork... [ D o u b l e  N e g a t i v e ]  d ep ic ts  the  in te rven tion  of the  o u te r  w orld in lo  the body 's 
in te rna l being, tak ing  up residence th e re  and fo rm ing  its  m otivations and  m ean in g s.11’ i
In this interpretation, Krauss effectively expands the artwork to incorporate the 
site “because we must look across the ravine to see the mirror image of the space 
we occupy.”1-'’ Her conclusion is that “our bodies and our experience of our 
bodies continue to be the subject of this sculpture even when a work is made of 
several hundred tons of e a r t h . A s  such, work in the expanded field has not 
affected a significant change on the level of content.
Institutional Critique
Crimp continues his criticism of both Minimalism and Earthwork by saying, “It is 
only when artists recognized the site of art as socially specific that they began to 
oppose idealism with a materialism that was no longer phenomenologieally and 
thus still idealistically grounded in matter 01* the bodv.”u,v Works of art that 
explore this social dimension of site constitute the third strand of site -specificity,
IL’ 1 R osalind K rauss. Passages in M odern  Sculpture. eHo.
Ibid.
1 Ibid.  i>7<).
I;- Douglas C rim p. 17.
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Such arlists, writes Miwon Kwon, “conceived the silt' not only in physical and 
spatial terms but as a cultural framework defined by the institutions of a rt,”U!H 
She writes:
M ore lim n ju s t the m useum , the site  com es to encom pass a relay of several 
in te rre la ted  luit different spaces an d  econom ies...that to g e th er co n stitu te  a 
system  o f practices that is no t sep a ra te  from  b u t open to social, econom ic, and  
political p ressu res. To be “specific" to such a site , in tu rn , is to decode a n d /o r  
recode the institu tional conven tions so as to expose th e ir h idden  o p e ra tio n s ,..':M>
These “codes” and “operations” became the focus of what we now call 
Institutional Critique, which includes a variety of work ranging from Mierle 
Laderman Ukeles’ liar Wash: Washing Tracks ( 1973), in which she literally 
scrubbed the museum’s floor in order to indicate the (gendered) labour relations 
on which such “neutral” spaces are based; Daniel Buren’s Painting Sculpture 
(u)7t), which hung from the centre of the Solomon Guggenheim rotunda in order 
to obscure the view across it; Michael Asher’s 1974 installation at the Claire 
Copley gallery, in which he emptied the space entirely, leaving only the gallery’s 
administrative staff; and Mans Haacke’s infamous MoMA Poll (1970), in which he 
questioned museum visitors about their political affiliations. Institutional 
Critique continued to be practiced through tlye seventies and eighties, perhaps 
reaching its endpoint in Fred Wilson’s project at the Maryland Historical Society, 
Mining the Museum  (1992), in which he reorganized the permanent collection to 
highlight issues of slavery (by placing silver shackles amid a silver tea set of the




sam e era , for exam p le , or a flogg in g  post am id  carpentry w ork). G enerally  
sp eak in g , after th is  p o in t th e  artist’s  critical approach  e ith er  b ecam e o n e  m ore  
th ing th e  m u seu m  cou ld  acquire to sign al its ow n  leg itim acy  or w as la m ed  and  
refrained  by b o o k s su ch  as M u seu m  u s M use (M oM A , 1 9 9 9 ) and The Museum  us  
Medium  (J a m es Putnam , 2 0 0  i) as s im p ly  a new  creative  m ean s.
B enjam in  B ueh loh  d isc u sse s  the rise (and even tu a l fall) o f  In stitu tion a l C ritique  
in his artic le  Coueeplual Art igqxtq tn ): from  the aesthetic o f  administration to 
the critique o f  institutions. W riting  from  the van tage point o f  the 199 0 s, he  
articu lates its  ach ievem en t as fo llow s:
Paradoxically , thou, it w o u ld  ap p ear that C onceptual Art tru ly  becam e th e  m ost 
sign ifican t parad igm atic  change of p o stw ar a rtis tic  p rodu c tio n  at the very m o m en t that it 
m im ed the opera tin g  logic o f  la te  cap ita lism  and  its  positivist in stru m en ta lity ... T h a t w as 
th e  m o m en t w hen H uren’s and  H aaeke’s w ork from  the late ipUos onw ard  tu rn ed  the 
v iolence o f  that m im etic  re la tio n sh ip  hack on to  the  ideological a p p a ra tu s  itself, using  it to 
analyze1 an d  expose the social in s titu tio n s  from  w hich the law s of positiv ist 
in stru m en ta lity  a n d  the logic of ad m in is tra tio n  e m a n a te  in the  first p lace. T hese 
in s titu tio n s , w hich d e te rm in e  the cond itions of cu ltu ra l consum ption , a re  the  very ones in 
w hich a rtis tic  p rodu c tio n  is transfo rm ed  in to  a tool o f  ideological con tro l and  cu ltu ral 
leg itim ation .
In o th er  w ord s, w h en  artists  m im ic  the w ay that th e  leg itim iz in g  in stitu tion a l 
system  o p era tes  (su ch  as r igou rou sly  ga th erin g  an d  d isp lay in g  s ta tis t ic s  and  
system atica lly  analyzing  artistic  trad ition s) in th e  production o f  art, the resu ltin g  
s ite -sp ec ific  artw ork is so c ia lly  sp ecific , rather than  (or in ad d ition  to )  
p h en o in en o lo g ica lly  sp ec ific . A ccording to B u eh loh , th e  sy stem  th e in stitu tion
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that is tho object of critique is exposed for what it is: an arm of what Theodor 
Adorno called the “totally administered world.”1:!°
Andrea Fraser, perhaps more than any other artist, exemplifies the ambitions of 
Institutional Critique to reveal the administrative aspect of museums and 
galleries. In Museum Highlights: A Gallery Talk  (ip8o) she plays the role of Jane 
Castelton, a docent at the Philadelphia Museum of Art who lakes visitors on a 
tour of the building. Rat her than discussing the artworks on display, however, 
Fraser mulls over the museum’s funding structure, its Donor Recognition 
Program and volunteer system, its practical facilities, the museum’s underlying 
ideology as a “one of the world’s great repositories of civilization,”1^ 1 its 
commitment to cultivating good taste, its disdain of the “lower class,” and its 
commitment to high standards. For example, she states, “Let’s not just talk about 
art. Because finally, the museum’s purpose is not just to develop an appreciation 
of art, but to develop an appreciation of values...”1'^ ’- It is Fraser’s insistence on 
the museum’s cultural role as an arbiter of good taste and decent conduct, and 
the proposed homology between artistic and social harmony, that reveals the 
institution to be the training center as well as the repository “for a cultivated, 
governed, discriminating instinct.’Tw
o" T h eo d o r A dorno and  M ax Ilo rk h e in u T . “T he C ultu re  Industry : E n ligh tenm en t as M ass 
D eception .” M edia .and. C ultural S tudies: Key w orks. M eenaksh i Gigi D urham  and  D ouglas M. 
Kellner, eds. M alden, MA : Blackwell, ::o o 6 . 41 ye.
a 1 A ndrea F raser, “M useum  H ighlights: A G allery T alk ." O ctober 57 ( tq m ): 107. 
a-’ Ib id , m u.
'*• Ib id .
Resonant Sites
On the heels of Institutional Critique emerged a more sensorial variant of site- 
specificity that bears the greatest affinity with today’s installation art. These 
“resonant” sites seek to impress upon the viewer certain physical aspects of the 
site and the histories that resonate within it. Like Earthwork, these sites are off 
the beaten path of the art circuit, but unlike Earthwork, they are not posited as 
“neutral” or somehow “exterior.” On the contrary: artists working in this vein of 
site-speeificity explicitly use the techniques and institutions of art to perpetuate it 
as a viable model for thinking about the materiality and historicity of a given site. 
As such, the site is posited as undeniably social and ideological. What 
distinguishes Resonant Sites from Institutional Critique, however, is its 
insistence 011 tin ..ite’s authenticity, on its power to signify, materialize or witness 
historical truth. It is, in the words of Claire Bishop, “integrally related to the 
specific history of the site in their structure and choice of m aterial."1;u As such, 
the artist’s role is to reveal this “authenticity” which is thought to be overlooked 
or otherwise obscured.
Perhaps the most illustrative example of a Resonant Site is Indigo Blue {1991) by 
Ann Hamilton, which was part of the groundbreaking exhibition Places with a 
Past in Charleston, South Carolina. The curator of the exhibition (Man- .Jane 
Jacob) invited nineteen artists (including two couples) to respond to “the 
economic, social, and cultural history of Charleston, manifested in issues such as
■ n Claire B ishop. In sta lla tio n  Art: A C ritical H istory . L ondon an d  New York: Rm itledge, 2 0 0 5 . pg.
warfare, slavery, class, sexuality, race, gender, religion and labour.'Tu Ann 
Hamilton's work occupied a former garage on Indigo Street in the  part of the city 
where the dye was manufactured in the past. In an effort to find a bodily tangible 
means of connecting to the site, she piled 1400 pounds of blue work clothing 
(approximately 18000 items) on a slightly raised platform inside the garage. Each 
garment still identified its former occupant by a num bered tag. Behind the 
mountain of clothes was a big wooden table with a sole person sitting at it 
dutifully erasing passages in a history book: International Law Situations , a 
Navel War College publication pertaining to legally defined land and water 
boundaries. Off to the side was the elevated manager’s office where he would 
have formerly surveyed his workers. Hamilton hung sacks of soya beans here, 
and strips of un-dyed cloth. ‘T’ As Lynne Cooke 1 sserts, “the power of the piece lay 
in its presence, in the singularity of the experience.”1^ / Hamilton’s emphasis on 
sensory knowledge clearly distinguishes her from Institutional Critique, and yet, 
as Indigo Blue demonstrates, her emphasis on the senses does not compromise 
the discursive register: the installation makes reference to the cotton industry in 
the American south, the history of indigo as the first cash crop of South Carolina, 
the history of Charleston as a Seaport, as well as the more general history of 
invisible “blue collar” labour.
Writing about such site-specific works in hindsight, trit RogolT states,
1,:> Lynne Cooke. “Places w ith a P ast."  T he B urling ton  M agazine (Aug. tq q i); 573. 
,-l<' Ib id .
1;r Ib id .
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Site specific a il  s e e m e d  to mo to function  in the  m odel of ra p p o rt. U goes in lo  so m e th in g  
th a t is a p p a ren tly  located  an d  specific an d  it w orks at uncovering  and  u n v eilin g  an d  
revealing  h idden  m ech an ism s  an d  a ssu m p tio n s . T he ac tua l a rtw o rk  th a t g e ts  p ro d u ced  
th ro u g h  th a t m odel h a s  a w hole  set of a ssu m p tio n s  ab o u t hav in g  an  em p a th y  w ith  the 
local.', a n d  com ing  in and b e in g  able to  expose a n d  reveal an d  u n co v er a n d  m ak e  explicit 
th ings th a t m ight have lain u n co v e red .1
This model of rapport is clearly at play in Indigo Bine and it is key 'o  Resonant 
Sites in general. As such, the artist works as an anthropologist of sorts, revealing 
the historical resonance embedded in the layered sediment of the site, usually 
discursively, but sometime quasi-literally. This leads David Joselit to state “In 
site-specific art, it is the artist as diagnostician or itinerant consultant who 
signifies presence in materializing a hitherto-virtual discursive site.”w> As such. 
Resonant Sites plays it both ways, sf to speak, or actually three ways: it 
emphasizes the phenomenological “theatrical” engagement of the viewer, it takes 
place “off-site,” and it participates in the discursive understanding of the site in 
question.
The I deal of Site Specificity
Despite their differences, Minimalism, Earthwork, Institutional Critique and 
Resonant Sites constitute the core of site-specifieity: they share the objective of 
calling attent ion to the “frame” (in literal and ideological terms) and of critiquing 
this frame in turn. As Miwon Kwon states, “The ‘work’ no longer seeks to lv' a
1|H In  C laire D oherty , ed. C o n tem p o ra ry  Art: F rom  S tu d io  to  S itu a tio n . L ondon: lllaek  Dog 
Pub lish ing  L td., e o o .g  8b .
1:1,1 D avid  Jo se lit . “N avigating  th e  N ew  T errito ry : Art, A v atars , and  the  C o n tem p o ra ry  
M edia.scape." A rtfo rum  (S u m m er a o o g ) :  1177,
n o u n /o b je c t  b u t a  v e r b /p r o c e ss . p: w o- m g  vhe v ie w e r s ’ critical (n o t ju s t  p h ysica l)  
acu ity  regard in g  th e  id e o lo g ica l r e n d it io n s  o f  th e ir  v ie w in g .”1*0 T h is p r o v o ca tio n  
occu rs o n  sev era l lev e ls  at once*
T h e (neo- :w m*' g a rth s!) aesthetic. a sp ira  tion  to  exceed  th e  lim ita tio n s  o f tra d itio n a l m ed ia , 
like p a in tin g  an d  sc r ip tu re , as well as th e ir  in s titu tio n a l se ttin g ; th e  ep istem olog ica l 
challenge to  re locate  m e a n in g  from  w ith in  th e  a r t  o b jec t to  th e  co n tin g en c ies  of con tex t; 
h e  rad ica l re s tru c tu r in g  o f th e  sub jec t fro m  an  o ld  C artesian  m odel to  a 
p hen o m en o lo g ica l o n e  o f liv e d  bod ily  experience; a n d  th e  self-conscious d e s ire  to  re s is t 
th e  forces o f  th e  cap ita lis t m a rk e t econom y, w h ich  c ircu la tes  a r t  w orks as tra n sp o r ta b le  
a n d  exchangeab le  co m m o d ity  goods -  all th e se  im p e ra tiv e s  cam e to g e th e r  in  a r t’s new  
a tta c h m e n t to  the  a c tu a lity  o f  th e  s ite .”1-'1
K w on’s  c h o ic e  o f  v erb s -  e x c ee d in g , c h a lle n g in g , restru ctu rin g , r e s is t in g  -  sp ea k s  
to  s ite -sp e c if ic ity  as an  oppositional p ra ctice  b a s e d  on  th e  r e v e la tio n  an d  
s u b v e r s io n  o f  v a lu e s , im m a n e n t cr itiq u e  o f  th e  art w orld , or an  a tta ck  o f  
id e o lo g ic a l ed ific e s , w h eth e r  b la ta n tly  (a s  w h en  H a n s H aack e  d isp la y e d  
in fo r m a tio n  o n  th e  in d iv id u a ls  w h o  p r e v io u sly  o w n e d  E d ou ard  M a n e t’s  Bunch o f  
Asparagus (1 8 8 0 ) ,  (Manet-PROJEKT 7 4 ,1 974 ), or  su b tly  (as w h e n  B u ren  
c o n n e c te d  th e  in s id e  a n d  o u ts id e  o f  th e  g a lle r y  w ith  a s tr in g  o f  s tr ip e d  b a n n er s  in  
Within and  Beyond the Frame (1 9 7 3 )).
1-10 M lw ' ti Kwon. O n e  Place a f te r  A n o th e r: S ite-Specific A rt an d  L ocational Id e n tity . 24. 
‘u Ib id . 12.
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Site-specificity enacts a displacement “from work to frame”1'*2: Minimalism 
shifted attention “from the portable m odernist sculpture to an environmental 
practice located in the literal space of the viewer”1'*-’*; Earthwork shifted attention 
onto the discursive frame bv failing to  escape it; Institutional Critique turned the 
logic of the frame against itself; and Resonant Sites enacts these three shifts 
simultaneously. In each case, the complex layering of factors -  ideological, 
phenomenological and historical -  tha t make any site “specific” are revealed in 
order to be reflected upon. As such, as Jam es Meyer asserts, “Site-specificity had 
a more implicit, and less recognized, intellectual source: the m odernist discourse 
of reflexivity.”144 As he explains,
M inim alism  d isp laced  th e  object o f  reflec tion  from  th e  w ork ’s m ed iu m  to  its a m b ie n t 
space; in s titu tio n a l c ritiq u e  caused  a  fu r th e r  d isp lacem en t, from  th e  exposu re  o f  th e  
“w hite  cu b e ” as a phenom eno log ica l space to  a critical exposure  o f  th e  a rt in s titu tio n . Yet, 
fo r  all its  rad icality , its m a te ria lis t co m m itm en t, th is  w ork  still o p e ra te d  w ith in  th e  
K an tian  cognitive m odel o f  reflexivity: it s till con fined  its  analysis to  th e  “f ra m e .’’hs
According to Meyer, this restricts the  relevance of site-specificity to the discursive 
limits of the a rt world, and h" moves on to reformulate the genre to include cross 
disciplinary projects in w  J i  the concept of “site” is pluralized.
I wall reflect on this later, bu t what I want to  pick up on here is the  question of 
reflexivity th a t goes hand in hand with the critique that site-specificity launched
‘*a See C raig O w ens. “From  W ork  to  F ram e, o r, Is T h e re  Life A fte r ‘1 h*. 1 >eath o f  th e  A u th o r’? ” 
B eyond R ecogn ition : R ep resen ta tio n . Pow er, an d  C ultv . Sco tt B iyson, B a rb a ra  K ruger, L ynne 
T illm an  e t al. ed s . In tro . S im on W atney . B erkeley: U  o f  C alifornia P, 1992 .122-39 .
‘•u Ja m e s  M eyer. “The F u n c tio n a l S ite .” D o cu m en ts 7  (Fall 199&): 24.
“*■* Ib id . 
us Ib id .
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against the fram e  of art, for it is in the conjunction of these three words tha t the 
ideal of the genre can be defined. Generally speaking, as Craig Owens explains, 
“the function  of the work of art -  any work of art -  is to conceal the multiple 
frames within which it is contained.”1-*6 “This is what the dominant ideology 
wants,” writes Buren, “that what is contaired should provide, very subtly, a 
screen for the container.’’w  in  stark contrast to this concealment, site-specific art 
seeks to reveal multiple frames within wiiich it is contained.” For example, 
Daniel Buren states that, “any work presented in that framework, if it does not 
explicitly examine the influence of the framework upon itself, falls into the 
illusion of self-sufficiency -  or idealism.”^ 8 Furthermore, for Buren, “the 
‘unveiling’ of the institutional frame can take place only within the frame, and not 
from some imaginary vantage point outside it,” as Earthworks sought to do.J49 
That is, not only is a reflexive critique of the frame necessary to counter the 
“dom inant ideology,” it is the only type of critique possible: the impetus of site- 
specificity is deconstructive.
Michael Asher’s 1979 exhibition at the Art Institute of Chicago, in which he 
relocated a twentieth-century bronze cast of Jean-Antoine Houdon’s marble of 
George W ashington (1785-91) from in front of the museum to inside it, is perhaps 
the most illustrative example. By recontextualizing the sculpture in its “proper” 
ibut seemingly absurd) art historical category among paintings of the same era, 
Asher called attention to the museum as an active producer, rather than passive
Craig O w ens. “From  W ork  to  F ram e, or, Is T here  Life A fte r ‘T he D eath  o f th e  A u th o r’?” 130. 
u? In  Ib id .
u 8 In  M iw on Kwon. O ne Place a f te r  A no ther: S ite-Specific A rt and  L ocational Id e n tity . 13-14.
In  C raig O w ens. “F ro m  W ork  to  F ram e, o r, Is T here  Life A fter T h e  D ea th  of th e  A u th o r’?” 130.
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container, of cultural value. The museum’s practice of categorizing works of art, 
its methods of installation (medium specific), and its aesthetic criteria were all 
revealed by Asher’s gesture.
Due to the “criticality” of site-specific projects like Asher’s “George W ashington,” 
as well as Fraser’s and Hamilton’s projects described above, Kwon aligns site- 
specificity with the historical avant-garde:
o n e  could a rgue  th a t th ro u g h o u t the  tw en tie th  cen tu ry , th e  h isto ry  of av an t-g a rd e , 
o r  “ad v an ced ” or “c ritica l,” a r t  p rac tices (how ever one  m igh t w an t to  ch a rac te rize  
th o se  p rac tices  th a t have  p re ssu re d  the  s ta tu s  quo o f d o m in an t a r t  and social 
in s titu tio n s )  can be describ ed  as th e  p ers is ten ce  o f  a d esire  to s itu a te  a rt in 
“im p ro p e r” o r  “w ro n g ” places. T h a t is, th e  av an t-g a rd e  struggle  has in p a r t  been  a 
k in d  of sp a tia l politics, to  p re ssu re  th e  d efin itio n  an d  leg itim ation  o f a rt by 
locating  it  elsew here, in  p laces o th e r th a n  w h ere  it “b e lo n g s.”1s‘>
These other locations include actual locations (remote landscapes, across city 
streets, in a foyer or garage, etc.) and abstract spaces (in a different artistic 
classification or political system, etc.), all of which were once subordinate to the 
“proper” site of art -  the museum. However, Kwon neglects to specify that the 
avant-garde sought to abolish the distinction between art and life and that it is 
due to the  failure of this ambition, not the ambition itself, that site-specificity has 
emerged. That is, the ideal of site-specificity can be defined as a continuation of 
the avant-garde self-reflexive tactic of exposing the workings of the institution of 
art, as well as the  material and political relations it embodies and obscures, but it
iho M iw on Kwon. “T h e  W rong P lace.” A rt Jo u rn a l (S p ring  2 0 0 0 ) : 42-3 . (This co n tin u ity  w ith the  
av an t-g a rd e  is d e b a te d  by O w ens an d  by  F raser.)
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does not seek to integrate art and life. Rather, it seeks to perpetuate art as a 
viable model of critical thought.
The genre in crisis
Site-specificity as a genre lost its stronghold almost simultaneously with its 
formulation. For example, in 1993 Douglas Crimp writes, “What remains of this 
critique today are a history to be recovered and fitful, marginalized practices that 
struggle to exist at all in an art world more dedicated than ever before to 
commodity v a l u e . T h e  tactics of artists like Morris, Haacke, Buren, Fraser, 
Asher, Hamilton and Smithson were “systematically opposed or mystified, 
ultimately o v e r t u r n e d .”1-^ 2 But why was the eriticality of site-specificity opposed 
and how was it overturned? The answer is entangled in two interrelated issues: 
the complicity of the artist who was taking the critical “exterior” position and the 
discursivity of the site rather than its “presence.”
Irit Rogoff offers a concise description of how the artists’ “rapport” with the site 
and their exposure of the codes and operations of the art system points to their 
complicity with it. Drawing on the cultural anthropologist George Marcus, she 
writes:
T he breakdow n o f  th a t w o rk  in an th ropo logy  w hich is based  in  rap p o rt, an d  I 
th in k  th e  b reakdow n of th a t  parallel w ork  in  co n tem p o ra ry  a r t  p ractices, com es
lr>‘ D ouglas C rim p. 156. 
lr>- Ibid. 155-6.
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w ith  this em ergen t n o tio n  of com plicity . C om plicity  is an u n d e rs tan d in g  th a t all 
w ork  is u n d ertak en  in  the form  o f a collusion an d  tha t it’s a collusion tha t is 
o p e ra tin g  at several levels,'.™
Andrea Fraser directly addresses this “complicity” in her 2005 article From the 
Critique o f  Institutions to an Institution o f  Critique. “It’s not a question of being 
against the institution,” she states; “We are the institution.” As Fraser explains, 
“Every time we speak of the ‘institution’ as other than ‘us,’ we disavow our role in 
the creation and perpetuation of its c o n d i t io n s .”1-^
Consequently, there is no position “outside” of the institution of art that artists 
can adopt to critique it. Rather, as Fraser argues,
It is a rtis ts  -  as m uch a m useum s o r the m ark e t -  w ho, in th e ir  very efforts to  escape  the 
in s titu tio n  o f  art, have driven its  expansion . W ith  each a ttem p t to evade th e  lim its  of 
in s titu tio n a l d e te rm ina tion , to  em brace  an  o u tside , to  redefine  a rt o r  re in teg ra te  it in to  
everyday  life, to  reach  “everyday” people an d  w ork  in  th e  “rea l” w orld , we ex p an d  o u r 
fram e  an d  b rin g  m ore  o f  the w o rld  in to  it. But we never escape it .1-™
This is not to say, however, “that we have no effect on, and are not affected by, 
what takes on beyond its boundaries.”1-^6 That the art world is severed from the 
“real” world is a myth: the “collusion” is multifaceted, as Rogoff suggests. 
Benjamin Buehloh, for example, argues that the critical assault on artistic 
conventions successfully weakens the traditionally separate sphere of artistic
In D oherty . 86.
'5-1 A ndrea  F raser. “From  the  C ritique o f  In s titu tio n s  to  an  In s titu tio n  of C ritique .” A rtfo rum  (Sept. 
2005): 283 . 
isr> Ibid. 282 ,
W’ Ib id . 283 .
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production and, thereby, facilitates its assimilation into the commercial stream, 
lie  writes,
T his [ paradox  of all co ncep tual p ractices] was tha t the critical ann ih ila tio n  o f cu ltural 
conven tions itself im m ed ia te ly  acquires th e  cond itions of the  spectacle, th a t the  
insistence on  a rtis tic  an o n y m ity  and the  dem olition  o f au th o rsh ip  produces in s tan t b ra n d  
nam es an d  identifiab le p ro d u c ts , and th a t the cam paign  to critique conven tions of 
v isuality  w ith textual in te rven tions, b illboard  signs, anonym ous h an d o u ts , and  p am p h le ts  
inevitably  ends by follow ing th e  pre estab lished  m echan ism s of advertis ing  and  
m arke ling  cam paigns.'®
Furthermore, according to Buehloh, the artist’s collusion extends beyond the 
insatiable market to include the Enlightenment episteme of progress, which took 
as its objective “to liberate the world from mythical forms of perception and 
hierarchical modes of specialized experience.”1^  In this light, it is not that the 
criticality of site-specificity failed; it is more that it eased its own cooption.
The second reason site-specificity lost its stronghold as a distinct genre is the 
waning of belief in the alleged authentici ty of the site in question. Jam es Meyer, 
for example, questions its “literal orientation
T hus the  p rem ise  o f site-specifieily  to locate the w ork  in  a single place, a n d  o n l y  
t h e n : ,  bnspot e the b o s call fo r  P resence, the d em an d  fo r the  experience o f  “being  
th e re .” An underly ing  topos o f  M erleau-Ponty’s phenom enology , o f the 
H appen ing  and perfo rm ance, Presence becam e an aesthe tic  and  eth ical crj d o
'•r>? B enjam in B uehloh. “C onceptual A rt 1 9 6 2 6 9 : Prom  th e  A esthetic  of A d m in is tra tio n  to the 
C ritique o f  In s titu tio n s .” C onceptual A rt: A Critical A nthology. A lexander A lbcrro  an d  Blake 
S tim son, eds. C am bridge, MA: M IT P, 1999 .530 .
‘•'>H ib id . 533.
'■>'> Jam es  M eyer. 23.
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c o i ’ u r  am o n g  the genera tio n  o f 'a rtis ts  and critics w ho em erged  in the 1060s, 
suggesting  an  experience oi ae lu a ln ess  and au th en tic ity  that would con travene 
th e  depravations oi an  increasingly  m ed ia ted , “one d im en sio n a l” society. An 
an tid o te  to  M eI.uhanism , to p o p u la r cu ltu re ’s v irtua l p leasures and  b lind  
co n su m erism , the aesth e tics  of P resence im posed  rigorous, even P uritan ical 
d em an d s: a tten d an ce  a t a p a rticu la r site  o r performance*; an ex tended, often 
excrucia ting  tem poral d u ra tio n ." ’"
What is not accounted for by Meyer is the dialectical relationship that Robert 
Smithson articulated between the allegedly singular “site” and the perpetually 
incomplete "non-site:” in Smithson’s formulation the two are eo-extensive and 
therefore the “immediacy” and “presence” of the site-specific work is 
compromised by its counterpart in the gallery. Rather, Meyer seems to suggest 
that the site-specific artwork succeeds in becoming a site itself, rather than part 
of a “potentially infinite chain extending from the site,” (to recall Owens’ words 
cited earlier). David Joselit clarifies Smithson’s dialectic in an updated 
vocabulary:
b a n d  a rt a n d  su b seq u en t site-specific  w ork th e re fo re  sh a re  a deep s tru c tu re . B elonging to 
a  period o f  u n p reced en ted  m edia expansion  ( th e  television  era), bo th  se ts  o f p rac tices 
cen te r  o n  the  m u tual de lim ita tion  o f v irtua lity  an d  p resence. In  Land a rt p resence  is 
asso c ia ted  w ith rem o te  te rrito ries, w hile v irtu a lity  in h eres  in m echanically  rep roduced  
d o cu m en ta tio n . In site-specific  a rt, it is the a rtis t as d iagnostic ian  o r itineran t consu ltan t 
w ho  sign ifies presence  in m ateria liz ing  a h ilh e rto -v irtu a l discursive site .""
Ibid.
"" David ,Joselit. 277.
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As Joselit suggests, site-specificity keeps the relationship between “virtuality'’ and 
“presence” in play.
Nevertheless, the emphasis 011 the “presence” of a site persists. To circumvent it, 
Meyer emphasizes its virtual dimension instead. I le puts forward the idea of a 
“functional” site, which he defines as “a process, an operation occurring between 
sites, a mapping of institutional and textual filiations and the oodies that move 
between lhem."lt,:! According to Mever, “The ‘work’ was thus not a single entity, 
the installation of an individual artist in a given place; it was, on the contrary, a 
function  occurring between these sites and points of view, a series of expositions 
of information and place.”11’-'* In this way, Mover argues, “Site as a unique, 
demarcated place available to perceptual experience alone the 
phenomenological site of Minimalism or the Serra monument -  becomes a 
network of sites referring to an elsewhere As Pierre Iluyghe states, “W hat’s 
interesting is how you create this conceptual displacement, the journey that 
brings you to this elsewhere, not the destination itself.”1(,r>
To underline his point, Meyer oilers the example of Christian-Philipp Muller’s 
project for the Austrian Pavilion at the 1993 Venice Biennale in which he crossed 
the Austrian border into neighbouring countries without the proper visas, Illegal 
Border Crossing Between Austria and the Principality o f  Lieehenslein (1993). As 
such, “he enacted a series of ‘illegal’ immigrations, recorded photographically and
“’•'.Jam es M eyer, a t .
1(’:* Ibid. 20.
"’ i Ibid. 28 .
In T im  Griffin, m odera to r, with C laire  Bishop, Pam ela M . Lee, Lynne Cooke el al. "R em ote 
Possibilities: A R oundtable D iscussion on Land A rt's C hanging  T e rra in .” A rtio rum  (S u m m er 
2005): 20 0 .
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by postcards mailed from these liminal sites.'”u,(’ According to Meyer, Muller thus 
participates in the discursive sites of national identity, illegal immigration, 
globalization and capitalist organization, as well as the actual site of the border 
and the biennale itself.
Kwon develops Meyer’s formulation in her influential text “Genealogy of Site- 
Specifieily.” She asserts “that in the advanced art practices of the past thirty years 
the operative definition of the site has been transformed from a physical location 
grounded, fixed, actual to a discursive vector ungrounded, fluid, virtual,”H,-; 
This “virtual” vector, according to Kwon, has effectively eclipsed the “actual” site:
th e  d is tingu ish ing  ch arac te ris tic  of today’s s i te o r ie n te d  a rt is the w ay in w hich 
the  art w ork 's  re la tio n sh ip  to  the actuality  of a location  (as site) and ttie  social 
c o n d itio n s o f the in stitu tio n a l fram e (as site) a re  b o th  su b o rd in a te  to  a 
( U s c u m i v c h i  d e te rm in ed  site  tha t is de linea ted  as a field o f know ledge, 
in te llec tu a l exchange, o r  cu ltu ra l d e b a te .lWI
In Kwon’s attention to the discursive register, however, she effectively sweeps the 
material history of the site in question under the carpet. This is no minor 
oversight: history marks sites with its political (often violent) ravages both 
physically and conceptually, thus making them  “specific.” Unhinged from the 
actuality of location, site-specific art threatens to obscure the lived consequences 
of the discourses it seeks to articulate. That is, if the site is reconceived as
.Jam es M eyer.
w ' M iwon Kwon. O ne Place a fte r  A nother: Site Specific A rt and  Locational Iden tity , no-go . 
",H Ibid. an .
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infinitely mobile, as purely discursive, then a consideration of the material 
relations that are hinged to this discourse are left by the way side.iwi
Of this newly dematerialized site of site specificity, .James Meyer states, ’i t  is the 
kind of space the philosophers (lilies Deleuze and helix (luattari have described 
as nomadic, a shifting or dcterritorialized site at odds with sedentary, striated 
space, the organized ambiance of the polis.”1 ° This statement implies that artists 
have shifted their attention away from the striatums they sought to expose 
through the ‘bos, ‘70s, and ‘80s in the effort of challenging the organization of the 
“totally administered world” ami on to the smooth space, which is associated with 
dis-organization, anti-author and anti-authoritarian aesthetic and political 
movements, linkage, assemblage and co-production, fluidity and potentiality.
But as Deleuze and (luattari themselves make clear, the smooth space is not an 
actionable space on its own: it is only in relation to striated space, by tugging at it 
and breaking it down, that it comes to political effect. Furthermore, “the smooth 
itself can be drawn and occupied by diabolical powers of onjanm itum ,''1"1 which 
may be exactly what we are witnessing in the discourse of site-specificity: artists 
changed tactics but they arc as ingratiated in the “striated" institution as they 
ever were.
Subjectivity
This is d iscussed  hv G regory  S holelle . “News from N ow here: Activist Art and  A lte r.” T h ird  Text 
45 (W in te r U)o8 no): 45-611,
1,1 .Jam es Mey»r. an .
11 G illes D eleuze and  Felix (lu a tta ri. A T h o u san d  P lateaus: C apitalism  and  S ch izophren ia . T rans, 
and F o rew ord  B rian M assm ni, M inneapolis: II o f  M inneso ta  P, 11)87. 4 8 0 .
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Just as the concept of immersion had repercussions for subjectivity, so too does 
site-specificity. With the mention of Deleuze and (luattari in respect to the 
dematerialization of the site, the question of what kind of subject inhabits what 
kind of space jumps into the foreground* in this case, the “nomad.” Kwon 
suggests this elusive figure when she writes,
ll  is not only the  artw ork  th a t is no t b o und  to the  physical cond itions oi a place anym ore, 
it is the  a rtis t sub jec t w ho is 'lib e ra ted ' from  any  en d u rin g  ties to local c ircum stances . 
Q ualities of p erm anence , co n tin u ity , certa in ty , g ro u u d cd n ess  (physical and  o therw ise) 
a re  though t to be  artis tica lly  re tro g rad e , th u s  politically  suspect, in th is  con tex t. By 
co n tra s t, qua lities  o fu u c o rla in tv , instab ility , am bigu ity , an d  im p erm an en ce  a re  taken as 
d esired  a ttr ib u te s  of a v an g u a rd , politically  p rogressive, a rtis tic  p rac tice .' ’
Kwon describes the types of spaces that are associated with these qualities: the 
“right place” and the “wrong place," respectively. “Right" places, according to 
Kwon, “reaffirm our sense of self, reflecting back to us an unthrealening picture 
of a grounded iclc nlity.” By contrast, “wrong" places tire places “where one feels 
one does not belong unfamiliar, disorientating, destabilizing, even 
threatening.”1'-’;* Kwon argues that “an encounter with a ‘wrong place’ is likely to 
expose the instability of the ‘right place,’ and by extension the instability of the 
self.”1?-1 As such, she is effectively making an argum ent for alienation as the 
premise of self-recognition (rather than a “continuous relationship between a 
place and a person”): it is the wrongness, rather than rightness, of place that
1 M iwon Kwon. The W rong  Place. g .|. 
, Ibid. .pa. 
r ' 1 Ibid.
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brings the subject “into focus,”1'7!’ In Kwon’s account, the site becomes 
increasingly fragmented and discursive but the subjet. t keeps focus and stays 
present: it does not succumb to the disorientation that Frederic Jam eson 
associated with postmodern hyperspace.
O f  course site-specificity was concerned with questions of subjectivity all along: 
Minimalism sought to challenge the ego-centered individual who transcends 
historical contingencies with an emphasis on the production of subjectivity as a 
social process, and with the subject’s inextrieubility from its (phenomenological) 
surroundings. likewise, “If minimalism returned to the viewing subject a 
physical body,” writes Miwon Kwon, then "iastJutional critique insisted on the 
social matrix of the class, race, gender, and sexuality of he viewing subject.”1 
On a similar note, Kirsi Peltomaki writes, “Beyond the generic ewer who... 
would complete the work of art, the 1960s and 1970s viewing subject had become 
an increasingly specific entity whose place in the work of art was scripted 
alongside material or processual relations.”1'77
These “scripts” differ from artwork to artwork but one thing that is consistent in 
the discourse of site-specificity is the effort to wade through the mediating layers 
of the site in order to get a clear view of our “selves” and how we are situated in 
the world. Even when the site is allegedly dematerialized, site-specificity 
maintains its ideal: to expose the site and critique it by denaturalizing it, by
1 '■'> ib id .
11’ M iw on Kwon. O ne Place a fte r  A n o th er: S ite-Specific Art am i L ocational Id en tity . 13. It is th is  
em p h asis  on sub jectiv ity  th a t m ad e  site  specificity  a v iab le  p rac tice  for the  a r tis ts  p u rsu in g  
id en tity  politics in  the early  m o o s .
K irsi Peltom aki. "Affect and  S pce to ria l Agency: v ‘»vving In s titu tio n a l Criticpte in  the 1070s." 
Art Jo u rn a l  (in..) (1*007): 36-51.
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making it scorn alien, nr by otherwise intervening in it so that it can no longer 
function as the “right place” and ground our identities. Much to Fried’s chagrin,
“it demands that the beholder lake it into account, that he take it seriously."' ’8 
This confrontation prom pts viewers into recognizing their own estrangem ent 
from the “right” ideas that organize their lives, which allegedly will lead to a 
more “authentic*” life.
On this existential note of “authenticity" it impossible not to understand site- 
specificity in the context of depth models of meaning: even if the site is laterally 
dispersed, the subject within it continues to function as an authentic presence. As 
Claire Bishop remarks, site-specificity is effectively “...grounded r  the 
authenticity of one’s first hand experience of a site”1"0 an authenticity that 
requires the artist’s intervention in order to be revealed: the artist seeks to break 
with appearances (ideological Int ers of site) in ord. I get at essences (the 
underlying structure of the site) and push aside inauthentic (m ediated) 
experiences of the site in order to experience* it as it “truly is.” This tru th  is 
variously deemed to be economic, political, ethnic or ethnographic, elassist, racist, 
historical or all of the *e.
Here we end at the opposite point from VR: in Kwon’s hum iliation, regardless of 
the degree of virtuality of any given site, what is important is that the 
viewer’s /u se r’s experience of it is felt to be “wrong” so that the “right” can be 
uncovered. What defines “right,” as earlier discussed, is no longer a secure
1 H M ichael F ried . (>;v
10 In T im  CrilTin, m o d e ra to r , w ith Plain* B ishop, Pam ela M. Lee, Lynne C ooke el al, “R em ote 
P ossib ilities: A R ound tab le  D iscussion  on I,and  A rt's  C h ang ing  T erra in ."  28c).
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locational identity, but rather a critical relationship to its ideological workings -  
an outside within. As Miwon Kwon states, "This precarious and risky position 
may not be the right place to be, but it is the only place from which to  face the 
challenges of the new orders of space and tim e.’’180 Thus, generally speaking, even 
as the conception of site changed from being literal or rem ote to bureaucratic and 
heavily mediated, the idea that the authenticity of the site could be revealed by 
the artist, and subsequently be authentically experienced by the viewer, was not 
questioned -  “and in this, very little has changed over the course of a whole 
century.”181
The Crossover Zone
New m edia immersion and site-specificity appear on the scene at approximately 
the sam e time, in the mid-1960s, with Minimalism on the one hand and 
technological developments such as the graphic user interface (GUI) on the other. 
Of course they can both be traced further back, and they arguably both have the 
history of simulation as one of their sources. However site-specificity maintains 
an integral tie to the site even when multiple, as Frasers, Ham ilton’s and 
Christian-Philipp Muller’s projects dem onstrate, while immersion severs it in 
order to  instate its own, fully encapsulated site, as the in-turned walls of the 19th
1811 M iw on Kwon. T he W ro n g  P lace . 43 .
181 C la ire  B ishop in  Tim  G riffin , m o d e ra to r, w ith  C laire  B ishop, P am ela  M. Lee, Lynne Cooke e t al. 
"R em ote  P ossib ilities: A R o u n d ta b le  D iscussion  on  L and  A rt's  C hang ing  T e rra in .” 294,
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panoram a and contemporary VR systems demonstrate. Both discourses gain in 
prominence during the following decades, building a solid discursive edifice 
within academia.
By the late 1980s they had also secured their place in the cultural imagination, as 
the popularity of Cyberpunk fiction and videogames indicate, as well as the rise in 
off-site art festivals such as the Sculpture Project in Munster (1987) or Places 
with a Past. Furthermore, the two start to  converge. According to Ron Burnett,
T elep resen ce , im m ers io n , an d  th e  ex p o n en tia l g row th  o f v ideogam es re flec t an 
in c reasing ly  s tro n g  c u ltu ra l d e s ire  fo r fu lly  em b o d ied  ex periences w ith  sc re e n -b a sed  
m ed ia . In o th e r  w ords, it is no t a n d  n ev e r h as  b een  en o u g h  to  ju s t  look a t sc reen s o r  even 
p h o to g ra p h s  from  a d is ta n c e .182
In line with this desire, museum-goers came to expect (rather than be surprised) 
a t being confronted by “theatrical” situations. In 1985 Tom Krens, the  Director of 
the Guggenheim, had an epiphany of
A  p ro fo u n d  a n d  sw eep ing  change... w ith in  the  very  co n d itio n s w ith in  w h ich  a rt i ts e lf  is 
u n d e rs to o d . ...The synch ron ic  m u se u m  -  if  we can  call it th a t -  w ould  fo rego  h is to ry  in 
th e  n am e  o f a k ind  o f in ten s ity  o f  experience, a n  aes th e tic  charge  th a t is n o t so m u ch  
te m p o ra l (h isto rica l) a s  it is now  rad ica lly  sp a tia l...18:'
As Rosalind Krauss explains, such a museum “has a need for the technologized 
subject, the subject in search not of affect but of intensities, the subject who
182 Ron B u rn e tt. “P ro jec ting  M inds." M edia  Art H is to r ie s . O liver G rau, ed . C am bridge, M A: M IT P , 
2 007 . 3 - 8 .
188 R osalind  K rauss. “T he C u ltu ra l Logic o f  th e  L ate  C apita list M useum ." 7.
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experiences fragmentation as euphoria, the subject whose field of experience is 
110 longer history, but space itself."18 *
By the late moos, each discourse bad nearly met its limit: the concept of “site" fell 
apart under the pressure of new telecommunication (and transportation) 
networks, which multiply the experience of space and time. For example, Stephen 
Prina states:
T h e  site-specific  seem s to  b e  g ro u n d ed  in a very  p a r tic u la r  location  an d  a p a r tic u la r  tim e, 
a n d  all in fo rm ation  is re la te d  to  th is . But w hen  you  take any  o f these  co o rd in a tes , space 
a n d  tim e, an d  you co m p o u n d  th em , th e  m odel d o esn ’t seem  to ho ld  up.w ,
This compounding results in the perpetual “wrong” place of a system that exceeds 
rational comprehension. Unlike the postmodern hyperspace that Jameson 
described, however, today’s space is multiplied as well as fragmented, duplicated 
as well as cited. We do not need to worry about growing new navigational organs 
thanks to  GPS and net-surfing Palm Pilots: our technologies will securely tether 
us to these new spaces. As Lev Manovieh states, “Over the course of twenty years, 
the culture has come full circle. If with GUI the physical environment m igrated 
into the computer screen, now the conventions of GUI are migrating back into 
our physical reality.”186
In this light, site-specifieitv may seem rather archaic; however, as Jill Dawsey 
explains, its “legacy” is “currently evidenced across disciplines, in contemporary
lS* Ibid. 17.
lS*> In J a m e s  M eyer, 20 .
,8" Lev M anovieh . T he Language o f  N ew M edia [L eonardo . R oger F. M alina a n d  Sean C ub itt, eds.]. 
C am bridge, MA: M IT  P. 2001. 2x4.
Q1
art, architecture, performance, and design, among other spheres of production, 
noting the extent to which it has been broadly assimilated by contemporary 
culture, ‘beyond the overtly artistic framework'.”18" This assimilation goes both 
ways: the electronically augmented space of commercial culture has become the 
paradigm for the art world,188 and art has been increasing called upon to refresh 
the perpetual momentum of commercial and technological “up-dates." Already in 
1984 Fredrie .Jameson argued that “the frantic economic urgency of producing 
fresh waves of ever more novel-seeming goods... now assigns an increasingly 
essential structural function and position to aesthetic innovation and 
experimentation."1811 More recently Blake Gopnik observes “how things have 
come full circle. The borrowings of fine art from pop culture -  even borrowings 
like [Barbara] Kruger’s that are meant to read as critique of their source -  have 
started to come back into the world of commerce.”1150 In this case, site- 
specificitv's legacy of infiltrating the function of a site in order to reveal its inner 
workings is redirected to bolster the site instead.
Almost simultaneously, the concept of “imm ersion” met its limit: its virtual 
approximation did not succeed in supplanting or simulating our immersion in 
the ROL in full. Although arguably close on the level of information that can be 
gleaned, a tour of Venice in CAVE, for example, cannot encode the smell of the
lS‘ J ill D aw sey, 1.
188 Sec Lev M anovich. “T h e  Poetics o f A ugm ented  Space .” N ew M edia : T heo ries a n d  P ractices of 
P ig itex tn a litv . A nna E vere tt an d  Jo h n  T. Caldwell, eds. L ondon  an d  New York: R outledge, 200;}. 
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,8‘* F red rie  Jam eso n , “’’’he  C ultural Logie o f Late C ap ita lism ." (1084) P ostm od e rn ism , or, T he
cult u ra l logic of la te  cap ita lism . D urham : Duke U n iversity  Press, 1001,4  -5.
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water or the stings of the mosquitoes or the moment of fear when the heel of 
one's shoe gets caught between the cobblestones. There is as of yet an 
experiential difference between computer- and cultural/meteorological systems, 
even if they continue to become more and more entwined. As Myron Krueger 
states, "It is true that today's virtual reality provides very limited tactile feedback, 
almost no proprioceptive feedback (as would be provided by walking on a sandy 
beach or on rough terrain), rare opportunities to s* lell, and little mobility.”1111
W hat I am looking at in this thesis is the aftermath of this near convergence and 
the crossover it created. As stated in the Introduction, the figure "crossover” 
occurs when two -/.ones approximate each other enough to create a force field 
between them that generates something new, in this ease, a new discursive zone. 
As you see on the diagram (fig, l), I am using the figure to illustrate the waxing 
and waning in prominence of new media immersion and site-specificity. That is, 
after the crossover, art works continue to be produced that indicate the 
endurance of site-specificity as an artistic approach, yet they fall to the side, 
marginalized by the rise of a “sensurround style,”1112 Similarly, new media 
immersion continues to be explored and developed; however, as Lev Manovich 
argues, it has been marginalized in both laboratories and the public imagination 
by an increased emphasis on the practical, medical, commercial and scientific 
utilizations of virtual technologies for augmented reality systems. ll«
1.11 In  R on B urnett. 331.
1.12 H al F oster. "D ouble E xposure." A rtforum  (Dee. 2 0 05). 
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Between these two marginalized discourses lies the new zone generated by the 
crossover. Here neither actual nor virtual emplacement is taken for granted anti 
presence is no longer associated with direct witnessing but rather with 
telepresence. According to Ron Burnett,
E very th ing  from  stereoscopic  glasses to  datagloves, sen so rs , an d  o th e r tactile  equ ipm en t, 
a s well as the  use o f CAVKs, su rro u n d  so u n d , m u ltip le  screens, and  hap tic  devices, 
suggests  th a t screens no longer exist as objects bu t are  m ore of a “site" o r  an  ecology 
w ith in  w hich h u m an s learn  to  create , w atch , p a rtic ip a te , anti in te ra c t.1" '
Regarding these new “sites” David doselit states, “These are the symptoms of a 
new spatial order: a space in which the virtual and the physical are absolutely 
coextensive, allowing a person to travel in one direction through sound or image 
while proceeding elsewhere p h y s ic a l ly .”11^  In more general terms, Otto Imken 
states, “This is where virtual and actual space open on to each other anti become 
undeeidable.”1^ '
Given the “undecidability” that characterizes the crossover, it is important to ask: 
how is it expressed or materialized in artworks and in their interpretive context, 
and how do the artworks envision or challenge it in turn?
Caroline A. .Jones, for example, describes the contemporary art world as follows:
V isito rs to  the w orld 's  b ienn ia ls  (and  D ocum entas a n d  M anifestas) are  by now fam iliar 
w ith  th is  sh ift from  form  to experience. W h eth e r s lu rp in g  w ater popsicles or Indonesian
Ron B u rn e tt. 320. 
u’-r> David Jo se lit. 276.
|,,(* O tto Im ken . “T he C onvergence of V irtual a n d  A ctual in  th e  Global M atrix: Artificial Life, Geo 
econom ics an d  Psvchogeography." V irtual G eographies: Bodies, Space an d  R elations. M ike C ram  
Phil C rang  an d  J o n  May, eds. London an d  New York: R outledge. lpgo. 105.
cu rries, sm elling  carbon ized  paper o f  shuffling th rough m o u n d s of coffee, w e a r in g ;; 1) 
goggles o r headphones, a rt "viewers" in tin* now m illenn ium  are  m et w ith d ram atica lly  
synaesthotic  an d  k inaesthelie  si enarins... be;gelling cu rren t desires to r (alw ays m ed ia ted) 
experience."1'
Within the crossover it is also unclear to which space tin art work belongs. As
Andrew Payne argues, we can
tak e  it as p a ten t tha t today  art lab o u rs  under th e  sign of w hat Fried calls th e  lite ra l, w hich 
is to  say the theatrical, ...Today th e n 1 is barely any  art, let alone art object; it has been 
rep laced  by som eth ing  called  cu ltu re , as .som ething we will know  by the fact th a t it 
sp read s  ou t over every th ing  like a seenograph ie  syrup . ...Today, p a c e  F ried , it is not the 
ob ject but the  affect it p rovokes w h en  placed in  its s itu a tio n  tha t counts. F or b e tte r  o r for 
w orse, perh ap s for b e tte r  a n d  for wrorse, we live in an  age o f th e  w ork o f a rt as  rainbow , as 
cab ine t of w onders, as percep tual m arvel o r  special effect." '”
It is as if Michael Fried’s nightmare “
toward some kind of final, implosive, hugely desirable synthesis”11'1' has been
actualized.
Anthony Vidler contextualizes this synthesis in wider cultural terms;
Now, the b o u n d aries  b e tw een  o rgan ic  and inorganic , b lu rre d  by cybernetic  an d  b io ­
technologies, seem  less sh a rp ; the body, itself invaded  an d  reshaped  by technology,
C aro line A. Jo n es, ed. S ensorium : E m bodied Experience, Technology, an d  C on tem porary  Art 
C am bridge, MA: M IT P. 12006.18.
">H A ndrew  Payne, "B etw een Art a n d  A rchitecture, .S tructure and  Sense." Philip Beesley, C hristine  
M aey, A ndrew  Payne et ni. Ilylozoic Soil: (iooloxtilo In sta lla tio n s 1995/2007. T o ro n to : R iverside 
A rch itec tu ral Press, 2 0 0 7 .5 6 , 57.
M ichael Fried, 66.
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invades an d  p e rm ea tes  ilu* space ou tside, even as th is  space takes on d im ensions that 
them selves confuse the in n e r an d  the o u te r, visually, m entally , and physically. ’'"’
Although Vidler is speaking gene rally, his deseriplion holds for eontetnporarv art. 
As I lal Foster explains,
im m ersive  experiences o f post cinem atic  de lirium  in w h H i rep resen ta tio n  and  space, 
m edia  and  body, a re  no longer felt to be d is tin c t... m igh t a ttem p t to engage the  new 
in ten sity  of spectacle  th a t accom panies the  new level o f  m odern iza tion , but often they  do 
so in  a way tha t only acclim atizes us to it aesthetically .""1
As Foster .suggests, art in the crossover facilitates these cultural changes as well 
as resulting from them.
Payne outlines five features that characterize contemporary art:
[ 11 an  in te rest in the in fo rm ationa l and  s im u lacra l p o ten tia ls  o f technologically  invested  
surfaces; [a] a s tu d ied  d isp lacem en t o f the  senso ria l regim es that o rganized  the 
su b jec t/o b jec t nexus u n d e r  cond itions o f m odern ity ; |g |  th e  post o r  u ltra -m o d ern  revival 
o f the  ( t c a i i m k u m t w c r k  [sic.] in the guise o f an  im m ersive m ilieu; [4] the expansion  o f 
a rt an d  a rch itec tu re ’s senso ria l spec tru m  to include non-op tieal stim u li; [5] and  the  neo- 
constructiv ist concep tion  o f a rt as an o rgan izer of novel form s o f conduct conceived 
accord ing  to gam e-like crite ria ."11"
Kach of these points is clearly indebted to the influx of immersive technologies in 
the tradi t ional sphere of visual art, which compromises its disciplinary integrity 
by including extra-visual stimuli and incorporating the viewer within the object
A nthony V idler. The a rch itec tu ra l uncanny: essays in the  m odern  u n h o m eF . C am bridge, MA: 
M IT 1\  lp q a . 147.
;‘m I lal Poster, “D ouble E xposure .” a.
A ndrew  Payne. f,7.
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itself, as Fried decried. As Raphael Lozano-Ifemmer states, “The collapse of the 
boundary is healthy for everybody.”"1’3
What I want to pick up on hen1 is Payne’s fifth point: contemporary works of art, 
by spatializing the crossover in model form, effectively model the 
viewer/user/participant. Vivian Sobchack writes:
(’ii'( troivics of all k inds it in n  an encom passing  p ercep tua l an d  rep resen ta tio n a l system  
w hose  various to n u s  ’in te rlace ' to  co n stitu te  a n  a lte rn a tiv e  and  abso lu te  e lec tron ic  w orld 
o f im m ateria lized  if m ateria lly  consequen tia l experience. A nd th is e lectron ic  w orld  
inco rp o ra tes  the  sp e c ta lo r /u se r  un iquely  in a spa tia lly  decen le red , w eakly tem pora lized  
a n d  quasi-d isem bodied  (o r diffusely em bod ied ) s ta te , "'v
What are the consequences of this post-diachronic decentring and 
disembodiment of subjectivity? On a similar note, David Joselit argues that the 
guarantees of the subject’s “presence” that were operative in site-specificity no 
longer convince:
Landscape* becom es m ediascape  w hose co n to u rs  and  topography  (as any Wed) su rfe r  
know s) are a s  unp red ic tab le  even sub lim e a s  an  u n m ap p ed  canyon in  U tah ; th e  body 
becom es an avatar, a p resence  beyond  o r b e n e a th  the th resh o ld  of id en tity  th a t, like a 
se n tie n t cu rso r, p ro jects agency an d  m obility  in to  a v irtua l world.-’,,f>
As such, whether we approach it from the angle of nev media immersion or site- 
specificity, subjectivity in the crossover, rather than conung into “focus” as
In R andy  (lladm an . "Body M ovies: A Linz Ars K lectroniea Festival Aw ard W in n er on the S tale  
o tT n terac tive  A rt.” C anadian  Art (W in ter c o n g ) ' 58.
; ,' i Vivian Sobchack. “The Scene o f the Screen : E nvision ing  Photographic, C inem atic, and 
E lectronic ‘Presence.’” Carnal T houghts: E m bodim ent a n d  M oving Im age C ulture . Berkley: tJ of 
California P, 1*004. tb.'b 
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Miwon Kwon .suggests, becomes a “function” of the virtual art work: like an 
avatar, its movements are dictated by the parameters set by the artist. As Nick 
Prior state's cynically, in the “age of computer-aided perceptions and wall-to-wall 
visuals... consumers of the visual wear t heir brains on the outside of their skulls, 
maximally exposed to the post-aesthetics of titillation and sensation.”-06
Is there another way to view this cerebral dislocation? If art today is both the 
effect and the support of this new comfort zone (which is not always so 
comfortable), then what can we learn about the world we live in from the models 
of space and subjectivity that artists build for us to experience? As Deborah J. 
Ilavnes state's, “We live' in a poly-centereel world, where virtual technologies have 
cre'ateel new definitions of self, place, anel community.”-’0? IIow are new concepts 
of subjectivity -  which have re'sulted from the loss of traehtional spatial, temporal 
anel bodily references -  spatialized in artistic form?
The old new zone and Minimalism revisited
But this new zone is not exactly new, even if the crossover is. If we look again at 
the eliagram, we can see that there has been an inter-zone -- a space between two 
organized zones -  for at least as long as the new media and site-specificity 
demarked their respective areas. Artists that ventured out into it wen; labelled 
“inter-disciplinary” or “experimental” as they worked outside of these sanctioned
;■<>(. Nick P rio r. “H aving O ne’s T ate a n d  H ating It: T ran sfo rm a tio n s  of th e  M useum  in a 
H y p en n o d e rn  EraAArt and  Its Publics. A ndrew  M cClellan, cd. M alden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 
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1,(17 D eborah  .1. H aynes. “In te rro g a tin g  N ew  M edia: A C onversation  w ith .Joyce Cutler-,Shaw and 
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discourses. Thu infamous g Evenings: Theatre and Engineering (1966) is a case 
in point: it was deemed as a both a technological and critical failure.1’08 The 
performances brought together some of the world’s best artists, such as .John 
Cage, Deborah Hay, Yvonne Rainer and Robert Rauschenberg, and paired them 
together with engineers from Bell Laboratories. The results were mixed: 
Rauschenberg, for example, staged a tennis game in which the rackets 
transm itted the sound of the ball’s impact to the lights in the armoury, gradually 
dimming them as the game progressed, and when the space was dark, several 
hundred performers entered the court, invisible to the “naked” eye but visible on 
large screens due to infra-red. But the reviews were consistent: 9 Evenings was 
accused of selling out the avant-garde4, and, as for the technology, the audience 
was “ready, able willing for a lot more than they were given.”1’00 In her review of 
the event, Lucy Lippard slates, “The opportunity to use certain technical devices 
overcame esthetic feasibility, and if all had gone more smoothly, the works of art 
would have become showcases for technological progress.”210 As it was, however, 
neither the art-types nor the technophiles were satisfied.
A lot of recent scholarship tries to claim such experimental artworks as the 
precursors for today’s art. Peter Weibel, for example, asserts that kinetic, art and 
op art “are being rediscovered” because “Everything that would later characterize 
computer art and the interactive virtual environment was there already, albeit in
:’aH.See C atherine  M orris, M ichelle Kuo, C larissa U ardiot el al. 9 E venings R econsidered : A rt, 
T heatre,, and  E ngineering , 1996. C am bridge, MA: M IT List V isual A rts C enter, e o o 6 .
M ichelle Kuo in Ibid. s8 .
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purely analog or mechanical form.”-11 lie provides the example of .lean Tinguely, 
whose motorized sculptures, when in movement, gave the impression of “virtual 
volumes.”'-’12 In a similar vein, Louise Poissant looks at experimental theatre in 
the early 1900s, as well as the “happenings” of the 1960s, and argues that they, 
like today’s technologically interactive environments, aim “for an increased 
empowerment of the spectator.”21'* Curators have also reached back in time in 
search of forerunners: the’ Institute of Contemporary Art in Boston opened its 
new building (designed by Diller Scofidio + Renfro) with an exhibition titled 
Super Vision (2006), which conlextualized Bridget Riley’s painting Pause (1964), 
for example, among contemporary artworks that investigate nano- and macro 
models of vision. “Now i t is easy to  see Pause, with its volumetric illusion, infinite 
curvature, ambiguous space, and pixilated composition, as an image that in some 
ways anticipates the familiar visual effects of computer-animated virtual 
space,”-1'! states the curator. Perhaps, just as now it is easy to see Robert 
Rauschenberg swinging his high-tech racket as an anticipation of Wii interactive 
sports video games.
Such straight lines are an effective means of including contemporary practices in 
the canon of avant-garde practices, thereby masking the u tter ubiquity, 
innocuousness and all too frequent banality of this type of work today. 
Furthermore, these straight lines effectively protect the art historian from asking
-.m i p (>tcr W eibel. “It is F o rb id d en  Not to  Touch: Som e R em arks on the  (F o rg o tten  P a r ts  o f th e) 
H istory  o f  In te rac tiv ity  and  V irtua lity .” M edia A rt .H isto ries. O liver G ran , cd. C am bridge, MA: 
M IT Ik 2 0 0 7 .3 8 .
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whether the avant-garde art as such any longer exists. W hat life is left in its 
oppositional taeties struggles to survive on the sidelines of the integrated 
spectacle, or, alternatively, sacrifices its status as art per se in order to exert its 
operations in another discipline altogether.
Hal Foster makes an argum ent with regard to Minimalism that dem onstrates this 
set of problems facing the art historian. His observation is worth citing at length:
T w enty  years  ago, I w ro te  a tex t titled  “The C rux of M in im alism ” w here  I a rgued  
th a t, in its b reak  from  the  fram e  o f pa in tin g  a n d  th e  p ed es ta l o f  scu lp tu re .
M inim alism  o p en ed  u p  a lin e  o f w ork  in  w hich  actual b o d ies  a n d  ac tu a l spaces 
w ere  tested , d efin ed , d e m a rc a ted . Along w ith m an y  o th e rs , I th ough t th a t line - 
th e  line o f  p rocess a n d  b o d y  a rt, o f s ite-specific  a n d  in s titu tio n -c ritiq u e  a rt, and  
so on  w as o f p rim ary  sign ificance . Yet it is now  c lea r th a t  th e  M in im alist 
op en in g  allow ed n o t on ly  fo r  a p rogressive  d iffe re n tia tio n  o f  b o d ies  a n d  spaces, 
b u t also  fo r th e  p a rtia l d isso lu tio n  o f  tho se  te rm s . ...T oday  th is  seem s to  b e  the  
desired  effect o f  so  m uch  a r t  -  d ig ita l p ic to ria l p h o to g rap h y , say, as well as 
p ro jec ted  im age in s ta lla tio n s  -  so  m uch  th a t th is  seco n d ary  line  o f a rt a f te r  
M in im alism  now  ap p e a rs  to  be  th e  d o m in an t one . A nd peop le  love it, o f  course, 
in  large p a rt because  it aesthe tie izcs, o r r a th e r  artifies , an  “ex p erien ce” a lready  
fam ilia r to  th em , th e  in te n s itie s  produced  by  m ed ia  cu ltu re  a t large. F o r the  m ost 
p a rt, such  a r t  is hap p ily  involved  w ith  an  im ag e  space th a t  goes beyond  the 
d istrac tive  to  the  im m ersive.-";
Foster effectively takes Minimalism from its secure place in the discourse of site- 
specificity and moves it into the inter-zone. From this point hall-way between the
-"> Hal F o ste r in co n v ersa tio n  w ith M a rq u a rd  Sm ith . “Polem ics, P o s tm o d ern ism , Im m ersio n , 
M ilitarized  Space,” J p u r n a f o f  V isual.C u ltu re  3.3 (2 0 0 4 ) : 326-70 .
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two discourses he draws two lines: one merges with the established site-specific 
line and suffers its fate of marginalization, and one cuts straight across the field 
into the crossover. What is interesting in Foster’s move is not only that it revises 
the literature surrounding Minimalism from developments that occurred 
afterward (for belter and for worst'), but also that it emphasized Minimalism as a 
watershed m om ent in art history for both avant-garde practices and m ainstream  
practices. As such, Foster’s argument reveals that it is the discursive boundaries 
of the interpretive context that prevented Minimalism’s flirt with illusionism 
from being recognized, not the artwork itself. As Rosalyn Deutsche states,
“objects of study are the effect, rather than the ground, of disciplinary 
knowledge.”1’16
This is the power of hindsight. Nevertheless, no m atter how relevant all of these 
previous artworks are to the issues that artists are now exploring, to draw straight 
lines across the zone is an act of historicism akin to claiming that the origin of 
Minimalism lies in Constructivism or that the origin of Earthwork lies in 
Stonehenge. Too much has changed and the  lines of influence and paternity are 
multiple, dotted, and indirect. As Rosalind Krauss acerbically stated in 1979: 
“Never mind that the content of the one had nothing to do with, was in fact the 
exact opposite of, the content of the other. ...The rage to historieize simply swept 
these differences aside.”1’1? Minimalism, for example, as Foster makes clear, 
sought to define and demark actual bodies and spaces; it did not seek to make
lf,f> R osalyn D eu tsche. “A goraphob ia .” Evictions; A rt an d  S pa tia l Politics. C am bridge , MA: M IT  I*. 
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-'v R osalind  K rauss. “S cu lp tu re  in  the E xpanded  F ie ld .” (1979) T h e  A nti-A esthetic : E ssays on  
P jw tinodern„C ulture . In tro . H al Foster, ed . New Y ork: Bay P, 1983. 32-3.
them  indistinguishable. The fact that, in the words of Frank Stella, “it didn’t do 
what it was supposed to  do”218 is another problem, which does not w arrant 
throwing the baby out with the bathw ater.219
Homogeneity
Assuming that art can play a role other than  further “aestheticizing” the 
intensities of media culture, it is precisely such differences that need to be 
articulated. For what is new is the imperative of working in this crossover zone: it 
is now all there is, or at least all th a t appears on the  radar. Benjamin Buchloh, for 
example, bemoans the neglect which artists otherwise experience, rendering their 
practices ineffectual:
L ook  a t M ichael A sh er, in  m an y  w ays th e  m o st rad ica l o f th e  figures involved in  
in s titu tio n a l c r itiq u e  fro m  th e  la te  six ties onw ard ...: his w o rk  is now  m ostly  neg lec ted ; th e  
v e ry  rad ica lity  o f  its  c o n te s ta tio n  ap p ears  fo rg o tten . C learly th e  com plexity  o f  A sh er 's  
w o rk  seem s to  pose , n o w  m o re  th a n  ever, in su rm o u n ta b le  o b s tac les  to  its  re c e p tio n  
w ith in  th e  p re se n t p a ra m e te rs  o f  th e  a rt w orld . So, as w ith  socia l rep re ss io n  a t  la rge , the  
w ay  to  re sp o n d  to  th e  w ork  is s im p ly  to  e rad ica te  i t  from  h is to rica l m em o ry  a n d  to  iso late  
its  p ro d u c e r as a n  o u ts id e r .—0
Buchloh is equally critical of art th a t is recognized under the present param eters. 
Daniel Buren’s current work, for example, fits in neatly: rather than connecting 
gallery spaces to spaces “outside” by way of his characteristic stripes, he now
218 In  A n n a  C. Chave. “M in im a lism  an d  th e  R heto ric  of P o w er.’’ A rts  M agazine (Jan . 1990): 44 .
210 R o sa lin d  K rauss d iscu sses  th e  rev ision  o f  M in im alism  in  “The C u ltu ra l Logic o f th e  Late 
C ap ita lis t M u seu m .”
320 In  H al F o ste r. R osalind  K rauss, Y ves-A lain Bois et al. “R o u n d tab le : T he P red icam en t of 
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makes ambiguous spatial environments of coloured and mirrored reflections (as 
exemplified in his 2005 Eye o f  the Storm  in the Solomon Guggenheim rotunda). 
Speaking of Buren’s success, Buchloh writes, “Daniel Buren, another radical artist 
of institutional critique...has now transform ed himself, willingly, into an 
affirmative state artist in order to avoid the fate that has befallen Asher.”221
Oliver Grau considers the  new media of immersion to be the primary medium of 
the “information society'”222 and David Joselit optimistically states, “this 
transform ation has produced new opportunities for a rt .”223 However, as Margot 
Lovejoy rem arks, it is not necessarily a m atter of choice: “for artists there is a 
paradox: Those who wash to comment on the contemporary are also bound to use 
the new1 media tools that are available to them  because they are expressive of our 
tim e.”224 Furthermore, given the unavoidable ubiquity' of these tools, there are 
few gradations or distinctions within the crossover: whether something is 
technological a rt or artsy technology' makes little difference to its cultural 
reception: it is all part of the same “scenographic syrup.”
Hal Foster asks: “what might these technologies render on the other side of their 
capitalist deployment? ...Is there another side to  this culture of immersive 
experience? Might there be a cultural politics that doesn't leave it to our masters 
to control even' aspect of these term s? ”22h in  order to begin formulating an 
answer it is imperative to define new' artistic positions th a t are neither
221 Ib id .
222 O liver G rau . V irtu a l Art: F rom  Illu sion  to  Im m e rs io n . 3.
22-1 D avid Jo se lit. 276.
22< In  D eb o rah  J . H aynes. 176.
“ 5 H al F o s te r  in co n v ersa tio n  w ith  M arq u a rd  S m ith . 32 8 .
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oppositonal (like Asher) nor ingratiating (like Buren), seeing as both positions 
are no longer viable. As Jill Dawsey suggests, “In contemporary culture, which 
seems too often characterized by an oppressive sameness, we may need to ask 
how the differences and distinctions that produce legibility might be discovered 
again.”226 By taking a close look at contemporary art practices that sit firmly in 
the crossover, such differences and distinctions can be discerned and articulated, 
thereby making their salience legible and more effective. This is the objective of 
the case studies that follow in Part Two.
Jill D awsey. 4.
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CHAPTER a: INTERACTIVE SPACES
“Interactivity," the buzzword of the digital revolution and postmodern aesthetics 
alike, promised to connect the inside and outside of experience in a way that is, 
allegedly, de facto political. The viewer/user is “activated" by these artworks in a 
way, critics says, that is akin to “real life.”- -  The problems with this assumption 
are glaring: how are technological prompts and theatrical set-ups akin to 
personal and social volition, and who says that we are all that ‘ : ive" in real life
anyway?
This chapter will look at two artworks that demand the viewer’s interaction in 
order to cohere: Olafur Eliasson’s Notion motion  (2005), which was included in 
the retrospective exhibition Take Your Time at the San Francisco Museum of 
Modern Art (2007) and PSi, Queens (2008), and Philip Beesley’s Hylo/.oie Soil 
(2007), which was presented at the Montreal Museum of Fine Arts as part of an 
exhibition celebrating the tenth anniversary of the Daniel Langlois Foundation 
for Art, Science and Technology {E-art: new technologies and contemporary art, 
2007)- These two artworks allow us to better understand the shift from “passive” 
observation to “active" participation that is endemic to new media immersion 
and site-specificity* alike, as well as the emphasis 011 the subjective experience of 
an art object rather than an objective evaluation of it.
This chapter first investigates the concept of “interactivity” as it circulates in art 
history in order to then ask: how does the viewer’s interaction with both Notion
Claire B ishop s tresses th is po in t in In sta lla tion  Art: A C ritical H isto ry . L ondon and  N ew  York: 
R outledge, 2 0 0 5 .
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motion and llylo/oic Soil inform her understanding of the artwork and, more 
specifically, how does her engagement with them define a particular model of 
space and subjectivity? I have chosen to loosen these artworks from their 
professional and generic categories ~ artist/installation (Kliasson) and 
architect/new media (Beesley) -  and set them side-by-side as a way of exploring 
the implications of interactivity in the crossover. As such, this grouping does not 
oppose the high-tech to the (seemingly) low-tech ill search of commonalities or 
differences; rather it highlights the assumptions made about subjectivity and its 
relationship to spatial experience in the heavily mediated technosocial context 
that these artworks share.
In particular, the questions that inform this chapter concern the precarious 
tenets of a human-centered universe in which subjects and objects are clearly 
distinguished and agency is defined in terms of individual volition. The 
rationality and security of such a world picture has been challenged by the 
widespread recognition that the cultural effects of technology exceed a vocabulary 
of utility. Consequent to this shift, the body, once a clearly demarked carrier of an 
individual “m ind” or “consciousness,” is now considered to be radically 
contingent to the energetic and technological flows that run through it. Concepts 
of “site” have likewise become unhinged fronractual geographic locations due to 
the technological possibility of being (tele-)present in more than one place at a 
time. Given this splitting and multiplying of both the subject and its location, the 
question follows; how can we understand our relationship to a space that
immerses us, given that immersion eradicates the distinction between “subject"
and “site"?
This chapter will sharpen two different responses to this question by probing the 
implications of the models of interactivity established by two different artworks: 
Olafur Kliasson’s Notion motion  is a highly contradictory spatial experience: it 
demonstrates how the subject becomes immersed within contemporary screen- 
based culture while also suggesting that breaking out of this immersion is the 
premise of the “self.” Overall, we could say that the subject is imbricated. By 
contrast, Philip Beeslev’s Hylozoic Soil does not offer a way for the “figure" to 
distinguish itself from the (technological) “ground;” rather, the subject is 
dispersed throughout a system that exceeds its ability to conceptualize as a whole 
Therefore it is not so much imbricated as it is indistinguishable. Despite these 
differences, both artworks explore the implications of interactivity through the 
iconography of nature. To close this chapter I will probe the reasons why nature 
provides such an interesting lens to explore this issue and what interactivity 
might mean on a larger cultural scale.
In teractivity
Interactivity as a creative ideal wed itself to technology in 1963 when Ivan H. 
Sutherland developed the first GUI (graphical user interface). This invention
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marked the turn from a concept of immersion that was aimed to sensually engulf 
the audience to a concept of immersion that required the audience to participate 
in the generation of the image. In the visual arts at that time there was an equally 
marked emphasis on int eractivity. Ideas of co-production through interpretation, 
such as those articulated by Umberto Ecu in The Poetics o f  the Open Work (1962) 
and Roland Barthes in The Death o f  the Author (1968) were widely embraced by 
th; (ueo) avant-garde. Minimalism emphasized the object’s contingency to the 
viewer s interaction in space; Fluxus and Happenings tried to actively integrate 
the audience into the production of the work; and Kinetic art and Op art 
demonst rated a more mechanical variant of interactivity: the viewer was asked to 
push buttons, move components or move themselves in order to experience 
optical changes. Also in the 1960s, artists started to  experiment with 
technological interactivity, as the exhibition 9 Evenings demonstrated.
In all these examples, the creative potential of interactivity was explored as well 
as its social implications, but doubts were quickly cast over the initial euphoria. 
Allan Kaprow, for example, states
to  assem ble people u n p rep a red  fo r an  event and say  tha t they are  ‘p a rtic ip a tin g ’ if  apples 
a re  th row n a t them  o r they are  h e rd ed  abo u t is to  a sk  very little  o f the  w hole no tio n  of 
p a rtic ip a tio n . ...I th ink  it is a m ark  of m u tu a l respect th a t all p e rso n s involved in a 
H ap p en in g  be w illing an d  co m m itted  partic ip an ts  w ho have a c lear idea w hat they  are to 
do.-"*
Allan Kaprow . “N otes on  the K lim ination of the A udience." (lqPB) P artic ipa tion . C laire Bishop, 
ed. [D ocum ents o f C ontem porary  Art. Iw ona Blazwick, e d . |.  London and  C am bridge, MA: 
W hitechapel an d  M IT P. n o o b . to;p
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By the end of the 70s many artists had grown suspicious of the audience and 
returned to a clear model of authorship. “1 mistrust audience participation,” 
Bruce Nnuman once state '’ Dieter Daniels describes Nauman’s well-known 
closed-eireuit installation Live Taped Video Corridor (1070) as follows:
Im m ediately  up o n  en te rin g  th is insta lla tion , th e  v iew er sees h is  own im age at the o th e r 
en d  of the c o rrid o r on one  of th e  two video m o n ito rs , while the second  m o n ito r show s a 
p re -reco rded  tape  of th e  em pty  corridor. T he a ttem p t to re assu re  onese lf o f o n e ’s 
p resence in th e  im age a n d /o r  space is ren d e red  alm ost im possib le  due to the  fact that 
m ovem ent to w ard s th e  video m onito rs en ta ils  m ovem ent aw ay from  the cam era  installed  
a t the en trance , causing  the se lf im age to  van ish  a lm o st im perceptib ly . T his hopeless to 
and -fro ing  m akes of th e  viewin’ a guinea pig ra th e r  th an  creative co-p layer.1"*"
Daniels concludes that by the 1970s, “audience interaction was either no longer 
desired, or else underwent severe ritualization and formalization.’’-s'
It is on this understanding of interactivity that site-spec fieity is premised: 
whether walking around Minimalist objects or Earthworks, or imaginatively 
engaging with the intellectual or sensorial propositions of Institutional Critique 
or Resonant Kites, the viewer’s role is not as a creative participant but as, 
precisely, a viewer. The viewer walks through the site and among its constituent 
parts or objects, but leaves 110 lasting mark of her presence on the artwork: her 
“interactivity” is limited to a spatial exploration of the site in'question. This 
exploration constitutes the raison-d’etre of the artwork, yet the parameters
In D ie te r Daniels. “S tra teg ies of In te rac tiv ity .’’ T ran s . T om  M orrison . M edia Art N et. 
hllp://w vyw .m edirnktm stnelz,de/si)urce--text/!r>5/
-»• Ibid.
‘•o ' I b i d .
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established for the exploration will hold in precisely the same way for subsequent 
viewers, as well. As such, viewers can be thought of co-habiting the site with the 
artwork, so to speak, but not co-authoring it.
By the time we hit the 1990s, “interactivity” had become an obnoxious buzzword 
of new media and site-specificity alike, cliche for everything that required 
pushing buttons or other actions (as basic as walking) on behalf of the 
user/viewer. As Mark Poster observes,
“in terac tiv ity” has becom e, by d in t o f th e  ad v ertis ing  cam paigns o f  te lecom m unications 
co rp o ra tio n s, desirab le  as an en d  in itse lf so tha t its usage can float and be  applied  in 
co un tless contex ts hav ing  little to  do w ith te leco m m u n ica tio n s.1-’:*'-*
In an essay titled Strategies o f Interactivity Dieter Daniels asks the question 
whether interactivity is an ideology or a technology. He follows the argument 
through two key periods; the 1960s, which demonstrates an emphasis on social 
interactivity, and the 1990s, which demonstrates an emphasis 011 technological 
interactivity. I le makes a pointed comparison between John Cage and Bill Cates: 
“Cage’s concept of interactivity stems from an aesthetic and ideology leading to 
the dissolution of the boundary between author, performance and audience;” by 
contrast, “Microsoft treats human users like it does computers: it programs 
them .”2^  Cage’s approach can be considered “bottom -up” in that it allows the 
musicians the freedom to modify the structure,-'! 1 whereas Microsoft’s concept of
-s~ M ark Poster. “P ostm odern  V irtu a lities .” cy b ersp a iaV tM Hd'b(>dies/Cyberpvuik: C u ltu res of 
Technological E m bodim ent 1 T heory, C ulture an d  Society 1. M ike F eatherstone  an d  Roger Burrow s, 
cds. L ondon: Sage Publications, ip p s. 88 .
-«  D ieter Daniels.
-s  i I b i d ,
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interactivity is “top-down” in that the users of the programs work in line with the 
patterns of interaction established by the software com pany.^' Daniels concludes 
that,
u ltim ate ly  th e ir  eonllic ting  m odels of in teractiv ity  s ta n d  tor two different b lu ep rin ts  of 
society . The respective p rincip les o f openness and  closedness could act as a le itm o tif  for 
th e  chang ing  m ean ing  o f the te rm  ‘in terac tiv ity  from  the  Y>os to the ‘p o s .;':,(>
In other words, the 1990s redefined the 1960s paradigm of “interactivity” as one 
of both electronic technology and late capitalism.
In order to  rescue this term from the emptying-out effect of over use, and in 
order to determine what positive social dynamics may still be at play in 
interactive artworks, it is important to look again at the origin of the term: critical 
understandings derive from human-computer interaction (I1CI), communication 
studies, and grassroots concepts of democratic exchange,237 which each continue 
to resonate in art historical accounts. The technological ideal of interactivity owes 
most to I ICI: “interactivity” is defined as the “interactive mode” of computer use. 
It is essentially an idea of interaction as control. Lev Manovich offers a useful 
summary'of IICI:
In  re la tion  In co m p u ler-b ascd  m edia, the concep t o f  in terac tiv ity  is a tautology. M odern  
IIC I is by defin ition  in teractive. In  co n trast to  ea rlie r in terfaces such  as batch  processing , 
m o d ern  IICI allow s the  u se r to con tro l the co m p u te r  in  real tim e by m an ip u la tin g  
in fo rm atio n  displayed on the sc reen . O nce an  object is rep resen ted  in a co m p u ter, it
L’v> Ibid.
:"i*' Ibid.
-■‘W D iscussed in M artin  Lister, .Jon Povey, Seth (Jiddings et al. New M edia: A Critical 
In tro d u c tio n . London and  New York: R outledge, 2 0 0 3 .4 0 -4 9 .
a u t o m a t i c a l l y  b e c o m e s  i n t e r a c t i v e .  T h e r e f o r e ,  t o  c a l l  c o m p u t e r  m e d i a  “ i n t e r a c t i v e ” is 
m e a n i n g l e s s  it s i m p l y  m e a n s  s t a t i n g  t h e  m o s t  b a s i c  f a c t  a b o u t  c o m p u t e r s . ' - ”*”
In brief, IK-I is the “ability to intervene in the computing process and see the 
results of your intervention in real time.’Tw
This idea of computer interactivity is at odds with the idea of face-to-face 
reciprocal interaction that art history has inherited from sociology and 
communication studies. Andy Lippman, an early researcher at MIT, offers a five- 
point definition of technological interactivity: l) mutual interruptibility (implying 
a complex back-and-forth exchange), 2) graceful degradation (so that 
unanswerable questions do not halt the interaction), 3) limited look ahead (so 
that none of the partners can foresee the future shape of the interaction), 4) no 
default (then; is 110 preplanned route1 to follow), and 5) the impression of an 
infinite database.”*)" As Alluequere Rosanne Stone summarizes, “Thus 
interactivity implies two conscious agencies in conversation, playfully and 
spontaneously developing a mutual discourse, taking cues and suggestions from 
each other as they proceed.”” )• But, despite this implication, as lis te r  states:
“This sounds like a pretty good description of conversation, but a very poor 
description of using a point-and-click interface to ‘interact’ with a computer.”2'*2
Lev M anovich. Tlu* Language o f New M edia [ L eonardo . R oger K. M alina an d  .Sean C ubitt, 
eds.|. C am bridge, MA: M IT P, 2 0 0 1 .5 5 .
M artin  Lister, Jo n  Dovoy, .Seth C idd ings el al. 41.
“4" In A lluequere R osaline S tone, “In troduc tion : Sex, D eath, a n d  M achinery, o r  H ow  I Kell in Love 
w ith My P rosthesis'.” T h e  W ar o f Desire a n d  T echnology at; th e  Close o f  the M echanical Age. 
C am bridge, MA: M IT P, 199C. 10-11.
’-■ u Ibid. 11.
- M artin  Lister, Jo n  Dovey, Seth  C idd ings el al. 4 2 .
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The Idea of face-to-face interaction also feeds the common assumption that 
interactivity enables grassroots democratic exchange, an assumption still at play 
in recent accounts of installation art. This belief is largely based on the 1960s call 
for lateral dialogue as a way of challenging established power systems. Martin 
bister explains:
In th is re a d in g ’in te rac tiv e ’ m edia  are  co n stru c ted  as a po ten tia l im p ro v em en t on 
passive m edia in tha t they  ap p ea r to h o ld  ou t the  o p p o rtu n ity  for social and  
political com m u n ica tio n s to  function  in a m ore  o pen  an d  dem ocratic  fashion 
w hich m ore  closely ap p ro ach es th e  i d e a l  con d itio n s o f the public sp h e re ."”
As such, interactivity is posed as a means to communicate with other people by 
way of the computer, not with the computer “itself.”
Art historical accounts of interactivity emphasize this assumption that 
interactivity is a more emancipating engagement with media than with “m ass” 
broadcast media (or discrete objects) and stress “active” operation as opposed to 
“passive” observation. Louise Poissant’s essay The Passage from  M aterial to 
Interface is a case in point. She argues that “the passage from material to 
interface” that the arts now evince is the result of many conceptual steps and 
technological discoveries over the past century. According to Poissant, artists’ 
search for new materials (and eventually for the immaterial) points “to the 
reorganization of the relationship between artists and spectators aiming, for over 
a century, for an increased empowerment of the spectator.”2^  Poissant outlines
"n  Ib id . 44.
" i i Louise P o issan t. “The Passage from  M ateria l to In te rface .” M edia Art H isto ries. O liver G rau , 
ed. C am bridge , MA: M IT P, 2 0 0 7 . 230.
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the historical forerunners of interactive art, starting with experimental theatre in 
the early 1900s and following through to the usual suspects of 1960s, Allan 
Kaprow’s Happenings and Bruce Nauman’s corridors and video environments. 
Based on this evolution, she states, “We are now (altering the era of the interface, 
which allows the users or the spectators to feel part of the process.”-r>
Poissant is far from alone in her emphasis on interactivity. Claire Bishop, in her 
hook Installation Art: A Critical History, supports Poissant’s argument that “it is 
no longer sufficient to give something to see, nor to touch transformed material.
It is necessary to have spectators experience other forms of sensations.”2'*6 Site- 
specificity, in general, is premised 011 this idea. As such, these analyses favour 
full-body immersion and supersede art history’s traditional evaluation of an 
object w ith an emphasis on the sensations of the subject. For example, Poissant 
argues th a t the “aesthetics of action” has now supplanted the  “aesthetics of taste”: 
“From now on, th is quest for meaning will be of secondary importance, replaced 
by the primacy of a relation that counts on the active and creative role of the 
spectator.”2'*7 Bishop modifies this argument in an effort to understand the 
various ways in which these “relations” determine the viewer’s experience and 
shifts the locus of meaning onto the emotional register of particular individuals. 
Poissant, like Bishop, opposes interactive art to art that'“‘was meant to be thought 
about and  not felt, 01* to be felt through the many detours of
“■is Ibid. 23 6 . 
“■i(' Ibid. 2 3 4 . 
I'' Ibid. 233 .
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int('lle(,tviali/,ation.”;,i« Both authors, therefore', assume an anti-intellectual stand 
that sweeps under the carped the intentions of many of the artworks they cited’i‘>
Arguably interactive art is more “active’” than  a static objel d'arl; howe'ver, this 
activity is still subject to the1 param eters of the artist or programmer. With regard 
to the later, many media critics have addressed the implications of “top down” 
programming. For example, Kku Wand suggests that interactivity “begins where’ 
interaction ends.”ar>{> Allucquere Rosaime Stone argues that the1 “electronic 
instantiat ion of a particular definition freezes the conceptual framework of 
interaction in a form most suitable for commercial envelopment -  the user moves 
the cursor to the appropriate place1 and clicks the mouse, which cause’s something 
to happen”'-^ 1 - poke-and-see technology. According to Stone, “the potential for 
interaction is limited, because the machine can emly responet te> an on-off 
situation, that is, to the e-lick of the mouse.”".'’2 Similarly, as Dieter Daniels avers, 
“the interaction of user and apparatus is integrated inte) the meelium itse lf  ’“-w - 
thereby yielding “interactivity.” Jean Bauelrillard goes as far as te> assert that 
interactivity is a simulacrum of activity th a t conceals the passivity e>f the user .a54
“■i« Ib id . 1246-7.
:>m p o r  exam ple1, the  fo re ru n n e rs  th a t P o issan t lis ts  (N am  J u n e  Paile a n d  P e te r C am pus, in 
ad d itio n  to  K aprow  a n d  N au m an ) are  each  well e s ta b lish e d  in the  d isco u rse  on  co n cep tu a l a r t, yet 
she  only pu lls fo rw ard  th e  in te rac tiv e  e lem en t of th e  w ork. S im ilarly , B ishop 's accoun t o f 
co ncep tua l a r tis ts  su ch  as M ichael A sher, Dan G ra h a m  a n d  M arcel B ro o d th ae rs  s tre sse s  th e  
“d isru p tiv e  force o f  the  v iew er's u n co n sc io u s d e s ire s  an d  anx ie ties"  (35) r a th e r  th a n  th e ir  
c ritiq u es o f  th e  in s titu tio n .
too Kku W and . “In te rac tiv e  S to ry te lling : T h e  R en aissan ce  o f  N a rra tio n .” New .Screen M edia: 
C in e m a /A rt/N a rra tiv e . M artin  R ieser a n d  A ndrea  Z app , e d s . L ondon: B ritish F ilm  In s titu te , 12002 
165.
“i’1 A llucquere  R o san n e  S tone. 10. 
w  Ib id .
D i e t e r  D a n i e l s .
“‘>1 In  M arie -L au re  R yan. 31.
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Despite the fact that interactivity is unavoidable when operating a computer, and 
that th is “interactivity” is a far cry from what is commonly understood as 
“interaction,” we are not off the hook: new media immersive environm ents may 
display interactivity by definition -  thus compromising any strict opposition 
between the two terms -  but the type of interactivity is an im portant factor in 
accessing how the viewer is implicated within the environment. Similarly, “old” 
media immersive environments may require a degree of interaction that static 
objects do not, but the claims made for this activity cannot be borrowed from the 
rhetoric of new media w ithout accounting for the limitations of the concept. 
Furthermore, whether “old” or “new,” low-tech or high-tech, interactive artworks 
need to  engage the debates surrounding the status of the “se lf5 as a bounded 
entity at a tim e when the tenets of posthum anism  and soft-determinism have 
compromised this boundary to an unprecedented extent. A close look at Olafur 
Eliasson’s Notion motion  and Philip Beesley’s Hylozoic Soil will help clarify these 
issues and illuminate different approaches.
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Olafur Eliasson: Notion motion
(Figures 2-9)
“If leadership in installation art for the masses were an elected position, the 
Icelandic-Danish dab hand would be a s h o o - i n ”255 announced The N ew Yorker in 
2008. Olafur Eliasson (b. 1967) is a denizen of the “discotheque’' Robert 
Smithson anticipated museums would become.286 His “studio” in Berlin employs 
a team of thirty’ architects, engineers, craftspeople, and assistants who help him 
conceptualize, design, and construct installations, sculptures, large-scale projects, 
and commissions. Eliasson is perhaps best known for his The Weather Project 
(2001); he filled the Tate’s Turbine Hall with an artificial sun, misty’ clouds and a 
m irrored sky, under which viewers were happy to sunbathe, nap, or study their 
own reflections. The artist himself acknowledged the danger that this wrork might 
slip “from  an artistic experience to mindless e n t e r t a in m e n t .  ”‘-57 As I write this 
chapter, Eliasson is making his next big international splash, The N ew  York City 
Waterfalls (2008): this project for Newr York’s Public Art Fund consists of four 
freestanding waterfalls in the East River. It is contributing (an expected) fifty-five 
million dollars to the city’s revenue.288
Eliasson’s notoriety also earned him a touring mid-career retrospective, Take 
Your Time: Olafur Eliasson, which sprawled across both the MoMA and PSi in
“G oings O n A bou t T o w n .” The N ew  Y orker (M ay 14-20, 2 0 0 8 ): 14.
R o b ert S m ith so n . T he C ollected  W ritin g s . Jack  F lam  , ed. B erkeley: U o f C aliforn ia  P , 1 9 9 6 .4 4 . 
- 5 7  D oro thy  S pears, “T h in k in g  G lacially, A cting A rtfu lly ,” The N ew  Y ork T im es, (S ep tem b er 2, 
2007).
C h arm ain e  P icard . “O lafu r E liasson 's W aterfalls fo r  N ew  Y ork." T he A rt N ew sp ap er  188 
(2 0 0 8 ): 4.
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2008 after its run at the San Francisco Museum of Art the previous year. 
W andering through the show was like reliving the little wonders that interrupt 
everyday routine -  such as watching the gentle movement of dust particles in a 
beam of sunlight, catching our image reflected ad infinitum in a manv-winged 
vanity m irror, or drawing on the wall with the light bouncing off a wristwatch -  
but on the  scale of IMAX. In Your strange certainty still kept (1996), for example, 
wrater droplets fall from a ceiling-mounted sprinkler and become visible in the 
rhythmic, frozen moments of a strobe light. It is like watching a downpour lit by 
lightning, only now the art work asserts itself as a referent for the natural 
occurrence rather than the other wray around. In these “devices for the experience 
of reality,”259 as he calls them, or alternatively, “phenomena-producers,”260 
Eliasson illustrates the promiscuous exchange between the real and the virtual 
that defines the contemporary moment.
However, Eliasson’s two descriptions are not interchangeable: the first suggests 
an essential being that can have the “experience” and an equally certain external 
“reality.” By contrast, “phenomena-producer” suggests no such philosophical 
grounding. Rather, it suggests the staging of immersive spectacles tha t have no 
integral relation to the world off-stage. Eliasson’s critical edge hinges on this 
ambivalence. His installation Notion motion, as it was shown in San Francisco, is 
a case in point as it establishes a productive tension between the two -  between a
- w  i n  M a d e l e i n e  G r v n s z t e j n .  “T a k e  Y o u r  T i m e :  O l a f u r  E l i a s s o n . ” [ e x h i b i t i o n  b r o c h u r e ]  S a n  
F r a n c i s c o  M u s e u m  o f  M o d e r n  A r t ,  2 0 0 7 .
2fK) In  D an iel B irnbaum . "In terview : D aniel B irnbaum  in conversa tion  w ith  O lafu r E liasson," 
O lafur E lia sso n . M adeleine G rynszte jn , D aniel B irnbaum  an d  M ichael Speaks. L ondon  an d  N ew  
York: P h a id o n , 2 0 0 2 .1 4 .
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phenomenological experience of a virtual world and the all too real devices that 
produced it.
The viewer approaches Notion motion through a long darkened corridor. T lu  
floor is not the usual gallery slick but is overlaid with roughly hewn planks that 
release their wooden odour and creak underfoot. At the end of the hall, at the 
back of the room onto which it opens, is a wall-sized screen. It looks like a video 
installation, perhaps by Bill Viola: on the screen appear wavelike patterns in 
black and white. Upon entering the room, the waves occupy our entire field of 
vision. Floor to ceiling and wall to wall, the undulating pattern of light is 
seductive and soothing. Of course it is not the sea nor a Viola video, but the 
cultural values attributed to water -  as renewing, vital, cleansing and, above all, 
as pure and natural -  are impossible to avoid.
On closer inspection (on the cue of a few jumping kids) several raised floorboards 
become apparent: the rate and force of stepping on them  determines the intensity 
of the wave pattern. The viewer thus determines the image: the screen changes 
from just a few lines of a long calm frequency to a saturated field of staccato, 
bright and luminous, if agitated. It is this interactive component of the work that 
changes it from being thematically immersive to functionally immersive: there is 
a feedback loop between the image on the screen and the viewer-cum-participant 
that binds them  together into a new combinatory entity.
This immersion, however, is fleeting: opposite the entrance by which we entered 
is another hallway leading out of the wave-space. The floor is the same rough
120
wood, but suddenly it ends and we find ourselves back on the gallery’s regular 
surface as if to mark the end of the shimmering experience we left behind. Here is 
an opening onto another room, literally the other side of the screen. Inside is a 
shallow pool of water with a bright light directed on its surface at a sharp angle. 
The magic is gone: by revealing the mechanism responsible for the image’s 
generation, Eliasson returns us to the mundane world governed by the laws of 
physics. Here, behind the scene, we see just nuts and bolts, which are obdurately 
material compared to the effects they generate.
In Nation motion, the back-lit screen thus establishes an arbitrary boundary 
between two very different spatial experiences: on one side, the viewer's 
movement is integrated into the itnage-spaee; on the other, her movement is 
stilled in favour of conceptual clarity. The artwork consists of both these 
experiences, thus I will analyze them separately only to then probe the conflation 
of the two ideas they so neatly keep apart: sensual immersion and intellectual 
alienation. It is this play across two different modes of experience -  “subjective” 
boundarilessness and a vantage point from an external “objective” distance -  that 
leads the  discussion to the sublime and to .Jacques Lacan. First, however, it is 
import ant to contend more specifically with the constituent elements of the 
installation: an interactive interface, a screen, light, and water.
Interactivity, narcissism and the screen
The relationship between the viewer and imaged-space is determined by the 
installation’s interface: jumping on raised planks in order to create a vibration
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that is transmit ted to the pool of water and consequently creates waves. As such, 
the installation is interne live. But what kind of interactivity is this? Parallels can 
be drawn between jumping on Kliassoti’s floorboards and I ICI: to borrow Soke 
Dinkla’s distinctions, both require purposeful action on the part of the 
viewer/participant.-*” That is, the viewers make conscious decisions about howto 
engage with the interface depending on the results they want to solicit. Eliasson’s 
inclusion of an interactive component points to his awareness of the viewers’ 
culturally conditioned aptitude to project themselves into imaged-spaces through 
technological mediation, as well as their desire to “feel” the spectacle rather than 
st “see” it.
Eliasson’s emphatically physical interface reiterates the dual role of interactivity 
discussed in Chapter One: it facilitates immersion while also dividing attention 
enough to prevent the user from getting “lost” in the image, The viewer thus 
becomes aware of her control over the image. As such, Notion motion is an 
example of what Lev Manovich calls “metarealism:”
Like classical ideology, classical realism  d em an d s  th a t the  sub jec t com pletely  
accept the illusion fo r as long as it lasts, In co n trast, th e  new  m eta rea lism  is b ased  
o n  oscillation betw een  illusion an d  its d estruc tion , betw een  im m ersin g  a view er 
in  illusion an d  directly  ad d ress in g  her,.. T he  u se r invests in the  illusion precisely 
because sh e  is given co n tro l over it,»w
In M arie-L aurc Ryan. nog. 
Lev M anovich. 209 .
On a similar note Oliver Grau asserts that interactivity within art projects is often 
subordinate lo immersion, rather than being its ecpial counterpart. I lis words art1 
worth citing again:
A lthough today the aud ience  can  exert its creative pow ers over the im age, lids 
co n tro l is counterw eighed  by the highly suggestive pow ers of the im age itself.
M aybe we a n 1 regain ing  a re la tion  to the im age th a t reaches far hack into 
precivilized history, giving it a pow er th a t tran scen d s a pw cliie  .»s well as physical 
b o u n d a rie s  and  enab les us to regress, lead in g  to an  ecstatic  sym biosis o f on looker 
a n d  image/":*
In other words, rather than peering into tm illusionistie space from outside its 
frame, the viewer/user becomes fused with the simulated reality itself in “ecstatic 
symbiosis.” Their “control” is thus relinquished to the overpowering illusion.
Mieke Bal describes this dynamic well in an essay on an earlier version of Notion 
motion :
...no  longer rep re sen tin g  m ovem ent, re ly ing  on th e  view er to m im ic it, th e  in sta lla tion  
m akes it “rea l.” The v iew er is in side  m ovem ent yet also  m akes it. Suddenly  th e re  is th a t 
tension , th a t u n se ttlin g  sense o f the self a s  necessarily  re la ted  to “yo u r in tu itive 
su rro u n d in g s” (of w hich the p a in te r  cou ld  only c re a te  the illusion). Yet, in sp ite  o f the 
p resence  o f  actual w ater, n o th in g  is real. T he rivalry  does not eoncerm the sun  an d  th e  sea, 
all o f th is is artificial, theatrical/" '*
a6» O l i v e r  O r a n .  “ I n t o  t h e  B e l ly  o f  t h e  I m a g e :  I I i s t o r i c a l  A s p e c t s  o f  V i r t u a l  R e a l i t y . "  L e o n a r d o  311.5 
3 7° •
“" i M i e k e  B a l .  “ L i g h t  P o l i t i c s . ” T a k e  Y o u r  T i m e : 1 J l a f u r  K l i a s s o n .  M a d e l e i n e  G r y n s z t e j n ,  e d .  N e w  
Y o rk  a n d  L o n d o n :  T h a m e s  a n d  H u d s o n ,  2 0 0 7 .  1 5 8 .
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H ow ever, the theatricality  that Bal evokes d o e s  not beckon  the  d iscu rs ive  m o d e  of  
address that M ichael Fried had in m ind  in 1967; rather, it h inds  the  v iew er  in 
what M anovich  calls  a “narc iss ist ic  co n d it io n .” H e  argues that
m ost new m edia , regard less of w het In » it re p re se n ts  to the u se r h e r im age o r  no t, can  he 
sa id  to activate the narcissistic  co n d ition  because  they rep resen t to the u se r  h e r ac tions 
a n d  th e ir  resu lts. In o th e r  w ords, it functions as a new kind of m irro r that reflects not 
on ly  the h u m an  im age hu t h u m an  activities. T h is is a d ifferen t k ind of narc iss ism  not of 
passive con tem pla tion  bu t ac tion . ''”'
Manovieh’s description is equally applicable to Notion motion. As Madeleine 
Grynsztejn states, Eliasson “understands their (the viewers’) kinetic involvement 
in his work as yet another, embodied and maximally individuated, way of 
seeing.”260 Specific to this "way of seeing” is the fact that the individual viewer’s 
physical movements and the “w hat” of what they arc1 actually seeing coincides.
Given this coincidence, the screen in Notion motion can be defined as belonging 
to the th ird  type of screen after “classic” aim “dynamic” that Manovich defines in 
his genealogy ~ the screen of real-time. Me explains that
W hat is new about su ch  a screen  is th a t its im age can change in real tim e, reflecting  
changes in th e  referen t, w h e th e r the position  of th e  object in space (rad ar), any a lte ra tio n  
in  visible reality  (live video) o r  chang ing  da ta  111 th e  com pu ter 's  m em ory (co m p u te r 
screen ). The im age can  he con tinually  u p d a ted  i n  r e a l  t i m e . - ' , y ’
Lev M anovich. 1235.
'•'M ' M adeleine G rynsztejn . "(Y )our K ntanglem cnts: O la lu r Kliasson, T he M useum . A nd C onsum er 
C ulture." 'fak e  Your Tim e: O lafu r K liasson. 17.
;'(l ’ Lev M anovich. pp.
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As such, tho real time screen shows the jmmcnl of the user’s interaction, rather 
than a static, permanent image (classical) or a moving image of the past 
(dynamic):'-1'’8 the vie wer has te) move in ae'tual space' to experience movement in 
virtual space. Similarly, in Notion motion, the' viewer neeels te) jum p are)iind in 
e>rder to create waves on the se'.reen, effectively turning themselves into giant 
joysticks.”'11’
What is unusual, he)we\'er, is that the viewers movements are ne>t represented by 
an avatar; rather, they are integrated into the pattern reflected on the screen. If 
there are a number of participants, then erne viewer’s movements become 
indistinguishable from another’s. It is em this point of integration and lack e>f 
distinctiem that the installation's theme of immersion (merging with the waves) 
anel its immersive functioning (using an interactive interface to implicate the 
viewer in the image) correspond most directly. As Mieke Bal writes, “the artist is 
invested in keeping viewers actively engaged by the works as long as possible ~ 
long enough, that is, for them never to be able to return to an ideological state of 
separation.”“7° Grynsztejn takes this idea further:
In  encourag ing  perfo rm ative  action  in th is  way, N o t i o n  m o t i o n  connects object to  sub ject. 
Located fully in n e ith e r the  ob ject nor the  actions o f the  subject, the  piece is s itu a ted  
instead  in an  elastic unfo ld ing  “betw een th e  sp ec ta to r and  the m ach in e” - in  experience. 
U ltim ately  N o t i o n  m o t i o n  p roposes an evocative cancella tion  o f the line a long  w hich each
-(,H Ibid. m g .
Ibid. n o .
M ieke Hal. 164.
125
body  u n d ers tan d s  itse lf as apart from  its su rro u n d in g s, a reduction  o f o u r estran g em en t 
from  a mnv m ore fully envelop ing  u n iv e rse /-’1
111 other words, in this first room of Notion motion the distance on which the 
spectacle is premised is compensated for by immersion.
Li
By focusing only on this immersive u nity of subject and object that the first room 
of Notion motion suggests, critics have neglected attending to the potent 
metaphors associated with light and water. Such oversights are common in 
discussions of art works that focus on their interactivity: it is as if the dynamic of 
interactivity itself were enough to legitimize the artwork in a message-is-the- 
medium kind of way, as if interactivity were always a positive end in itself. 
However, given the contemporary preoccupation with the dematerialized realm 
of square waves flowing through fibre-optic networks, investigating Eliasson’s 
use of light and water further defines the space of the installation and the viewer’s 
experience of it.
As Geert Lovink remarks, “Light -  the symbol of physics, rationalism, the 
spectacle, of heaven and eternity -  is a funny substance to play with. It is abstract 
yet visible, bringing clarity while retaining its religious dimensions.”2?2 Ken Ilillis 
discusses metaphors of light as they changed over the centuries, starting with the
M adeleine G rynsztejn . “(Y )our K ntanglem cnls: O la lu r Kliasson, T he M useum , And C onsum er 
C ullu re .” 18.
G eert Lovink. “Real and  V irtua l Light o f R elational A rch itec tu re: An In te rv iew  w ith  Rafael 
Lozano tle m m e r."  IJncanny N etw orks; D ialogues w ith the V irtual In te lligen tsia . Geert Lovink, eel. 
C am bridge, MA: M IT P, n o o n . 304 .
“primordial view of the world as darkness and light” and Plato’s later 
repositioning of light as a metaphysical truth “conceptually withdrawn from the 
kosmos.”'J7:i Ilillis then turns to Augustine’s differentiation between divine Lumen 
and earthly Lux, and between intellectual vision and physiological sight, with the 
value placed on the former. With the Enlightenment came the assertion that 
“hum ans also constitute a light source,” an “illuminating source of the Good.”~74 
By contrast, earlier medieval Neoplatonist mystics sought “to be flooded by the 
universal light of God, a state of ‘direct perception’ achievable only by suspending 
the reflexivity and critical distance that normal cognition operating within a 
cultural milieu provides,”2''?,
Ilillis argues that many aspects of these philosophies of light still resound in 
today’s virtual environments, especially the idea of suspending cultural 
awareness in order to “directly” perceive a mystical truth. Most relevant to 
Notion motion is his observation that,
In  N eoplatonic fash ion , u se rs  look  in to  a v irtu a l w orld  com posed  o f light. H ow ever, by 
th en  re locating  a p a r t of th e se  in d iv idua ls’ sense  o f se lf  to  an icon  located  b o th  in  an d  o f 
the  ligh t, VR collapses the  N eop la ton ic  d is tan ce  betw een  ligh t a n d  self. ...by position ing  
th e  see r  o f  and  in  the  light, as b o th  w here in  an d  illum ina ted , V R  goes b ey o n d  the  
stereoscope to suggest a tra n sc e n d e n t doub ling : b o th  it and  th a t p a rt o f th e  s e e r’s 
iconised  s e lf ‘w ith in ’ the techno logy  m igh t now  form  a n a tu ra l place.*-"6
;-"v Ken Ilillis . “Tow ard th e  light ‘w ith in ’: O ptical technologies, spatia l m e tap h o rs  an d  changing 
sub jec tiv ities.’’ V irtual G eograph ies, M ike Orang, Phil C rang a n d  Jo h n  M ay, eds. L ondon  and  New 
York: R outledge, typo. 34.
*u Ibid. 38.
*7!> Ib id . 39.
* ;6 Ib id . 41.
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The user's interactive engagement with screen culture that Ilillis exposes here is 
highly relevant to understanding the significance of the viewer’s double' role in 
Notion motion as looking into the light and being rendered visible on the 
semen by it. In the integration of bodily motility and screen image, the 
participant is metaphorically positioned as merging with the light. I lore she 
allegedly forms a “natural place” akin to Grynsztejn’s “totally enveloping 
universe,”
Certainly Kliasson is not alone in bathing viewers in light: such spaces are 
common in contemporary art and are indebted to the Light and Space artists 
working on the West coast in the 1970s, especially Jam es Turrell. Consider his 
Wedgawork IV  (1974) for example, which seems to dissolve a solid wall into an 
abyss of red light that the viewer might fall into if nearing too close. Claire Bishop 
describes Turrell’s work as follows:
T he a rg u m e n t th a t T u rre ll’s in sta lla tions a re  o b jec ts  o f p ercep tu a l en q u iry  -  like th e  
M inim alist scu lp tu res  o f  M orris o r A ndre -  has th e re fo re  ten d ed  to  d o m in a te  read in g s  of 
h is  w ork, backed  up  b y  T u rre ll’s own asse rtio n s  th a t  ‘p e rcep tio n  is th e  ob ject an d  
objective’ o f  his a rt. F a r  less a tten tio n  is pa id  to  th e  w ay in w hich  h is in s ta lla tio n s  in  fact 
u n d e r m i n e  th e  self-reflexivity  o f  phenom eno log ica l percep tio n . R a th e r th a n  g ro u n d in g  
th e  v iew er’s pe rcep tio n  in the h ere  and  now , T u rre ll’s in sta lla tio n s a re  spaces o f 
w ithdraw al th a t su sp e n d  tim e an d  o rp h an  us f ro m  the w orld . ...TurreH’s w orks do  n o t 
m ake us 'see  ourselves see in g ’ because, as G eorges D id i-H u b erm an  h as  observed , ‘how , 
indeed , cou ld  I o b s e r v e  m y s e l f  l o s i n g  t h e  s e n s e  o f  sp a tia l lim its? ’2??
According to Bishop, “The extreme effects of these colour fields frustrat e our 
ability to  reflect on our own perception: subject and object are elided in a space 
that cannot be plumbed by vision.
As Eliasson is frequently associated with Turrell and the contemporary 
resurgence of interest in phenomenology in the arts, Bishop’s observation is 
important to bear in mind: like TurreH’s Wedgework, in the first room of Notion  
m otion , self-refiexivity is undermined. Furtherm ore, given that light is not 
projected onto the viewer but that the viewer is projected into  the light, this loss 
of spatial limits is transferred onto the virtual register. That is, that part of the 
viewer tha t is jumping on the boards might know exactly where he or she is 
positioned in the gallery, yet the part of the  viewer that has entered the 
experiential space of the waves is disoriented by being submerged: it is 
impossible to locate the results of one’s input with any degree of precision or to 
distinguish it from another viewer’s. On both these counts -  disorientation and a 
departure from the reflexive tradition -  this particular site departs from the 
discourse of site-specificity.
This sense of spatial disorientation and dedifferentiation is part of the appeal of
immersive experiences. As I lal Foster states, “In this art we get the rush of special
effects along with the surplus-value of the aesthetic .”2?9 It is also a recurring
theme in contemporary art. Consider Daniel Canogar’s work, for example, in
which viewers enter a darkened space filled with projections of normally invisible
l!"fi Ibid, 87 . Also .see R osalind  K rauss, “T h e  C ultu ra l Logie o f  th e  Late C ap ita lis t M u seu m .”
O c t o b e r  5 4  ( 1 9 9 0 ) :  3 -1 7 .
’J 7 ‘> In Mai Foster, R osalind  K rauss, Yves-Alain Hois e t al. “R oundtab le : T h e  P red icam en t o f  
C o n tem p o rary  A rt.” A rt Since 1900. N ew  York: T h am es  a n d  H udson , 2 0 0 4 , 676.
129
in-vivo colls and substrates (Blind Spot, 2002) or astronomical imagery such as 
the moon and planets {Memory Theatre, 2004). Once within these macro- and 
micro-worlds the viewer's shadowy silhouette is superimposed somewhere 
between the plethora of overlapping projections in a way that suggests his or her 
immersion in the microscopic or telescopic spaces. As Canogar states,
“Technology is not only a mechanical engine: it has changed the way we see 
reality.”-8"
Clearly Notion motion taps into this dream of entering into unison with an 
energetic source greater than our own, whether that be the coded sine waves of 
digital technologies, the rays of “divine” light, or the energetic flows that 
constitute the universe as we know it through quantum  physws. He translates 
this dream  into its most simple form -  light waves reflecting off of waves of water. 
As Rosalind Krauss observes of one of Viola’s artworks, “Once physical space is 
converted to psychological space... (notice I’m not say phenomenological space), 
all connection to the reality of his artistic means is dissolved.”281 This description 
applies to Notion motion, as well: in the first room, the physical space is 
effectively absorbed into the psychological space represented by the waves. As 
such, we can also think of Notion motion as an apt example of what Hal Foster 
derisively calls “faux-phenomenology,” which he describes as “experience
-H<1 In G lo ria  Pieazo. “G loria Pieazo In terv iew s D aniel C anogar." S en tience . L erida , S pain : Kl R oser 
E xh ib ition  G allery, 2001.
“8l In H al Roster, R osalind  K rauss, Y ves-Alain Hois et al. 677.
reworked, keyed up, given back to us in a very mediated fashion -  as immediate, 
spiritual, absolute.”282
Claire Bishop’s description of one of Eliasson’s works touches on Krauss’ and 
Foster’s distinction:
In  Y o u r  i n t u i t i v e  s u r r o u n d i n g s  v e r s u s  y o u r  s u r r o u n d e d  i n t u i t i o n  2 0 0 0 , ihe effect o f a 
chang ing  sky  as c lo u d s pass o v e r th e  su n  is re c re a te d  th ro u g h  e lec tro n ic  d im m ers  on  an  
irreg u la r sch ed u le  -  b u t the  lig h ts  are  n o t concealed , an d  th e  m ech an ism  is la id  b a re  fo r 
u s  to  see. E liasson  m ak es a p o in t ab o u t o u r  pe rcep tio n  o f  n a tu re  to d a y  (as so m e th in g  w e 
m ore  freq u en tly  experience  th ro u g h  m e d ia tio n  th a n  f irs t-h an d ), b u t  th e  fact th a t  su ch  a 
p o in t a b o u t m ed ia tio n  is m ad e  th ro u g h  in s ta lla tio n  a rt (a m ed ium  th a t  insists  o n  
im m ed iacy ) is parad o x ica l.288
This paradox between its form (a medium that aims to be immediate) and its 
content (the mediation of nature) is what characterizes Eliasson’s “return of 
phenomenology”284 as faux: it operates a t the th ird  remove. T hat is, it is not 
about the nature of our perceptions, but rather, it is about the mediated nature of 
perceptions about m ediated perceptions. “Real” phenomenology, by contrast is 
precisely not removed bu t “prim ary:” In Krauss’ influential reading of Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology o f  Perception, sh. illustrates how perceptual 
“tru th ” and cognitive “tru th ” are irreconcilable, as there are certain phenomena 
(especially those of one’s own body) that the m ind cannot correlate .285
282 Ib id .
283 C la ire  B ishop. 77.
28<) C la ire  B ishop. 76.
28s See fo r  exam ple R osalind  K rauss. P assages in  M o d ern  S c u lp tu re . C am bridge, MA: M IT P, 1993. 
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Notiori motion, however, allows an escape from the primary world by absorbing 
the body into the image. On th is point Bishop’s description of Turrell’s work cited 
earlier becomes crucial. By “orphaning” the body from the here and now of the 
world, the body into which we are pushed in Turrell’s work is not negotiated in 
relationship with any alternate agency or definable exterior (as it would be in 
“real” phenomenology). Similarly in Notion motion, the virtual body merges with 
the waves as though returning to the “regressive symbiosis” that Grau defined. 
Thus in Turrell’s and Eliasson’s installation alike, “faux-phenomenology” borders 
on the oceanic: the viewer’s experience is allegedly pre- or extra-linguistic and 
her body is posited as pre-differentiation.
On this count Eliasson’s affinity with VR is clear: Hillis, for example, states that, 
“W hether positioned as a transcendence machine or a utilitarian prosthesis 
enhancing thought, VR reflects a desire for a return to either a pre-linguistic or a 
pre-lapsarian state, or both.”286 He is not alone in this observation: as discussed 
in the first chapter, many new media critics have rem arked that VR might be the 
latest m anifestation of a regressive fantasy to enter a “pre-symbolic” space. Ryan 
recounts that the radically anti-semiotic mode of communication sought after by 
VR was called the “language of the angels” by 18th century mystics.28? Lev 
Manovich characterizes the dream  as “the desire to see in technology a return to 
the primitive happy age of pre-language, pre-m isunderstanding.”288 Indeed, it 
resonates with the Lacanian Real tha t is forever out of reach but forever desirable.
286 Ken H illis . 31.
a8" M arie -L aure  Ryan. 59.
288 Lev M anovich. 59.
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The “dream of a natural language,” as Ryan calls it, is a dream of living among the 
referents without the interference of signs,2g9
Water
Here we touch directly upon the second m etaphor at play in Notion m otion : 
water as a recurring m otif of the sublime. The most famous image is perhaps 
Caspar David Friedrich’s painting of a man standing high on a cliff above a sea of 
fog th a t threatens to engulf him on his precarious perch and drown him in the 
abyss (Wanderer above a Sea o f  Fog, 1817). As catalogued by Edmund Burke in 
the eighteenth century, characteristics of the sublime include “power, deprivation, 
vacuity, solitude, silence, great dimensions (particularly vastness in depth), 
infinity, magnificence, and finally obscurity (because mystery and uncertainty 
arouse awe and dread).”29° Unlike Immanuel Kant, who focused on natural 
phenomena, Burke also considered hum an constructions -  the industrial “second 
nature. ”29i This shift in attention marks the beginning of what we now call the 
“techno-sublime:” the subject conceptually reaches out in the effort to 
understand the complexity of technological processes that, although a part of 
everyday life, seem to exceed rational com prehension.^2
On a more contemporary note, consider the work of Bill Viola, whose recent 
video installations use the latest plasma screens and special effects in order to
289 M arie -L aure  R yan. 59. A lso see M ike F ea th e rs to n e , “T h e  A esthetic ization  of E veryday Life.” 
C onsum er C ultu re  an d  P o s tm o d e rn ism . L ondon: Sage Pub lica tions, 1991. 65-82 .
-90 N ick B ingham . “U n th in k ab le  com plexity? C yberspace o th erw ise .” V irtual G eograph ies. Mike 
Crang, Phil C rang an d  J o h n  M ay, eds. London an d  New York: R outledge, 1999. 246.
-•'a I b id .
Also see F redric  Ja m e so n  o n  the sub lim e. “T he C u ltu ra l Logic o f Late C ap ita lism .” (1984) 
P o stm o d ern ism , or. The cu ltu ra l logic o f la te  cap ita lism . D urham : Duke University' P ress, 1991. 34.
133
immerse the viewer in religious imagery. Five Angels fo r  the Millennium  (2001), 
for example, surrounds the viewer with five screens in a dark room filled with 
ambient sound. On the screens, which are individually titled Departing, Birth, 
Fire, Ascending and Creation, we see water imagery, rippling waves as seen from 
below or above the surface. Suddenly the figure of a person leaps straight out of 
the depths, dramatically breaking the surface. Of Viola’s work, Hal Foster states,
[Viola] seem s to  w an t to  deliver w hat W alte r B en jam in  once called, in th e  th ir tie s  in 
re la tio n  to  film , “th e  b lu e  flow er in th e  lan d  o f techno logy” -  th a t is, the  effect o f sp iritu a l 
im m ediacy  th ro u g h  th e  m ean s o f in tensive  m ed ia tio n . T his effect is a k in d  o f te c h n o ­
sub lim e th a t overw helm s th e  body  an d  space  alike, b u t w hich today  goes w ell beyond 
sim p le  d istrac tio n  (B en jam in ’s concern  in  the  th ir tie s)  to ou trig h t im m ers io n .2**
Viola’s depiction of the sublime may be more overtly religious than Eliasson’s; 
however, the similarity is striking: as in Notion motion, Five Angels immerses the 
viewer in order to establish a parallel between the figure on the screen and the 
viewer in the darkened room. This heightens the effect of passing through the 
screen or the water’s surface to enter the wave space, virtually in the case of 
Notion motion and actually in the case of Viola’s actors.
Scott Bukatman summarizes the effect of the sublime on he viewing subject as 
follows:
T he sub lim e in itia tes a crisis in  the su b jec t by d is ru p tin g  th e  custom ary  cognized 
re la tio n sh ip  betw een  sub jec t an d  ex te rn a l reality . It th re a te n s  h u m a n  th o u g h t, 
h ab itu a l signifying system s, and , finally, h u m a n  prow ess: th e  m ind  is h u rr ie d  out
2** In H al Foster, R osalind  K rauss, Yves-Alain Bois ct al, 676.
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of itself by  a crow d o f g rea t an d  confused im ages, w hich affect because they  are 
crow ded and  confused. T he final effect is not a negative one, how ever, because it 
is alm ost im m ediately  accom pan ied  by a process of, an d  iden tifica tion  w ith, the  
in fin ite  pow ers on d isplay. The phenom enal w orld  is tran scen d ed  as th e  m ind 
m oves to encom pass w hat canno t be  c o n t a i n e d . 1
The identification of the viewer with the waves of Notion motion and the 
resulting confusion between subject and object has already been discussed, but 
the philosophical implications of this confusion have not yet been named a 
“threat.” The threat is this: if the ontological “disruption” that is experienced as a 
temporary pleasure in Notion motion becomes a permanent state, then the 
sovereignty of the subject is effaced. Within the safe confines of the gallery', the 
viewer can enjoy this threat, knowing that there is nothing to fear: it is just a “set­
up.”
This “set-up” is didactically emphasized in the second room of Notion motion, 
which shatters the dream of a natural language and spiritual transcendence by 
revealing the mechanisms of illusion. What begs to be discussed, therefore, is the 
mastery  of the sublime that is part and parcel, not antithetical, with its 
experience and central to its cultural salience: like Friedrich’s protagonist who 
stands on firm ground or Viola’s actors who press through the water without 
losing balance, the sublime threatens to overwhelm but never does: the very idea 
of the sublime is premised on a incontestable distinction between man and 
nature, subject and object, and so drowning is not a narrative option. In the first 
room of Notion motion, the subject experiences an exhilarating crisis due to the 
-l| i In N ick B ingham . 246 .
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fact that this distinction threatens to dissolve, hut when we enter the second 
room a safe distance is re-established and the mastery of the self is regained. As 
Mieke Hal explains: “When considered in its temporality, sublimity is nearly 
overwhelming, an experience of fmitude in the face of infinitude -  yet crucially, 
in the end, mastery is restored.
Considered as such, Eliasson’s two-part installation correlates perfectly with the 
two-part experience of the sublime: threat and control, dissolution and resolution, 
immersion and alienation. Nick Bingham describes this story of confrontation 
and mastery succinctly. Drawing on several other authors, he writes:
as the in itially  destab iliz ing  m o m en t of be ing  faced w ith  the ‘un th in k ab le  
com plex’ is transcended , the  positio n  o f  th e  observer and the observed are 
reversed , lead ing  to  a ‘renew ed  a n d  newly s tren g th en ed  experience of the s e lf  
w hich is now  ‘free’ to  a p p reh en d  ‘th e  w hole’ all at once. This, o f  course, is the  
m aseu lin ist ‘god-trick ’ p a r excellence: the  d ream  o f  a d isem bodied  view poin t th a t 
y ields an (im aginary) to ta lisa tio n , of an  (im possib le) ‘august p o sitio n ’ -  the  p lace 
o f  C ritique -  in  w hich ‘one is alw ays in  th e  right, th e  m ost know ledgeable an d  
s tro n g est.’-'"’
If in the first space of Notion mot ion the viewer transcends earthly Lux  in an 
imaginative union with Lumcm, then in the second space the viewer transcends 
the contingent effects of her perceptual and proprioceptive experience to enter 
the realm of Reason -  rhetorically.
-■<).! M ieke Bal. 163.
Nick B ingham . 250,
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Considering this transcendence, the second space of Notion motion can be 
understood to function according to the tenets of “critical realism” rather than 
the “virtual realism” of the first s p a c e . N o w  we are back 011 solid ground, so to 
speak, where the world is explained (away) by matters of fact, by our most 
“cherished weapons,” explanations.-1'8 “Critique” is the cultural safeguard against 
immersion. It protects us from facing, in the words of W..J.T. Mitchell, “the 
ineradicable fragility of our ontological distinctions between the imaginary and 
the real, and the tragic elusiveness of the Cartesian dream.
Eliasson relies on the armour of critique and seeks to polish it:
to  step  out of ourselves an d  see the w hole se t-up  w ith the artefact, th e  subject and  
the object -  th a t p a rticu la r quality  also gives us the  ability to  criticize ourselves. I 
th ink  th is is th e  final a im : giving the  sub ject a critical position...:*"0
This may sound like a site-specific gesture, but there is a catch to his revelation of 
the mechanism of illusion. He articulates this well: showing the machinery allows 
the viewer to see the work as a representation, rather than as an unmediated 
presentation. lie states: “there’s a certain moment where people go ‘Aha!’; the 
moment they say ‘Aha!’ they see themselves.”'*01 But simultaneous with this 
eureka moment is a loss in the power of the illusion to disturb on tological 
boundaries: “Something more artistic can make the work representational, and it
M arcus A. Duel and  David B. Clarke. “V irtual W orlds: S im ulation , Supp letion , S (ed)uelion  and  
Sim ulacra." V irtual G eographies: Bodies, Space an d  R elations. M ike Crang, Phil C rang an d  Jo n  
May, eds. London an d  New York: R oulledge, 1999, 267.
;,,)H Nick Bingham . 257.
•■!»<) in  M arcus A. l)oel an d  David B. Clarke. 265.
In Daniel B irnbaum . 21. 
i"1 Ibid. 14.
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would lose its ability to q u e s t i o n , h e  says. 1 Ierein lays the catch: “giving the 
subject a critical position” also means saving it from being in “question," as it 
would be when faced with total immersion. In brief, Kliasson provides a way out 
of the abyss of immersion to a sale position from which we can assess the waters, 
but he does so at the expense of leaving ontological distinctions between subject 
and site firmly in place.
On this count, Kliasson states that “exposing the representational layer sort of 
clears the experience and makes it possible for us to see ourselves seeing.”'*'’-'* This 
idea that art can reveal some sort of masked “tru th” is longstanding and integral 
to site-speeifieily but instead of dismissing it as conventional or impossible, it is 
important to ask: how does Kliassons “exposure” help the viewer understand her 
“critical position”? In the process of staging this elaborate contraption to teach 
viewers that “reality" is obscured by “representational layers," he effectively 
makes a representation of the representational layer, a representation in which 
the wave pool denotes natural phenomena and the screened waves denote its 
mediation. However, we can only experience the waves of water and light by way 
of this mediation, for when we look down from the edge of the pool we see only a 
volume of water and the dark plastic below. Consequently, our experience of the 
waves occurs at a representational remove. Contrary to his statement, this 
suggests that the experience cannot he unmasked or “clean'd” as it is reliant on 
the very representational layers that Kliasson seeks to peel away,
^  Ibid, 31.
In (r itte  O rskou, “Inside th e  Spectacle." O lalu r Kliasson: M inding  the W orld. (Jitte  O rskou, 
C arslen T hau , M arianne K rogh .Jensen et al. A arhus, D enm ark: ARoS A arhus K unstm useum , 
aoof,. hU p://\v\vvv.olafurrlia.N Son.net/publ lex t/tex ts .b ln il, 5.
138
As Mieke Hal states succinctly, in this way Kliasson “drastically severs the 
relationship between ‘real’ and ‘natural.”’'50'' Intentionally or not, Kliasson is 
pointing to the mutual imbrication of humans and technology in a way that 
eschews any simple humanism or determinism. In response to this effacement of 
the clear distinction between humans and “their” world, however, Kliasson’s 
Notion motion proposes that viewers learn to snap out of it, so to speak that 
they learn to put aside the pleasures it offers and view it from an imagined 
exterior. In an interview with Daniel Birnbaum, for example, Kliasson states, “our 
surroundings are being taken to a higher level of representation, and therefore 
taken away”'i()r> - and he seemingly wants to give them back. As such, his stance 
vis-a-vis the culture of immersion is nostalgic for a site-specific model of 
subjectivity in which there is still a “real” reality to be found somewhere 
underneath the layers. The second room of Notion motion effectively repositions 
the subject as the alpha agent over a beta object.
There is vet another catch to Kliasson’s “exposure”: given that the viewer cannot 
physically be in the two rooms of Notion motion at the same time, she cannot see 
herself in the sereened-image from behind the screen. This is important because 
it creates a blind-spot in the installation: the viewer cannot stand in the external 
position of Critique with regard to her own actions. But what happens if we 
change the mode of our encounter of Notion motion from temporal to spatial? 
The narrative of the sublime, which relies on one room of Notion motion being
:i"i M ie k e  B a l. 159.
' In D aniel B irnbaum . 10.
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experienced after the other, obscures the simultaneity of these two spaces. 
Following the ideas of Henri Bergson, Marianne Krogh .Jenson states:
...it is only for us tha t the  tim e-in terval exists; o u ts id e  ourselves there  w ould only 
be  space. C onsequently , sp a re  ra n , a lte r  all, only be s im u ltan eo u s , because 
w henever we speak  ab o u t d irec tion , m ovem ent and  ex tension , we have s ta rted  off 
by sep a ra tin g  the seg m en ts  from  each o th e r  and  su b seq u en tly  collated the  places 
they  occupy: tha t w hich we call 'before ' and  ‘afte r ' ac tually  exist sim ultaneously , 
s id e  by sido.s<’<>
Thus if we spatialize our experience of the installation, the passage from one 
room to  the next cannot be divided into different Cartesian coordinates occupied 
at different moments in time, as we are accustomed to thinking. Instead of here 
or there, we are left with one continuous movement that is seized in the mind as 
one spatial extension -  and actually is one gallery room divided in two bv a 
screen.
Here is the crux: if conjoined as such in simultaneity, the two rooms of Notion 
motion look remarkably like .Jacques Lacan’s famous diagram of two overlapping 
triangles that intersect at the boundary of the screen, or, in Laeanian terminology, 
the Screen. This Screen is the permeable membrane that mediates between the 
sum total of culturally acquired codes of language and vision, and the Real, the 
material conditions of existence that are forever beyond its powers to encode.-'*0? 
The Screen has the function of translating the latter into the communicable form
M arian n e  Krogh .Jenson. “W ith  In ad v erten t R eliance.” O lafu r Kliasson: M inding  the  W orld, 
h tlp ://\y w w ,o la fu re lia sso n .n e t/p u b l lex t/lex ts .h tm L  6.
Keith Moxey. T he Practice o f T heory: P o s ls tru rtu ra lis in , C u ltu ra l Polities, and  Art H istory. 
Ithaca an d  Loudon: Cornell U P, m p4 . 53 4.
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of the former as best it can while also preventing the Real from overwhelming the 
Symbolic and worrying away its tenuous hold. Notion motion illustrates this in 
almost didactic fashion: in the first room the viewer is continuous with the 
screened waves but then, by turning the corner and entering the second room, 
she is given the conceptual handles to make sense of her experience: she passes 
into the Symbolic. From this side of the sereen/Sereeti, however, she can no 
longer access her experience in the “more fully enveloping universe” of the other 
side, although it continues to seep through: the price of gaining knowledge is to 
forever contend with internal dehiscence.
In sum, if one room is experienced after the other, the work oscillates between 
two different spatial experiences. As Jonathan Crary states, “while there is this 
distinctly de-mystifying character to the mundane concreteness of these elements, 
it is paradoxically at odds with the highly evanescent and even sublime effects 
that these elements produce.”808 As such, the viewer moves from a 
phantasmagoric space to a rational space: the viewer goes from seeing reflections 
of her own wavelengths to seeing the world as external and knowable. Which 
room a viewer (or critic) privileges depends on her own philosophical outlook. 
However, what cannot he avoided in eit her of these two spaces is that both lead to 
transcendence: Light and Reason: are these not one and the same in Western 
thought? The place of the enlightened mind, the place of vision rather than sight, 
the place of the Good and the True and other such Platonic Ideas?
Jo n a th a n  C rary. “O lafur Kliasson: V isionary  K vents.” O lafu r Kliasson. K unsthallo  B asel, 1997. 
lU li)://w w \y.plafurotias.son.net/in ib l te x t/te x ts .h tm l. 7.
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Furthermore, the first room of Notion motion suggests that the viewer is a 
creative agent capable of generating space through physical movements, yet in 
the resulting space, no definitive position is attributable: she is immersed. In the 
second room, the viewer is no longer part of the play; rather, she becomes part of 
the audience that watches how others interact with the set-up: she has no role. 
Amid all the contractions Notion motion sets in motion, this is incontestable: in 
neither room can the viewer assess her own entanglement in the specifics of the 
site. She is alternately everywhere and nowhere, Eliasson’s installation thus offers 
a false sense of agency: with the body lost, banished or both, the subject cannot 
act in the virtual/actual site in which it is nevertheless imbricated. In Notion  
motion the double empowerment of creating our own wave space and assessing 
this space with the tools of cultural reason tu rns out to be a double 
disempowerment.
By contrast, when thought of in its spatial simultaneity, Notion mot ion privileges 
neither the apparatus nor the “natural” elements, neither the Light nor the 
Critique, but rather investigates the “indeterm inate lim it” between themA°9 In 
Jonathan Crary’s words, “It is a question of mobile and non-hierarchized 
relations between spectator, apparatus and milieu -  elements out of which a non- 
identifiable and non-localizable phenomenon coalesces and subsists.”'!10 Given 
this non-lvierarchical non-identifiable non-location, Notion motion  opens an 
interstitial space in which the subject can experiment with its pre-subjeetive
•|m> .Jona than  C rary. “Y our C olour M em ory: I llu m in a tio n s o f  the U nforeseen ." O lafur Kliasson: 
M inding  the  W orld. IiU p://\v\v\v.o la fu re lia sso n .n e t/p u b l tex t/lex is .lit ml. 4.
•,10 .Jonathan  Crary. “O lafu r K liasson: V isionary  K vents.” 6.
1 4 2
status. In Lacanian term s, this shifts the emphasis off of the graduation into the 
Symbolic and on to the t ransitional m irror “phase,” which is not yet or no longer 
here nor there. As the curator of the exhibition Madeleine Grynsztejn states,
“This ‘in-between’ space is the crucial space of process, creativity and agency that 
Kliasson wishes both his work and its viewers to inhabit.”'*” It is to this end that 
he insists on interactivity.
But can the viewer feasibly stay in this “in-between” space without falling into the 
pitfalls of disorientation or transcendence? Jonathan Crary’s premise in The 
Techniques o f  the Observer, like Hillis’, is that optical technologies, by 
conditioning viewers to  see a certain way, function as the “training ground”'*12 for 
assuming a certain model of subjectivity. I-Iillis states that,
T hough th e  form s a n d  cu ltu ra l con tex ts o f  th e  cam era  o b seu ra  an d  VR differ, all ad d re ss  
a n  ongo ing  W este rn  desire fo r  tran scen d en ce  from  ‘th is  ea rth ly  p lan e ’, an d  each  suggests  
th a t th is  m igh t b e  o b ta in ed , if  only v irtua lly , th ro u g h  th e  fusion o f im ages a n d  rea lity , an d  
a b a n d o n m e n t of th e  em b o d ied  c o n s tra in ts  o f rea l p laces. ...b o th  offer im ag in ary  access to 
a  paralle l w orld in  w hich, a s  if  by  m agic, u se rs  m ig h t b ecom e th e  c re a to r  o f  th e ir  ow n 
onto logical g round . *1:*
In the first room of Notion motion  the “parallel world” to which the viewer 
‘“transcends” is characterized as an undivided “nature” before figure/ground 
distinctions: the viewer is reflected as a particular wavelength among waves: 
subject and object are made of the same substrate, so to speak.
:!U M adeleine G rynsztejn . “A tten tio n  U niverse: T h e  w ork  o f O lafur K liasson.” O lafu r K liasson. 39.
*11! Ken H illis. 27.
;!1;* Ibid. 28.
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Yet there is a question still left hanging:
IIow  can a reflective in d iv id u a l ab so rp tio n  in  th e  fringes, tra n s itio n s , pu lses o f o n e ’s ow n 
p a rtic u la r  ‘p u re  experience* be effectively reconc iled  w ith ‘ex p erien ce ’ as im m ers io n  in th e  
tang led  confusion  o f a sh a red , m u tu a lly  in h ab ited  w o r ld ? 51 >
That is, if in the first room of Notion motion the viewers interact with the artwork 
by becoming fused with it (as Oran suggests), how can they subsequently “see 
themselves” as part of a specific site? The second room proposes to do just that; 
however, it only succeeds in replacing the fusion of the subject and object with 
the domination of the subject.
P hilip  Becslev : H y lozo ic  S o il
(Figures 10-14)
Philip Beesley’s installation Ihjlo/.oic Soil offers a very different model of 
interaction and spatial experience, and, consequently, a veiy different model of 
subjectivity. Beesley (b. 1956) is a practicing architect in Toronto who designs 
public and residential buildings, as well as stage-sets and exhibitions, l ie  also re ­
directs the Integrated Centre for Visualization, Design and M anufacturing 
(ICVDM), where he researches the integration of flexible lightweight structures
111 J o n a th a n  C rary. “R obert Irw in  and  the  C ondition  o f  T w iligh t.” R obert L ehm an  Lee lu re s  3. 
B ettina Funcke an d  K aren Kelly, eds. N ew  York: Dia A rt F o u n d a tio n , 2 0 0 4 , 83 .
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and interactive systems in architecture. Beesley has earned several prestigious 
awards and grants for his architectural work (including a Governor General’s 
Award in 1998 and the Prix de Rome for Architecture in 1995). He is also known 
for his architectural scale geotextiles, which are inspired by the organic world but 
created with the use of highly specialized visualization tools and digital 
technologies.
Hylozoic Soil is one of these large scale geotextile installations. Walking into the 
artwork is like entering the recesses of a forbidden forest, or the deep contours of 
moist cave: it seems to be alive with hidden life forms and ancient secrets. Webs 
of plastic mesh hang in stalactite and stalagmite formations. Small fern-like 
appendages furl and unfurl themselves gently. Geodesic organizations and 
latticework arch overhead to create a porous, provisional enclosure. Clusters of 
fleshy balloons inhabit its lining like barnacles o r a colony of an unidentified 
species. As curator Jean  Gagnon describes it, "These quasi-plants -  all synthetic 
-  come to life in the space, retracting, contracting, slackening and opening as we
pass/’s^
Indeed, they seem alive despite their origin b  r ~rylic and silicon rather than 
protein and carbon. W hether prim ordial or beckoning the future into early arrival, 
Hylozoic Soil is a highly functioning assemblage of material bits and digital bytes. 
According to Beesley, the various twitches and turns of the members of this 
strange ecosystem function like the parts of a body: he describes “breathing
3*5 J e a n  G agnon . E -art: new  technologic ., a n d  co n te m p o ra ry  a r t . M o n trea l: M o n trea l M useum  o f 
Fine A rts  an d  th e  D aniel L anglois F o u n d a tio n , 2 0 0 7 .1 3 .
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pores” that sweep through the air, “kissing pores” that cup and pull, “swallowing 
pores” that expand and contract, and “whiskers” that ripple and spin.''5*16 
Following this analogy, the visitor inside the installation is like the prey of giant 
Venus Fly-Trap, being tickled and ultimately digested.
As the title suggests, Beesley is an advocate of Hylozoism, a belief that m atter is 
anim ate and p 'ssibly even conscious, and that therefore life is inseparable from 
matter.-w Here he has anim ated standard m anufacturing m aterials with 
electronics: it uses sensors and proximity detectors, muscle wires, actuators, and 
networks of microprocessors to  sense and respond to the viewer’s movement. As 
such, Hylozoic Soil is an example of reactive interactivity*: it does not involve the 
user’s purposeful action (as does Notion rnotion) but results from her movement 
and position in space, for example, or from her volume, speed, tem perature, etc. 
By walking through the  “body” of the installation, the viewer is feeding data to its 
artificial intelligence, which is fed back in a seemingly erratic way.
Tim McKeough recounts his encounter with Hylozoic Soil in the magazine Wired. 
Here is his announcement (nearly) in full:
“T he f irs t im p ressio n  is th a t  i t ’s very b en ig n ,” Beesley says. In d eed  th e  co lum ns -  m ade of 
over 7 0 ,0 0 0  de lica te  la se r-c u t co m p o n en ts  th a t  converge in  a skele ta l canopy -  ap p ear 
h a rm less . T hen  y o u  notice th e m  sw allow ing like a  fo rest o f  m echan ica l th ro a ts . A system  
o f p rox im ity  sen so rs , m ic ro co n tro lle rs , s tra n d s  o f  tita n iu m  nickel m em o ry  w ire , and  
custom  circu it b o a rd s  help  H y l o z o i c  S o i l  zero in  on  v ictim s. H u n d re d s  o f  frond like  fingers
v 6 P h ilip  Beesley. H ylozoic Soil: G eo tex tile  In s ta lla tio n s  1 0 0 5 /2 0 0 7 . Philip Beesley, C hristine  
Macy, A nd rew  P ayne et al. T o ron to : R iverside A rch itec tu ra l P ress, 2 0 0 7 .1 5 8 . 
aw C h ris tin e  M acy. “D isin teg ra ting  M atte r, A n im atin g  F ie ld s.” H vlozoic Soil: G eotex tile  
In s ta lla tio n s  iq q f ; /2007 . 3 0 .
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m ade of se rra ted  M ylar, ace ta te , and  po ly carb o n ate  reach  ou t to  g ree t you, as dense 
colonies o f w hiskers w ave excitedly overhead . But d o n 't get too  close: N eedles a ttach ed  to  
tin y  la tex  b lad d ers  a re  po ised  to  pierce y o u r skin , an d  co llector b a rb s  grab h a ir  and 
clo th ing . “It has a lo t o f  hu n g er,"  Beesley says. “It tre a ts  you  m uch like  any w ild an im al 
w ould  tre a t  a hum an : Y ou’re its  food.”*18
This brief description opens up several interrelated issues that are im portant to 
explore in the context of this chapter: the relationship between reactive 
interactivity and our awareness of bodily and spatial limits; the installation’s 
mimicking of “natural” forces and its exemplification of the technological sublime; 
and the  cultural implications of the model of subjectivity’ that is homologous with 
this “digested” body and indefinite space.
Interactivity
In the discourse of immersion, the rate and quality’ of feedback is of utmost 
concern: with head-tracking and other devices which survey the  body’s position 
in order to map it onto the digital space, interactivity becomes the primary means 
of implicating the  user within the virtual world. In Hylozoic Soil, feedback is 
seemingly erratic: its software is organized into “local behaviour affecting isolated 
groups of devices, coordinated behaviour between neighbouring groups, and 
global behaviour running throughout the whole system.”319 Contingent but not 
interdependent, “[ejach board produces its own response to local sensor 
activity”^20 while also listening for messages from neighbours and headquarters.
8,8 T im  M c K e o u g h .  W ir e d  15 .11  (N o v .  2 0 0 7 ) :  1 3 4 .
P h i l i p  B e e s le y .  1 5 9 .
220 I b i d .
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Consequently information flows through the system in a decentralized way, 
dispersing its pulses rather than gathering them  for organized action.
Of particular interest here is N. Katherine Hayles’ argument that through the 
ubiquitous use of digital technologies, the understanding of information as 
pattern and randomness (rather than presence and absence) has become a 
feature of everyday life. As previously cited, with regard to VR systems she writes: 
“In these systems, the user learns, kinaesthetically and proprioceptively, that the 
relevant boundaries for interaction are defined less by the skin than bv the 
feedback loops connecting body and sim ulation.”321 Hylozoic Soil, rather than 
allowing the viewer to see a mirror image of her movement in an altered form 
(like when an elbow corresponds to an extra appendage in the virtual reality), 
responds to  our movements in a way that makes it impossible to incorporate its 
algorithms into our own body. Consequently the boundaries for interaction 
remain unclear and we cannot gain control over its responses even as we sense 
that it is we who are instigating the subtle frissons and vibrations.
Andrew Payne describes the interaction with Hylozoic Soil differently. He writes:
“these works., .construct a kind of eerie simulacrum of the inter-subjective
encounter, one in which the object/milieu gestures by turns seductively and
ominously to the viewer/occupant.”322 With neither the installation cohering as a
distinct entity, nor the viewer’s feedback reflecting her seeming physical integrity',
the distinction between one and the other is blurred. As Beesley states, this is “an
32' N. K atherine  H ayles. “V irtual Bodies an d  F lickering S ignifiers.” The V isual C u ltu re  R ead er. 2nd 
ed. N icholas M irzoeff, ed . London an d  New  York: R outledge, 1998, 2 0 0 2 .1 5 3 .
322 A n d r e w  P a y n e .  “ B e tw e e n  A r t  a n d  A r c h i t e c t u r e ,  S t r u c t u r e  a n d  S e n s e . ” H y lo z o ic  S o i l :  O e o te x t i l e  
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intertwined world that moves beyond closed systems.”"2:! The boundaries of 
neither "it” nor “I” are clear in Hylozoic Soil's “extended physiology,”"2' Here we 
touch on the second issue: just as the distinction between user and installation is 
blurred, so too is the distinction between “technology” and “hum an,” Half 
organism/half microchip, Hylozoic Soil can be described as a biometric 
environment that seeks to “reconcile natural processes and the artificial 
world.”"2" it is also biomimetic: it aims to replicate existing biological 
functions."26
In the epigraph to the catalogue, Eric Haldenbv goes so far as to state that, “This 
wonderful piece refreshes, or, even, restores the fundamental relationship 
between the built and natural environments.”"2'7 This “fundamental” relationship 
is of course highly debatable. Momentarily disentangling Hylozoic Soil’s dual 
iconography of organic life and technological networks will open two different 
trains of thought and bring the implications of their synthesis into greater relief.
“Nature” and networks
Describing Hylozoic Soil without reference to natural figures such as caves, 
forests and bodies would be difficult: the allusion is slippery yet too clear to deny. 
In the context of Beesley’s previous work, these references gain in credibility. 
Several of his installations were even inserted into the natural environment, such
■ w  P h i l i p  B e e s le y .  2 0 .
"u  Ib id . 21.
"-5 J e a n  G a g n o n .  15.
22(1 C aro line A. Jo n e s . “B iom em etics.” Scnso rm m : Ih n b p d ied E x p e rien ce , T echnology, an d  
C ontem porary  A rt. C aroline A. Jo n e s , ed. C am bridge, MA: M IT P, 2006 .115 . 
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as Haystack Veil (1997) and Erratics Net (1998), These projects consisted of 
fabricated mesh textiles that hovered above the ground. Overtime, they 
mimicked the process of soil composition and decomposit ion like “alien 
appendages to nature’s body.”3-8 Implant M atrix  (2006), by contrast, is an 
interactive geotextile that acts like a terrestrial prosthesis. Unlike soil, the 
“implant” displays “mechanical empathy,” which Beesley defines as a kind of 
“architectural eroticism”: “The components of this system are mechanisms that 
react to human occupants as erotic prey. The elements respond with subtle 
grasping and sucking motions.”32'1
What is evident in these previous works is Beesley’s interest in the “ground” -  
both literally and in the artistic sense. Beesley states, “In terms of figure-ground 
relationships the figures I compose are riddled with the ground.”330 In this way 
his work is akin to Walter de Maria’s Earth Room  (1977), in which the viewer 
becomes the only visible “figure.” But to consider his work as an example of 
Earthwork would be misleading: rather than moving the concerns of sculpture 
out into the “expanded field” that Rosalind Krauss maps out, in which a 
sculptural “figure,” whether minimally apparent (like Richard Long’s walks 
through the English countryside) or intrusive (like Michael I Iei/.er’s Double 
Negative), still reigns over the “ground,” Beesley’s concern is more in line with 
Robert Smithson’s: both artists are determinedly non-figural. As Rosalind Krauss 
states of Smithson’s Enantiomorphic Chambers (1964), for example, in which
32fl P h i l ip  B e e s le y .  2 a .
3;"> Philip  Beesley.
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mirrors are positioned in a way that the viewer visually disappears from the space, 
“It is not just the viewer’s body that cannot occupy this space, then, it is the 
beholder’s visual logic as well; Chambers explores what must be called a kind of 
‘structural b l i n d n e s s . S i mi l a r l y ,  when within Ihjlo/.oie Soil, the viewer cannot 
define their position in relation to the space as they are effectively dispersed 
throughout a structure that exceeds figuration: it appears as all ground.
As such, perhaps Beesley’s work is better compared to a modern painter like 
Alberto Giacometti, who “tried to  eliminate the notions of a distinct object and 
empty space,'”:« 2 In his sculptures we see the flesh torn open and extending 
outward to the world as if melting and pulled by a non-loealizable force of gravity. 
Or perhaps Surrealism is a more apt comparison: its adherents played with the 
lack of distinction between humans and machines already in the early 20Ul 
century. For example, think of Max Ernst’s collage of a strange looking aircraft 
with thick human arms flying over a field that is empty except for two small 
soldiers carrying a wounded third (Murdering Airplane, 1920). According to 
Richard Serra, however, the subversive effects that Surrealism generated at the 
time have now been commodified into normative thrills, now, that is, that the. 
human/machine distinction is 110 longer clear cut. I le dismisses it by saying, 
“There is nothing cheaper than cheap Surrealism.”^
Aspects of surrealism are continued in the 1990s postulation of the informe. 
Originally theorized bv Georges Bataille, the informe acts to de-class matter,
•W‘ R osalind  K rauss. “E n tropy .” Form less: A U ser’s  G uide. Yve-Alain Bois an d  R osalind  E. Krauss. 
New York: Zone Books, 191)7. 76.
Lev M anovieh. 255.
:w:> In M ark  Godfrey. "P ierre lluyghe 's  D ouble Spectacle." Grey Room 32 (S u m m er :>oo8); 59.
submit structures to entropy, and otherwise “bring things down in the* world.”■«»
I to writes, “What it designates has no rights in any sense and gets itself squashed 
everywhere, like a spider or an enrlhworm.”:w-> Ilis ideas were picked up by 
Rosalind Krauss and Yves-Alain Bois, whose exhibition L'informe: Mode 
d ’emploi ( U)t)6) discredited the opposition of form and content oil which 
modernist art history is based. Instead, the in fori no seeks to liberate art and its 
interpretation from questions of style and iconography and, rather, focus on its 
value us an operation , "which is to say, neither as a theme, nor a substance, nor a 
concept.”'«(> It also discredited the modernist segregation of the arts according to 
their primary perceptual modality, in this case vision. Instead, the informe 
participates in a fantasy that experience could he unmediated by the “hegemony 
of the visual.
If we put the ideas of the informe to use with regard to Ihjlo/.oie Soil, the 
operation that the installation enacts through its reactive interface is to 
decentralize the subject by dispersing its input across the installation and 
outputting it in various perceptual modalities, and thus offering a “thrill.” .Jean 
Gagnon calls Beesley’s projects “probes into an aesthetic of reception.”:*#1 
“Aesthetic” is the appropriate1 word as it is the viewer’s proprioception that, when 
dispersed throughout the svstenr, becomes sensible by another organ, such as a 
whisk of air on hen* skin, for example, or a quiet “click” of plastic parts. As such,
« i In Yve-Alain Bois and  R osalind  K. K rauss. 5,
*»•'> Ibid,
:u<> Yve- A lain Bois. “Thu Use Value' o f ‘Form less.’" Form less: A U ser’s G uide. 15.
■e • C aroline A. .Jones. “The M ediated  Sensurium ." Sensoriim r. K inbodied E xperience, Technology, 
and Contem porary ' Art. 18.
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the subject is do-classed, lowered to the level of an organism whose organs 
express themselves independently of a central nervous system. As described by 
the mid-twentieth cent my philosophy of Orgonomy, “milliards of organisms 
functioned for countless thousands of years before there was a brain.
Given this dispersal, the info mu* also helps make sense of llijlo/.oic Soil's affinity 
with vast information networks. Here a discussion of iconography meets it limit: 
these networks are most often thought of in terms of their “unthinkable 
complexity’”* *° and their inability to cohere as a visible or cogent “form.” The 
great military powers - and the fibre-optic channels they carved across the globe 
to transfer information at the speed of light from one node to the next are 
equally difficult to hold in the mind as a distinct figure. As Fredrie Jameson states,
the  technology of o u r own m om ent no lo n g er possesses this sam e  capacity  for 
rep re sen ta tio n . | ... 11 F u r th e rm o re 11 w an t to suggest th a t our faulty  rep re sen ta tio n s  o f 
som e im m en se  eom m uniealional and  co m p u te r ne tw ork  are them selves hu t a d is to rted  
figura tion  o f  so m eth ing  even deeper, nam ely , the w hole w orld system  of a p resen t d a y  
m u ltin a tio n a l cap ita lism , m
Resistant to representation or faultily figured, digital information networks and 
the late capitalist system they support evoke the technological sublime.
The parallelism between “natural” nature and “technological” nature inherent in 
the idea of the technological sublime is not lost on Beesley; perhaps it is even the
Ibid. no .
■u>> Nick B ingham . e .|.p P o .
aH Fredrie Ja m e so n . “The C ultu ra l Logie of Late C apitalism ." (1084) P o stm odern ism , or, T he 
cu ltu ral logic o f la te  capitalism . D urham : Duke U niversity  Press, u jq t, 36-7.
premise of llyhm nc Soil, What is clear is that the' installation exceeds “the binary
oppositions of our traditional ways of thinking: oppositions such as
subject/object, self/other, form/function, organic/inorganic, static/dynamic.
The crux of the issue is that, if both terms are figured in the mind as “nature,” 
bio-nature and metric nature, how can we hope to disentangle them? Bruno 
Latour argues that this desire to  separate the scientific from the political and 
laboratory experiments from public experience is “one of the most tragic 
intellectual failures of our age.” us He writes:
T h is  is w hat has changed  so m uch: there  are  still people  who oppose  the no tion  o f 
sp littin g  science a n d  h u m an ity  in to  ‘two cu ltu res ', bu t th e ir efforts have now  
m oved inside the sciences them selves, w hich, in the m ean tim e , have expanded  to  
cover the whole o f  cu ltu re  an d  politics. The new  political, m oral, ethical, a rtistic  
fau lt lines are  now  inside th e  sciences and  technology, hu t to say  'in side ' no 
lo n g er m eans any th in g  since  it is also everyw here in the  collective experim en ts  in 
w hich w e are  all involved. If  n o th ing  is left o f the trick ling  dow n m odel o f  science 
p roduc tion , n o th in g  is left o f  the two cu ltu re  a rg u m en t e ither, even though  o u r 
best m inds still d ream  of keep ing  scientific facts an d  h u m an  values ap a rt, o r 
even s tra n g e r expect to ‘b u ild  a b ridge’ betw een  th e  two d o m ain s as if they w ere 
n o t totally en tang led . P e rh ap s it is less a tragedy  th an  a farce. * h
According to Latour, distinguishing between an external, unified, scientifically 
factual “nature” and the grey domain of human values is “farcical” because it
^i-'.Iean G agnon. i.|.
i* B runo Latour. “A tm osphere, A tm osphere ."  O lafur Kliasson: The W ea th e r Project, T he U nilever 
Series, Susan  M ay, Bruno L atour, Israel Rosenfield, et al. London: T a te  Publishing, u o o g . gg.
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defers a degree of responsibility to nature as though it were not a product of the 
same cul tural deliberations that govern the rest of our environment.
Instead of trying to distinguish between them , the question then becomes, what 
do we get when we integrate them? It is now widely accepted that nature is a 
culturally constituted category, hut arguments running the other direction are 
less common. Drawing on (lilies Deleuze and helix Guattari’s idea of the 
“niaehinie p h y lu m ,”ti:> Otto Ini ken argues that we need to start thinking about 
the Matrix -  the name he gives the “the power g r i d ”'*!0 of global 
telecommunications networks that link and combine heterogeneous virtual and 
actual communication spaces as a new artificial-life form, not just as similar to 
a life form:
[The M atrix  is] not a m ere  organ ism  (w hich is still tra p p e d  hy its  lim ited  
functionalities an d  restric tive  s tra tifica tio n s) b u t a n o n -lin ea r, asym m etrica l, 
chao tically -assem bled  functionality  w ith m u ch  m ore  po ten tia l freedom  th a n  that 
o f  an  en tity  encased  in sk in  or lim ited  to b e in g  an  agg lom eration  o f  d iscre te  
organs. A new  being m ad e  up of w idely d is tr ib u te d  h ard w are , softw are, a n d  
pulses o f  electricity  cou rsing  th rough  its nervous system  is now  s tre tch in g  its 
exoskeleton  across the p lane t, in to  the u p p e r  a tm o sp h e re  crow ded w ith sa te llites, 
an d  even ou t to inco rpo ra te  da ta  from  sen so rs  on  the G alileo space p ro b e  
cu rren tly  o rb iting  Jupiter.:* e
:*•<!• D eleuze, Gillcs an d  Felix G u atta ri. A T housand  P lateaus: C apitalism  and  S ch izophren ia . T ran s, 
and Forew ord  B rian M assum i. M inneapolis: U o f M in n eso ta  P, 1987, 409-10 .
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According to Imken, consumer-friendly interfaces disguise “the raw chaotic flux 
of digital bits with multicoloured tree-structures, imaginary desktops, and self- 
descriptive g r a p h i c s ”^ 8 in order to represent the Matrix in the guise of a machine 
that is under human control, coherent and unified.
But neither “bio-” nor “artificial-” life are as organized as we would like to figure 
them. The Matrix is not like a “mere organism” but neither is this “organism ” the 
“mere” discrete entity we once thought:
Life does no t o r a i r  in  a sta te  o f  equ ilib rium , but h a s  been show n to be a chaotic , 
se lfo rg a n iz in g  p ro cess  em erg ing  out o f  th e  in c reasin g  com plexity  of a given 
po p u la tio n . ...C om plexity a rise s  when increasing  connectiv ity  c rea tes dynam ic  
new  possib ilities am o n g st p rev iously  iso la ted  co m p o n en ts : new  processes such  as 
com p etitio n , rep ro d u ctio n , m u ta tio n  a n d  especially  evo lu tion .m1’
Bio- and artificial-life processes are thus remarkably similar. In light of 
this similarity -  and in light of the current revival of a soft technological 
determinism -  ascertaining whether we have become more like digital life 
forms due to their pervasive influence on all sectors of life or whether we 
never were different from them in the first place is of little use. The end 
result is the same: the distinction is hard to maintain. As Donna llaraway 
states, “the difference between natural and artificial, mind and body, self-
1 ibid.  94. 
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developing and externally designed” has become “thoroughly
ambiguous.”:®’
Claude Fischer encapsulates the premise of soft determinism well:
A ccording to  th is  school o f th o u g h t, new techno log ies a lte r  h isto ry , n o t jsolely] by 
th e ir  econom ic logic, bu t by th e  cu ltu ra l a n d  psychological tra n s fe r  o f  th e ir  
e ssen tia l qua lities to th e ir  u se rs , A techno logy  ’im p r in ts ’ itse lf  on  perso n a l and  
collective psyches.™*
(liven this “impression,” the question then follows, what does it mean for 
subjectivity? According to .Jonathan Crary, the “loss of autonomy due to the 
increasing integration of the individual into various electronic, networks and 
assemblages.... is a question of the ongoing prosthetic subsum ption of the 
nervous system into becoming simply a relay or conduit amid larger systems and 
flows. Furthermore, given that these larger systems and flows of various 
electronic networks constitute “an evolutionary, spatio-temporal process of 
connection and intertwining, not a virtual geography,” ^ >3 the question of how we 
can inhabit its space becomes all the more urgent.
On these two counts -  space and subjectivity - (lilies Deleuze and Felix 
Guattari’s tome A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia provides 
the most apt theoretical frame for understanding Hylozoic So il As Elizabeth
:,;><) In A nthonv  Vidlor. T he a rc h ite c tu ra l uncanny : essays in the  m o d e rn  unhom ely . C am bridge, 
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Grosz states, “Deleuze is a cartographer offeree rather than form.”:ii>i Together 
with Guattari, he outlines a concept of the “body without organs” (BwO) that 
describes the non-transcendent dispersal of subjectivity or, rather, functionality, 
throughout II, hrzoic Soil's “extended physiology,” as well as its implications.
Mere is their advice 011 how to become a BwO:
W e are  in  a social fo rm a tio n ; first see h o w  it is s tra tif ie d  fo r us an d  in u s  a n d  a t the p lace  
w here w e are; th e n  d escen d  from  the s tra ta  to  th e  d e e p e r  a ssem blage  w ith in  w hich  w e a re  
held; g en tly  tip  th e  assem b lag e , m ak in g  it p ass  o v e r to  the side  o f  th e  p lane  o f  consistency . 
It is on ly  th ere  th e  BwO reveals itse lf fo r w hat it is; co n n ec tio n  o f desire s , c o n ju n c tio n  o f 
flows, co n tin u u m  o f in tensities.ass
Rather than an organized  entity in which each part tits into its proper slot or 
contributes to the final goal, a c/is-organizod body functions by establishing 
provisional, ephemeral linkages with o ther bodies without organs in a continuous 
process of “becoming.” Connections are made; connections are broken; new 
patterns develop; new possibilities emerge. But reaching the stasis of “being” is 
off the  horizon altogether as it would require a hierarchical organization of parts 
to the whole: a stratification rather than dispersal of energy.
Still the  question remains, how can a “stratified” entity -  a subject, the viewer -  
inhabit the “sm ooth” non-geography of Hylozoic Soil? With regard to the Matrix, 
Otto 1111 ken asserts that, “In order to survive and prosper along with the ever-
•!!)i E lizabeth  G rosz. Space, lim e, an d  p e rv e rs io n  : essays 011 the  politics o f bod ies. L ondon a n d  
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expanding Matrix, we m ust destratify, de-homogenise ourselves and our thinking 
even further.”356 Similarly, with regard to Hylozoic Soil Christine Macy writes,
th e  in s ta lla tio n s  a re  ab le  to  re sp o n d  to  people  en te rin g  th e  room , fu r th e r  b lu rr in g  th e  
b o u n d a ry  b e tw een  th e  v iew er’s sen se  o f se lf a n d  th e  tex tile ’s ‘s e n se ’ of th e  view er. T he 
re su lt is a d ecen tra lized , u n se ttle d  a n d  d isp e rsed  c o n s c io u s n e s s .^
Beesley’s installation suggests tha t the viewer’s body outputs and inputs 
information that exceeds its organization as a singular bounded being; instead, it 
merges with other bodies w ithout organs -  in this case, the installation -  in 
energetic patterns that we are only beginning to imagine.
Deleuze and Guattari probe the implications of the fact that all particles are in 
constant motion and know no such boundaries as “my” body and “th is” plant. 
Instead, these particles form “assemblages” or “multiplicities.” On th is point, as 
well, Im ken’s description of the Matrix is an equally apt description of Hylozoic 
Soil:
T h e global M atrix  exem plifies a  sm o o th  space  w h ich  effec tu ates  com plex, n o n ­
lin e a r  in te ra c tio n  b e tw een  th e  v ir tu a l an d  ac tu a l, th e reb y  c re a tin g  new  a n d  
un ex p ec ted  possib ilitie s . T he m o st d istinc tive  fe a tu re  o f  th e  M atrix  is 
u n d o u b ted ly  its  d is tr ib u tio n  o f  co n tro l an d  co m m u n ica tio n s , w h ich  are  d isp e rsed  
th ro u g h o u t a m esh w o rk  w eb o f  in te rc o n n e c ted  b u t  h e te ro g en eo u s  m u ltip lic ities . 
M ultip lic ities ex h ib it e m e rg e n t p ro p e rtie s  th a t  c a n n o t be  d e d u ced  from  an
356 O tto  Im ken . 96.
357 C h ris tin e  Macy. 32.
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in d iv id u a l part, p ro p e rtie s  th a t  will n o t em erge  un til th e  p rocess is ac tua lly  ru n  
th ro u g h .
Beesley creates unexpected multiplicities in a similar non-linear way: Hylozoic 
Soil instigates a feedback loop between the haptic and the fibre-optic, between a 
proprioceptive sense of space and computer code, and between the organic and 
the metric in a way th a t cannot be predicted until interaction occurs. As such, it 
exceeds the boundaries of organized beings, creating “new and unexpected 
possibilities.”
Not tha t hum ans ever were independent, bu t that now it has become urgent to 
shed this protective philosophical dermis in order to probe the implications of 
our m utual contingency and intricate intertwining with the techno-social 
environment that is now our “nature.” Hylozoic Soil suggests tha t we need to 
think of the space we inhabit as part of our very bodies and our bodies as part of 
the bio-geography and digital non-geography we inhabit simultaneously -  not by 
being “present” in the way a “being” is present, and not by harnessing both bodies 
and their environments in the service of the cerebral machine, bu t by 
Understanding the self as being in a continuous process of actualization and 
undoing. As Robert Pepperell states in the catalogue, “We can th ink of ourselves 
not as isolated agents trapped in a dermal shell, bu t as boundless clusters of 
activity blurring into space and tim e.”359
35fi O tto  Im ken . 9 8 .
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This is in sharp distinction to the autonomy of the modernist subject. As Caroline 
A. Jones writes, “Neurasthenic fragmentation or normative segmentation -  these 
seemed to be the ego’s only possible responses to the mediated modern 
sensorium. Yet fragmentation into depression or madness was not always a one­
way street; sometimes the  auditor could reframe the experience of dissolution as 
sublime.”1*60 Beesn v s installation suggests the sublimity that results from a lack 
of containment; however, such freedom in fragmentation is, as Jones remarks, 
“an option we can explore in art if not in reality.”"*61 Deleuze and Guattari’s 
understanding of the relationship between the “plane of organization” and the 
“plane of consistency” is especially pertinent on this point:
T h e p lan e  o f  o rgan iza tion  o r d ev e lo p m en t effectively covers w hat w e have called 
s tra tifica tio n : F orm s a n d  sub jec ts , o rg an s and  fu n c tions, a re  “s tra ta ” o r  re la tio n s betw een 
s tra ta . T h e  p lane  o f  consistency  o r  im m anence , o n  the  o th e r  hand , im p lies a 
d e s tra tif ica tio n  of all o f  N atu re , by  even th e  m o st artific ia l o f m eans. T he p lan e  o f 
consistency  is the  b o d y  w ith o u t o rgans. ...The p lan e  of o rgan iza tion  is co n s tan tly  w orking 
aw ay a t th e  p lane o f  consistency , always try ing  to  plug lin es  of flight, s to p  o r in te r ru p t the  
m o v em en ts  o f  d e te rrito ria liza tio n , w eigh th em  dow n, res tra tify  th e m , re c o n s titu te  form s 
a n d  sub jec ts  in a d im en sio n  o f  d ep th . C onversely, th e  p lan e  of consistency  is co n s tan tly  
ex trica tin g  itse lf fro m  the  p lan e  o f o rgan iza tion , causing  partic les to  sp in  off th e  s tra ta , 
sc ram b lin g  form s b y  d in t o f sp eed  o r slow ness, b reak in g  dow n fu n c tio n s  by m e a n s  o f 
assem blages o r  m icroassem blages;*62
What th is means with regard to Hylozoic Soil is that, when the viewer enters the 
installation, she is effectively passing from the plane of organization to the plane
;*60 C aro line  A. Jo n e s . “The M ed ia ted  S en so riu m .” 31. 
i*61 Ib id . 39.
G illes D eleuze an d  Felix G u a tta ri. 269 -70 .
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of consistency: the subject, as we have inherited it from humanism, becomes 
scrambled into new patterns and dispersed along new lines. Thus we are in a 
perpetual process of “becoming,” as Deleuze and Guattari argue -  of becoming 
other.
But it is crucial to understand that “one continually passes from one to the other, 
by unnoticeable degrees and without being aware of it, or one becomes aware of it 
only afterward.”363 Otherwise the plane of consistency would be a plane of 
“abolition” or “regression to the  undifferentiated”3fi4; it would mean complete 
immersion. As Deleuze and Guattari ask, “Is it not necessary to retain a minimum 
of strata, a minimum of forms and functions, a minimal subject from which to 
extract materials, affects, and assemblages?”' ^  In this light, Hylozoic Soil’s 
dispersal of the viewer through the cybernetic circuit pushes the experience to the 
pole of immersion, thus suggesting the sublime effect of deterritorialization 
without addressing the need -  and inevitability -  of reterritorialization.
In the essay M imicry and Legendary Psychasthenia Roger Caillois also 
addresses deterritorialization, but from a different perspective, The essay 
explains how mimetic species of insects are “assimilated to the surroundings” by 
the “process of the generalization of space at the expense of the individual.’^ 66 He 
writes:
363 ib id . 269.
3N ib id . 270.
3(’5 Ibid.
3f>f> Roger Caillois. ‘'M im icry  an d  L egendary  P sy ch asth en ia .” (1936) T rans. Jo h n  Shepley. O ctober 
31 (1984): 31.
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...along w ith  the in s tin c t of se lf-p reservation , which in  som e w ay o rien ts  th e  c rea tu re  
tow ard  life, there is generally  speak ing  a so r t of in s tin c t of ren u n c ia tio n  th a t o rien ts  it 
tow ard  a m ode of red u ced  existence, w hich in the e n d  would no  longer know  e ith e r 
consciousness or feeling  - the  in ertia  o f th e  elan v ita l, so  to speak . ...th is a ttrac tio n  by 
sp ace ...an d  the effect of w hich lift* seem s to  loose g ro u n d , b lu rrin g  in its re trea t the  
fro n tie r  betw een  th e  organ ism  an d  the  m ilieu  and ex p an d in g  to  the sam e degree* the 
lim its  w ith in  w hich, accord ing  to  P y thagoras, we a re  allowed to  know , as we shou ld , that 
n a tu re  is everywhere, the  sam e .:i(’7
Caillois explains that, like the “Carausius Morosus,” for example, “which by its 
form, color, and attitude simulates a plant twig,” a schizophrenic invariably 
responds to the question “where are you?” by stating, “I know where I am, but 1 
do not feel as though I’m at the spot where I find myself.”'*68 Caillois concludes 
that “The [schizophrenic] individual breaks the boundary of the skin and 
occupies the other side of his senses. He tries to look at himself from any point 
whatever in space. He feels himself becoming space.”'*61*
As Rosalind Krauss observes, this description of psychasthenia itself seems “to 
blend imperceptibly into that clamor for the  erasure of distinctions’^  and recalls 
the informe discussed earlier, as well as deterritorialization; however, as Caillois 
demonstrates, unlike the theories of Bataille or Deleuze and Guattari, 
psychasthenia is dependent on vision -  on “a disturbance in the perception of 
space.”'*?1 Hylozoic Soil, as already noted, allows us to explore radical
:)f’7 Ib id . 32,
•iM Ib id . 30 .
Ibid.
•v° R osalind  K rauss. “E ntropy ." 75. 
w  R oger Caillois, 28 .
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dcdifferentiation - in the context of art not life * precisely by representing it 
visually. As Krauss states, cancelling the distinction between figures and their 
surrounding spaces in actuality would “produce a continuum unimaginable for 
our earthly bodies to traverse, but to which we as viewers might easily slide ~ or 
glide • in an effortless, soaring, purely optieal movement.”"'?2
What the installation does not address, however, is how a newly “psychasthenic” 
visitor would be “reterritorialized” in the world outside the museum. As .Jones 
states, “Leaving us open, unbounded, or fragmented is not meant to produce us 
as psychotic, but to make us available for re-organ-ization in term s we might be 
able to negotiate for ourselves.”'*™ Deleuze and Guattari suggest that this 
fragmentation is instated by capitalism in order to produce a “se lf’ in need of 
bureaucratic reorganization. This echoes Guy Debord’s assertion in the late 1960s 
that “‘stimulated’ viewers are already everywhere”^  as they are called forth by 
capitalism itself and thus offer no opposition to it. To find more positive 
assessments of Hylozoic Soil’s technophiliac dispersal of subjectivity, especially 
the potential for creativity, we would need to look at theorists such as Rosi 
Braidotti, who, in Donna I laraway’s words, “searches for figurations that can 
guide us to emergences more attuned to justice, pleasure and historical
372 R o s a l i n d  K r a u s s .  “ E n t r o p y . ” 7 5 .
•v:s C aroline A. Jo n es. “T he M edia ted  S en so riu m .” 39 -40 .
W't G uy D ebord. “E d itoria l N otes; T he A vant-G arde o f P resence .” T ran s . J o h n  Shepley. Guy 
Debord and  the S iluation ist In te rn a tio n a l. Tom  M cD onough, ed. C am bridge, MA: M IT P, n o o n . 
141. D iscussed in Dore Bowen. “Im agine  T h ere ’s No Im age ( I t’s Easy If  You Try); A ppro p ria tio n  in 
the Age o f Digital R eproduction .” A Com panion. G uide to A rt since 1945. A m elia Jo n e s  ed. M alden, 
MA; Blackwell Publish ing  Ltd., 2 0 0 6 . 539.
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specificity;"’*'^  however, as the installation leaves viewers in a state o f “ego- 
pulverization,” to use .Jones’ dramatic phrase, assuming that it (as a “theoretical 
object”) is positing its own counterargument would shift the experience of the 
installation onto an ironic register, which, I think, is wandering too far from the 
work 'itse lf’. Rather, the fact that relerritorialization is not suggested reveals the 
installation’s weakness: how can an experience of Hylozoic Soil serve as a model 
for interacting with the actual world if the “self’ no longer harbours a minimum 
of intent ional actions?
To return to the question of spatial experience, Hylozoic Soil, unlike descriptions 
of cyberspace that extend a homogenizing Cartesian grid out into infinity, has no 
such uniformity. Rather, like the Matrix and the infonne, as well as the work of 
Giacometti, Hylozoic Soil attem pts to depict what Lev Manovieh calls a space- 
medium: “an environment in which objects are embedded and the effect of these 
objects on each other” -  precisely what is missing in from computer space/*'''6 
Whereas the space-medium assumed a certain stickiness in (anti-)modern work, 
in Beesley’s high-tech organism, this chunky, thick, resisting spatial matrix is 
translated into a fluid process of continuous linkage. Drawing on the ideas of 
Deleuze’s reading of Ilenri Bergson, Elizabeth Grosz describes this sticky yet 
smooth space as follows:
perhaps space, too, need s not be co n stru ed  as even, hom ogeneous, co n tinuous, in fin ite ly
the sam e. Perhaps space  also h a s  loci o f in ten sity , o f com pression  o r elasticity , perh ap s it
vs Rosi B raidotli. M etam orphoses: T ow ards a M ateria list T heory  of Becom ing. C am bridge, UK: 
Polity, c o o n . Back cover.
•>"h Lev M anovieh. 255.
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need s no longer he considered  a m ed ium . P erhaps it can he considered  lum py, in tensified , 
localized, o r  regionalized, ...P erhaps, in o th e r  w ords, there  is a m a t e r i a l i t y  to  space itself, 
ra th e r  than  m ateria lity  resid ing  w ith only  its co n ten ts. This im plies tha t space  itself, if it is 
h e te rogeneous, is m ultip le , d ifferen tia l, s p e c i f ic .f
111 other words, in the spatial experience' that Hensley offers in Ihjloxoic Soil, the 
certainties of the subject’s position on a grid are subsumed by a process of 
localization that knows no such abstract demarcations. Instead, both subject and 
object are const ituted in a “connection of desires, conjunction of flows, 
continuum of intensities.’’^ 8
“Nature” and the Culture o f Immersion and/or Interactivity
If we compare Philip Beesley’s Ihjloxoic Soil and Olafur Kliasson’s Notion motion , 
then it quickly becomes apparent that these two installations are addressing 
many of the same issues, albeit from different angles. Consider, for example, the 
role of interactivity: Kliasson’s interface is purposeful while Beesley’s is reactive. 
As such, one offers the illusion of control while the other denies its possibility. Or 
consider the prominence of the mediating screen in Notion motion and the 
(alleged) absence of mediation in Ihjloxoic Soil; consider Kliasson’s rhetorical 
alienation and fusion of subject and object and Beesley’s collusion of the two; the
w* K lizabeth G rosz. “The F u tu re  o f  Space: 'to w a rd  an  A rch itec tu re  o f In v en tio n .” O lafu r Kliasson: 
S u rro u n d in g s S u rrounded : Kssays on Space an d  Science. Peter W eibel, ed, C am bridge, MA: MIT 
P, u o o i. ad d .
Gilles Deleuze and  Felix G ualtari. Kit.
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emptiness of the spaee in Notion motion and its palpability in Ih/lozoic Soil', and 
the primacy of the visual in the former and the primacy of proprioception in the 
latter. Together these installations demonstrate Caroline A, .Jones* observation 
that “Our dreams of eluding hegemony are fed by complex desires to escape 
language, to escape signification, to escape sense for sensation."w  Eliasson tries 
to return us to our senses, so to speak, while Beesley shows that the idea of 
escape is premised on boundaries which are no longer operative.
(dearly these two installations express two different attitudes toward the culture 
of immersion in which we live today and the resulting crisis in conceptions of 
spaee and subjectivity. Eliasson’s division of Notion motion into an experience of 
sensual immersion and, subsequently, an experience of intellectual alienation 
reiterates the core tenet of site-speeifieity - * that it is necessary to break with 
naturalized conceptions of a specific site (in this case, the “site” is the virtual 
image-space) in order to reveal its ideological functioning. Due to this “break” in 
experience, it becomes apparent that the “self” is equally conceived as a result of 
breaking with immersion. However, as Jones asks, “In our increasingly mediated 
sensorium, is the self building on this reflexive tradition, or radically departing 
from it ?”:<«» If we deduce Eliasson’s answer to this question from the second room 
of Notion motion , it seems to suggest the former the necessity of maintaining a 
distinction so as to allow for contemplation.
‘ " C aroline A. .Jones. “The M ediated  H ensonum ." no . 
:,ti" lin'd. 38 .
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By contrast, Beasley's Ilylo/.oie Soil, rather than oscillating between an 
"immersive” and an "alienated” relation to technology,; ’ y ‘s an ‘‘interrogative" 
one, to borrow Jones’ taxonomy. She defines interrogative artworks as “work 
t hat repurposes or remakes devices to enhance their insidious or wondrous 
properties; available data translated into sensible systems."'**-’ Ilylo/.oie Soil does 
both: it visually enhances interactive systems to the point of mystification and it 
translates data into sensible form. As such, in response to Jones* question cited 
above, Ilylo/.oie Soil seems to suggest the latter the necessity of departing from 
the reflexive tradition in order to account for the radical contingency of the “self* 
and the post-human condition. Instead of illustrating the tenets of site-speeifieity. 
Beesley offers an experience of site par excellence. As Claire Bishop states, “the 
space in which such self-reflexive perception may take [dace is foreclosed, and we 
become one with the surrounding environment.'
Despite illustrating two different takes on interactive technologies, both Notion 
motion and Ilylo/.oie Soil explore these issues through the lens of nature. To 
summarize the implications of their work, 1 want to bring this subtheme into the 
foreground in order to determine why nature is such an interesting lens through 
which to explore ideas about space, subjectivity, immersion and site-speeifieity,
1 have already addressed how both Kliasson and Beesley employ the iconography 
of nature waves and eaves to articulate a complex understanding of the
)!i| Ib id . (), "Im m ersive th e  ‘cave’ p arad ig m : the v irtu a l helm et, the  black- box video, the  
ea rp h o n e  se t” a n d  “A lienated tak in g  technology an d  ‘m aking it s tran g e ,’ i xaggera ting  a ttribu te 's  
to provoke shock, using technologies to sw itch senses o r  induce d iso rien ta tio n ’’ 
a|,;' Ib id . (>
C laire  Bishop. 87.
i(>8
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►squaro waves of digital information and the “cave” paradigm of technologically 
mediated immersion, 'l’his parallelism in the vocabulary is easily explained in 
technical terms: frequencies oflight are reduced to sequential points on a graph 
that can he coded into strings of ones and zeros, anti CAVK is a recursive acronym 
for “cave automatic virtual environment." 1 lowever, there is more to the 
parallelism than the choice of terminology. As already discussed, the sublime is 
evoked by both installations: once as a technologically mediated experience of the 
natural sublime (Notion motion), and once as an experience of the techno- 
sublime represented through the iconography of nature {Ilylo/.oie Soil).
'Phis association of “nature” with the sublime touches on an important issue: 
Kliasson calls attention to the technological mediation o f  nature, thereby 
demonstrating their imbrication, whereas Beesley stresses that nature is always 
already technologically mediated, thereby demonstrating their indistinction. That 
is, Notion motion teaches us how to intellectually extract ourselves from the 
sublime effects of screen-based immersion -  the opposite of the “penetration” 
theorized by Allucquere Rosanne and actualized in the installation’s first room.
By contrast, Hylo/.oie Soil searches for a way to turn mutual inter-penetration 
toward creative ends. t
M  T hose  two d ifferen t ap p ro ach es to im m ersion  th rough  in te rac tio n  exem plify a m uch la rger 
cu ltu ral debate: how  can co n tem p o ra ry  a rt (its p roduction  and its  critic ism ), w hich is so 
thoroughly  in d eb ted  to the “old fa thers" o f the  F rank fu rt School, especially  A dorno  and  
llo rk h e im e r’s essay “The C ultu re  Industry ,"  em brace th e  insigh ts of the  p ro m in e n t “young 
w om en" w riting  today, such  as D onna H araw uv and N. K atherine llay les , w ho have taken  up  the 
lack o f  d is tin c tio n  betw een technology an d  n a tu re  to fu rth e r  (p o sF )fcm in is t th o u g h t, w ithout 
com prom ising  its  s ta tu s  as "art" as opposed  to  “spectacle"?
lb q
The new relationships that artists have forged with the longstanding tradition of 
“critical” thought are explored in the following chapter. Here I want to stress the 
lack of dist inction that marks contemporary theory in order to return to the 
question already on the table: why are debates around “nature” particularly 
“fertile” for exploring questions of technology? In a way, the question is already 
answered: creative potential. However, looking again at Notion motion  and 
Ilylo/.oie Soil and the relationships they establish between the viewer’s body and 
the space of the installation will bring the implications of this debate into greater 
relief.
both Notion motion and llylo/.oic Soil dem onstrate what Bruno Latour has 
described as “a delicate sphere of climate control”:^ :
th e  tired  o ld  d iv isions betw een  wild and  d o m estica ted , p riva te  a n d  public, techn ica l an d  
organic , a re  sim p ly  ignored , rep laced  by a se t o f  ex p e rim en ta tio n s  on the  co n d itio n s  tha t 
n u r tu re  o u r collective lives. Seen th rough  th is ap p ro ach , c lim ate  con tro l is not in sp ired  by 
a m ad  am bition  fo r  to tal m as te ry  of the e lem en ts , b u t by a reasonab le  w ish  to ascerta in  
w h a t so rt o f b rea th in g  space is m ost conducive to civilized lifc..<!i('
According to Latour, “nature” is not a pre-given condition common to all 
humankind, which, in its singularity, holds out the promise that hum ankind may 
one day be united again and thereby regain its “natural” status. (I Ie refers to the 
entrenched idea that Nature is unified as a second Tower of Babel, which like the 
first -  Culture - is crumbling apart into m ain’ different natures, or
B runo L atour. 40 . 
:>Kh Ib id . 30 .
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multinoturalism .) Rather, the conditions that create our collective “atm osphere” 
are always plural -  natural and cultural, scientific and political.
“The problem is,” writes Latour, “that while we know how to conduct a scientific 
experiment in the narrow confines of a laboratory, we have no idea how to pursue 
collective experiments in the confusing atm osphere of a whole culture.”:*8? As 
such, these “experiments" are do facto  political. The clincher is that, whereas 
formerly “[o|utside the laboratory was the realm of experience - not experiment" 
-  today “1 tithe laboratory has extended its walls to the whole planet.”#*8 That is, 
today there is no longer a clear distinction between hum an experiences and 
teclmoseientifie or technocratic experiments: “experiments are now taking place 
on a life-size scale and in real time.”;*81’
Latour’s observation that 4he distinction between the inside and outside of the 
laboratory “is simply evaporating before our eyes’”*’’0 is an apt description of the 
crossover: now “[ajrtists have perforce become white coats amongst other white 
coats.”#’1 The installations Notion motion and Hyhr/xne Soil are a case in point: 
the body of the viewer is not a pre-given “natural” condition against which to 
measure the vicissitudes of technology. Rather than being the (disavowed) 
“ground” of experience, it is contingent 011 the term s of the “experim ent.” As 
Caroline A. Jones writes,
Ib id . ;u- 
Ib id .
-i*'1 Ib id . 3a.
Ib id .
*>• Ib id . 30 .
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T he now se n so rin m  is seductively  alive. C om posed  as it is of w h a t l la ra w a y  d u b s o u r 
‘leehnoseien tific  n a tu re e u ltu re s , ' its liveliness d ues not d ep en d  so le ly  on  o rganic  
eo m p o n n d s , but lin k s  p ro sthe tiea llv  a n d  aesthetica lly  to  silicon b ased  m aeh in ic  phyla.*"-'
In other words, in both Kliasson’s and Beasley's installations, the body ‘is not a 
closed unity but rather an open, unfinished set of possibilities, even of 
possibilities that have yet to be invented.”^
In Notion motion this radical opening is quickly closed when the viewer is forced 
back into a space structured by the binaries inside/outside and subject/object. By 
contrast, in H ylow w  Soil this radical opening is too open to be actionable. To use 
Ilaraway's words, this maehinic phyla is “disturbingly lively, and we ourselves 
frighteningly i n e r t . Y e t  both lvliasson and Beesley play with the “edge” of 
immersion afforded by interac tivity in order to probe the ways in which the 
subject is implicated in the experim ental/experiential sites that are now 
ubiquitous -  the flickering light of digital screens and the pulsating rhythms of 
“intuitive” and biomimetie technologies.
'Phis chapter opened by noting the tendency of art historians and cultural critics 
to reinstate interactive ideals in an immersive world (in its actual and virtual 
manifestation), but the  opposite is also evident, in fact more prominent -  the 
tendency to reinstate a degree of immersion in a culture characterized by ever- 
increasing interactivity’. To close, I want to shift the discussion to broader term 
similar to the wav immersion tends to win over interactivity in both Notion
C aro line  A. .Jones, "T he M edia ted  S o n sn n m n .'b p p  
*"! .Jona than  C rary . "O lafu r K liasson; V isionary  Kvents." 8. 
;,,u In  A nthony  V idler. 148.
I talian ai'. >’ Hylozoic Soil, so toe is the danger tha t immersion will dom inate 
interactivity in a cukurai sens-;. This is the sticker: On the one hand, despite the 
inflated rhetori; and the technological fact of interactivity, the participant might 
be relirx; cashing Lie ' ast vestiges of intellectual and creative independence. Lev 
Manovich describes this predicam ent well:
M ental p ro cess  o f  reflec tion , p ro b le m  so lv ing , recall, an d  a sso c ia tio n  are 
ex te rn a lized , eq u a ted  w ith  fo llow ing  a link , m o v in g  to  a n ew  page, choosing  a new  
im age, o r  a new  scene .... In  sh o rt, w e are  a sk ed  to  follow  p re -p ro g ra m m ed , 
objectively  ex isting  asso c ia tio n s. P u t d iffe ren tly , in  w h a t c a n  be re a d  as an  
u p d a te d  v e rs io n  o f  F ie n c h  p h ilo so p h e r  Louis A lth u sse r’s co n cep t o f  
‘in te rp e lla tio n ,’ we a re  a sk ed  to  m is tak e  th e  s tru c tu re  o f  so m eb o d y  else’s m in d  fo r 
o u r  ow n.... In te rac tiv e  m ed ia  a sk  u s  to  id en tify  w ith  so m eo n e  else’s m en ta l 
structure's
In other words, in the “more fully enveloping universe” the view er/user is 
recreated in the image of the installation’s “program. ” As such all inter- is 
removed from the activity.
On the other hand, as Marie-Laure Ryan suggests, in a culture of interactivity 
some degree of im m ersion is useful in grounding “the hypertextual 
imagination .”396 she suggests that, “as long as it is a tem porary game and not a 
perm anent condition, the m ind's exile in the nowhere of incessant travel from 
sign to  sign m ay  lead to a deeper appreciation of what it means to have a body
: m  Lev M anovich . 61.
M b  M arie -L au re  R yan. 353.
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and to belong to a world.”397 This suggestive hope can lead us in two directions: 
like Allucquere Rosanne Stone argues, remembering the body can be an effective 
way of challenging the “old Cartesian trick,” which needless to say, continues to 
forget the body. This is an urgent task. As previously cited, “Remembering the 
body may help us to prevent virtual systems from becoming unwitting 
accomplices in new exercises of social control.”398 it  also has philosophical 
implications: it prompts us to  remember that the w'orld “looks back,” tha t 
substance cannot be “m astered,” that everything is embedded in the same dense 
“flesh.” Technological immersion can thus be seen as an antidote for postm odern 
fragmentation, “schizoid” subjectivity, and the sense of perpetually being in the 
“wrong place” or a “smooth space.”
Alternatively, if the challenge leads to the obliteration of the opposition -  if it 
leads to immersion at the  expense of interactivity -  then we would enter the 
regressive symbiosis of subject and image that fuels the dream  of a pre-symbolic 
pre-m isunderstanding immersive world. Here we would land straight in  the 
hands that control the technologies of immersion for profit and coercion.
In the case of Olal /  Eliasson’s Notion motion  and Philip Beesley’s Hylozoic >0* , 
the experimental interactive spaces they structure for the viewer result in a 
seemingly benign immersion; however, let us not underestim ate the impact of 
artistic figurations on the  ROL. Art is a powerful means by which a culture
Ib id . 355. (m y  italics)
398 A llucquere  R osanne S to n e . “V irtu a l S y stem s.” In c o n y  ra tio n s  [Zone 6]. J o n a th a n  C raiy  an d  
S an fo rd  K w inter, eds. New  York: Z o n e , 1992. 6 2 0 .
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represents itself to itself, and thus these figurations have practical political 
consetptences. Citing Elaine Scarry, Vivian Sobchack writes:
“we m ake th in g s  so  th a t  th ey  will in tu rn  rem ak e  us, rev ising  the  in te r io r  of em b o d ied  
co n sc io u sn ess .” ...M ore recen tly  (although  no lo n g e r th a t  recently ), w e have b een  
rad ically  “re m a d e ” b y  th e  percep tive  (as well as expressive) techno log ies o f p ho tog raphy , 
c inem a, an d  th e  e lec tron ic  m edia  of television a n d  co m p u te r -  th e se  a ll the  m o re  
ti o n a tiv e  o f “th e  in te rio r  o f em bodied  co n sc io u sn ess” (and  its ex te rio r ac tio n s  too) 
because  th ey  are  techno log ies th a t  are cu ltu ra lly  p e r v a s i v e .  They be lo n g  no t m ere ly  to  
sc ien tis ts  o r  d o c to rs  o r  an  ed u ca ted  elite  b u t to  all o f us -  a n d  all o f  th e  tim e.-w
With regard to the things we make of late, Anthony Vidler states:
Such objects a re  no  lo n g er su b jec t to  subjects; th e y  c o u n te r  a ttack . A s in  the  collages of 
M ax E rn st, th ey  un io n ize  in  revo lt, b u t now  in  th e  form  o f  critical m ach in es  th a t  pose nr,w 
id en titie s  fo r th e ir  sub jec ts. A s ap p a ra tu ses  th e y  b o th  w ork  on  an d  fu se  w ith  o n ce- 
sep a ra te  bod ies, th ey , like th e  cyborgs th a t  “u se ” th em , scram ble  all th e  recognized  codes. 
Such objects figh t back , th ey  m ach ine  us as m u c h  as we m ach ine  th e m .4°o
What both Sobchack and Vidler make clear is th a t cultural/technological/artistic
objects are “critical machines” that not only help us build critical theory around
the crossover we are currently experiencing (both inside and outside the arts, if
we hold onto this distinction) bu t also transform  us from within. Eliasson’s and
Beesley’s installations, as figurations of contemporary spatial experience *- as
“cognitive maps” for navigating our tethered carbon and silicon bodies through
spaces that are at once geo- and techno-, act lal and virtual -  “machine us”
• m  V ivian Sobchack. “T he S cene of th e  Screen: E nv ision ing  Pho tograph ic , C inem atic , a n d  
E lectron ic  ‘P resen ce .’” C arnal T hough ts: E m bod im en t a n d  M oving Im age C u ltu re . Berkley: U o f 
C alifornia P, 2 0 0 4 . 135- 
‘i , w  A n th o n y  V idler. 158.
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according to their spatio-mental constructions. This reconfiguration of space and 
subjectivity, as Sobchack asserts, transforms our exterior actions, too.
To close this chapter let me pose two “what i f ’ questions in order to approach the 
practical and political consequences of Notion motion and Ilylozoic Soil:
What if we really believed we could extricate ourselves from the seductive and 
insidious effects of our immersive technologies and stand outside them  like a 
Romantic on an isolated perch? Would we watch as others are washed away by a 
sea change and celebrate our distance, like Friedrich’s gentleman holding onto 
his hat? Would we dive into it for the thrill and risk drowning ourselves?^01 Or 
can we think of some other position to occupy that is actually actionable?
Alternatively, what if we really believed that we were indistinguishable from the 
various networks in which we are technologically enmeshed? Would we resign 
ourselves to being a transm itter without volition or a flow without destination 
and let the “programs” run as they may? Flow would this impact our 
understanding of our position in the “global” network? Would we feel more 
responsible toward the relentlessly m aterial realm in which most of the world 
labours and hungers or less? W hat agency could we exert from the position of 
Bataille’s earthworm?
4«m See M artin  Jay . “D iving 'in to  th e  W reck: A esthetic  S p ec ta to rsh ip  a t th e  F i n - d e - s i e d e . ” Critical 
H orizons 1:1 (Feb. 2 0 0 0 ). 93-111.
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“These subjects are no harmless fictions.”-*02 Depending on how we answer these 
questions, we will define ourselves as either sovereign, “.stimulated,” indifferent, 
or redundant -  none of which deliver on the promise of political action that the 
buzz of “interactivity” managed to sustain from the 1960s through the 1990s. 
Now in the crossover, as Olafur Eliasson’s Notion motion and Philip Beesley’s 
Ilylozoic Soil articulated in spatial form, interactivity is an end to itself, like Yves 
Klein’s blue or Jackson Pollock’s drips after the height of fame: an artistic 
material, pliable to the hands of the artists, but with no inherent meaning of its 
own. In  the hands of Eliasson and Beesley alike, interactivity solicited 
bewonderment, which lead to  disillusionment in the former and captivation in 
the latter. However, if indeed interactivity points to the most recent 
“reorganization of the relationship between artists and spectators aiming, for 
over a century, for an increased empowerment of the spectator, ”-*°3 then we 
should ask whether it leads to empowerment in either. As Vidler states, “This 
complex and impure system of existence, indeed, offers neither the luminous 
promise of technological utopia nor the dark hell of its opposite.”-*°4
-i02 R osalyn  D eutsche. “A g o rap h o b ia .” Evictions: Ar t  a nd S p a tial P o litics. C am bridge, MA: M IT P, 
19 9 6 .2 9 6 .
•103 L ouise P o issan t. “The Passage from  M ateria l to  In te rface .” M edia A rt H isto ries. O liver G rau, 
ed. C am bridge, MA: M IT P, 2007 . 230 .
•i'u A nthony  V idler. 148.
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CHAPTER 3: SPATIAL FACSIM ILES
In 1998 Maria Lind published “Some Reflections on Site Specificity in 
Contemporary Art” in Parkett magazine. In this text she supplements Miwon 
Kwon’s description of “site-oriented” work by defining “other attitudes and 
modes of working in relation to site,”1 namely “spat ial facsimiles” and “ambient 
spaces.” In the former, artists “choose a certain place with particular social, 
economic and emotional implications and then move, it in the form of an exact - 
and unique -  copy to another, often institutional context.”2 In the later, an 
atmosphere is created and feelings are invoked that give the sensation of being 
transported to a place that is entirely different from the one we entered. It is 
experiential and affective, totally absorbing and all-encompassing.”^
In 2000 Martin Jay published “Diving into the Wreck: Aesthetic Spectatorship at 
the ‘Fin-de-siecle’” in the journal Critical Horizons. In this text he discusses how 
“[tjhe contemplative, distanced viewer who is able to judge from afar the 
spectacle before him or her, has been replaced by a more proximate, involved 
‘kinaesthetic’ subject whose body is stimulated as much as his or her eye.”4 He 
observes that
P resen ta tio n  ra th e r  th an  rep re sen ta tio n , tran sg ressiv e  desu b lim atio n  ra th e r  than
sym bolic sub lim ation , in co rp o ra tin g  the abject ra th e r  th an  facing th e  ex tru d ed  object,
' M aria Lind. “Spatia l Facsim iles a n d  A m bient Spaces: Som e Reflections on S ite-Specifieity  in 
C on tem porary  A rt.” Parkett 54 (1998-99): 191- 
a Ibid.
•* Ibid. 193.
■1 M artin  Jay , “Diving in to  th e  W reck: A esthetic  S p ec ta to rsh ip  at th e  F i n - d e - s i H d e . "  Critical 
H orizons 1:1 (Feb. 2 0 0 0 ). 93.
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identify ing w ith  d es tru c tio n  ra th e r  than  co n tem pla ting  creation : all o f  these  are 
evidenced in a wide varie ty  of recen t m odes in co n tem p o rary  a r t .1'
The conclusion he draws about such simulacra! immersive experiences is dire: “If 
aesthetic judgment is to be a model for its political counterpart... it cannot do so 
on the basis of this aesthetics of violent immersion.”6
Both these authors belabour what they consider to be a lack of specificity in 
contemporary art. Lind states, “Specificity seems too strong a notion in relation 
to their approach. It is rather a question of working associatively, of being 
sensitive to a site.”? Jay argues that such “sensitivity” is effective only 
sensationally, not critically or discursively, and asserts the need to reintroduce 
the “much-maligned contemplative eye” that is
able to  ju d g e  and  w eigh th e  m erits  of specific event an d  objects, th e  eye th a t  u ltim ately  
provides the  m ateria l fo r a p rocess of d iscursive com m unica tion  abo u t th e  w recks th a t 
have o ccu rred  in the p a s t and  th e  ones in th e  fu tu re  th a t m ight p e rh ap s  b e  fo resta lled .8
In other words, if a specific relation to a site (or event) is replaced or 
overshadowed by a sensitive relation, then the distance that specificity implies is 
collapsed in favour of the proximity of borrowed emotions.
Certainly artworks that operate at this additional remove have the potential to 
make a great impact on current ways of thinking; we can call it the tru th  value of 
fiction. I Iowever, this potency is reliant on contextualizing one’s experience in the
r> Ibid. 105.
(> Ibid. 93,
-'M aria Lind. 193.
8 M artin  Jay . 109.
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simulated world after the fact. In this process of reflection, the “immediate” 
experience of artwork is negotiated discursively in order to determine its 
relevance and applicability to the actual world. That is, we interpret it by 
breaking the hermeneutic seal and allowing the virtual and actual world to 
interpenetrate. As M artin,lay bemoans, however, there is a trend in 
contemporary art to preclude reflection and interpretation and indulge instead in 
the immediacy of the (simulated) situation.
This chapter explores two such “site-sensitive” and “proximate” works * Triple 
Bluff Canyon (2004) by Mike Nelson (b. 1967) and Weis:sc Falter (2007) by 
Gregor Schneider (!,. 1969). Both installat ions are facsimiles of actually existing 
or once existing sites and both establish a strong sense of ambience. As Maria 
Lind states, such installations
w ould  be h a rd  to im agine w ith o u t tech n o  cu ltu re  a n d  digital w orlds, w here  reality  can be 
co n stru c ted . T hey co n ta in  a vision o f a n o th e r lib e ra tin g  cond ition  based  on an in tensely  
individual experience, involving as m any  senses as possible. It is a trip  to  som ew here 
else."
As both Triple B luff Canyon and Weisse Falter exemplify, the discourses of site- 
specificity and new media immersion cannot be distilled one from the other. In 
the “trips” that they structure for the visitor kinaesthetic involvement becomes 
the measure of the facsimile’s “reality” (as opposed to visual accuracy). 
Furthermore, both installations provide a platform for discussing the 
implications of emphasizing the “immediacy” of experience at the expense of the
" M aria Lind. 194.
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discursive register of experience, implications to which they demonstrate two 
different attitudes, one resistant and the other embracing.
In the ease of Nelson’s installation, viewers make a trip to a defunct cinema, his 
former studio space in London, and Robert Smithson’s Partially Buried 
Woodshed (1970) in Ohio. In Schneider’s installation, viewers are imaginatively 
transported to Chiba, not to the ocean front playground pictured on tropical 
vacation advertisements, but to the prison cells identified in the catalogue as the 
American military detainment camp 111 Guantanamo Bay. Given the Partially 
Buvied Woodshed’s status as a political icon of resistance to the Vietnam war and 
Schneider’s blatant reference to a contemporary war, the thick layering of 
representation that constitutes today’s political mediascape is of foremost 
concern in both of these works: Schneider addresses the de-sensitization and de­
realization that results from a continuous stream of (biased) media coverage by 
having us climb through the television or computer screen into a model prison, 
and Nelson updates Smithson’s anti-war icon with references to the US 
administration that is orchestrating Guantanamo, or “gitmo” as the Americans 
positioned there call it. Thus “GWOT” -  the military acronym for the Global War 
on Terror -  provides the broadest interpretive context for these two works.
Other contexts that are necessary to consider in relation to these two artworks are, 
of course, art history -  specifically the crossover of site-'-pecificily and immersion 
-  and the artists’ own practices. It is within this more intimate circle that this 
chapter begins, gradually increasing its param eter and opening the discussion 
outward to include the contemporary mediascape. My hope is to define more
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specifically I ho stakes at piny in the “eclipse of the spectacle"10 that these two 
installations exemplify and to conjecture as to where we might go from this 
“somewhere else.”
Mike Nelsonr Triple BhilTCanyon
(Figures 15-21)
There are indeed three bluffs in Nelson’s Triple B luff Canyon: a cinema foyer, a 
Victorian living-room/studio, and Smithson’s Partially Pdried Woodshed, Ivach 
admit to their game of deception, hut what can be potentially gained or lost by 
their bluff? And is the canyon between them impassable or bridgeable? The title 
of the installation is apt: double-entendres multiply and spin it into a vortex of 
meaning that can take off in flight or bore its way into the ground until it hits 
rock bottom. 'File trick is to lav a floor underneath our feet as we move along so 
that we can anchor our associations and slowly build a match-book house of 
meaning.
This is what Mike Nelson does himself: he is first and foremost a builder. 'Fake 
The Coral R ee ffio o o )  that he built for M att’s Gallery in London, for example, lie 
constructed room after room of small reception areas that amounted to a maze of
1,1 See Jo n a th a n  t 'ra rv . "Kclipse o f  tin ’ Spectacle." Art a fter M odern ism : R eth ink ing  
R epresen ta tion . Brian W allis, ed. Forew ord  by M arcia 'tu ck e r. New York: New M useum  of 
(’■-m leuiporary  A rt, 1984. 2 8 4 0 4 .
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various decrepit ami illicit places: taxi offices and greasy mechanic shops, 
gathering rooms for Americana fanatics, hikers and Mecca pilgrims, and hideouts 
for porn addicts and dope-smoking hank robbers each complete with the dank 
and detritus of use and forlorn ambitions. The inhabitants of these rooms were 
long gone: they left in a rush before we got here, leaving behind a scattering of 
clues. As viewers, “We art' cast in the role of part trespasser, part archaeologist, 
and part detective a person moving through the traces of others’ existences, 
trying to understand what catastrophe may have caused this emptiness and what 
condition may have shaped the inhabitants’ lives."11
For another oxi \ take 24a ( )rwell Street (2002), the location of the 
installation he built for the 2002 Sydney Biennale. In this reptilian pet shop the 
cages are all open and the sealv slithering creatures are nowhere in sight, only the 
pathetic miso-en-seene of their "natural” habitats, perverse dioramas of life in the 
wild, 'fhe Biennale’s creative director describes the view looking out from the pet 
shop window: “there’s a small square with turquoise metal seats where an 
Aboriginal couple are nodding off, bulging plastic tartan laundry bags at their feet, 
syringes carefully placed on the wall beside them .”11’ In a land once governed by 
Aboriginals and marsupials, which continue to face threats of cultural or actual 
extinction, an unbearable noise begins to build in the empty silence of the dusty 
cages ■ the noise of fears: dispossession, miscegenation, contagion, entrapment,
11 M ike N elson in S im on (Iran i. “M aze M aker." ARTnews (M ar. 2 0 0 2 ): 94.
u’ R ichard  G rayson. “n .|a  Orwell S tre e t.” M ike Nelson: .Between a Form ula a n d  a Code. P e te r Beley, 
R ichard  G rayson, R alph RugniTet :>1. Cologne: W nlther Konig, a o o h . iS.
18»
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poison. We oscillate between imagining ourselves taxonomieally labelled and 
locking the key to the' cage.
These two installations, alongside The Deliverance and the Patience at the 2002 
Venice Biennale, his Turner prize presentation at the Tate The Cosmic Leyend o f  
the Urobovos Sevpant (2002), and his recent Creative Time project in New York,
A Psychic Vacuum  (2007), lan e earned Mike Nelson a reputation, alternatively, 
as “the artist that we expect to construct a thrilling, affective parallel world ,”1'5 as 
a “maze m a k e r , a n d  as a “British Kabakov.”1;' One critic wonders “if it is his 
ultimate intention to build a work of art so va>, it consumes the reality around 
it.”11' Another critic quips that “Brecht has built his very own city.”1'7 And yet 
> other states, “It was brilliant theatre, which is not always the best thing von can 
say about a rt .”18
Clearly critical opinion is as multifarious as the references in Nelson’s fabricated 
spaces, pe. haps because of them . “Nelson’s work delights in an ebullient over­
coding,” writes Dan box: “I feel dizzy."11’ Rather than taking these Issues in turn 
as so many parts of a puzzle, which, if properly decoded, would supposedly make 
his work transparent to our analyzing eyes, my approach will be different: I will 
accept t he premises of his work as my own and proceed from there. That is to say, 
if non-linearity, opacity, concatenation, duplicity and repetition form the basis of
1:1 D ean K enning. "M ike N elson." A rt M onthly  208  (2 0 0 8 ): 23.
'■i S im on G ran t. 04.
'• 'W illiam  heaver. "T u rn er Prize 2001." ARTnews 101.2 (2 0 0 2 ): 134.
111 J o n a th a n  Jo n e s . “Species o t  Spaces: Jo n a th a n  Jo n e s  011 M ike N elson." Frieze 53 (2 0 0 0 ): 75,
1' Dave Beech, “M ike N elson .” Art M onth ly  234 (.2000): 37. 
lK Jo n a th a n  Jo n e s . 7(5.
Fox, Dan. “M ike N elson." Brie/e 8 5  (2 0 0 4 ): http://\vY vw .lV io/.o.oom /issuc/reviev m ike  nelson.
1 .
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Nelson’s work, 1 want to discover the salience of these tactics more so than the 
individual or conflicting meanings of innum erujle details.
The difference 1 am outlining here between the significance of details in their own 
ri.,nt and their functioning within Nelson’s three-dimensional tableaux allows me 
shift the locus ever so slightly onto how an artwork establishes a structural 
pattern that determines its reception, rather than recounting singular 
experiences of viewing. Nelson’s work is so open to associations that every viewer 
could potentially establish very different frames of reference for the objects he 
includes. As Clare M anchester writes, “it is the multiple narratives that can be 
woven from the physical clues left hor.ind bv the artist that are really the main 
locus of the work ...these readings are - aled primarily by the viewer's own frame 
of reference, her own personal memories, history, and ». Ture.”;’n Similarly Claire 
Bishop asserts that “The inevitably subjective streak in all these accounts once 
more asserts the fact that works of installation art are directed at and dem and the 
presence of the viewer.”1’1 But this does not get us very far in term s of describing 
the relevance of his work to current artist ic and cultural debates. There needs to 
be some sense of the work below or above or beside this volatile layer that can 
provide a platform for such a discussion.
To this end I propose that we accept the poststructuralist tenet that subjects are 
constituted by acts of communication. It then follows that all artworks, as 
semiotie objects, constitute their “ideal" viewer. It is the acco’1 it of the
C lare M anchester. “M ike N elson : The Ur- horns o f ll lu s io n ."  A rtext 7(1 (noo:>): (h>.
;M B ishop, C laire. In sta lla tio n  A rt: A C ritica . T istory , L ondon and  New  York: R oullodge, aoofs. n .
installation lroin this “ideal” position that 1 am  interested in analyzing in order to 
avoid falling wholesale into the conceptual trap of the "experience economy" and 
its premises of the “authenticity" and “incommensurability” of experience. We 
can deduce this “ideal” viewer by the structure of the space with which it is 
homologous and, as such, bring to light the installation's political salience.
Cinema
Upon entering the Modern Art Oxford (MAO) visitors see a defunct ticket booth 
bearing a faded poster of V >n. Through the door to the side is a dank corridor 
with purple walls that, leads to a foyer. hither time has rolled back or we have 
strayed far from family entertainm ent: this is not some futuristic multi-level 
Cineplex with bright lights and kaleidoscopic decor: the ceiling is low; the walls 
are dark red; the carpet is thick; the lights are dim; the trim m ing is solid wood; 
the glass is dirty. Three more doors lead from here, suggesting three different 
imaginary universes we can enter. But only one door opens and, instead of 
fulfilling the expectation of a voyage to some fantastical cinematic elsewhere, we 
are thrown back into the stark white gallery space. All that is to be seen is the 
bare wooden construction of Nelson's bluff. No poly-sensorial immersion. No 
alien “other.’’ Back to square one but not quite: we are still on the other side of 
the ticket booth, in the belly o f the exhibition.
Do the gallery walls look different for having passed through the rabbit’s hole or 
does disillusionment reign in the absence of illusion? As Nelson states, “the foyer 
functions almost like a trailer, intended to build up the suspense, the sense of
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expectation, yet you step outside it into the empty spaee of the gallery, and I am 
sure that after raising so much expectation a lot of people were disappointed.”2- 
And this is precisely the point of the “return” to the gallery. By not catering to 
expectation, Nelson denies imaginative indulgence in “the 'hidden other’ behind 
the white walls of the main exhibition s p a c e . I n s t e a d ,  expectation roams 
unm oored through an empty space in search of some other tantalization. But 
what if there is none, and we are left standing here looking at a plywood wall?
In the effort to fill in the space left by our deflated expectations, the details of 
Nelson’s first tableau take on their full weight. For example, consider the 
suggested age and status of the  space together with the fact that no alternative 
world opens up: rather than being positioned as the disembodied consumer of 
mass spectacle, the viewer is cast in the role of Roland Barthes’ “perverse” body,2-* 
the part of the \iew er that never merges with the screened world bu t stays behind 
eating popcorn, grazing the knees of neighbouring spectators, kissing in the dark, 
and scanning the crowd for other sights and other ways to  satiate desires. Not 
only does the foyer allude to the history and seedier side of this popular form of 
entertainm ent, bu t also, by stopping short of narrative fulfillment, Nelson 
prevents the sublimation of this “perversity” to the dictates of filmic immersion.
In this light, the tattered poster for Alien takes on new significance: in addition to
denoting the genre “science fiction” and, more specifically, the encounter with an
exotic and dangerous “other” in its most b latant and paranoid form, it also
-2 P a tric ia  B ickers. “T rip le  B luff [in te rv iew  w ith  M ike N elson]." A rt M o n th ly  (Ju ly -A ug . 2 0 0 4 ): 4 . 
-vi C a th e rin e  G ran t. “T u rn e r  Prize: L igh t's  O n -  A nyone H om e?" F lash  A rt 3 4 .2 2 2  (2 0 0 2 ): 40 .
-u D iscussed  in  M artin  Jay . Songs o f  E xperience: M o d ern  A m erican  a n d E u ro p ean  V aria tion  on  a 
U nive rsa l T h e m e . Berkeley: U o f C alifo rn ia  P. 2 0 0 5 . 38 4 .
suggests an encounter with the “other” that occurs within the param eters of 
"self." Barthes' bi-part model of a cinema-goer is akin to the psychological 
compartmentalization at the heart of Freudian psychoanalysis. Freud writes:
“This uncanny is in reality* nothing new or alien, bu t something which is familiar 
and old-established in the mind and which has become alienated from it only 
through the process of repression.”2;’ As Anthony Vidler explains, "The uncanny, 
in this sense, might be characterized as the quintessential bourgeois kind of 
fear”26 and its favourite m otif is “the fearful invasion of an alien presence.”2"
If we take this a bit further, the viewers’ exit out the other side of the cinema foyer 
is analogous to leaving the perverse body behind and repressing this alien “other” 
that is the object of so m uch filmic and psychological fascination. By occupying 
the narrative space habitually reserved for the screen, however, the gallery is 
pulled into the artwork as one of its constituent elements. As such, what is 
commonly understood as a neutral container for artwork becomes a fictional 
element among other fictional elements. Arguably this is the case with all 
artworks -  context becomes/is content -  bu t by this explicit exchange of the 
cinema auditorium  for the empty gallery, Nelson sets into m otion a productive 
conceptual contagion between the two: both are spaces in which the viewer is 
called upon to enact a script, w hether imaginatively, physically, or both.
A n th o n y  V id ler. T he a rc h ite c tu ra l uncan n y : essavs in  th e  m o d e rn  u n h o m elv. C am bridge , MA: 
M IT P, 1992 .14 .
- b  Ib id . 4 .
Ib id . 3.
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Studio
The idea of conceptual contagion becomes even more evident as v ie w e r s  confront 
Nelson’s second bluff. Here is another make-stnft plywood room set inside the 
gallery walls. This time there is no door: instead, we look inside it through the 
missing bay window, a modest apse supported by a pair of metal joists and a two- 
by-four. The interior, by contrast, is completely realistic*, plaster mouldings 
define the  living-room walls: a light bulb hangs down from a ceiling rose; an 
eclectic collection of objects covers even* surface -  books, a fan, metal stools, 
maquettes, fake monkey’s head, a tiny skull, a wall-mounted mask resembling a 
cow and various other sculptures, packages labelled in Arabic, filing cabinets, a 
work bench and a desk lamp. As Nelson states, it looks like a “nutter’s den.’’28
This Victorian front room once served as Nelson’s studio in South London.
Rebuilt in the MAO, it is an autobiographical gesture tha t aligns his personal 
working space with the abandoned underground spaces he is known to construct, 
such as the  reception rooms of The Coral Reef. As one critic describes it, “its litter 
of props -  animal masks, hum an bones, sci-fi paperbacks, and religious 
kniekknacks -  intim ated that this was the den of an authentic subscriber to cult 
mythologies rather than of an artist who treats them as raw m a t e r i a l . T h i s  
“nutter” is evidently also a hrieoleur, combining this cacophony of stuff into some 
sort of syntax. He ignores Victorian mores of propriety* and rationality and quietly 
gnaws at them from the inside, like a renter not at home in his house. The room
-8 In P a tric ia  B ickers. 4.
-H> R achel W ithers. “M ike N elson." A rtfo rum  43 .3  (2 0 0 4 ): 238.
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seems to be filled by some sort of code that is impenetrable to us blit palpable, as 
though we could potentially crack it wide open -  and thereby dispel with this 
uncanny presence.
As such, the viewer wears the hat of a detective. However, whereas viewers of 
Nelson's previous installations walk through the spaces gathering clues that help 
them re-establish the presence of the departed occupants, here we are kept 
outside by the barrier of the  window sill: looking in from the edge of the window, 
we are cast in the role of a nosey neighbour rather than a forensic expert. Private 
space is revealed as infinitely public: this pane-less architectural feature frames 
our view of the internal space that is on display like a picture,:*1’ or like the world 
on the other side of the computer screen that we can finally embody “for real.” As 
such, the viewer also wears the hat of a flaneur or a cyber-cowboy exploring 
digital worlds.
By peering in this virtual world we also notice that the studio is not entirely 
vacant: it doubles as a projection booth for a US conspiracy theorist named 
.Jordan Maxwell. Through the double doors at the back of the room, which open 
onto the gallery space, we see Maxwell “bounced off and distorted through a 
convex m irror.”:*1 He is giving a “Basic Slide Lecture.” This tirade is “an 
explanation of the occult symbolism he sees in government and corporate logos: 
Exxon’s double cross, all-seeing eyes on dollar bills, the rising sun of the new
•tl’ Sec A nn Friedberg . “The V irtu a l W indow ." R eth ink ing  M edia C hm ige:.l'he  A esthetics of 
T ran s ition. David T h o rn b u rn  a n d  H enry  J e n k i n s ,  eds. B rad Sea well, assoe. ed. C am bridge, MA: 
M IT P. 2 0 0 3 . 337-53 -
•il M ike N elson in P atric ia  B ickers. 4,
IpO
world order in Shell’s logo , the pentagram that forms the Pentagon.’’s- He rants 
about the  Illuminati, the Knights Templar, freemasonry and "secret cabals of evil 
masterminds running the world from a bunker in Switzerland. At one point he 
says: ‘The people who are running this country are some of the biggest criminals 
the world has ever known.”’1"
Adrian Searle writes, “Artists, like conspiracy theorists, need to make connections, 
however implausible. They need to deal with mental space as well as physical 
objects, history as well as the present." ?-i Identifying the artist with an obsessive is 
remobilizing a longstanding cliche, but as Nelson states, “you can use those 
structures to articulate something 111 an elegant and unexpected way."'"’ In Triple 
Bluff Canyon, Maxwell’s continuous spout of far-fetched fantasies and 
unsubstantiated theories is displaced from the creative source -  the mythic 
artist’s studio -  to the negative space of the gallery that surrounds it. In this 
ambiguous position, Maxwell hangs like a spectre over the entire exhibition.
Once implanted. Maxwell’s paranoiac associations keep their stronghold over the 
viewer’s imagination. In the wooden shack that constitutes the third bluff, for 
example, we come across oil drums half-buried in sand, which now resonate with 
Maxwell’s semiotic analyses and his allegation of “plotting a New World Order 
with roots in ancient Egypt, Viewers enter this shack through a rickety wooden
■5- P an  Fox. 1.
■o In A drian  Searle. "R iddle o f  S an d s.” G u ard ian  U nlim ited  A rts (2004): 
h t tp : / / a r t s .gnard ian .co .U k/foatnre .s/stor v /o , 11710,121nS72.00.htm l, 1. 
ai ibid. 2.
In P a tric ia  B ickers. 2.
O ssian W ard . "M ike N elson a t the M odern  A rt M u seu m ,” A rt in A m erica (Nov. 2 0 04). 
h ttp ://f in d a rtic Ies .o ()in /i)/a rtic le .s /in i m 1248 /is /n i 117069 9 5 0 .1 .
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structure that carves out a narrow passageway in a giant dune. The windows are 
unusually high but sand pours in just the same, and we can see nothing but sand 
through the slats in the wood. “The shed looks I like] the sort of out-of-the-way 
forgotten byre where someone might have been kept kidnapped for months or 
years, or where Saddam might have hidden himself," ''" writes Searle, updating the 
paranoia to today's mediaseapc.
“The Woodshed"
There is no other door in this sand-tilled shack, so we have to turn around and go 
back through the tunnel... back through the cinema foyer... and out by the ticket 
booth. From here we can walk up a different set of stairs and see the shed from 
afar. “The space seems to hide a terrible enormity,”^  writes Searle. At this 
distance, from this vantage point, Nelson’s shed is a perfect rendition of Robert 
Smithson’s Partially Buried Woodshed (1970) as it appeared on the cover of Arts 
M agazine in May 1978 -  except for the sand, for the location, for the historical 
context and the resulting significance.
Robert Smithson made the Partially Buried Woodshed on an invitation from 
Kent State University in 1970. When his original plans for a nmd-slide fell 
through, he started working on the idea of burying a building. A small woodshed 
was chosen on an abandoned farm at the back of the university grounds, which 
was nowr only used to store dirt, gravel and firewood. Tie hired a local contractor 
to backhoe truckloads of dirt 011 the shed until the central beam cracked -  twenty
A drian Searle. a, 
Ibid.
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in total. Smithson donated the work to the university and insisted that no further 
alterations be made to i t . T h e  woodshed and the surrounding area were thus 
left to fallow: it was a monument to entropy.
When, several months after the earthwork was installed, four students were killed 
by the National Guard during a protest following the American invasion of 
Cambodia, the Partially Buried Woodshed was widely embraced as a memorial 
for the tragedy and as an icon of the anti-war movement in general. In hindsight, 
Nancy I Iolt describes it as follows:
I th in k  0110 o f the  m ost shock ing  th ings, w hen  I look buck, w ere  the Kent shoo tings. It 
shocked  m e m o re  than  th e  p residen t g e ttin g  assassin a ted . I th ink  it changed  everybody 's 
m ind , even th o se  who w ere  conservative. .So m any people ju s t  sw itched overn ight a lte r  
th a t. E very th ing  ju s t becam e very, very  clear. [...] [T ]he s tu d en ts  obviously recogn ised  the  
paralle l. P iling the  earth  u n til th e  cen tra l beam  cracked , as though  th e  w hole governm en t 
w ere cracking. Really, w e h ad  a revo lu tion  then . It w as the en d  of one  society an d  th e  
b eg inn ing  o f the  next. ">
While the campus was closed, someone painted “MAY 4 KENT 70” on the shed.
Renee Green, in an installation titled Partially Buried (1946), presented archival 
footage of Smithson’s assistants producing the earthwork intermixed with other 
texts and videos, concrete remains of the woodshed’s foundation, interviews 
about the Kent State massacre, news footage of the event, an auto-interview, 
images of the university’s Afro-American student union (which was committed to
u*> See Je re m y  M illar. T rip le B luffO anyon: M ike N elson. S h o rt sto ry  by Brian A ldiss. Oxford, UK: 
M odern Art O xford, 2 0 0 4 .
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non-violence), and a soundtrack of the Jackson Five. As such, she presents a 
more ethnographic sense of time and place than Smithson’s i arthwork captured 
i)n its own.
Green's multilayered montage is in sharp distinction to Tacit a Dean’s ironic film 
Prom Columbus, Ohio to the Partially Buried Woodshed (1909). Dean uses the 
same archival footage together with contemporary shots of herself and a friend 
searching for the shed 011 the university campus. Maps and hand-written 
instructions did not suffice to ascertain its exact location, but eventually a 
concrete foundation of a small building is found. The search ends abruptly with 
Dean and her friend nestled in the tall grass surrounding the site, gazing off into 
the distance as if basking in the residual “aura” of the earthwork. As such she 
produces a “pastoral sense of tim e”*1 that runs contra to both Smithson and Dean. 
Pilgrimages to remote Earthworks have become a type of tourism onto its own 
and the politics of the site are all bu t invisible.
Nelson’s contribution to this quagmire of meaning is not straightforward. There 
is no sense of ethnographic or pastoral time, nor is there a sense that Nelson is 
reasserting Smithson’s adherence to the law of entropy: after all, he has revived 
the woodshed by building it here in the MAO. In the words of Michael Wilson, his 
remake is an effective meditation on “the space between reality, representation, 
and replication,”^ ’ It is due to the introduction of the term “replication” that it is 
important to context ualize Triple B lu ff Canyon at the crossover of immersion
•u Alex Coles. “Revisiting R obert S m ithson  in Ohio: T acita  D ean, Sam  D uran t am i R enee (b e e n . 
P arachu te  104 (1*001): ig6.
c  M ichael W ilson. “M ike N elson." A rtfo rum  46 .3  (2007): gSS.
194
and sitn-spcciiu’ity, rather than pursuing the sile-spce-ific vector alone (as did 
Green and Dean). When Charmaine Picard asked him, “Do you want youi 
audience to recognise that they’re looking at art?” he answered, “1 want them to 
immerse themselves. One hopes that the work would allow you to forget that you 
are looking at art. You’re in something that feels real, but it's somehow not 
real.”i:'>
Triple B lu ff (kuujon marks the exact point at which it no longer makes (enough) 
sense to speak of specificity in relation to a site that is itself highly mediated. 
Standing on the edge of the sandy desert, the woodshed appears as an image, 
organized within the constraints of a rectangular frame.vi Nelson state's, “As an 
image on a magazine' cover it somehenv became? mem? elislanevel, yet mem? 
tangible'. I don’t know if that sounels odd, but it almost became the reasem, the 
most absurel and banal reasem, te> ivbuild it.”r- Given Smithson’s resistance to 
“the? inevitable subsumption of the temporal patterns of the? site-specific work 
beneath those? inherent to the technological medium,” !0 this is particularly ironic. 
Smithson always insisted that non-sites eoulel only be grasped by a combination 
of references, thus eradicating “the possibility of the? earthwork being frozen” by 
photography d'/ Perhaps that is why the image of the shed, as the? sole available 
reference, made it appear ‘ more distanced.”
■o Charmaine* P icard. “M ike N elson M eets M anhattan ."  T he A rt N ew spaper 183 (2007): 45. 
n  .See Lev M anovich. T h e  L anguage o f New M edia [ Leonardo. R oger P. M. ina an d  Sean C ubitt, 
eds,). C am bridge, MA: M IT P, 2001 . 2(45. 
r> In Patric ia  b ickers. 4. 
i<’Alex C oles. 130. 
f  Ibid. 131.
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The tangibility of the woodshed, however, is not n.ore accessible in Nelson’s 
remake than in the image of Smithson’s “original.” W alter Benjamin, in his 
renowned essay The Work o f  Art in the Age o f  Mechanical Reproduction, argues 
that the aura of a unique work of art can only be experienced at a distance: once it 
is brought closer to the viewer by way of the camera, this aura/distance is 
dest royed. Many years later Paul Virilio makes a similar argument in “Big 
Optics,” this time in the context of new telecommunication technologies.
Whereas the “small optics” shared by human and  camera vision position objects 
in human perspective, with clear distinctions of near and far, the “big optics” of 
electronic transmission erases these distinctions: it travels at the speed of light, 
making every position accessible from every other position on earth, at least in 
principle. As Lev Manovieh summarizes, “So, if for Benjamin the industrial age 
displaced every object from its original setting, for Virilio the post-industrial age 
eliminates the dimension of space altogether.”!8 in light of these essays, one 
could say that Nelson’s remake of the Partially Buried Woodshed allows viewers 
to experience a physically remote (and no longer standing!) work of art -  in short, 
to experience telepresence.
Telepresence, however, is endemic to what Virilio calls the “derealization of the 
terrestrial horizon.” !'' Lev Manovieh uses the concept of modernization to 
contextualize Benjamin’s and Virilio’s discussion in broader terms, lie cites 
Jonathan Crary: “Modernization is the process by which capitalism uproots and 
makes mobile that which is grounded, clears away or obliterates that which
impedes circulation, and make exchangeable what is singular.”*0 Reproductions 
(like Nelson’s woodshed) are thus part of “the continual process of turning 
objects into mobile signs.”*1 The sign-value of Smithson’s Partially Buried 
Woodshed and its mobility is what Nelson toys with in Triple, B lu ff Canyon, not 
the idea of an original artwork (Dean) or an authentic site (Green). Moving the 
anti-war icon into the present political context of the Global War on Terror 
rekindles the idea of “('racking the central beam ” while representing in material 
form the aridity of the current political climate: unlike mud, sand cannot support 
life and does not stick together. Smithson’s Partially Buried Woodshed implied a 
parallel between the weight of the dirt and the weight of popular opinion, but 
sand slips through the cracks. It is bedrock already crumbled and at the very end 
of its cycle, just before dust.
Returning to Benjamin and Virilio, both authors argue that spatial distance -  the 
distance between the subject who is seeing and the object that is seen -  is an 
inherently positive and “necessary ingredient in human culture.”*2 As Manovieh 
summarizes,
F or B enjam in a n d  Virilio, distance; g u a ran teed  by v ision  p reserves th e  au ra  o f an  object, 
its  position  in th e  world, w hile th e  desire  “to  b rin g  th in g s ‘c lo ser’” destroys o b jec ts’ 
re la tio n s  to each  o ther, u ltim ate ly  o b lite ra tin g  the m ateria l o rd e r a lto g e th e r an d  
re n d e rin g  the no tions o f d is tan ce  a n d  space meaningless.™
r-“ Ibid. 173 .
Ibid. 1 74 . 
w Ibid.
™ Ibid. 175 .
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This positive appraisal is in sharp distinction to the widespread tendency to 
consider distance* negatively. Manovieh summarizes this attitude succinctly:
D istance becom es responsib le  fo r crea ting  the  gap betw een  sp ec ta to r and  spectac le , for 
sep a ra tin g  .subject an d  object, fo r pu ttin g  th e  firs t in th e  position  of tra n sc e n d e n ta l 
m aste ry  an d  ren d erin g  the  seco n d  inert. D istance  allow s th e  sub jec t to tre a t the  O th e r as 
object; in sh o rt, it m akes ob jectification  possib le .'’'
Many of the issues tit stake in this debate are apparent in the crossover of 
immersion and site-specifieity: the negative understanding of distance is used to 
promote the ideal of sensual proximity on which immersion is premised, while its 
positive understanding is used to promote the necessity of alienation to critical 
thought on which site-specifieity is premised.
All of these term s bear directly on Triple B lu ff Canyon: it is a poly-sensorial 
environment that immerses visitors rather than  placing an object before them, 
yet at the same time it plays with the gap between spectacle and spectator in a 
way that makes it impossible to reconcile the two: not only can the shed, which is 
made of wood, not be defined as “the woodshed” until we see it from afar, but 
also the two experiences are not congruent. For example, if we imaginatively 
project ourselves inside the shed on the basis of an image and walk around, the 
floor is in one place, but if we enter Nelson’s set from behind, the floor is much 
lower. This may sound like a m inor detail but it creates a significant rift in our 
understanding of the woodshed. It makes one wonder which is more deceiving,
!>t Ibid. 174.
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the set or the image, relative to Smithson’s “original,” and thus instates doubt 
that kinaeslhetic involvement is necessarily more “tru e” than visual analysis.
History, space and subjectivity
Perhaps this discrepancy accounts for Nelson’s “odd” observation that the 
photograph of Sm ithson’s work on the cover o f A rts Magazine, made it more 
distant yet more tangible: he plays between alienation and immersion rather than  
positing one oven- the other and thereby casts a double role for visitors as both 
insiders and outsiders. But how can we begin to describe this in-between space in 
theoretical rather than practical terms? How does the oscillation that Triple B lu ff 
Canyon sets in motion between spectacle and immersion contribute to the 
political salience of the installation? In order to  answer this question it is 
necessary to consider the remade Partially Buried Woodshed within the context 
of the other two tableaux. W hen taken as a whole, Triple B lu ff Canyon’s opened- 
ended plethora of details begins to coalesce into a more definitive model of the 
visitor’s participation, as well as subjectivity, narrative, history and space in 
general.
In Triple B lu ff Canyon the viewer walks in and around three distinct sets. As 
Ralph Rugoff states, “Like theatre sets at intermission, Nelson’s architectural 
environments are littered with telling clues that conjure unseen actors and 
histories,”5r> In other words, we might imagine the actors on stage bu t we are not 
their understudies who follow their lines on the side. Similarly Richard Grayson
ss R alph  Rugoff. “T he P um pkin  P a lace .” M iM M isgnL B ctw een„a . Form ula  an d  a C ode. 36.
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states, “we are no longer direct players in the piece moving through corridors 
and spaces as stand-ins for the previous inhabitants seemingly just departed (as 
in most of Nelson’s work. p'>f> I h' i-s referring to 24a Orwell Street but his 
observation holds for Triple B lu ff Canyon, as well: despite the fact that the 
installation requires perambulation, the viewer is never in the position of being 
able to break the fourth wall of the theatre and partake in the actions that Nelson 
depicts: there is no cinema beyond the foyer, 110 invitation to  enter the studio, 
and no way to traverse, the sea of sand. As Nelson states, “it kind of forces you to 
stay outside it.
As such, the dynamic the installation establishes with the viewer is not one of 
total immersion, nor is it one of calling at tention to the functional aspects of a 
given site. The viewer may be an integral part of the theatrical piece (as Michael 
Fried bemoaned), but as Ilugoff states, “though we may be more than mere 
‘viewers,’ our role in not quite that of fully realized dram at is personae. After all, 
it is up to us to concoct our own speeches.
This responsibility for concocting narrative coherence where there are only 
disparate fragments is crucial to understanding how narrative functions in Triple 
B luff Canyon and what kind of model of subjectivity it establishes. Dan Fox 
describes the installation as follows:
T he a r t is t’s tw ilight zone  o f  m ethodo logy  folds sw a th es  o f  re fe ren ces  back  on  them selves.
I t ’s a nervous system  co n s ta n tly  firing  p u lses o f  in fo rm a tio n  a llu sio n s to  h is to rica l
■V’ R ichard  G rayson , ly . 
s.' In P a tric ia  Bickers. 4. 
>K R alph Rugoff. g8.
m o m en ts , n o d s  to  lite ra ry  o r  c inem atic  so u rc e s  -  m ak in g  in te r te x tu a l leaps o f  logic w ith  
alm ost th e  sam e deg ree  o f a u tis tic  lucid ity  as the  p a ra n o id  M axwell."'11
Then he asks, “...what does it m ean to be unable to read the references in 
Nelson’s labyrinths...?”60 As if answering this question, Clare M anchester writes, 
“Nelson’s constructed reality leaves the viewer continually between states, 
between worlds, between narratives.”61 As Ralph Rugoff suggests, “...they engage 
us on a kind of narrative treadm ill”.62
Despite this fracturing, however, there is an underlying structure to Nelson’s 
installation th a t guides the viewer in a particular way. Thereby, it also suggests a 
particular (precluded) narrative structure, as Adrian Searle observes:
T he e n tire  ex p erien ce  o f  T r i p l e  B l u f f  C a n y o n  h a s  th e  m a n n e r  o f a q u est, w ith  p itfa lls  (th e  
w rong d o o r), d is illu s io n m e n ts  ( th e  b reak d o w n  a n d  loss o f  illusion , w hen  w e see th a t  th e  
co rrid o r a n d  foyer a re  b u t a  s tag e  set), t r a p s  a n d  b e g u ile m e n ts  ( th e  lec tu re r, m ak in g  us 
believe in  th e  u n tru e , as th o u g h  to  frig h ten  an d  m is lead  u s), an d  a lo n g  d a rk  c o rrid o r in to  
th e  u n k n o w n , w h e re  we e n d  u p  a t  a m ise rab le  d e a d  end , w ith  only  a very lim ited  view  o f 
w h a t m ig h t lie b ey o n d . A nd  th e n , having b eg u n  aga in , th e  rev e la tio n  o f  th e  d e se r t, a 
vision as ago rap h o b ic  a n d  em pty1 as th e  e a r lie r  sp aces  w ere  c lau s tro p h o b ic .61
Similarly, referring to  HP Lovecraft, Nelson states: “Rather than  writing a clear 
narrative or adhering to a linear structure, he runs one story into another, 
creating an atm osphere that conjures up the sense of a narrative unfolding ,”64
59 D an  Fox. l.
60 Ib id . 2.
hI C lare M ancheste r. 69.
6~ R alph  Rugoff. 38.
‘’’ A d rian  Searle. 2.
•u In  P a tric ia  B ickers. 3.
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But this unfolding is only a chimera and the quest is never fulfilled: we end up 
back in the  beginning, literally and figuratively.
Due to th is  denial of narrative closure ~ despite its suggestion -  the  fragments 
pile up on top of one another rather than following in a line that the viewer can 
follow in turn. In this description we hear many echoes of the postmodern subject 
that is fractured and multi-tasked to death. In 1984 Fredric Jam eson stated:
If, in d eed , th e  sub jec t h a s  lo st its  capacity  actively to  ex ten d  its  p ro -te n s io n s  an d  re ­
te n s io n s  ac ro ss  the te m p o ra l m an ifo ld  an d  to  o rgan ize  its  p a s t and  fu tu re  in to  co h e re n t 
ex p erien ce , it becom es d ifficu lt eno u g h  to  see how  th e  cu ltu ra l p ro d u c tio n s  of su ch  a 
su b jec t cou ld  resu lt in  an y th in g  b u t  “h eap s o f frag m en ts"  a n d  in  a p rac tice  of th e  
ra n d o m ly  h e te ro g en eo u s  an d  frag m en ta ry  a n d  th e  a lea to ry .1’1'
In light o f this radical heterogeneity, Jam eson asserts that the viewer is asked “to 
rise somehow to  the level at which the vivid perception of radical difference is in 
and of itself a new mode of grasping what used to be called relationship: 
something for which the word collage is still only a very feeble nam e.”66
As if following up on Jam eson’s search for an adequate way in tvhich to 
understand the postm odern subject, Barbara Maria Stafford states:
U nlike  tw e n tie th -c e n tu ry  eu t-and - as te  collage tech n iq u es  -  ju x ta p o s in g  recognizable  
sn ip p e ts  o f  th e  w orld -  ...new  e lec tron ic  reco m b in an t m ed ia  are  seam less  and  en d less . 
S irch aggressive rep u rp o sin g s  a re  no t ab o u t c rea tin g  physica l an d  sp a tia l ad jacency
<>5 F red ric  Jam e so n . “T he C u ltu ra l Logic o f  Late C apitalism ." (1984) P o stm o d ern ism , or. T h e  
cu ltu ra l logic of la te  cap ita lism . D u rh am : D uke U niversity  P ress, 1991. 25.
(,hIbid . 31.
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am o n g  in eo n g m en t b its . R a th er, th e ir  in te n t is to  p ro cu re  m o rp h ed  sy n ch ro n iza tio n  
ac ro ss  com plex m u ltid im en sio n a l data.*’"
She then asks; “Has the paradigm of the computational remix, in fact, subtly 
warped our view of the self as being no different from the customized bit whose 
meaning derives from the autom ated link-up?’’68 According to Stafford, the “self” 
emerges in the process of correlating this unconnected manifold, not by 
smoothing it over into a cohesive narrative or establishing hierarchical 
relationships, but rather by assembling the bits “by means of associative jumps 
and synchronized recurrences.”6^
With the inclusion of the simulated Partially Buried Woodshed, Nelson’s 
“collage” does not only conjoin disparate references, it conjoins disparate 
historical eras. As such, Nelson’s articulation of a “deeply stacked strata of 
experience that cannot always be distilled or conveyed on a flow chart”'70 is 
equally an articulation of a model of history that cannot be charted. As Ralph 
Rugoff suggests, Nelson’s work is “...testifying to a type of contemporary history 
that, rather than  progressing, appears trapped in a vicious cycle.”''1
What kind of history is this? Rachel Withers writes that “Nelson’s self­
consciously citational assemblages reference the morphing of historical myths 
(Maxwell’s conspiracy theories, for example) to the  point where even the artist’s
B arbara  M aria  S tafford . “P ic tu rin g  U ncertainty ': F rom  R ep re sen ta tio n  to M ental 
R ep resen ta tio n .'’ M edia A rt H is to rie s . O liver G rau. ed. C am bridge, MA: M IT P, 2 0 0 7 .4 5 6 .
Ibid.
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D an Fox. 2.
R alph Rugoff. 37.
2 0 3
own work becomes a recyclable artefact, yet every return is different.""- 
Elsewhere she adds, “For Nelson, one suspects, the refraining of past motifs in 
present contexts is rather like moving a magnifying glass over a specimen: Focus 
is gained, lost, and regained -  with added insight. ...Present contingencies and 
the accretions of myth compel adjustments to the picture.”-* In other words, in 
Nelson's tableaux history is in a constant process of revision as facts or myths 
from the past are incorporated into the events of today and vice versa. Smithson’s 
Partially Burk’d Woodshed, for example, is given added political value when 
repositioned in the context of the Global War on Terror. Similarly, the 
W oodsheds status as an icon of the moment when the government’s involvement 
in Vietnam collapsed under public pressure is transferred onto today, as if 
optimistically waiting for a similar turn j f  events, or at least a turn in public 
opinion."*
The model of history that Nelson presents also departs from Robert Smithson's. 
“History,” Smithson wrote, “is a facsimile of events held together by flimsy 
biographical information.”^  Nelson’s associative links are equally flimsy but, 
“[wjhile Nelson deftly blends this factual and imaginative material, his work 
never reiterates the stale idea that history is mere fiction. Instead, its multifarious 
thematic construction seems designed to accommodate the complexities of a time
R achel W ithers. “M ike N elson .” 238 . 
r *  R achel W ith ers  a n d  Mike N elson. “A T h o u san d  W ords: M ike N elson T alks ab o u t h is recen t 
w ork .” Artfo rn m  4 0 .6  (2002): 105.
"i N elson qu ips, “1 m ean  really, how  011 earth  cou ld  th a t m an  have been voted  in again?" (in 
C h arm ain e  P icard). A few m o n th s a fte r w riting  th is  c h a p te r  "the m an" lost the  election .
”r< In  B rian  W allis. “E xcavating the  1970s." Art in  A m erica 85.9 (1997): 97.
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when all places are interconnected and no history is strictly local.’”"1’ As such. 
Nelson expands upon G r e e n ’s  local site-specifie ethnography to include disparate 
connections that update the work for the “globalized” present. This runs counter 
to Smithson’s adherence to the principle of entropy, in which energy slowly 
drains out of system, leaving only a pile of dirt. As Rachel Withers conjectures, 
“Though the idea of history as an infinite, Borgesian hall-of-mirrors carries a 
claustrophobic frisson of its own, on balance it seems a more tempting notion 
than the [Smithson’s] esehatological thesis.”"7
It is on this idea of history as a hall-of-mirrors that .Jameson’s explanation of 
postmodern history, space and subjectivity as heterogeneous (and schizophrenic) 
needs updating for the contemporary: as Vivian Sobehaek argues, heterogeneity 
has by now become so pervasive as to be effectively experienced as homogenous. 
She states, “Temporality is now constituted and lived paradoxically as a 
homogenous experience o f discontinuity.”?* This transformation of temporality 
also impacts our understanding of space. As Sobehaek explains,
space becom es eorrelativelv  experienced  as ab strac t, u n g ro u n d ed , an d  fla t -  a s ite  (or 
screen) fo r  play an d  disp lay  ra th e r  th a n  an  invested  s itu a tio n  in  w hich action  co u n ts  
ra th e r  th a n  com putes. Such a superfic ia l space can no  longer p recisely  h o ld  th e  in te rest of 
the  sp e c ta to r /u se r  b u t has to  constan tly  stim u la te  i tw
Jonathan Crary makes a similar point regarding the resulting superficial space:
"" R alph Rugoff. p . ? .
~  R achel W ithers. “Mike N elson." 2 38 .
Vivian Sobehaek. “The Scene of th e  Screen: E nvisioning Pho tograph ic , C inem atic, an d  
E lectron ic  ‘P resence .’" C arnal T hough ts: E m bodim ent an d  M oving Im age C ultu re . Berkley: U o f 
C alifornia P, 2 0 0 4 .15O.
11 Ibid . 15R
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as  rep roductive  technology a tta in s  new  param ete rs  o f  m im etic  ‘fidelity* (ho lography, 
h ig h -rc so lu tio n ’l'V) there' is an  inverse move of the im age to w ard  pure surface, so  that 
w hatever drifts across the screen o f e ither television o r  hom e co m p u te r is part o f the  
sam e  h o m o g e n e ity /1’
Both Sobehaek and Crary attribute this homogenization to electronic spaces in 
which “Saturation of color and hyperbolic attention to detail replace depth and 
texture at the surface of the image ...”81
Triple B lu ff Canyon manifests this homogenization of spatial and temporal 
heterogeneity. Time is suspended: narrative fragments pile up but narrative 
development is precluded. As such, to evoke the longstanding opposition between 
description and narration, we could say that Nelson emphasizes details, rather 
than stories. Lev Manevich’s analysis of computer-based game-play addresses 
this emphasis, and he concludes by suggesting that the opposition no longer 
stands. He writes,
f W Jhile from  one point o f  view, gam e  narra tives can  he aligned  w ith an c ien t n a rra tiv es  
th a t  are  also s tru c tu red  a ro u n d  m ovem ent th ro u g h  space, from  an o th e r perspective they 
a re  exact opposites. M ovem ent th ro u g h  space allow s the p lay e r to p rogress th ro u g h  the 
narra tive , hu t it is also valuab le  in  itself. I t is a way fo r the p layer to explore the  
en v iro n m en t.81-'
s" Jo n a th a n  Crary. “Eclipse of th e  Spectacle." 289. 
m Vivian Sobehaek. 158.
811 Lev M anovieh. 247.
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When walking through Nelson’s installation, as when playing a computer game, 
the plethora of details on display is akin to the “extent of knowledge””'5 a user can 
glean about the virtual environment, and thereby bolsters its realism. I lowever, 
as Crary and Sobehaek suggest, this realism is not grounded in temporal or 
spatial depth.
Manovieh’s discussion of the “navigable space” of computer games is crucial in 
this respect, as well; compu'er space cannot offer the continuity that joins objects 
together in a singular “real” space. Although designed on a Cartesian grid, “What 
is missing from computer space is space in the sense of medium an 
environment in which objects are embedded and the effect of these objects on 
each other.”8 ’ Rather, as Manovieh asserts, it is “aggregate.” He writes, “Although 
new media objects favour the use of space for representations of all kinds, virtual 
spaces are most often not true spaces but collections of separate objects. Or, to 
put this in a slogan: There is no space in c y b e r s p a c e .”8-5
Despite this Cartesian grid work, “computer-generated worlds are actually much 
more haptic and aggregate than optic and systematic.”86 In Manovieh’s use of 
these term s he is borrowing from Aloes Riegl, who outlined two ways of 
understanding space: “Haptic perception isolates the object in the field as a 
discrete entity, whereas optic perception unifies objects in spatial continuum.”87
See Paul M ilgram , H a ru o T a k e m u ra , Akira IH sum i et al. “A ugm ented  Reality: A Class of 
D isplays on  th e  R eality-V irutality  C ontinuum ." SPIK [T elem an ipu la to r and  T elepresence 
T echnologies] 2351 ( 1994): 1182-92.
«■' Lev M anovieh. 255. 
t,r' Ib id . 253.
8(1 Ibid. 254.
K" Ib id . 233-4.
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Note that Manovieh asserts a positive valuation of optic perception, with which 
.Jonathan Crary agrees. Summarizing Riegl’s distinction, Crary writes:
For Riegl, a tactile  art (o r  l u i p t i c  a rt, deriv ing  from  the Greek word lo r "touch") is o n e  in 
w hich the w orld  is m ade p resen t in an  e te rna l, u n ch an g in g  objective form . H is exam ple 
was ancien t E gyptian a r t , the self-evident taetility  of which w as posed against the idea  of 
oplicality . O ptical art, in co n tras t, inco rp o ra tes  in to  it the d is to rtio n s an d  concea lm en ts  of 
light and  shadow', the le la tiv iza tion  of d istance , a n d  above all the subjective experience  of 
th e  eye itself, L eonardo  da  Vinci’s pa in tings, w ith th e ir  effects o fsftn n a lo , w ould be a 
decisive exam ple of w ork  that defined  the  optical m ode: they affirm  tha t vision is no t 
abou t a grasp  o f  stable an d  d iscre te  form s, but abou t a d isso lu tion  an d  b lu rrin g  of 
iden tities, ab o u t the n eb u lo u s in tervals betw een  an d  am ong  objects.”"
In the absence of the optical “relativization of distance,” computer space becomes 
“flat” as Sobehaek suggests.8(>
A parallel can be drawn with Triple B lu ff Canyon: moving through the 
installation is like navigating through a haptic space: it consists of three distinct 
virtual objects that we can explore in great detail yet the gallery space in which 
they are constructed falls into emptiness: it is not "programmed” and therefore 
not “used.” As such, “space” in Nelson’s installation is more “aggregate” than 
continuous, and the viewer’s body is given little space in the resulting flatness -  it 
is not embedded within a continuum but rather pushed to the surface, forced to
HB .Jonathan Crary. “R obert Irw in  and  the  C ondition  of Tw ilight.” Robert L ehm an Lectures 3. 
Bettina Funekc and  K aren Kelly, ed.s. New York: Ilia Art F oundation , 2 0 0 4 .7 3 .
“Its fla tness a function o f its  lack of tem p o ra l th ick n ess  and bodily investm en t has to 
a ttrac t sp e c ta to r  in terest at the su rface .” 158.
208
stay outside, as it were, where it projects onto the virtual world on display rather 
than investing into it.‘’()
Of this navigable hut not inhabitable space, Manovieh writes, “It is also an 
expression and gratification of a psychological desire, a state of being, a subject 
position or rather, a subject’s trajectory.”1’1 But how can we connect this 
trajectory through haptic space (whether in a computer or through an installation) 
to the widespread idea that the user’s/viewer’s movement through an artwork is 
more: “active” than their “passive” observation of it, given that according to Riegl, 
it is optic space that allows relationships to be established between one 
object/subject and another? 1 low is the viewer’s trajectory significant in itself, if 
it is?
If we answer this question with deference to Michel de Certeau (who Manovieh 
claims is the best theoretician of navigable spaces'’-’-), the viewer’s movement 
through the space of the installation is akin to his or her movement through the 
city:
it is a p rocess of a p p r o p r i a t i o n  o f  the to p o g rap h ic  system  by th e  p ed es trian  (ju st as the 
sp eak e r a p p ro p ria te s  and  assu m es language); it is a sp a tia l r e a l i z a t i o n  o f th e  site  (just as 
th e  act o f speaking is a sonic realiza tion  o f language).1’ '
In other words, “their trajectories form unforeseeable sentences.”'’! According to
de Certeau, this is how pedestrians substitute “the technological system of a
See .Jonathan  Crary. “Kelipse of th e  Spectacle .” 289.
*" Lev M anovieh. 274.
■w Ibid. 2 68 .
M ichel De C erteau. The Practice o f  Kyetyday I.il’e. T rans. Steven K endall. Berkeley: U o f 
C alifornia P, 1984, 1988. 97-8 .
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coherent, totalizing space” with “a narrative cooked up out of elements drawn 
from shared sites, an allusive, fragmented tale whose gaps fall into line with the 
social practices it symbolizes.”'^ But there is a catch: linking a selection of 
unrelated objects, images and references is like writing without conjunctions. As 
such, given the type of space that Triple B lu ff Camion establishes for the viewer -
a space that is “more haptic and aggregate than optic and systematic”'"1 it
proffers a “spat ial sentencing” of an “elliptical” kind “made up of gaps, slips and 
allusions.”1'?
In light of this lack of grammatical coherence, the viewer’s trajectory through 
Triple B lu ff Canyon can be thought of as analogous to navigating through digital 
hyperlinks. As Marie-Laure Ryan states (drawing on Arthur Kroker), “the 
hypertextual imagination” -  “fascination with the discontinuous, the analogical 
jump, the chance encounter of heterogeneous elements, and the poetic sparkles 
caused by their collision” is a major three in contemporary culture.*'8 “Like 
Baudelaire’s flaneur, the virtual flaneur is happiest on the move, clicking from 
one object to another, traversing room after room, level after level, data volume 
after data volume.”*'*' Lor better or worse, most computer sites are so 
overwhelmed with navigational options that only the most persistent user will be
() i Ibid, xviii.
'>'< Miclu-l I)e  C erteau. “Practices o f Space.” On Signs, M arshall Blonsky, ed. B altim ore: Jo h n  
H opkins U P, it)8r>. 137,
Lev M anovieh. 1253.
" r Michel De C erteau. “Practices o f Space," 137.
,,K M arie-L aure Ryan. N arratives as V irtual Reality: Im m ersion  and  In terac tiv ity  in L itera tu re  and  
Kleetronie M edia. B altim ore: .Johns H opkins U P, m oot, 353, 
w Lev M anovieh. 274.
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able to grasp the logistics of its (limiting) code just as the viewer is unable to tie 
together all the loose ends in Triple Bluff Canyon.
As such, due to the weak syntax and discontinuities of the viewer’s trajectory 
through the installation, Nelson demonstrates that our navigation through the 
aggregate1 spaces in which we spend more and more of our time are more like the 
autistic leaps of logic Dan Fox refers to than coherent narratives. But does this 
“autism” differ from the model of culture as schizophrenic? Jameson wrote,
W hen  tha t re la tio n sh ip  [betw een  signifier a n d  s ig n ified | b reaks dow n, w hen  th e  links of 
the signifying chain  sn ap , then  w e have sch izo p h ren ia  in the fo rm  o f a ru b b le  o f  d istinc t 
an d  u n re la ted  .signifiers. ...the sch izo p h ren ic  is red u ced  to  an  experience  of p u re  m ateria l 
signifier:;, or, in  o th e r  w ords, a se rie s  of p u re  and  u n re la te d  p re sen ts  in tim e. ...[T jha t 
p re se n t su dden ly  engulfs the su b jec t with u n d ese rib ab le  v ividness, a m a te ria lity  of 
p e rcep tio n  p roperly  overw helm ing , which effectively d ram atizes  the  pow er o f th e  m ateria l 
o r  b e tte r  still, the lite ra l s ig n ifie r in iso la tio n ."10
Jameson describes how these “unrelated presents” penetrate  the schizophrenic 
due to h is/her inability to correlate1 them with their respective signifieds. 1 le 
makes it clear, however, that this is not a diagnosis of postmodern culture as 
somehow pathological, but that the linguistic malfunctioning particular to 
schizophrenia can function as a useful aesthetic (rather than clinical) model for 
understanding the implications of the cultural tendency to emphasize “pure and 
unrelated” experiences.
100 P redric Jam eso n . 26 -7.
If we use autism as an aesthetic model instead, we see that there is likewise a 
breakdown in signification; the relationship between one signifier and another is 
obscured, so to speak, rather than the signified to  which it refers, Barbara Maria 
Stafford explains that the autistic can easily memorize discrete facts but has 
difficulty in binding these particulars into a coherent concept.'01 “In short,” she 
states, “this want of cross-cortical cooperation looks a lot like an extreme form of 
nonnarrative experience.”102 Due to the absence of “the binding drive that 
connects the topographically distributed sensorial packets in our cognitive field 
into linked association,” it is as if the autistic “sees the world pixelated or 
“parceled.”10'* According to  Stafford, the autistic lacks the process “of compacting 
the heterogeneous and the anomalous into the coherent.”10-* Furthermore, given 
that “the story of the self’ emerges from “the ordered integration of many and 
varied sensory elements into a subjective experience,”u,5 the autistic “self” is more 
“episodic” than narrative.
According to Stafford, understanding this “episodic se lf’ “is essential for dealing 
intelligently with the discretely autonomous as well as the coalescent aspects of 
our polymodal information age.”106 Like Jam eson, she is not suggesting that 
culture is pathological, but rather that an understanding of autism allows for a 
better understanding of the “uncertainty and instability of self-consciousness”10? 
that is common to all hum an minds but has previously been overlooked. Art
1,11 B arbara  M aria S taffo rd . 457. 
u,y Ibid.
I(w Ib id . 
u,i Ib id . 465 .
I(,s Ib id . 457.
Ibid. 465 .
107 Ib id . 453.
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history, as well, has overlooked “episodic” authors and “patchy” artists;108 Art has 
been primarily concerned with the “compacting” process, with “unifying the 
manifold into a coherent image,” with illusionism , and the postm odern analogy 
of the schizophrenic continued this tradition despite its emphasis on subjective 
fracturing. But how does the analogy of the autistic serve to elucidate 
contemporary art? Wha t are the ideological effects of this (new) model?
To close this section, I would like to  read this model across Michel de Certeau’s 
conception of “spatial sentencing” discussed earlier. According to de Certeau, the 
pedestrian’s negotiation of strategic space through the  lens of personal 
associations is a “tactic” by which the “weak make use of the strong.”1"'-1 A similar 
tactic tha t is also relevant to Triple B luff Canyon  is the  consumer’s navigation 
through the sea of goods and services that constantly beckon our attention. De 
Certeau writes,
It [the  tac tic] m ust co n stan tly  m an ip u la te  ev en ts  in  o rd e r  to  tu rn  th e m  in to  
“o p p o rtu n itie s .” T he w eak  m ust co n tin u a lly  tu rn  to  th e ir  ow n en d s  forces a lien  to  th em . 
T h is  is ach ieved  in the  p ro p itio u s m om en ts  w h en  th ey  a re  able to  co m b in e  h e te ro g en eo u s  
e lem en ts  (th u s, in a su p e rm a rk e t, th e  housew ife  co n fro n ts  h e te ro g en eo u s  a n d  m obile  
d a ta  -- w h a t she has in  th e  refrig era to r, th e  ta s te s , ap p e tite s , an d  m oo d s o f  h e r  guests , th e  
b es t buys an d  th e ir  possib le  co m b in a tio n s w ith  w hat sh e  a lready  h a s  on  h a n d  a t  hom e, 
etc .); the  in te llec tual syn thesis  o f  th e se  given e lem en ts  takes th e  form , how ever, n o t o f a
Ibid.
" ,'1 M ichel De C erteau . T he P ractice  o f Everyday Life, xvii.
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(lisrour.sc*. bu t ofllu* decision  itself, the act an d  m a n n e r  in  w hich th e  o p p o rtu n ity  is 
“se iz e d ." '1,1
The clincher is that, with autistic logn, the products on the superm arket shelf are 
mon* likely to be stacked into a precarious tower than “synthesized” into a meal, 
for it is precisely the ability to combine the heterogeneity that is lacking. As such, 
if we think of the episodic self as a contemporary model of culture, we would be 
relinquishing the idea that our personal trajectories and phrasings form “tactics” 
by which we can bend “strategies” to our own ends. Instead, they remain ju st that: 
personal trajectories and phrasings.
G regor S chn eid er; W e isse  b o lter
(Figures 22-37)
Gregor Schneider continuously transform s his house on Unterheydener Strasse 
in his home city, Rheydt, Germany, into a labyrinth of uncanny spaces: a “coffee 
room” that slowly revolves and a tiny windowless “guest room” with a dirty 
mattress thrown on the ground, for exampje. As Philip Auslander describes it, 
Hans Ur (1985-) is “an architectural representation of a psyche so turned in 011 
itself that the journey into it leads to dead ends, hazards, and conundrum s like 
windows that open only onto other windows and rooms bathed in light: that
1,0 Ibid. xix.
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appears natural but is actually artificial.”111 The visitor goes “through certain 
rooms only to come unexpectedly upon more rooms tucked into the body of the 
house, am orphous and organic in its depths and defying comprehension.”112 
Gregor Schneider himself states, “of course I can’t know what will happen. 
Someone might open the WTong door at the wrong moment and plunge into an 
abyss. ”n 3
W hen Schneider moved “this gigantic and obsessive total art wrork”uJ into the 
German Pavilion at the Venice Biennale in 2001, his reputation in the art world 
as “a specialist for rooms and their effects”1^  wras cemented. Totes H aus Ur 
(“dead” H aus Ur), w'hich was awarded the  Golden Lion, entirely invaded the neo­
classical, fascist architecture of the  pavilion with the inglorious architecture and 
broken morale of post-war gloom. As Ulrich Loock states, “Thus he takes over 
and affirms an existing building, constantly seeking to  make a connection with 
what it is not, with an uncanny deeper level th a t fundamentally questions the 
existential possibility of dwelling, of finding refuge in a house.”116 After the 
ravages of the  Second World War, “dwelling” and its impossibility was a major 
cultural and philosophical theme: m odern m an was considered to be perpetually 
alienated and essentially homeless.
111 P h ilip  A u slan d er. “B eh ind  th e  Scenes: G regor S c h n e id e r  s T o te s  H aus U r.’' PAJ 75 (2 0 0 3 ): 86.
1,2 U lrich  Loock “T h e  D ead H o u se  U R .” P a rk e tt 63  (2001): 141.
11:1 In  Ib id . 143.
"4 J e n s  H o ffm an n . “G regor S ch n e id e r.” F lash  A rt (Jan .-F eb . 2 001): 107.
"s J a n  T h o rn -P rik k e r. “G rego r S chne ider: W h en  V iolence T akes th e  F orm  o f a R o o m .” G oethe- 
In s t i tu t : h ttp ://w w A v .g o e th e .d e /k u e /b k u /th m /e n 2 iQ 2 6 6 1 .h tm
116 U lrich  Loock. 138.
215
Already in these two works, some of the issues that I want to  explore by looking at 
Schneider’s more recent work are apparent: W hat does it mean to show the dark 
underbelly of modern domestic “bliss” and architectural “transparency" and 
bring to  light the “uncanny deeper level”? And what is gained by subjecting the 
visitor to  strong, uncomfortable physical stimuli? Allegedly “the artist himself is 
not entirely sure whether he is building a refuge or a prison, whether his activities 
will lead to isolation or to liberation.”11" Although normally considered to be polar 
opposites, Schneider dem onstrates that there is only a thin line between them, a 
line -which can easily be crossed.
These questions accrue even greater urgency in relation to Schneider’s Weisse 
Folter (2007) at the K21 Kunstsammlung in Diisseldorf. Here he constructed an 
actual prison -  the American Camp V in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba -  which is 
known to  most of the world only through media images. In this installation, the 
oscillation between depth and surface that Nelson sets in motion leans to the side 
of sensual engulfment: space is rendered more continuous than aggregate, and 
the viewer is more akin to an explorer of an unknown frontier than  a hyperlinked 
flaneur. Furthermore, ju st as Nelson fills the Victorian front room with the most 
un-Victorian of figures (the biicolew* and the conspiracy theorist), Schneider 
changes the museum -  symbol and upholder of “civil” society -  into the least 
hum ane of places: “Weisse Folter” means white torture, th a t is, torture that 
leaves no lasting mark on the body, such as extended isolation, extreme sensory 
deprivation, and shame. Each of these points need elaboration in order to
n" R ena te  Puvogel “N egative S p a tia l S cu lp ttire .” P arkeH 63 (2001): 129.
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approach the most pressing question: how does this installation relate to the 
political crises and the all-too-real reality of torture that it takes as its aesthetic 
and conceptual source?
The -newer enters the installation by descending to the cellar level of the museum, 
passing through a metal door, and then immediately through a second door. The 
only evidence that distinguishes the installation from the museum architecture is 
the staff member who kindly asks if you are familiar with Schneider’s work, so as 
to offer a subtle warning. Otherwise, there is no indication: “the museum and 
prison building are indistinguishable from each other.”118 As Jan  Thorn-Prikker 
states: “One does not have the feeling of entering a model, but rather of being 
shunted through a real prison, although one in fact knows better and is holding 
one’s entry ticket in one’s hand, after all.”11^
The entry ticket, however, does not seem to suffice to keep the waves of 
immersion at bay once within Weisse Folter: viewers report intense fear and 
disorientation. Crossing the second threshold we enter a hallway, with heavy, 
dark-red sliding doors to the left and right. With trial and error, some open, some 
do not. Inside are small cells, with a raised platform for a bed and a small metal 
toilet and basin in the corner. The walls are pristine white and everything is 
brightly lit, but there are no windows: just blind slits in the thick outer wall.
There is not the slightest trace of human occupancy to be found.
118 Ja n  T h o rn -P rik k er.
Ib id .
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One of these doors leads to a second corridor as bright as the first and also with 
sliding doors -  white not red -  to the left and right. Already the architectural 
layout begins to evade the perambulatory viewer. Here one of the doors opens 
into a pitch black, sound-proofed room sealed off from all glimmers of light; 
there is not even an emergency exit sign. The viewer is left to grope in the dark. 
Thorn-Prikker describes his experience as follows: “One cannot enter this room 
without an immediate feeling of anxiety. One feels one’s way along the wall like 
an insect, in the hope of finding an exit. At the same time one struggles against 
panic attacks in the hope of regaining some orientation. There are two exits, but 
these again only lead to further passage-ways. More rooms containing more 
horrors align them .”120
One of these passage-ways is identical to the first, yet noticeably different for the 
fact that the doors open into different types of cells: one has a green chain-mesh 
door that cannot be opened -  a “cage for hum an beings;”121 another is triangular 
in shape, with a one-way mirror at its apex for an unseen eye to obseiwe its 
occupant from the other side of the divide. Penetrating further into the prison, we 
come across another room lined in shiny metal, wiiich is dramatically over­
heated by a powerful light source. If you w-ant to turn  around to avoid this 
discomfort, too bad: the doors only open one-wray. The view'er is forced to enter a 
dark room chilled to nearly freezing -  a cold-storage area complete with hanging 




Eventually the labyrinth opens onto a large space, which appears like a 
ceremonial hall compared to the severe restrictions of the other spaces. But this 
hall is as accommodating as a steel barn, with corrugated sheet metal walls and 
concrete flooring. It is not a place to stay but a place where1 -  if coming from the 
outside -  the viewer’s status changes to livestock. As Thorn-Prikker states, “It is 
like a garage where human beings are handed over or taken away."1-- The heavy 
metal door is fortunately unlocked: it “expels the visitor out into the open space 
outside the building."'w. Here, Dominic Kiehler observed a “sharply dressed 
young m an [who] looked palpably relieved as he gathered his wits outside by the 
lake,’’12-} This garden and the infinitely more coherent architecture of the museum 
provide the counterpoint to Schneider’s prison: WAtsse Folter itself is conceived 
without an exterior.
Spatial practice
No wonder Icarus risked his neck trying to fly away on makeshift wings: a bird’s- 
eye view would help make the experience of traversing this labyrinth more 
digestible. As Michel de Certeau writes, “The person who ascends to that height 
leaves behind the mass that takes and incorporates into itself any sense of being 
either an author or s p e c t a t o r . ” 12-1* Weisse Folter's absence of legible form -  made 
all the more glaring in contrast to the clinical hyper-rationality of the individual 
rooms and the museum’s relatively transparent architecture -  precludes the
122 Ibid.
Ibid.
‘-I D om inic Kiehler. “G regor S chneider: K m  K u n stsam m hing  N ordrhein -W estfalen . F rieze 
M agazine, h t tp :/A v\v iv ,frieze.com /i.ssue/re \,iew /g reg o r sch n e id e r 
12S M ichel De C erteau . “P ractices o f Space." 123.
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possibility of making sense of the space, thus pushing the sensations even deeper 
into the body. This is Schneider’s forte: to keep the mind’s organizational power 
at bay long enough for impressions to bore their way into the psyche rather than 
being presented to it in intelligible form. As one critic states, “his work is a 
speculation on perception without recognitions.”1126
De Certeau, however, interprets Icarus’s flight negatively. He states:
C an the  vast tex turo logy  b en ea th  o u r gaze be an y th in g  b u t a rep re sen ta tio n ?  An optical 
a rtefact. T he analogue to  the facsim ile w hich, th ro u g h  a k ind  o f d istancing , p roduces the  
space  p lan n er, the city p lan n e r o r  the  m ap-m aker. T he city pan o ram a  is a ‘theo re tica l’ (i.e. 
v isual) s im ulacrum : in sh o rt, a p ic tu re , o f w hich th e  p recond itions for feasib ility  are  
forgetfu lness and  a m isu n d e rs tan d in g  o f  p r o c e s s e s .1- •
The analogy de Certeau draws between vision and distance clearly runs counter 
to Benjamin’s and Virilio’s positive evaluation of these same terms. Furthermore, 
he ecpiates them with pictorial representation and spectacle -  with surface and 
simulacra -  rather than with depth and actuality, the “mass” as he calls it.
If we consider Weisse Falter from De Certeau’s perspective -  from “the threshold 
where visibility ends”1128 -  then our descent into Schneider’s labyrinth reflects 
“another spatialitv.” He describes it as follows:
E luding  th e  im aginary  to ta liza tio n s of th e  eye, th e re  is a stran g en ess  in  th e  com m onplace 
tha t c reates no  surface, o r  w hose surface is only an  advanced  lim it, an edge cut ou t o f  th e
1-'1’ U lrich knock. 148.
o" M ichel De C erteau. “Practices o f Space." 124. 
«-•» Ibid.
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visible. In th is to tality . I shou ld  like to ind icate  the  processes th a t a re  foreign to the 
'geom etric ' o r  'geograph ic ' space of visual, panoptic  o r theoretical co n stru c tio n s.
It is easy to argue that Weisse Falter allows for this sense of strangeness and 
foreign ness to reign: despite its clear lines, the architecture of this prison is 
unmappable; the eye is rendered inutile as we grope our way in the dark or pull 
and push on the doors in hopes that they open; and the “surface” of the media 
representations of Guantanamo Bay • which are as fiat in form and content as 
the US government can make possible ~ is rendered as an immersive depth. Here 
the viewer is not offered a panoptic view but is, rather, confronted by profound 
opacity.
Aesthetic vocabulary
However, despite the viability of this line of interpretation, I think it is equally 
important to look (yes, look) at all the ways in which Schneider’s installation 
plays between such conceptual pairings as surface/depth, optic/haptic, light/dark, 
and geometric/amorphous rather than asserting the primacy of one over the 
other. Unlike Claire Bishop, who claims that the history of installation art must 
be structured “not on theme or materials, but on the viewer’s experience” -  
thereby shifting attention away from formal analysis and toward subjective 
testimonials -  I would like to assert that “materials,” or, more generally, the 
artwork’s form, is crucial to consider if we want to understand how the artwork 
functions as a set of (irresolvable) propositions. As Mieke Bal argues, an art
1“<> Ibid.
1:1,1 C laire B ishop. Insta lla tion  Art: A Critical H istory. London and  New York: Routlcdge, 2 0 0 5 . 8.
object is a “theoretical object” in its own right, In order to discern the theoretical 
propositions that Weisse Folter asserts, we need to look at what it sets before us 
in the visual field and the explicit references it makes to previous art movements 
and artists, specifically Minimalism and Bruce Nauman.
Minimalism is relevant to Weisse Folter not only because it shifted the attention 
off of discrete objects and on to the experiential space of the viewer, as Fried 
complained, hut also because of its “minimal" visual vocabulary: shiny metal 
surfaces of various colours, clean geometric shapes, serial repetition of forms, 
and standard manufacturing materials devoid of overt signs of authorship. As 
Clement Greenberg states disparagingly, “Minimalist works are readable as art, 
as almost anything is today including a door, a table, or a blank sheet of 
paper,”1'*' Artists such as Donald Judd, Carl Andre and Dan Flavin chose to work 
in this style partially due to the universal, transhistorieal values attributed to such 
forms and materials at the beginning of the 1960s. Of course this appears naive in 
hindsight, and, as the easy cooption of minimalist forms by corporate powers 
demonstrates, fatally flawed. Anna C. Chave has gone farther than any other critic 
in arguing for the latent aggression that Minimalism exerts upon the viewer. She 
writes, “With closer scrutiny... the blank face of Minimalism may come into focus 
as the face of capital, the face of authority, the face of the father.”'-’*-
In this (anachronistic) light, the visual analog)’ between Minimalism and Weisse 
Folter is the perfect summary to Cbave’s accounting: “Minimalism... might well
1(1 Hal Foster. "The t ’m x  of M in im alism .” Individuals: A Selected H istory  of C 'n .item poraryA rt: 
1945 Kate. L inker, D onald Kuspit el al. H ow ard S ingerm an , ed. New York: Abbeville P, 
i y H ( ) .  i ( > : p
• w ( ’have. A nna C. "M inim alism  and the  R hetoric of Pow er.” A rts M agazine (Jan . lpyo ): 51.
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be described as perpetuating a kind of cultural terrorism, forcing viewers into the 
role of victim.”™ On a less dramatic note, Zde Brant observes, “We have all been 
in warehouses or storerooms with exposed metal beams, concrete floors, and 
florescent lighting, where our footsteps echo and the atmosphere is one of cold, 
hard industry.”'^! Part of Schneider’s power is to make these common, “mundane 
spaces seem sinister and foreboding,” w> thus unleashing their latent aggression. 
Gerd Blum describes Weisse Folter as follows:
O n e  is pusln  vl back o n to  oneself, onto  o n e ’s ow n body. No contact, 110 ob jects in  th e  room , 
gen era te  th is  feeling, o f u tte r  sh apelessness. T his feeling, p roduced  by th e  a rran g em en t of 
th e  room s, co rrela tes w ith the  m ean ing  o f the righ tless space o f G uan tanam o: the  inm ate  
is deg raded  to the body , in co n tra s t to a person  w ith th e ir  rights.
In this light is seems that Minimalism’s insistence on embodied experience in the 
effort of demonstrating greater social contingency and responsibility has 
backfired: its aesthetic vocabulary now' functions as a means of degradation, 
coercion -  and torture.
It is due to this alleged violence against the viewer that it is necessary to specify 
more precisely the relationship that Weisse Folter establishes with those who 
walk its halls. I11 this regard, Bruce Nauman’s “corridor” works, which occupy a
>:« ibid. 4 0 .
w  Zbc B ran t. “G regor S chneider’s S u p e r Dull at La M aison Rouge." W hitehot M agazine o f  
C on tem porary  A rt. h ttp ://w h ito h o tm n g a z in o .c o m /w h ito h Q tarticles.cfm ?id  1191.2.
•as Ibid. 4 .
Blum , G erd. “G regor Schneider, W eisse  Bolter, Km K unstsam m hm g.” R upreohL K arls- 
U niversitiit H eidelberg  [course h an d o u t ], 2 0 0 8 , w w w .offerm anns-
ga leriiyde/ftp /lIandou .tW eisse l'o ller.pclf. 4. My tran sla tio n . (M an ist au f sich se lb st, au f d en  
eigenen  K brper zuriickgcw iesen. Kein K ontakt, koine G egonstiinde im Ram n erzeugen  d as  Gefiihl 
des N ulL Z ustands. Dieses (lurch de G esta ltung  dor Riium e erzeug le  Gefiihl ko rre lie rt mil dem  
Inhalt d e s  rech tslosen  Raum os des G uan tanam o: der In sasse  w ird  zum  K brper d eg rad ie rt, in 
G egensatz  zu e in e r Person m it iliren R echten .)
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pivotal position between Minimalism and what we now ('all installation art, 
provide a more apt comparison. Take his closed-eireuit installation Live-Taped 
Video Corridor (1970) as it was described by [Meter Daniels in the previous 
chapter, for example, which Dieter Daniels argues makes of the viewer a guinea 
pig rather than a creative co-player.18? In Weisse Folter the viewer has a similar 
difficulty of ascertaining her position relative to the installation, her movements 
are controlled, and she has the feeling of being simultaneously isolat ed and 
watched. Regarding Schneider’s work, one reviewer states, “From the very 
beginning, Schneider tests the limits of his viewers, forcing them to experience 
feelings and situations that many consider uncomfortable.”1-8 Another is 
“annoyed at being so manipulated.”18'1 The words “force” and “manipulation” 
indicate a drastic shift from Minimalism’s “relation” with the viewer (and other 
“participatory” art movements in the 1960s) to a dynamic between cat and mouse, 
where the viewer is batted around to make a point.
Referring to Gregor Schneider’s 2008 work Siisser Du/l at La Maison Rouge, 
which contains several similar features such as a hot room, a cold room, a bright 
room and a dark room, Zde Brant writes,
w h at i.s rem ark ab le  abou t S ch n e id er’s w ork... is th e  w ay tha t S chneider, u n p re sen t, o f
course , is able to con tro l h is  v isito rs w ith in  his do m ain  every th ing  from  th e ir  path
1 v See D ieter D aniels. “S trateg ies o f  In te rac tiv ity .” 'Frans. T om  M orrison . M edia Art N et.
l i t tp : / /w w w .nuH lienkunstne l/.de /sou rce  le x l/6 5 /
> <H Zde B ran t. 1.
o'> D om inic Kiehler.
(...[by] p reven ting  any  back track ing ) to th e ir  bodily system s (one room  is so ho t th a t I 
began  lo feel faint in m y w in ter jack e t), an d  m ost sign ifican tly , th e ir e m o t i o n s .1 r>
Referring to Weisse Folter, a blogger stales,
Pow erlessness and in h u m an ity  a re  the m essage  of W e i s s e  l o i t e r  ju s t  as p riso n e rs  are 
com pletely  at the m ercy  o f the g tia rd s and  b u re a u c ra ts  who con tro l w hat they  experience, 
m .iseum  v isito rs are, fo r  a sho rt w hile at le a s t, com pletely  a t the  m ercy of G regor 
S chneider, an  absen t bu t all pow erfu l god .1 a
As these two statements make clear, visitors to Weisse Folter are more like 
Schneider’s guinea pigs than equal participants, yet the distinction between 
feeling a little faint and the utter mercilessness of the actual prisons needs to be 
maintained.
Architecture
But the coercion is not limited to the domain of the physical. As Renate Puvogel 
states, Schneider’s installations are  “designed so that visitors will sense subtle 
changes in their own behaviour without being able to recognize their cause.”1''- 
This internalization  of the  coercion sets off alarm bells: it marks the shift from 
power to bio-power that Michel Foucault analyzed so thoroughly. Following 
Foucault, it is possible to see the mechanics of this shift in architectural form, 
especially prisons and other slate institutions, such as hospitals. Most famous is
11(1 Zbe B rant, a.
a 1 A ndrew  Hummed. "G regor S ch n eid er’s W eisse Folter." G erm an  Jo y s. (Ju ly  <), 12007): 
liU p ://a n d ro w h a n n n e l.ty p o p a d .ro m /g e rm a n .jo y s /2 o p 7 /o 7 /g re g o r~ se lm e id e .h tm l 
■ i" R enate  Puvogel. 124.
his description of Benllvam’s panopticon, in which the prisoners internalize the 
all-seeing eye of power and self-survey their own behaviour.'-w
However, as Michel de Certeau remarks, “One inhabits only haunted sites -  the 
opposite of what is set forth in the Panopticon,”l<w A close look at the architecture 
of Weisse Folter reveals the ways in which it purposefully confuses two 
architectural principles as they are defined by Anthony Vidler: light space -  “that 
paradigm of total control championed by Jerem y Bentham and recuperated 
under the guise of ‘hygienic space’ by m odernists led by Le Corbusier” -  and dark  
space -  the initial fear of ‘“darkened spaces, of the pall of gloom which prevents 
the full visibility of things, men and tru ths’” on which the transparent spatial 
paradigm is based.‘’is As Vidler states, Foucault’s “insistence on the operation of 
power through transparency, the panoptic principle, resists exploration of the 
extent to which the pairing of transparency and obscurity is essential for power to 
operate.”1-*6
The residual and constitutional presence of dark space within the light is 
precisely what Gregor Schneider dem onstrates and exploits through his 
architectural collusion of the panopticon with obscure, intrauterine and literally 
dark spaces. This collusion is apparent in the following blogger’s description:
Like a m edieval h illtop  fo rtre ss , th e  in s ta lla tio n  is filled w ith  s tran g e  tw ists , dead -en d s, 
an d  doors th a t lead  now here . T he fea tu re less  u n ifo rm ity  o f th e  space  o ffers no d u e s ; you
1 is M ichel F oucau lt. D iscipline an d  pun ish : th e  h irth  o f  the prison . (1977) T ran s. A lan  S heridan . 
N ew  York: V intage Books, 1995 .195-228 .
111 M ichel De C erteau . “Practices o f  Space .” 143. 
ur> A nthony  V idler. 168. 
w> Ibid. 172.
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.som etim es believe you  have b ack track ed  to  a p a rt o f  th e  in s ta lla tio n  you  th ough t y o u  had 
escaped , un til you n o tice  a su b tle  chan g e ...1
The medieval “dark" ages was precisely what the Enlightenment sought to 
eradicate, yet as Vidler explains, the “fantasy-world of stone walls, darkness, 
hideouts and dungeons” featured prominently in the late eighteenth century 
imagination. Fortresses (and the prisons at Guantanamo) make their assertion of 
power overt despite their opacity -  one is subject to the King’s (or the States’) 
authority. So too is the viewer subject to “the mercy of Gregor Schneider” in his 
labyrinthine passages. The “featureless uniformity” of Schneider’s prison, by way 
of the “blankness” previously discussed, also suggests that one is subject to  
“society’s steeliest face; the impersonal face of technology, industry, and 
commerce; the unyielding face of the father.”1)8
Critics of Schneider’s previous works have expressed this dark hell well. Speaking 
of his exhibition 26,11.2006 at the Morra Greco Foundation, Filipo Romeo writes: 
“You felt as if you were in the bowels of the earth, far from the world of the 
living.”1')') Speaking of the Totes IIaits Ur, Renate Puvogel writes: “[Wjith no way 
of understanding the layout, one feels as though sucked deeper and deeper into a 
vortex...”180 Also speaking of Totes Haus Ur, Ulrich Loock writes, “Gregor 
Schneider takes the visitor with him into an interstice between the  abyss and 
banality, pointing to the uncanny foundations of domestic living and thereby
1 >7 A ndrew  Hammed.
'•i8 A nna C. Chave. 55.
*')') R om eo, Filippo. “G regor S ch n e id e r.” A rlfo rum  (M ay 2 007): 386 . 
•s0 R enate  Puvogel. 129.
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raising the  possibility of a way of dealing with th is unfathomable element that 
shatters any existential stability.
Ask yourself a simple question: if given the choice, would you prefer to stay in 
Schneider’s pitch-black sound-proofed room or in the interrogation room under 
the eye of the one-way mirror? My guess is, neither, which reveals the potential 
for both light and dark space to participate in white torture. Furthermore, 
following Anthony Vidler’s argument, Weisse Falter appears to he the perfect 
manifestation of the inherent “darkness” within “light” space, and as such, it 
expresses a return of the repressed. On this point Hal Foster asks, “W hat are the 
social effects when artistic forms and cultural institutions are desublimated..,?
It’s not always a liberal017 event: it can also open up those spheres to a 
depoliticized rechanneling of desire by ‘the culture industry’.”1-';2 W hether Weisse 
Folter participates in th is “rechanneling” 01* whether it succeeds in liberating the 
repressed is -  unfortunately -  a question that begs its own answer: gallery-goers 
can indulge in the momentary sensation of repression precisely because their life 
is lived far from the fortified walls of Guantanamo.
The “dark” and “uncanny” is “located on the other side of familiar places: as the 
unfathomable basis of the latter it is the place where one cannot be,” writes 
Ulrich Loock of Schneider’s work.1-** The reason “one cannot be there” is because 
this “there” obscures all spatial limits and thus breaks the param eters of the 
individual “self” along with it. As such, we can understand Weisse Falter as
w  Ulrich Loock. 149,
I n  H a l  h o s i e r ,  R o s a l in d  K r a u s s ,  Y v o s - A la in  B o is  c l  a l .  " R o u n d t a b l e :  T h e  P r e d i c a m e n t  o f  
C o n t e m p o r a r y  A r t . ” A f t  S i n c e  1900. N e w  Y o rk :  T h a m e s  a n d  H u d s o n ,  2 0 0 4 . 672. 
m  U l r i c h  L o o c k .  153 .
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indulging in the current academic fashion of celebrating the subject’s dissolution. 
As Hal Foster explains, “for many of us ‘autonomy’ is a bad word -  a ruse in 
aesthetic discourse, a deception in ego psychology, and so on. We forget that 
autonomy is a diacritical term  like any other, defined m relation to its opposite, 
that is, to  s u b je c tio n .C o n s id e r in g  that detainees in Guantanamo have had all 
the legal rights th a t are associated with autonomous subjectivity forcefully 
removed, Schneider’s installation is not w ithout irony: wre can only assume that 
he is complicit with the theoretical and experiential dissolution of subjectivity for 
the sake of critique of the torture that dissolves it literally.
Hal Foster discusses such “immersive experiences of post-cinematic delirium in 
which representation and space, media and body, are no longer felt to be 
distinct.”^  He states that
y o u ’r e  s o m e h o w  l o s t  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  y o u r  b o d y ,  a n d  y o u  s t u m b l e  n o t  o n l y  i n t o  t h e  w o r k  b u t  
t h r o u g h  i t  a s  w e l l .  I t ’s  a n  e f f e c t ,  b e y o n d  d i s t r a c t i o n ,  o f  d i s o r i e n t a t i o n ,  o f  b e i n g  l o s t  i n  
s p a c e ,  a n d  o n e  h a s  t o  w o n d e r  a b o u t  i t s  i d e o l o g i c a l  e f f e c t s  -  t h a t  i s ,  b e y o n d  i t s  s h e e r  
a e s t h e t i c i s m ,  w h ic h  i s  w h a t  a t t r a c t s  p e o p le ,  f o r  a g a i n  i t  g iv e s  t h e  r u s h  o f  m e d i a  i n t e n s i t y  
w i t h  t h e  s u r p l u s  v a lu e  o f  a r t . '56
This general description is equally apt for Weisse Folter: stumbling is the mode of 
exploring its hallways, sometimes literally groping in the dark; the sound- and 
light-proofed room render the tvays in which we habitually orient ourselves -
H a l  F o s t e r  in  c o n v e r s a t i o n  w i t h  M a r q u a r d  S m i t h .  “ P o l e m i c s ,  P o s t m o d e r n i s m ,  I m m e r s i o n ,  
M i l i t a r i z e d  S p a c e .” J o u r n a l  o f  V i s u a l  C u l t u r e  3 .3  ( 2 0 0 4 ) :  3 2 5 .
‘5s H a l  F o s t e r .  “D o u b l e  E x p o s u r e . ” A r t f o r u m  ( D e c .  2 0 0 5 ) .  
h t t p : / / f i n d a r t i c l e s . e o m / p / a r t i c I e s / m i  m o 2 6 8 / i s  4  4 4 / a i  0 2 7 8 6 2 3 8 7 . 2 .  
w> H a l  F o s t e r  in  c o n v e r s a t i o n  w i t h  M a r q u a r d  S m i t h .  3 2 9 .
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through hearing and sight -  inoperative; and it explicitly plays off the media 
intensity’ surrounding Guantanamo Bay within an artistic context.
So what are its ideological effects? Tellingly, someone emailed Schneider and told 
him that his artworks were “degenerate.” Indeed, the homology7 between subject 
and space is perhaps nowhere more tightly conceived than in the “pure” neo­
classical forms of the Nazi “civilization.” Subtly approaching this topic, Dave 
Beech w rites (of Family Schneider, 2004), “its bleakness plants his work in a 
world of real contradictions, not sublimated out of contention by a e s t h e t i c s .”^ /  
However, this knee-jerk assum ption that aesthetics is always on the side of a 
repressive power or the coercive “culture industry7” is clearly in error. As both 
Weisse Folter and Triple B lu ff Canyon make explicit, aesthetics can unleash the 
suggestive, emotive and political pow7er contained in the repressed.
That being said, however, the question still hangs: wiiat are its ideological effects? 
Claire Bishop suggests tha t “the idea of instinctual renunciation is key to the 
experience of mimetic engulfment structured for the viewer [by such all- 
encompassing installations].”^ 8 Like Caillois’ insect mimicking its surroundings, 
viewers surrender their distinction from the surrounding environment, thereby7 
“decentring” themselves. In brief, according to Bishop, the effects of immersive 
installations are renunciation, withdrawal, non-reflexivity, and being out of time, 
precisely7 the effects tha t site-specificity sought to  remedy by grounding the 
viewer both spatially and temporally. W ith Freud and the uncanny already on the
W Dave B eech. “G regor S ch n e id e r.” A rt M onthly  2 8 2  (D ec .-Jan . 2 0 0 4 -0 5 ): 28 .
>58 Claire B ishop. 84.
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table, it not a great leap to  associate these effects with the “death drive,” which 
Bishop summarizes as “an instinct of libidinal retreat... a desire to return  to our 
primary biological condition as inanim ate objects.”1^
The conceptual alignment of immersion with the regressive desire to return to a 
pre-symbolic union with “nature” has already been discussed; the twist added by 
Weisse Folter is the state of terror -  rather than bliss -  that such dissolution can 
solicit w hen it leaves the realm of wishful-thinking and becomes physically 
actualized. Zoe Brant describes these emotions more specifically: “Schneider 
aims to inflict upon \isitors pure, unabashed emotion; emotion that the average 
viewer experiences only occasionally; emotion that is rife with anxiety', fear, panic, 
and at th e  end, relief.”160 This is not to suggest that every' visitor experiences 
Weisse Folter according to Schneider’s alleged intent; it is only to say that a 
negative emotional response seems to be the desired response, more so than  the 
gratification of “penetrating” a virtual world, to recall AR Stone’s choice of verb.
“Issues”
As such, Schneider’s work exemplifies a second major trend: as Nicolas de 
Oliveira argues, subjective experience is what characterizes contemporary' art, 
rather th an  addressing issues. But are wre satisfied with this intensification of the ‘ 
personal at the expense of the discursive? As Jan  Thorn-Prikker remarks,
>59 Ibid.
160 Zoe B ra n t. 3.
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T he fact th a t  S chneider a b s ta in s  from  m aking  an y  political references to  h is room s only 
serves to  heigh ten  th e ir  effect. T here  are  no accusa tions here. Mere, all th a t is show n is 
w h a t can b e  done. ...W hat he show s in D iisseldorf is th e  p roduceab ility  o f d esp e ra tio n .If>1
This suggests that the only predictable response is emotional, whereas political 
responses will vary widely. As Blum states, “The political statement of the work is 
left to the interpretation of the viewer.”162 Weisse Folter may be “quite enough to 
give one an idea of how hells can be made,”16-'* but how' does this generalized 
emotion relate to the very specific political reality' of Guantanamo? Are we left 
with an extreme relativism on the level of the political?
Probing this question, Dominic Eichler asks, “Was Schneider's intention to  dent 
the barrier that prevents people (himself included, presumably) wTho haven’t 
experienced such deplorable places and practices from empathizing with those 
who have?”l64 It may be tem pting to answrer positively to this question; however, 
if/w'hen keeping an eye on the art object, it is hard to imagine empathy as its 
modus operandi: no where in these prison cells is there the slightest hint of 
hum an occupancy. Nor is it that the guards and inmates have “just left,” like the 
personae of Nelson’s tableaux: they never walked these halls in the first place. 
This point, I think, is crucial: empathy cannot cross the boundary’ that separates 
life from death. If there is a hum an presence to empathize with in the halls of 
Weisse Folter, it is that of a ghost from wrhich all humanity’ has been methodically 
extracted. Given that wrhite torture breaks the individual’s sense of “self,” not
1(11 J a n  T horn -P rik k er.
Iha G erd  Blum . 3. M y tran s la tio n . (D ie po litisehe A ussage des W erks ist d e r A uslegung  des 
B etrach te rs iiberlassen .) 
lf, i J a n  T horn -P rikker.
1(u  D om inic E ich ler. 1.
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their body, this is not as far-fetched as it might sound: inmates can be literally 
living and  dead. Perhaps we need to rephrase the question of empathy: how do its 
limits, which are so palpable in Weisse Folter, speak to the politics of 
incarceration?
It seems to me that Schneider structures a political response as well as an 
emotional response, which becomes evident in his deployment of form (rather 
than in his suggested content, if we can temporally separate the two for the sake 
of analysis). This is evident in three related aspects: Weisse Folter's context 
within the gallery, its status as a simulacrum, and its negotiation between two- 
and three-dimensional representations.
Institutional Critique
As mentioned before, when one descends to the basement level of the museum, 
one enters Weisse Folter almost directly -  almost. Although convention may 
dictate that we suspend our disbelief in order to enter the imaginary realm of an 
artwork, we are nevertheless aware of our secure location within the museum. 
These two spines -  the artwork’s and the museum’s -  coexist, nestled one within 
the other, just as the museum is nestled within Diisseldorf, within Germany, 
within continental Europe, within Western culture. The feet that the prison is 
“inside” the gallery cannot be overlooked, and Schneider draws particular 
attention to it by making viewers leave by an emergency exit, thereby making 
them reorient themselves in relation to the museum.
Museums (according to Dave Hickey) are also “therapeutic institutions,’’,(’r> 
instruments of the state that have tor their intent the governance of a populace, 
not its freedom. Like any effective ideology, they work discretely and disavow 
their own heart of darkness; the construction of the “good” citizen necessitates 
the construction of its “had” opposite -  the terrorist, the anarchist and the 
revolutionary. The enlightened individual who joins the sensus communis 
through his contemplation of art finds his home upstairs in the gallery, whereas 
downstairs in the hidden depths of the cellar his repressed “other” is alienated 
from the communis and spit out into the street. Luckily viewers are allowed back 
in, if need he, to retrieve their coats and use the facilities -  and reclaim their 
position in society.
This path of movement that Schneider establishes -  in the front door, out the 
back ~ emphasizes the architectural frame of the museum. Schneider also 
emphasizes the ideology of the “white cube” by echoing it in the white cells of 
Weisse Folter, As Bluin states, “The uncanniness and mysteriousness of this work 
counts for the penal system as well as the art system.”166 This analogy makes 
Brian O’Doherty’s famous words ring in a different key:
U nshadow ed, w hite, clean, a rtific ia l -  th e  space is devo ted  to  the  technology o f esthetics.
W orks o f art a re  m ou n ted , hung , sca tte red  fo r s tudy . T heir u n g ru b b y  surfaces are
un touched  by tim e  and  its  vicissitudes. A rt exists in  a kind o f e te rn ity  of d isplay , and
l6r- Dave Hickey. The Invisible D ragon: F our Essays on Beauty. Los Angeles: A rt Issu es  Press, 1993. 
lWl C erd  Blum . 3. My tran sla tio n . (Das unheim liche , geheim nisvolle in d iesem  W ork gilt sow ohl 
deni S traf- als atich dem  K unstsystem .)
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th ough  thore is lots of “p e rio d ” (late m odern ), there  is no tim e. This e te rn ity  gives the  
gallery  a lim bolike s ta tu s ; one  h as  to have died already  to ho th e re ."1”
As we know, there is no time in Guantanamo, just the period marked by the 
Global War on Terror, and the detainees tire held in a limbolike status, literally 
suspended between life and death. Weisse Folter is also unshadowed, white, 
clean and artificial and devoted to a particular technology of aesthetics -  that of 
alternating sensory overload and deprivation.
But while 0 ‘Doherty asserts that “The space offers the thought that while eyes 
and minds are welcome, space occupying bodies are not,’’168 Weisse Folter 
welcomes (if we can call it that) the body and not the eyes or mind. Therefore, we 
could easily say that Schneider participates in the “return of the repressed,” and it 
is true to some extent -  the body with all its uncanny contours is brought home to 
the museum, so to speak. But it is equally true to say that Schneider’s intense 
emphasis on the body divides it from the mind yet again, this time to make a 
political point: the mind cannot survive in a place like this.
Facsimile
Richard Frances asks, “So what to make of this faultlessly persuasive and 
blatantly gimcraek illusion? IIow to parse an undeniably physical reality that 
both mimes and vitiates realism?”1'"’ So far I have discussed Weisse Folter as we 
experience it in the basement of K21. 1 have gone along with its premise of
«*? Brian O ’D oherty. Inside  th e W h ite  Cube. In tro . T hom as McKvilley. (Berkeley: U o f C alifornia P, 
15.
U,K Ibid.
11,11 R iehard Frances. “Gregor S chneider."  A rtforum  (Feb. 1*004): 148.
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immersion to participate in the virtual world as though it were real 111 order 
to figure out what is at stake in the construction of this world. In this light, 
Schneider has built the equivalent of a roller-coaster: fear is packaged and sold as 
raw, hut the safety-belts are securely buckled. Mike Featherstone explains,
“Today fun fairs and theme parks such as Disneyland... provide enelaved 
environments for the controlled de-control of the emotions, where adults are 
given permission to behave like children again.”1"1’According to Featherstone,
this is a higher level of control, rather than a regression. Furtherm ore crucially
- “it bears the offprint of desire for t he expelled other... Hence we have the 
attractions of the forest, fair, theatre, circus, slum, savage...”1"1 ...torture and 
Guantanamo.
This particular theme park is a simulation of an .actually existing institution in the 
American military camp in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. It is necessary, therefore, to 
change registers and consider Weisse Folter as a three-dimensional 
representation of the images circulating on the internet by which we have come 
to “know” it. That a visitor to I<2i could be ignorant of these images is difficult to 
imagine (yet possible); I would hazard to guess that for the majority of people 
who enter the installation, these images -  of chain-link walls and fences, hallways 
blocked by guards, and cells with unnamed orange-clad inhabitants -  are 
brought before our mind’s eye and linger there throughout our visit. The question
l"° Mike F oathorslonc. ‘T h e  A eslhetiei/.atinn  of Everyday Life.” C onsum er (.'a llure and 
P ostm odern ism . London: .Sage Publications, m m . do , 
v  Ibid. Hi.
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is: what happens when we see installation through the images and the images 
through the installation? How does one inlbrm our interpretation of the other?
.Ian Thorn-Prikker suggests that, “Here, the vague impressions of newspaper 
readers and television viewers are given a jolt.”17- Two things come up in this 
observation. First, the idea of “jolting” the viewer aligns Schneider’s work with 
the long-standing avant-garde tactic of “shocking” their viewers into realizing 
their complicity with mass media. Grant Roster explains this well:
H ere  aesthetic  shock o r d islocation  coun terac ts  the false reality  conveyed by d o m in an t 
cu ltu ra l form s. A lthough it o p e ra te s  in a som atic  o r bodily  reg ister, its effects are  not 
pu re ly  physical. R ather, the experience of shock becom es the cataly tic  agent for a 
"he igh tened  p resence of m in d ,"  as ben jam in  co n ten d s. We m eet the ep istcm ologieal 
challenge posed  by aesth e tic  shock no t by ab an d o n in g  ourselves to the  p leasu res  o f on Lie 
d islocation  but by renew ing, an d  expanding , o u r  efforts to g rasp  the  com plexity  of the  
su rro u n d in g  w orld. “A lienation ,” as Brecht w rites, is “necessary  to  all u n d erstan d in g ."  
T h u s  the experience o f shock  (w hich is necessary  to overcom e th e  an esth e tic  haze o f 
m o d ern  life) is followed by a reconsolidation  o f th e  subject a ro u n d  a heig h ten ed  capacity  
to  perceive the h id d en  o p era tio n s  o f  political pow er.1’-1
What becomes strikingly clear in this explanation is that the claims made for 
“shocking” installations tire utterly conventional. What is also clear is that in 
installations like Weisse Folter, the reconsolidation of the subject is jeopardized
' ' “ Jan  T horn -P rik k er.
G rant Kcsler. C onversation  Pieces: C om m unity  an d  C om m unication  in M odern A rt. Berkeley: 
II of C alifornia P, 2 0 0 4 . 84.
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by an emphasis on immersion at the expense of alienation by an emphasis on 
“ontie dislocation” at the expense of reconciliation.1? i
'Fhe second part of Thorn-Prikkers observation that needs to be addressed is 
Schneider’s concrete materialization of “vague impressions,” which results in an 
irreconcilable tension between two- and three-dimensional representations of the 
prisons in Guantanamo Bay. Dominic Kiehler suggests that, in Weisse Folter,
“the transition from the real to the simulated hyper-real is potent.”1’^  However, 
this assumed “real” is itself only known through media representation for it is, in 
reality, located at an impassable distance the other side of the military border.
As such, Weisse holler effectively allows us to pay a virtual visit to a site that we 
cannot visit in actually.
Referring to Totes Ikius Ur, Philip Auslander states,
The experience o f claw ing o n e’s ow n way th ro u g h  th e  h o u se  in  Venice is so im m ed ia te  
and  im m ersive  tha t it isn ’t voyeuristic... V oyeurism  re q u ire s  d istance  and  de tachm en t, 
n e ith e r o f  w hich is possib le  here. T h is  space encourages its audience to  su rre n d e r its 
purely  sp ec la to ria l positio n  and  becom e perfo rm ers  as w ell.1 b
Again, distance is valued negatively and automatically associated with voyeurism. 
Yilmaz Dziewior observes that “photographs of his installations tend to be as 
unspectacular as the work itself,” ^  thereby also suggesting that a “purely 
speetatorial position” is impossible to maintain, even in a photograph of a
1 11 will pick up  th is  d iscussion  a little la te r  on, as N elson an d  S chneider d iffer in th e ir  approach  
to  the  negative dialectics o f the  av an t-g ard e .
1 '■> D om inie Kiehler. l.
1 Philip  A uslander. 87.
1 Yi lmaz Dziewior. “G regor S chneider." A rtib rum  (S u m m er m nS ): r j a .
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simulacra bast'd on a photograph. Both of these descriptions seem to support 
Mark Rosenthals understanding of installation art, which, he asserts, takes 
immersion as its underlying premise: “there is no frame separating this art from 
the viewing context, the work and the space having melded together into an 
approximation of a life experience.’’178
However, it is important to acknowledge, first, the constant framing that 
Schneider builds into his installation -  the many doorways and windows, open or 
closed -  that break up the flow of perambulation into so many framed vistas. And 
second, most crucially, it is important to pursue the possibility of being 
“voyeuristieally immersed.”170 That is, immersion may be a way to undermine 
purely “retinal” art, as is frequently asserted, yet it may also be a way into  a 
purely visual space. By this I mean that immersion, in the case of Weisse Folter, 
does not collapse the distance between Guantanamo and Diisseldorf, nor does it 
even suggest that this could be possible. Rather, we walk through its maze 
sharply aware that we are walking through a picture. Here we are literally the 
“viewer in the painting,” as opposed to the “viewer o f  the painting” who remains 
planted on the ground outside its frame (to use Wollheim’s distinction). What 
Schneider has built in the K21 is a depiction of a mediascape: it is a simulacrum 
of a series of images, not a series of existing spaces as they “are” in “reality.”
The reason I am emphasizing this point is because it tugs at all the slip-knots 1 
have tied in this complex web of meaning. For regardless about what we say
‘•’B M ark R osen thal. U nderstanding . In s ta lla tio n  Art: From  D ucham p to Ilo lzor. M unich: Pres tel, 
2003 . 25.
1 hvona Rlazwiek. “Psychic Spaces: F ilte r  a t yo u r own risk." A rt M onthly  248 (2001): 30.
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about our phenomenological encounter with Weisse Folter, this installation 
operates at a secondary remove: it exemplifies Hal Foster’s conception of “faux- 
phenomenology:” “experience reworked, keyed up, given back to us in a very 
mediated fashion -- as immediate, spiritual, absolute.”'80 And regardless about 
what we say about empathy, this additional remove makes it even less possible 
than it already was: it is more like entering television and internet 
representations of Guantanamo than the prison “itself.”
What th is three-dimensional tableau of a specific mediaseape amounts to, 
therefore, is more akin to computer space than actual space. When Richard 
Frances writes that “Schneider did not so much fool the eye as dupe the mind and 
body,”'81 we can read this as saying: our eye knows exactly what we are looking at 
~ a simulacrum -  yet, like every convincing Virtual Reality, we are experientially 
transported “there.” In our culture, viewer’s have become adept at tele­
transporting themselves into a virtual space by way of technological mediation. 
Gregor Schneider (like all the artists in this thesis} plays off of this aptitude. In 
Weisse Folter the viewer is like an explorer who is pushing forward into unknown 
territory -  an (American) cowboy rather than a (European) dandy.'82 This 
explorer defines his subjectivity through conflicts with his enemies and an 
invariably hostile “nature,” both of which are conjured by Schneider: unseen 
guards populating an inhospitable environment.
lHo In I la l  Foster, R osalind K rauss, Yves-Alain Bois et al. 677. 
|H| R ichard  Frances. 148. 
lH- Lev M anovieh. 273.
240
Furthermore -  most importantly -  like a com puter rendition, nothing outside the 
walls of Weisse Falter exists: it falls into emptiness, neither programmed nor 
used. As such, the prison is not part of a “continuous” space but is like an isolated 
object suspended in “aggregate” space. Here we have come back around to the 
fact that Schneider’s prison is conceived as pure inferiority, without its own 
exterior, like a hermit crab within the architectural shell of the museum or a 
digital object floating within a data-space empty of data. In relation to the 
museum, I argued that Weisse Falter functions as an “institutional critique” of
i j
sorts, dem onstrating the repressed “other” on which Western Civilization is 
premised and the mutual constitution of the two. In relation to com puter space, 
however, the emptiness surrounding the representation appears like an 
expansive conceptual void. On this point Weisse Falter takes 011 its full weight as 
a “theoretical object.” With the political actuality that is Guantanamo pressing on 
our minds, it becomes urgent to ask: how can we begin to make sense of this vast 
empty space that is not “program m ed” according to  any known legal or ethical 
codes? How can We build a bridge across this abyss to the dark heart of light 
space? To rephrase the question of empathy yet again, how can we refuse its 
limits and connect the inside of Guantanamo and the  torture that occurs there 
with the outside of W estern “freedom”?
“Critiq u e ” an d  “E xperienc e ”
Mike Nelson’s Triple B lu ff Canyon and Gregor Schneider’s Weisse Bolter are 
similar on many counts; both address the distinction between spectacle and 
immersion, both resist suggesting a coherent narrative; both require 
perambulation; both fabricate 3 -0  simulations of 2-0 representations; both 
outline a conception of space that is heavily influenced by com puter culture; both 
take the already virtual “mediaseape” as the foundational “reality” to which it 
refers; both make overt reference to the Global War on Terror; and both suggest 
that the opposit ional tactics of the avant-garde are still alive, although their 
effectiveness is cast in doubt.
It is these tactics and these doubts that I want to  develop in conclusion: if the 
“shocks” afforded by immersive installations such as Nelson’s and Schneider’s are 
to have a therapeutic effect beyond the pleasures of “ontie dislocation” -  to follow 
the tenets of the traditional avant-garde -  then the experience m ust be integrated 
into a meaningful historical narrative, either on the level of the individual or on 
the level of the cultural. But what happens if such over-arching narratives are no 
longer plausible or desirable? And the shocks no longer dislocate but rather 
implicate the viewer even deeper in “The Culture Industry” or “The Society of the 
Spectacle”? What if the long-held opposition no longer stands?
On the question of “experience,” the distinction between the two German words 
Krlebnis and Erfahrung  is useful: “Erlebnis generally connotes a more 
immediate, pre-refleetive, and personal variant of experience than
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Erfahrung, ...[which is] a more temporally elongated notion of experience based 
on a learning process, an  integration of discrete moments of experience into a 
narrative whole or an adventure.”l8s Thus, Erlebnis denotes an unm ediated, 
instantaneous “intensity of feeling”l84 that is “irreducible to the rational workings 
of the mind,”186 whereas Erfahrung  denotes “integrated narratives”186 that 
mature over tim e through the process of memory. The avant-garde tactic of 
“shock” can therefore be understood provoking an Erlehnis in hopes of creating 
more historically insightful Erfahrungen.
With th is distinction in m ind it becomes clear that Gregor Schneider’s 
installation Weisse Folter offers an experience that is more in line with the 
meaning of Erlebnis: he stresses the immediate, the emotive and the sensual, 
over the  rational processes that seek narrative coherence. Martin Jay expresses 
some of the risks involved in emphasizing Erlebnis'.
t u r n i n g  t h e  s u b j e c t  i n t o  a  t o t a l l y  p a s s i v e  r e c e p t a c l e  o f  e x t e r n a l  i n f l u e n c e s . . .  s h o r t - c i r c u i t s  
t h e  c o n s t r u c t i v e  m o m e n t  t h a t  a l l o w s  e x p e r i e n c e  t o  t r a n s c e n d  m e r e  s e n s u a l  s t i m u l a t i o n .  I t  
a l s o  c a n  o b l i t e r a t e  o r  a t  l e a s t  s u p p r e s s  t h e  r o l e  o f  m e m o r y  a n d  p a s t  e x p e r i e n c e  o n  t h e  
p r e s e n t ,  a b e t t i n g  t h e  r e d u c t i o n  o f  e x p e r i e n c e  t o  l i t t l e  m o r e  t h a n  m o m  - W - u y  e x c i t a t i o n ,  
w h i c h  B e n j a m i n  a n d  A d o r n o  f o u n d  s o  p r o b l e m a t i c  i n  E r l e b n i s .  I t  a l s o  f a i l s  t o  r e g i s t e r  t h e  
w a y s  i n  w h i c h  e x p e r i e n c e  m a y  h a v e  a  p o w e r f u l  f u t u r e - o r i e n t a t i o n  a s  w e l l ,  t h u s
i8m M a r t i n  J a y .  S o n g s  o f  E x p e r i e n c e :  M o d e r n  A m e r i c a n  a n d  E u r o p e a n  V a r i a t i o n  o n  a  U n i v e r s a l  
T h e m e . 11.
181 I b i d .  9 6 .
188 I b i d .  2 2 5 .
186 I b i d .  1 5 3 .
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c o m p l i c a t i n g  a n y  b e l i e f  i n  a b s o l u t e  p r e s e n c e  o r  i m m e d i a c y  a s  t h e  q u i n t e s s e n c e  o f  “ a n  
e x p e r i e n c e . ” 18"
With regard to Weisse Folter, the viewer’s “suffering of the object” (to use 
Vivian Sobchack’s phrase) is most blatant, as is the suppression of the 
discursive register of experience in favour of sensual immediacy. This 
results in a lack of protensive terrq. rality. Jonathan Crary states,
I n  i t s  o v e r w h e l m in g l y  p e r v a s i v e  f o r m s  w i t h i n  c o n t e m p o r a r y '  t e c h n o l o g ic a l  c u l t u r e ,  
p e r c e p t i o n  c o in c i d e s  w i t h  a n  i n d i v i d u a l  e v a s io n  o f  b o t h  h i s t o r y  a n d  m e m o r y .  I n  i t s  
m y r i a d  c o m m o d i f i e d  m o d e s ,  i t  b e c o m e s  a n  i m a g i n a r y ' d e l e t i o n  o f  a l l  t h a t  is  u n b e a r a b l e  o r  
i n t o l e r a b l e  i n  c o l l e c t iv e  a n d  i n d i v i d u a l  e x p e r i e n c e . 188
In the absence of historical knowledge and futurity, the potential of Weisse Folter 
to mobilize political action is undercut : the perpetual present of immersion traps 
us in what we could call a political melancholy, “an obsessive acting out rather 
than working through of the simulated traum a.”18?
This “immediacy” also calls the status of art into question. Ryan states, for 
example, tha t “If there is such a thing as a ‘truth universally acknowledged’ by 
literary theorists, this tru th  is that attention to the  rhetorical devices through 
which a world emerges out of words is an essential aspect of aesthetic 
appreciation.”1?0 Oliver Grau is unwilling to accept the fusion implicit in total 
immersion as an acceptable model of aesthetic and subjective experience. He 
writes:
l8? i b i d .  4 0 6 ,
188 Jo n a th a n  Crary'. “R obert Irw in  an d  th e  C ond ition  of T w iligh t.” 83 -4 .
l8l) M a r t i n  J a y .  “ D iv in g  i n t o  t h e  W r e c k :  A e s t h e t i c  S p e c t a t o r s h i p  a t  t h e  F i n - d e - s i e c l e 1 0 7 .
19a M a r i e - L a u r e  R y a n .  1 7 6 ,
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In  v irtu a l en v iro n m en ts , a frag ile , core e lem ent o f art com es u n d e r  th re a t: th e  o b serv er’s 
ac t o f d istanc ing  th a t is a p re req u is ite  fo r any critical reflection. A esthetic  d is tan ce  always 
co m p rises  th e  possib ility  of a tta in in g  an  overall view, of u n d e rs tan d in g  o rg an iza tio n , 
s tru c tu re , a n d  fu n c tio n , and ach iev ing  a critical ap p ra isa l,... N o tw ith stan d in g  th e  longing 
fo r  “tran scen d in g  b o u n d a rie s” an d  “a b an d o n in g  th e  self,” the h u m a n  sub jec t is 
c o n s titu te d  in  the ac t o f d is tan c in g .1'11
W ithout critical distance and reflection, all is sensation, and when all is sensation, 
there is no coherent subject to speak of. As Claire Bishop states, the subject is 
dislodged or annihilated.
This is not to say, however, that an emphasis on Erfahrung  instead comes 
without risks. Quite the opposite: as Martin Jay explains, Erfahrung  “connotes a 
progressive, if not always smooth, movement over time, which is implied by the 
F ah't (journey) ...and the  linkage with the German wrord for danger (Ge/a/m).”192 
As a cumulative process, Erfahrung  is thought to “produce a kind of wisdom that 
comes only at the end of the day.”1^  As “totalized, holistically integrated 
narratives,”1^  however, Erfahrungen  are inevitably premised on exclusions and 
repressions. The question of w hat gets included and what does not, and whether 
a normative narrative is adopted or a new one is established, will determine the 
relative merits and risks of a particular Erfahrung.
w  O liver G rau . V irtua l Art: F rom  Illu sion  to  Im m ersio n  [L eonardo . R oger F. M alina an d  Sean  
Cubitt, ed s .]. T ran s. Gloria C ustance . C am bridge, MA: M IT P, 2 0 0 3 . 202 .
■92 M artin  Jay . Songs o f Experience: M odern  A m erican  a n d  E uropean  V aria tion  on  a U niversal 




Mike Nelson, I would suggest, despite his purposeful foreclosure of narrative 
coherence, offers the opportunity to build meaningful yet non-normative 
Erfahrungen. As previously discussed, Michel de Certeau’s theory of how 
individual “tactics” fill “strategic” spaces with layers of unintended meaning 
provides a useful model for understanding how the viewer negotiates Triple B lu ff 
Canyon. In light of the distinction between Erlebniss and Erfahrung, the full 
significance of the fact that the  viewer’s “phrasing” is built without conjunctions 
comes to  the fore: distinct Erlehnisse are composed by an “autistic lucidity” that 
is irreducible to the ideological pressure of normative narratives of the “self,” the 
“nation,” or any other such totalizing concepts. This can be seen positively: it 
maintains the model of the bricoleur who constructs meaning in the present 
tense instead of following habitual flows and patterns of established relations. Or 
negatively: it paralyzes agency with the inward-looking logic of autism. In either 
case, Triple B lu ff Canyon maintains a radical heterogeneity that has the potential 
to demonstrate cracks in homogenous Erfahrungen. These cracks appear 
suddenly when the fragments remain disconnected long enough to  generate new 
leaps of logic that might, perhaps, be less coercive or even potentially fuel 
alternative narratives.
The question returns, however: how is this narrative articulation or lack thereof 
related to the installations’ political positions? As already mentioned, the avant- 
garde tactic of shock is intended to provoke a temporary disturbance in 
conventional Erfahrungen in order to allow thought to take a new form 
thereafter. The premise of th is approach is alienation or estrangement and its
approach is dialectical: it instigates a back and forth argumentation of thesis 
(convention) and anti-thesis (shock) in the hopes of reaching a sustainable 
resolution or synthesis. Both Nelson and Schneider continue this legacy, albeit 
with significant differences from the “traditional” avant-garde and from each 
other. It is evident in Nelson’s evocation of the alien, the pervert, the fanatic, the 
bricoleur, and the paranoid theorist -  all of whom are figures on the outer fringes 
of “normality.” It is equally evident in Schneider’s simulation of Guantanamo 
Bay’s Camp V within W estern civilization -  in the basement of its revered house 
of contemplation, the museum.
On this count we could say that, generally speaking, both Nelson and Schneider 
conjure up the uncanny as a way of corroding the security of the “homely” from 
inside. According to Anthony Vidler,
its [the uncan n y ’s] re -em erg en ce  as an  aesth e tic  sensib ility  since th e  m id-six ties seem s at 
once a co n tin u a tio n  o f  its privileged position  in th e  ‘negative d ia lec tics’ o f the m o d e rn is t 
av an t-g ard e  -  a role given doub le  force b y  the self-conscious irnn iza tion  of m o d ern ism  by 
p o stm o d ern ism  -  a n d  a p ro d u c t o f  the  new  technological cond itions o f  cu ltu ral 
rep resen ta tio n .'w
This “double force” is debatable, given the political indeterminacy of irony, the 
homogenizing effect of digital technologies, and the collapse of the hierarchies of 
power against which the avant-garde pitted itself. Now “the world is flat,” to use 
Thomas L. Friedman’s phrase, and power is disseminated along lateral lines.
“w A nthony  V idler. 9,
247
Furthermore, as Hal Foster asks, “Can the abject be represented at all? If it is 
opposed to culture, can it be exposed in culture?”1'16
A few pages later, Vidler’s tone is less optimistic. lie  writes:
But it is in th is very con fro n ta tio n  w ith  social a n d  political practice th a t the aesthe tic  
theo ry  of estran g em en t finds an  apparen tly  in trac tab le  an d  unyield ing  test. T he form al 
an d  critical e x p r e s s i o n  o f a lienation , as the  first av an t-g a rd es found to th e ir  chagrin , does 
no t alw ays n eatly  co rrespond  to  the  w ork  of tran sfo rm in g  o r  oven am elio ra tin g  such 
cond itions in p ractice. F orm al exp lo ra tions of d efam iliarization  b ased  on earn ivalesque 
reversals of aesthe tic  n o rm s, su b stitu tio n s  of th e  g ro tesque  for th e  sublim e, the  uncanny  
for th e  dom estic , can all too  easily be construed  as decora tion  o r ca rica tu re . F aced w ith  
the  in to lerab le  s ta te  ol rea l hom elessness, any reflection  on  the “tra n sc e n d e n ta l” o r  
psychological unhom ely  risks triv ia liz ing  or, w orse , p a tron iz ing  political o r  social 
a c tio n .11'7
Certainly artists and critics cannot change the world through their installations 
and words alone, but neither will it change without them. Triple B luff Canyon 
and Weisse Folter are both serious artworks that demand serious attention. Their 
political implications need defining in order to prevent their prem ature dismissal 
as yet another example of the violence of “the aesthetic ideology.”1'18
I will return to Nelson, but with regard to Schneider’s wholesale embrace of 
immersion, I want to cite Marlin Jay’s biting words:
,,»6 In M artin  Jay. “Diving into th e  W reck: A esthetic  S p ec ta to rsh ip  at th e  F i n - d e - s m i e .” 108.
11,7 A n t h o n y  V id le r .  u i - i g ,
See M artin  Jay. ‘“T h e  A esthetic  Ideology’ as Ideology, O r, W hat Does It M ean to  A estheticize 
Politics?” C ultural C ritique 21 (S pring  1992): 41-61.
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Sim ulacra! sh ipw recks an d  v irtua l dives give u s  a frisson o f ho rro r, hut w hen  we compare* 
th em  to the  no il-illusory  trau m as of actual d isaste rs , th e re  is clearly som eth in!' 
lacking. ...W e are p e rh ap s  lucky that wi* are  sp a re d  th is  fate; no, we are certa in ly  lucky 
th a t we arc* spared  it. Hut reflecting on it as sp ec ta to rs  from  afar, rem oved from  it by tim e 
a n d  space, is a useful re m in d e r  th a t an aesthe tics o f v irtu a l im m ersion  in the  s im u la ted  
w reckage o f  pseu d o -d isaste rs  m ay well prove to  be an  an aesth e tics  w hen it conies to  
reacting  to th e  trau m as ou tside  of the aesthe tic  fram e .1,)l)
We can visit and revisit Weisse Folter as often as we like, indulging in the thrill of 
ontic dissolution it offers, yet this will bring us no closer to the horror that the 
actual prisons in Guantanamo instate: white torture may leave no physical scars 
hut the psychological traum a it incurs is actual, resulting in a loss of identity, of 
productivity and even of the “self.” If we consider a virtual approximation of this 
traum a to he Schneider’s objective, it fails miserably and borders on t rivialization, 
as Vidler feared, by turning it into location-based entertainment.
.Jay’s assertion of an anaesthetic haze borders on another problem: the artwork’s 
assimilation into the stream of capitalism, spectacle and “The Culture Industry,” 
which is all the more easy when it is “stimulating.” Benjamin Buchloh describes 
the situation as follows:
T h e  postw ar situ a tio n  can be  described  as a negative teleology: a steady  d ism an tlin g  of 
th e  au tonom ous prac tices, spaces, an d  sp h eres  o f cu ltu re , and a p erpe tua l in tensifica tion  
o f  assim ila tion  and hom ogen ization , to the p o in t today w here we w itness w hat D ebord 
called  “the in teg ra ted  spectacle.-""
M artin  Jay . “Diving into the  W reck: A esthetic S pec ta to rsh ip  a t the I ' i n d e  s i c c l c . "  ioB. 
In H al Foster, R osalind K ratiss, Yves-Alain Hois et al. ()'/:> ,■
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According to Buchloh, and other leading art historians such as Hal Foster and 
Rosalind Krauss, the “double force” that Vidler attributed to avant -garde tactics 
has dwindled to a very low rumble that borders on mannerism.
Buchloh continues:
T h e  artistic  capacity still m ight exist no t only to  reflect on the position  th a t the  art w ork  
assu m es w ith in  the w ider system  of infin itely  d iffe ren tia ted  rep re sen ta tio n s  (fash ion , 
ad v e rtisem en t, en te rta in m en t, etc.), b u t also to recognize its suscep tib ility  to  becom ing  
in teg ra ted  in to  those su b se ts  o f ideological c o n tro l / '11
With regard to Triple B luff Canyon and Weisse Folter, both demonstrate a keen 
awareness of their position in the contemporary mediascape in ways 1 have 
already discussed. However, on the second count -  integration into “the 
integrated spectacle” ~ only Nelson overtly resists: he continuously breaks the 
illusionistic space1 so as to require constant renegotiation on the behalf of the 
viewer in relation to the work.
Schneider’s Weisse Folter, on the other hand, does not have an overt defence 
system and the viewer’s indulgence in the dark space of the prison easily aligns 
itself with the “experience economy” that indiscriminately turns everything into 
aesthetic experience, “recasting trauma as ecstasy, accident as adventure, death 
drive as joy ride.”:,(r-’ Certainly Weisse Folter demonstrates the narrowing of the 
gap that Buchloh so clearly articulated, especially given that simulation of the 
“wreck,” not spectacle, can be thought of as its most successful model. However, 
;,<’1 Ibid.
F.T. M arine tti in M arlin  Jay . “Diving in to  the W reck: A esthetic  S p ec ta to rsh ip  a t the F i n  c/e- 
Kicc/c," 104.
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this is not to suggest that Schneider capitulates to this flattening of the cultural 
field, nor that he is reaping the rewards of “Shoah business” by turning political 
torture into entertainment. Rather, he is working within it in an effort to work 
with it towards new ends.
It is this working with and within immersion that needs defining in hopes of 
finding a way through to the other side of its capitalist deployment (to recall 
Foster’s words) and it is this point that 1 want to develop in closing. In a 
“roundtable discussion” Benjamin Buchloh asserts,
Today we are  in a political and  ideological .situation th a t, w hile it is not qu ite  yet 
to ta lita rian , po in ts tow ard  the e lim ination  o f co n trad ic tio n  an d  conflict, an d  th is  
n ecessita tes a re th in k in g  of w hat cu ltu ra l p rac tice  can be u n d e r the  to talizing co n d itions 
o f  fully advanced cap ita list o rgan iza tion .1’0'!
I lal Foster makes the observation that,
M any a rtis ts  perh ap s m ost u n d e r fifty -  a ssu m e  tha t tha t d ialectic is now  overw helm ed, 
th a t they have to w ork  w ith in  a condition  of spectacle . T h a t’s no t to say they cap itu la te  to  
it... Some a rtis ts  also find productive  cracks w ith in  th is  cond ition ; it’s no t as seam less as 
B enjam in | Buchloh | m akes it ou t to  be.-’0'
Yves-Alain Bols conjectures:
Yet perhaps cond itions have changed  again now , and, instead  o f  a po lar o p p o sitio n  a la 
A dorno betw een  resis tan t high a rt an d  m a ssc u ltu ra l trash , b o th  have becom e, in the
In H al Foster, Rosalind K rauss, Yves-Alain Hois et al. 676,
:'°i Ibid. (175.
context o f global m edia , so m any b its in the  p lanetary  web. T he parad igm  isn 't resistance  
versus d isso lu tion  any m ore: resistance is im m ediately  dissolved in the new .s itua tion /’01'
This constant shifting of boundaries between resistance and dissolution and the 
very mutability of the terms of critical thought means that artists and critics need 
to constantly shift their position so as to place themselves at a nexus in the 
“planetary web” that has the potential to transmit their ideas most widely and 
most forcefully.
It is to these three imperatives rethinking the totalization and homogenization 
of contemporary cultural practice, finding productive cracks, and adapting to a 
forever changing cultural situation that Triple B luff Canyon and Weisse Toller 
answer: they demonstrate two different ways in which “aesthetics” can he 
annexed to “politics” without falling into the pitfalls normally associated with the 
“aesthetieization of politics” and its violent consequences, “the beautiful ideas 
that kill,” as futurist F.T. Marinetti called them .;’0(’ In an essay titled ‘“The 
Aesthetic Ideology’ as Ideology; Or, What Does It Mean to Aeslhetieize Politics,” 
Marlin Jay outlines the ways in which “the aesthetic is variously identified with 
irrationality, illusion, fantasy, myth, sensual seduction, the imposition of the will, 
and inhumane indifference to ethical, religious, or cognitive considerations.”1'0'7 
Thereafter he offers ways in which the lack of distinction between aesthetics and 
polities can he viewed more positively, two of which correspond to the 
installations under discussion.
-“•*> Ibid.




One critic describes Mike Nelson’s Triple B luff ('any on as “an oblique but no less 
angry confrontation with the barren nature of much contemporary political 
thinking, and the resultant desolation that is visited upon entire peoples.”208 This 
confrontation, I suggest, lies in Nelson’s “ebullient overeoding,”200 the resulting 
polysemy, and his overt reflexivity. As Rachel Withers states, “Serpentlike,
Nelson’s installations are forever nipping at their own tail.”210 Triple B luff 
Canyon simultaneously constructs and deconstructs meaning, dangling its 
possibility before the viewer who needs to work hard in order to “phrase” all of 
Nelson’s loose odds and ends into a semblance of coherence, while foreclosing 
the possibility of a totalizing narrative. 1 lowever, due to the “autism ” that 
threatens to result, it is unclear how anything beyond a deeonstruetive critique 
can be established. But at least, as Jay states, “a polities informed by the skills of 
reading literature deconstruetively will be less prone to tyranny than one that is 
not.”211
Gregor Schneider’s Weisse Folter establishes a different relationship between 
aesthetics and politics. In this installation the viewer is bereft of the normative 
wavs of negotiating a space and experiences her senses more forcefully. This 
emphasis on Erlebnis over Erfahrung  prevents the viewer from assimilating her 
experience, thereby resulting in a (simulated) trauma; the cognitive structures 
cannot be found to make sense of the experience. In this light, it becomes 
apparent that Schneider is attempting to represent the unrepresentable -  the loss
™>1 J e re m y  M illar.
-’m> D an Pox. 1.
‘11) R achel W ilbers am i Mike N elson, to .i s .
:MI M arlin  Jay . “T h e  A esthetic Ideology' as Ideology; O r, W hal Hoes It M ean to  A estheticize 
Polities?” ‘yt.
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of subjectivity that results from torture. As Martin Jay explains, following the 
ideas of .lean Francois Lyotard,
th e  result is a polities that can  be  called aesth e tie ized  in the sen se  of an ae s th e tic s  o f the 
sub lim e. T h a t is, in so fa r as th e  sub lim e acknow ledges th e  u n p re se n la b ih ty  of w hat it tries 
to  p resen t, it s tops sh o r t o f a tte m p tin g  to realize theore tica lly  in sp ired  b lu e p rin ts  fo r 
po litical u to p ia s .1'11’
II is precisely a blueprint of the halls and cells of Weisse Folter that Schneider 
prevents the viewer from drawing in their mind. As such, they are pushed back 
onto the subjective register of experience -  but there is drawback. As Jay states, 
“Not all political problems, after all, allow the luxury of an indefinitely deferred 
solution. The sublime may be useful as a warning against violently submitting 
incommensurable differends to the discipline of a homogenizing theory, but it 
doesn’t offer much in the  way of positive help with the choices that have to be 
made.”81:*
This is not to say that Triple B lu ff Canyon and Weisse Folter are effective as
political “actions”: Nelson’s embrace of polysemy prevents a clear position from
being articulated, and Schneider’s emphasis on sensational immediacy at the
expense of discourse prevents the installation from functioning as a political
allegory. It is to say, however, that their resistance to any sort of totalization -
their refusal to close the4 process of meaning-making (Nelson) or to proffer
blueprints (Schneider) -  invokes a model of aesthet ic judgment that equally
refuses to reduce particulars to rules and conventions. This type of judgment,
1'11’ Ibid. 5 4 - 
-’O  11)1(1.
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based on Immanuel Kant’s judgement of taste, is in urgent need of rediscovery: 
within the political realm, it can mediate between the general and the 
particular"11 so as to avoid flattening specificity to an immersive homogeneity. It 
is for this reason that looking at these two installations from all different 
perspectives has political implications, even if subsequent action is not dictated, 
or perhaps because subsequent action is not dictated. Nelson and Schneider 
make no prescriptions; yet Triple B lu ff Canyon and Weisse Folter, and the 
tentative narratives we concoct in order to traverse the sea of references or the 
wash of intensities, “ultimately [ provide] the material for a process of discursive 
communication about the wrecks tha t have occurred in the past and the ones in 
the future that might perhaps be forestalled.”2'f>
M i Ib id . 55.
L,|;> M arlin  Jav . "D iving in to  the W reck: A esthetic  S p e c ta to rsh ip  at the  F i n - c l c  - s t o c k . "  uk ).
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CH APTER 4 : AUG M ENTED PI A C E S
S u r v e i l l a n c e  n e v e r  t i r e s  o f  t a k i n g  p o s s e s s i o n  o f  o u r  w o r d s  a n d  i m a g e s .  I n  m y  r e c e n t  
w o r k  I  a s k  w h a t  w o u l d  h a p p e n  i f  a l l  t h e  c a m e r a s  b e c a m e  p r o j e c t o r s  a n d  y i w c  u s  w o r d s  
a n d  i m a g e s  r a t h e r  t h a n  t a k i n g  t , . e m  a w a y  f r o m  u s ?
R afael L ozano-1le n u n e r
I I o w  w e  d e f i n e  p u b l i c  s p a c e  i s  i n t i m a t e l y  c o n n e c t e d  w i t h  i d e a s  a b o u t  w h a t  i t  m e a n s  t o  
b e  h u m a n ,  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  s o c i e t y ,  a n d  t h e  k i n d  o f  p o l i t i c a l  c o m m u n i t y  w e  w a n t .
R osalyn D eutsche
Lev Manovieh’s work 011 new media investigates the impact of immersive 
technologies on the way we negotiate contemporary’ culture, what he calls 
“transcoding”: “ the projection of the ontology of a com puter onto culture itself.”1 
In 2003 he wrote:
It is qu ite  p ossible th a t th e  em p h asis  o f  the firs t d ecad e  o f the 2 0 0 0 s  w ill tu rn  o u t to  be 
ab o u t the  physical th a t is, physical space filled w ith  e lec tro n ic  an d  v isu a l in fo rm atio n . 
W hile  en ab lin g  fu r th e r  d ev e lo p m en t o f  v irtu a l sp aces ... co m p u te r  an d  ne tw o rk  
tech no log ies m ore actively e n te r  o u r  real physica l sp a c e s .-
According to Manovich, technologies now “make the physical space into a 
dataspaee: extracting data from it (surveillance) or augmenting it with data
1 Lev M anovich . T h e  Language' o f N ew  M edia ( L eonardo . R oger F. M alina  an d  .Sean C ubit t, cels.], 
C am bridge , MA: M IT P, 2 0 0 1 . 223.
8 Lev M anovich . ‘T h e  P oetics of A ugm en ted  Space.” N ew  M edia: T h eo rie s  an d  P rac tices o f 
D ig ilex tuality . A n n a  E verett an d  J o h n  T. Caldw ell, eels. L ondon  and N ew  York: Reuitleelge, 2 0 0 3 . 
70 .
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(cellspace, computer displays).”3 This results in what Manovich calls “augmented 
space,” derived from the already established term  “Augmented Reality” (AR). 
Rather than  being posited as opposite to  VR, however, augmented space is 
premised on the continuity between VR and AR. That is, whether the 
technological effects are all encompassing (as in VR) or supplementary (as in AR) 
is a m atter of scale -  the  relative size of the display -  and of investment in the 
inform ation/sim ulation it adds to our experienced
David Joselit describes common occurrences of augmented space as follows:
I t ’s th e  e lec tric  w h isp e r b leed in g  fro m  e a rp h o n e s  in  subw ay  cars, a n d  i t ’s th e  d isa rm in g  
ex p erien ce  o f  believ ing  fo r a  m in u te  th a t  th e  w e ll-d re ssed  guy ta lk in g  to  h im se lf  o n  the 
s t r e e t  is c razy  -  u n til  you see h is h e a d se t. O r i t ’s  th e  zo m b ie  dance , v isib le  th ro u g h  the 
g lass  en c lo su re  o f  a v ideo a rcad e , o f  tw o  ad o le scen t boys w hose  v irtu a l ad v e n tu re  is be ing  
c o n d u c te d  th ro u g h  th e ir  a c tu a l m o v em en ts  o n  a p la tfo rm  in  fro n t o f  a screen .s
Clearly th is spatial confusion or overlap poses problems for ideas of site- 
specificity. The previous chapters outlined in great detail how artists and a rt 
historians working in the  crossover have contended with the collapse of 
subject/object distinctions and the loss of “critical” distance that immersion 
implies, as well as the viewer’s fully embodied participation in the artwork. This 
chapter looks again at this nexus of problem s, this tim e with an emphasis on 
actual (augmented) places -  specific sites -  as they are negotiated by physical 
(also often augmented) bodies by way of technological mediation,
3 Ibid. 77.
4 Ibid. 79 .
s David Jo se lit . “N av iga ting  th e  N ew  T e rrito ry : A rt, .Avatars, a n d  th e  C o n tem p o ra ry  M ediascape. 
A rtfo rum  (S u m m e r 2 0 0 5 ): 276.
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To restate, this stress on “real” places and people is not in opposition to  their 
allegedly dematerialized and disembodied “virtual” counterparts; rather, it 
assumes that we can be “pod” and “ped” interchangeably or even simultaneously, 
like the  guy with the headset. Which is the  “right” and which is the “wTong” place 
to be, to  use Miwon Kwon’s vocabulary, is difficult to assert given their newf 
degree of interpenetration: our subjectivities are now embedded in th is plurality 
of site just as we/they now incorporate the  technological peripherals (or in-vivo 
technologies) by which wre interface with this plurality. As such, the emphasis in 
this chapter on real people and places takes as a given the virtual dimensions of 
both as part of the actuality of augmented space.
In particular, this chapter investigates an artwork that “takes place” in situ:
Rafael Lozano-Hemmer’s outdoor installation Under Scan (2.006) as it was 
presented in the  East Midlands, United Kingdom. Lozano-Hemmer (b. 1967) is a 
Mexican-Canadian “m edia” artist who is perhaps best known for his project 
Vectorial Elevation (1999), in which he installed robotic aircraft search lights in 
Mexico City’s Zocalo Square and his exhibition in the Mexican Pavilion at the last 
Venice Biennale (Some Things Happen More Often Than All o f  the Time, 2007). 
The particular project under investigation in this chapter -  Under Scan  -  raises 
im portant questions about contemporary experiences of public space, 
mediascapes, and the conditions of communication under increased 
technological surveillance -  questions which are highly relevant to an 
understanding of the crossover as it is evinced outside of the specialized domain 
of the gallery. As Lev Manovich states,
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F o r a few decades n o w  a rtis ts  have already  d ea lt w ith  th e  en tire  space  o f  a gallery; ra th e r  
th a n  c rea ting  an  ob jec t th a t a v iew er w ould  l o o k  a t ,  th ey  p laced th e  v iew er in side  th is  
o b jec t [as d id  E liasson , Beesley, N elson and  S ch n eid er]. N ow ...a rtis ts  have a new  
challenge: p lacing a u s e r  inside a space filled w ith  dynam ic, co n tex tua l d a ta  w ith  w hich 
th e  user can  in te ra c t.6
More specifically, my concern lies with ow the radical plurality of augmented 
space and  the similar hybridity of our tethered techno-bodies interface and 
negotiate with each other to establish a similitude -  or dissimilitude -  of a 
(posthuman) public (augmented) sphere.
Ron Burnett observes that, “One of the impulses at the heart of this evolution is 
the desire to be inside images and screens, tha t is, to share the stories and events 
from within the space and time of the m edium .”7 According to Lev Manovich, 
“The computer age brought with it a new cultural algorithm: 
reality>media>data>database.”8 The question then follows, how can we work 
backwards to access the reality tha t the medium turned into data? Or is the 
community we might create based on these shared experiences limited in 
purview, scope and relevancy to the space and time of the medium alone?
These kinds of questions make it necessary to consider recent theoretical 
approaches to computer games when contending with interactive art projects in 
augmented space such as Lozano-Hemmer’s: it reconfigures aesthetic 
engagement as it has been traditionally understood due to its dual emphasis on
6 Lev M anovich . “T h e  Poetics o f  A ugm en ted  Space.” 8 2 -3 .
7  Ron B u rn e tt. “P ro jec ting  M in d s.” M edia A rt H is to rie s . O liver G rau, ed. C am bridge, MA: M IT P, 
2007. 3 2 8 .
8 Lev M anovich . T h e  L anguage of N ew  M edia . 224-5.
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simulation and interactivity, and it participates in a “cultural space of surface 
play and neo-spectacle”'^  that site-specificity seeks to redress. An underlying 
effort in this chapter is thus to see if a conceptual link can oe built between the 
“kinaesthetic performance”10 of computer games and radical democratic 
definitions of a public sphere that is premised on conflict, such as that posited by 
Rosalyn Deutsche. This “link” may sound preposterous, and it is, especially since 
conflict in computer games more likely calls for a “shoot-‘em-up” solution than 
open-ended discursive exchange. What I am investigating, rather, is whether or 
not the  way in which space is represented and navigated in artworks that are akin 
to computer games has any value for how we can visualize a public sphere at a 
time when “the electronic realm contaminates our quotidian reality.”11
Rafael Lozano-Hemmer: Under Scan
(Figures 38-45)
Rafael Lozano-Hemmer’s outdoor installation Under Scan disrupts the viewer’s 
daily routes and reveries through urban space with evocations of telepresent 
entities and unconnected memories. The installation floods an urban square with 
white light streaming from high-powered projectors; a surveillance system tracks
■) A n d rew  Darley. Visual D igital C u ltu re: Surface Play an d  Spectacle in New M edia  G en re s .
L ondon and  N ew  York: R outledge, 2 0 0 0 .1 4 9 .
10 Ib id . 151.
11 D aniel C anogar. “Rafael L ozano-H em m er.” 2 0 0 6  Bien n ale  o f Sydney . 172.
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the passers-by. Custom-made software crunches the data and then projects a 
video-portrait (one of a thousand such portraits in the system’s database) onto 
the ground in the pedestrian’s path, aligned and to scale with the pedestrian’s 
shadow. If the pedestrian moves away, the portrait turns away, fades into the 
light, and becomes dormant again. Every seven minutes, the grid of the tracking 
system is projected onto the space, revealing the installation’s technological 
workings -  its integration of surveillance and simulation technologies.
The video-portraits included in Under Scan were made by Lozano-Hemmer in 
collaboration with local filmmakers. He invited random people he encountered at 
concerts, on campuses and at community centres in the five cities in which the 
work was shown (Derby, Leicester, Lincoln, Northampton and Nottingham) to 
come to the studio. They could represent themselves any way they want, as long 
as they make eye contact with the camera at some point so as to effectively make 
eye contact with the eventual viewers of the portrait. The individual self­
representations/portraits that resulted vary widely; they deliver messages of 
political protest, sexual innuendos, playfulness, scrutiny or detachment. In one 
we see a lady flailing her arms and legs like a toddler in a fit, for example, and in 
another a man calmly flips through snapshots before flinging them  at the 
camera/viewer. We see people rolling over, dancing, flashing a pen light, or 
simply waving at the camera.
Pedestrians who walk through Under Scan quickly learn that their shadows 
constitute the interface by which they can access the database of portraits. This 
interface is exceptionally “intuitive” and easy to manoeuvre, requiring no
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specialized skill, coordination or dexterity. Shadows seemingly become computer 
cursors that roll over the concrete “screen” underfoot, thereby causing portraits 
to “pop up.” This is not bow the system works: it tracks the pedestrians and 
projects the images in their path, thereby denying them active control over the' 
image-spaee. However, the sense of navigating an interactive screen that is 
connected to a database of images persists.
Lev Manovich theorizes both “database logic” and “navigable space” in The 
Language o f  New Media, lie argues that the database is “a new symbolic form of 
the computer age...a new way to structure our experience of ourselves and of the 
world.”12 He writes,
In d eed , if  a fte r the d ea th  of G od (N ietzsche), th e  en d  of g ran d  N arratives o f 
E n lig h ten m en t (L yotard), a n d  the  arrival o f the W eb (T im  B erner-Lee), th e  w orld appears 
to  u s  as an  endless a n d  u n s tru c tu re d  collection o f  im ages, texts, a n d  o th e r d a ta  records, it 
is on ly  ap p ro p ria te  th a t  we will be m oved to  m odel it as a d a ta b a se .1"
According to Manovich, narrative is now only one method of accessing data 
among many o t h e r s .^  In computer games, for example, narrative is suggested, 
but winning the game is a m atter of learning its hidden logic -  its algorithm. This 
leads him to conclude tha t
co m p u te r  p rog ram m ing  encap su la tes  th e  w orld acco rd ing  to its ow n logic. T he w orld  is 
reduced  to  tw o k inds o f  so ftw are objects that are  co m p lem en tary  to  each o th e r  d a ta  
s tru c tu re s  and  a lgorithm s. A ny p rocess o r  task  is red u ced  to an a lg o rith m ...[aJnd any
111 Lev M anovich. T he Language of N ew  M edia. 2i<).
Ibid.
M Ibid. 220 .
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object in th e  world be  it the popu la tion  of a city, or the  w ea ther over the  eour.se of a 
cen tu ry , o r a chair, o r a hum an  bra in  is m odeled  as a d a ta  s tru c tu re , that is, da ta  
organized  in a pa rticu la r way for efficient search  and  re triev a l.,:>
inDatabase* logic thus understands the world at “interface value.”
Under Scan is clearly tin example of the world turned into data. In this case, city 
inhabitants are turned into video-portraits and subsequently accessed by an 
algorithm: the computer tracks, sizes and then projects a portrait according to a 
pre-programmed code. According to Manovich,
T h e d a tab ase  becom es th e  cen te r  o f  th e  creative process in the co m p u te r age. H istorically, 
th e  artis t m ad e  a un iq u e  w ork  of art w ith in  a p a rticu la r m edium . T herefo re  the in terface  
d id  not exist. W ith new  m edia, the co n ten t o f  th e  w ork an d  the in terface a re  se p a ra te d .>'
In this light, the people’s public expression that is recorded in the portraits 
comprises the “content” of Under Sean, which is subsequently accessed by a 
particular interface (one among other possibilities).
More specifically, the interface that Under Scan uses is akin to what Manovich 
calls “navigable space.” As discussed in the previous chapter, computer space is 
“aggregate” rather than continuous: it is comprised of discrete data-entities, 
which are positioned on an XYZ grid, but have no knowledge of each other. 
Furthermore, borrowing from game theory he writes, “rather than conceiving 
space as a totality, one is dealing with a set of separate places.”18 Despite
>■* Ibid. 223 .
10 This is S herry  T u rk ic ’s phrase .
17 Lev M anovich. T he Language1 o f New M edia. 227. 
Ibid. 257.
2 6 3
differences between the genres of computer games, they all consistently choose a 
navigable space interface. That is, the player/avatar seemingly moves through the 
aggregate computer space in order to interact with the data-entities, whether they 
he the gamer’s “enemies,” walk-through architectural designs, scientific 
visualizations, or models of abstract information.
'Flic ubiquity ’’ ■ navigable space interface leads Manovich to argue that it is “a
cultural form in its own right.”11’ lie writes,
O f course, both the  o rgan iza tion  of sp a re  and  its use to  rep resen t o r  visualize so m eth ing  
else have always b een  a fu ndam en ta l p a rt o f hum an  cu ltu re . A rch itec tu re  and  ancien t 
m nem onics, city p lan n in g  an d  d iagram m ing , geom etry  and  topology, are  ju s t so m e  of the 
d iscip les an d  techn iques tha t w ere developed  to h a rn ess  space’s sym bolic and econom ic 
capital. Spatial c o n stru c tio n s  in  new  m edia d raw  on a ll these ex isting  trad itio n s but 
they  are  also  fundam enta lly  d ifferen t in one key respect. For the  first tim e, s p a c e  b e c o m e s  
a  m e d i a  t y p e , - "
Lozano-l lemmer explores the city as a communication device that not only 
includes spatial constructions that speak about “official” history and “proper” 
behaviour by way of their architectural monuments and layout, but also spatial 
constructions that incorporate massive screens or “information architecture”111 
and portable screens that deliver information ‘ site. It is due to this dual 
emphasis that Lozano-I lemmer’s work cannot be eontextualized within the 
discourses of site-sped fieily or new media alone. As Priamo Lozada and Barbara
“> Ibid. afii.
Ibid.
See M ure S teinberg , “bu ild in g  P ercep tions: M edia A rchitecture  and  the  H ypersurfaee 
K xperience.” P arachu te  l ig  (Jan .-M arch  e o o .j) :  i:>8 gS.
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Perea stale, “Rafael Lozano-l lemmer’s artistic praetiee forges a new kind of space; 
an interstitial terrain, wherein the aesthetic equation is re-defined and disciplines 
are reconfigured.”--
The new kinds of spaces Lozano-Hemmer forges within t he city are set in 
contrast to what he calls “vampire buildings” - the perpetually restored edifices 
of a bygone era that no longer hold the symbolic force they once did and 
“default buildings” the new “generic, defeatured buildings that relied market 
forces and not local specificity”^  Both are inadequate figurations for 
contemporary urban reality, lie  stall's: “Cicero said, ‘we make buildings and 
buildings make us’. Our situation in the globalized city says the opposite: the 
urban environment no longer represents the citizens, it represents capital.”- ! 
According to Lozano-I lemmer, the homogenization of the built environment “has 
reached a crisis of representation that carries with it a tremendous avidity of 
connection.”-!!
Fredrie Jameson lamented the breakdown of urban coherence and inlerlmman 
connection in his famous description of the Bonaventtire Hotel in Los Angeles, in 
which the passer-by loses her sense of spatial and subjective coherence,-0 
Lozano-Hemmer, however, does not lament this “loss.” Rather, he sees it as an
Priuino Lozada and  B arbara P erea. “P ro logue.” Rafael Lozano 1 lem m er: Som e T h in g s H appen  
More O ften  T han  All o f the  Tim e. B arrios, dose Luis, M anuel D eLanda, B arbara L ondon el al. 
Rafael Lozano 1 le m m e r an d  Cecilia G andarias, eds, T u rner/A & R  Press, e.007. 97.
In G eert Lovink. “Real a n d  V irtual bight o f  R elational A rch itectu re: A11 In terview  w ith  Rafael 
L ozano-H em m er." U ncanny N etw orks: D ialogues w ith  the V irtual In telligen tsia. G eert Lovink, ed. 
C am bridge, MA: M IT P, n o o n . 307 .
“ i In do se  Luis B arrios. “R eflections aro u n d  Loose I in d s .” Rafael L ozano-H em m er: .Some 'Pilings 
H appen M ore O ften 'P h an  All of th e  T im e. Mb.
Ibid.
•‘’dam eson , Predrie. “T he C ultural Logie o f  Late C apita lism ." ( iy 8 , |)  P ostm odern ism , o r, The 
cu ltu ra l logic o f la te  capitalism . D urham : Duke U niversity  Press, m y  t.
opportunity or motivation to intervene in public space in order to establish new 
communicative gestures that are more representative of the relationships that 
people have with places today and with the people who share these places. As 
such, he agrees with Jam esons conclusion: it is imperative to establish new 
representations that contend with changing spatial experiences. For Jameson, 
this was postmodern “hyperspace;” for Lozano-Hemmer this is today’s 
mediascape, with its multiple layers of virtual messages emanating from various 
electronic devices, the codes of the built environment itself, and the inseparability 
of the two. 1 to states, "The old idea of a site is problematic when we think of the 
Internet, globalization and our era of non-location. We now live in multiple 
realities and works that use new technologies are somehow overlaying this 
electronic reality onto the everyday.”"'
In this volatile terrain, Lozano-Ilemmer uses technology “to reactivate our city, to 
make it our own.”'-8 lie has set up various projects that seek to provide the public 
with the ability to interact with the site on new terms. As he explains, “In 
relational architecture, buildings are activated so that the input of the people in 
the street can provide narrative implications apart from those envisioned by the 
architects, developers, or dwellers.”-1' His 2001 project Body Movies is a case in 
point: in front of the Old City Mall in Rotterdam, he set up a looo-square-m etre 
interactive projection screen on which the shadows of passers-by appeared fully 
in focus regardless of their distance. Also projected onto the screen were random
•" In Randy (Ilad m an . “Body Movies: A t.in/. Ars K leetm niea Festival Aw ard W h in er on the S ta te  
o f tn te ra e tiv e  A rt.” C anadian Art (W in te r n o o n ): 60 .
Ibid. 58.
In (lee rt Lovink. 307.
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snapshots of pedestrians in the area. When a shadow and a silhouette in the 
photograph fell into alignment, the projected image changed.
Some of the narratives that emerged in Body Movies were quite comical, even 
carnivalesque:
A 1*5-m etro shadow , cast by a m an  and  his w heelchair, m oves across a public pla/.a. The 
w heelchair's  occupan t is having an ino rd inate  a m o u n t of p leasu re  a s  his large sh adow  
cru sh es sm alle r shadow s east by o thers in the a re a . At a n o th e r  tim e, a kid enjoys 
sto m p in g  on a little shadow  cast by h e r teacher, o r  a m o n stro u s C h ihuahua loom s over a 
sm all crow d of h u m a n  silh o u e ttes  hudd led  b e n e a th . '0
Little stories like these demonstrate the degree to which participants used Body 
Monies for creative expression. According to Manuel DeLanda, “...Lozano- 
1 lemtner has taken over some of these spaces | “horn from the desire to express 
authority, such as central plazas and m onum ents”] changing their a f f o r d a n e e s . ’k u  
In Body Movies, the space is “made responsive to commands not emanating from 
a central authority, "t-
Similarly in I hider Sean, the space of city square becomes a site of impromptu
encounters. Lozano-l lem m er’s artworks, 111 the words of Cuauhtemoc Medina,
“involve a re-distribution of powers; they provide the location of modified
subjective interactions.”-™ As such, we can compare Under Sean to other
instances in which public space was taken over by the public in ways that run
C hris tin e  Rod fern. “Rafael Lozano lle m m e r."  C on tem porary  01 (2007): 56.
IV  Lam ia, M anuel, “T he Expressiv ity  of S pace ,” Rafael Lozano lle m m e r: Som e T hings H appen  
M ore O ften  T han  All of the T im e. 105.
*•' I b id .
C uauh tem oc M edina. ‘T ’ro m  W ithin Shadow s." Rafael Lozano llem m er: Som e T h ings H appen  
M ore O ften T han  All of th e  T im e. 119.
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counter to the rituals that the authorities envision (whether commercial, religions, 
or nationalistic) and try to instate architecturally (if not forcefully). 'Take 
Krzysztof Wodiczko’s 2001 work in Tijuana, Mexico, for example, in which he set 
up “a situation for others to animate monuments and project themselves. 
Wodiczko created a live projection system which would project the face and voice 
of a speaker onto the iconic spherical architecture of the Omnimax theatre at the 
Centro Cultural Tijuana (CKCUT), The stories that emerged told of the violence, 
disempowerment, sexual abuse anti family disintegration that women working in 
the "m aquiladora” industry face on a day-to-day basis. According to Wodiczko, 
“via th is architectural form we somehow build a bridge, link with other people.”ss 
The public plaza, containing an audience of more than fifteen-hundred, became a 
place of test imony rather than "ontrol during the two consecutive nights of the 
installation.
In Under Scan the portrait’s “testimony” is pre-recorded in the studio to be later 
replayed in situ. Nevertheless, a degree of “intimacy" is achieved. According to 
Lozano-1 lemmer,
O ne could  argue th a t the co n tr ib u tio n  o f perso n a l in te rac tiv ity  is p recisely  the 
tran sfo rm a tio n  o f in tim id a tio n  in to  ‘in tim acy ': the possib ility  fo r people  to co n stitu te  new  
re la tio n sh ip s  w ith the u rb an  lan d scap e  a n d  th e re fo re  to  re-estab lish  a con tex t for a 
b u ild in g 's  social perform ance,.'!'1
u  K rzysztof W odiczko. “In terview : A rch itec tu re  an d  T h erap y .” Art in. th e  T w en ty -ld rs t C entury . 
(l’BS) h t tp :/ /w w w .p b s .o rg /a r l:1i/a r lis ts /w o d ie z k o /c lip e .h tm l 
Ibid.
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This sounds like a classic site-specific gesture -  empowering the audience to 
forge more “authentic" relationships to the site, rather than following official rites 
from rote. Certainly it is the case with Wodiczko’s work. However, as Medina 
states,
Lozano I le m m e r’s w orks in d u ce  th e ir  u sers to  dev ia te  from  the cu s to m ary  a im s o f 
co n tem p o ra ry  pub lic  space  ( tran s it, tra d e  and  co n su m p tio n , and  ad v e rtisem en t) an d  
instead  p ro m o tes  a form  o f sp ec tra l in tc rsub jec tiv ity , th e  m eetin g  o f  v isual fan tasies in 
th e  guise o f social illusions.:’7
What Medina is highlighting here is the virtual dimensions of Lozano-1 Iemmer’s 
work the ways in which it has heen mediated by personal stories and 
incorporated into tangential memories ~ dimensions that site- specificity sought 
to cut through in order to reveal the site’s official script and ideological force,
Lozano-1 Icmmer states,
1 am  in te re s ted  in  d is tan c in g  m y p rac tice  from  th e  n o tio n  o f  th e  's ite -sp ec ific ,' p a rticu la rly  
from  th e  po stm o d ern  a tte m p ts  to  find and  d eco n stru c t essen tia l co n stitu en t 
charac teristics o f  a p a r tic u la r  space: I am  very co m m itted  to  the  idea  th a t  a site  co n sis ts  o f  
an  in d e te rm in a te  n u m b e r  o f  in te rsec tin g  im ag inary , socio -po litical, physical, an d  
tc lep resen t spaces.":”1
'Phis very indeterminacy is key to understanding IJruler Scan: the installation 
actively resists the idea that a site can he adequately decorticated to render it 
knowable and intelligible. Instead, Lozano-1 lem m er has created a space in which
C uauhtem oc M edina. 118.
;!K In G eert Lovink. 30 8 .
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video-spectres, military technology, commuters, loiterers, shadows and literally 
concrete space intermix to establish a site that evades reification. As he slates, “In 
my work 1 try to encourage exeeptionalism, eccentric reading of the environment, 
alien memories (meaning, those that don’t belong to the site).’A'1
However, I.ozano-Ilemmer is equally keen to distance himself from the adjective 
“virtual.” lie states,
[ R ela tional 1 was a good w o n t in co u n te rp o in t to  th e  te rm  ‘v irtu a l', w hich em p h asizes  th e  
d em a te ria liza tio n  o f  experience  an d  asks us to  c rea te  in  s im u lacra . ‘R e la tio n a l’ 
em p h asize s  the d em a te ria liza tio n  o f the real e n v iro n m e n t an d  asks us to  q u e s tio n  the 
d iss im u la tio n , i"
The fact that the  urban environment is (partly) demateriali/.ed due to its 
splintering into disparate “pods” or “cells” and  it perforation by a plethora of 
virtual windows is incontestable. As Jonathan Crarv states;
All o f u s  in  the p re se n t-d a y  technological c u ltu re  in h a b it a sh iftin g  m ix o f new  a n d  old 
p e rc e p tu a l m odalities, o f  h y b rid  zo n es co m p o sed  o f K uelidian space a n d  d im en sio n less  
ex p erien ces of e lec tro n ic  ne tw orks th a t o ften  a p p e a r  to  be  seam lessly  co n n ec ted , a
But is this dissimulation? (Am this spatial hvbridity be de-hyphenated or 
dissembled to reveal the “real” environment, as site-specifieity sought to  do?
n  In J o s e  I.uis B arrios. 14P.
•i" Ib id . 147. Also sec C eert Lovink. 307.
■i* J o n a th a n  C rary . “R obert Irw in  a n d  the  C ondition  o f  T w iligh t." R obert L ehm an  L ec tu res 3. 
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Surveillance ana Simulation
Rather than  as site-specific or virtu; 1, Lozano-Hemmer defines his work as 
“technological a l  ualizatieas of urban environments with alien m e m o r y , H 2 and 
this is indeed what comes to pass in Under Scan: the viewers are interpolated by 
video-portraits that burst into their shadows like foreign ideas or flashbacks. The 
project intervenes in the site only ephemerally, without any suggestion of 
historical validity or propriety. In order to understand the significance of this 
interruption or eruption in the urban fabric, it is necessary to first understand 
how surveillance and sim ulation technologies are used in Under Scan, practically 
and symbolically.
Lozano-Hemmer states, “My position is that technology is an inevitable aspect of 
society, and  it is a key challenge for the media artist to develop it or m isuse it to 
break th e  stereotypes and create new technological l a n g u a g e s . ” 43 Lozano- 
Hem m er’s introduction of video-projections in an urban plaza not only multiplies 
the already mu’ Tple space by adding the “space” behind the screen; it also 
subverts the language of spatial control by allowing the audience to  play with the 
param eters of surveillance technology. As Medina states,
in s te a d  o f  k eep in g  th e  in d iv id u a ls  u n d e r  a p e rm a n e n t b u t se c re t s tru c tu re  o f c o n tro l an d
d e tec tio n , h e  e s tab lish es  a m irro r in g  w ith  th e  su rv e illan ce  device th a t  tu rn s  it in to  a
-i2 In  Jo se  Luis B arrios. 148. 
43 In  G ee rt Lovink. 310.
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m im etic  device, w h ere  th e  sub jec t observes h is o r  h e r  ac tio n s as effected  on a visible 
m ech an ism .
This description sounds rather utopian, as if the technology is now under our 
control, in our power, and as if the simulations serve to neutralize the violence of 
surveillance.
However, two problems arise: first, there is no way not to interface with the 
system, no way to slip by undetected: we are under a scanner, quite literally. Our 
movements are tracked and our next movement is already predicted. Clearly 
Under Scan is benign: Lozano-Hemmer “allows us to physically engage these 
surveillance technologies, and reconnect to  the electronic soc^ ’ body in more 
playful w a y s . ’b s  Yet his gesture of revealing the technology tha t generates this 
playful arena -  of “disabling their stealth a c t iv i t y ”^  -  does not undo the fact that 
the audience is subjected to  the dictates of the device. As Lozano-Hemmer states, 
the audience “becomes the  target of extremely predatory electronic d e t e c t i o n ”. ^  
In the  words of Victor Stoichita, “In the old m anuals of perspective, it was the eye 
that was trapped; this time, it is the enti ; oody.’bs
The predatory capacities o f electronic surveillance have been boosted since 9/11 
and th e  introduction of the  Patriot Act in the United States. As Luzano-Hemmer 
states,
44 C uau h tem o c M edina . 118.
45 D an ie l C anogar. 172.
4(> Ibid.
47 In J o s e  Luis B arrios. 146.
48 V ic to r S to ich ita . “T echnology , M agic a n d  th e  R e -e n c h a n tm en t o f  the  W o rld .” R afael Lozano- 
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W h a t is new  is the  degree  o f  co m p u te riza tio n  th a t  th e  new  su rveillance system s, w hich 
in v ad e  o u r public  an d  p riv a te  spaces, possess. ...It is lite ra lly  ab o u t techno log ies designed  
to  d isc rim in a te  b a se d  on a se ries  o f  in n a te  p re ju d ices . T his new  in tensifica tion  of 
su rv e illan ce  is ex trem ely  p ro b lem atic ... w
In his project Subtitled Public (2005), for example, the viewer walks through a 
trae' j. * .. Lem that randomlv -booses a verb conjugated in the third-person 
0 Lsmisses,” “benefits,"' or “quiets down”) and projects it onto her
wherever she goes, effectively branding her. Given that it is difficult to read the 
label projected onto one’s own body, viewers look at each other to make sense of 
their experience. The only way to rid oneself of the nagging label is to touch 
another person, in which case their two labels switch (for better of for worse). 
According to Lozano-Hemmer, “The system pretends to have the ability to 
identify moods, gesture, desires and actions, bu t in the end it is chance that takes 
this to an  absurd level. ”s°
As Stephen Graham explains, the intensification of surveillance involves systems 
that “can now provide the data inputs necessary to develop electronic simulations 
of ‘reality’ used by a num ber of powerful organizations such as the military, the 
state and  large firms.’’s1 Furthermore,
T h e  co m pu terized  linkage be tw een  su rve illance  an d  s im u la tio n  helps to  recon figu re  and  
in ten sify  su rveillance  p rac tices b ecau se  s im u la tio n s  becom e con tin u a lly  u p d a ted
49 In J o s e  Luis B arrios. 143-4.
5° I n  I b i d .  151.
5‘ S tephem G raham  “G eographies o f  S u rv e illan t S im u la tio n .” V irtua l G eographies: Bodies. Space 
and  R e la tio n s . M ike G rang, Phil C rang  a n d  J o n  M ay, eds. L ondon an d  N ew  York: R outledge, 1999. 
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re p re se n ta tio n s  cybcrnetically  connected  ‘b ack w ard s’ to  ex ten d in g  w ebs of d a ta  cap tu re  
an d  ‘fo rw ard s’ to (a tte m p te d ) d iscip linary  a n d  co n su m er p ra c tic e s /-’
In the United Kingdom where Under Scan was first installed, the wide-area 
public CCTV surveillance system, currently “m anned” by security staff, is also 
being digitalized. As Graham explains, “New, digital systems are algorithmically 
programmed to scan for certain ‘unusual* events or targeted individuals or 
vehicles, thus withdrawing opportunities for human discretion in the tracking 
and monitoring of individuals.”S3
Harun Farocki, perhaps more than any other artist, has addressed this 
intensification of surveillance from a critical perspective. Consider his m ulti­
screen video installation in Documenta XII, Deep Play (2007): a striking green 
soccer field is overlain with graphs of data, dynamic diagrams outlining the 
players’ every move, arrows tracking the ball, computer renditions of the players 
(all with the same generic face), and a continuous stream of sports reportage. 
These various simulations of the game im print themselves on the  retina as 
though we ourselves were a surveillant oculus. The power implied in this transfer 
is quickly eroded, however, as our attention is fractured over the twelve 
competing screens. The technology does not provide access to a “deep” truth; 
instead, the simulations seem to obliterate their real-life referents.
This now-common combination of surveillance and simulation makes the second 
problem in Under Scan all too apparent; tha t a surveillance device can also
re  I b id .  
ss I b id .  1 3 6 .
274
function as a “mimetic device,” as Medina suggests, does not in itself subvert the 
technology. Simulation is now part and parcel with surveillance and lends it new 
force. In both Subtitled Public and Under Scaji “(t |he body is inscribed into the 
system; it is monitored, studied, assimilated, subverted and converted into a 
tool...’’m However, as Lozano-Hemmer states, “Next time a person stops in front 
of a surveillance camera they might expect to have words projected 011 his or her 
body, and know that it is highly likely that they will not agree with the subtitle 
assigned to  their public body.”®
Participation and Communication
In Under Scan the body/tool/avatar provokes the appearance of a video-portrait. 
According to Medina,
U n d e r  S c a n  behaves, in  th a t  sense, as a m odified  a g o r a ,  w here  ind iv iduals engage ag a in  
in th e  gam e o f  in te rp e lla tin g  each o th e r, in te rru p tin g  th e ir  business an d  m onologues, and  
ap p earin g  fo r them selves an d  o thers; th is  is th e  p leasu re  involved in  th e ir  public  
existence/*6
In their engagement, authorship is handed over, so to speak, to the participants -  
the individuals who appear in the video-portraits and the passers-by who are 
interpellated by them. On a similar note Daniel Canogar writes,
T his layering  o f  new m ed ia  over public space h as  paradoxically  reaw akened  b eh av io u rs  
th a t  have trad itio n a lly  b een  p resen t in th ese  spaces. F o r exam ple, people h av e  alw ays
54 P riam o Lozada an d  B arbara P erea . 97.
55 In  Jo se  Luis B arrios. 151,
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explored their identities as citizens in the marketplace, agora or forum, and have used  
these settings to figure out how to incorporate them selves into the social body.'-’
As such Under Scan changes the ecology of a generic urban space, a “non--plae ”-r>8 
of minimal social interaction, into a thriving “public sphere” allegedly, and 
relatively speaking.
Both these aspects -  participation and the modified agora -  need to be probed 
further in order to understand how communication occurs in Uniter Sean, if it 
occurs as Medina suggests. According to Lozada and Perea, “the mise-m-scene  
proposed by the artist becomes a space of potentiality, as stage for possibility 
where ‘audience’ become ‘actors’."™ This idea is cliche by now. Perhaps Victor 
Stoichita’s account allows us to go beyond it: “We are no longer before, a work, we 
are in a work. We are the work,” he states: “Therein lies the trap .”60 For if we are 
the work, how do we then get out of ourselves enough to gain some perspective 
on our own participation, enough at least to participate in an agora?
Medina suggests this narcissistic trap when he states,
T he cen tra l tene t o f  such  an o p e ra tio n  is, iu fact, the active illusion o f an  a p p a ritio n : one 
w alks in  a public sq u a re  and , as if  invoked by a  spell, a ch a rac te r em erges b efo re  o u r  eyes 
on  th e  pavem ent, an d  ad d resses  us as if  m ateria lized  from  a d ream .61
He continues by describing the “gothic feeling” Under Sean provokes:
s? D aniel C anogar. 172.
s8 See M arc  Auge. N on-P laces: In tro d u ction  to an  A nthropo logy  o f S uperm qdern ity . T ran s . .John 
Howe. L ondon: Verso, 1995.
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tho se  im ages com e to m eet tis very m uch as il they were the dead , em erg ing  from  inside 
th e  shadow s on the pavem ent p ro jected  by the pow erful beam  necessary  to tire 
m echan ism , in o rd e r to follow, describe and  in terac t w ith o u r m ovem ent.'’'
If this is a modified agora as he suggests, what/who exactly are we engaging with? 
As if to answer this question, Stoichita writes, “...the observer simultaneously 
faces his shadow-self and the image of the other.
The idea of me-and-my' shadow was explored extensively by Peter Campus in his 
work of the early 1970s, in which he used closed-eircuit video-feedback systems 
to instantaneously project images of the gallery visitors back to them in modified 
form. Campus’ 1974 work Shadow Projection is particularly relevant to Under 
Sean. When the viewer enters the room, her shadow as well as a video image of 
her are simultaneously projected onto a screen. David Joselit describes the effect 
as follows:
T he view er is keenly aw are th a t she o r  he can increase  the  size an d  clarity  o f b o th  shadow  
a n d  video im age by  m oving closer o r  fu rth e r aw ay from  the  cam era eye. The1 ‘w ork’ w hich 
is requ ired  of the sp e c ta to r  is therefo re  to  su p erim p o se  one im age perfectly  up o n  th e  
o th e r in o rd e r  to resolve th e ir  difference in size.6*
This proliferation of nor self >. lentical images is, according to Joselit, endemic to 
the media enviiomnent, which asks of consumers to continuously strive for 
identification with their “image.” In Shadow Projection viewers are given the
Ibid. 118.
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‘o D avid Jose lit, “T he V ideo Public S phere .” T h eV isu a l C ulture  R eader. M irzoeff, N icholas, ed. 2 ml 
ed. L ondon  and N ew  York: R outledge, 1998, 2 0 0 2 .4 5 4 -5 .
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choice whether to reconcile the disparate images and claim them as a singular 
“se lf  or allow them to diverge.
In this light, both Campus’ shadowy works and Under Scan may resemble a 
phantasmagoria  more than an agora ; however, given the facility with which we 
now engage with the media environment and the extent to which image-based 
telecommunication technologies have been naturalized, as well as the 
continuation of the belief that images deliver to us their referents, the ethereal 
and under-worldly flavour of Under Sean
is in fact a heavily m ed ia ted  m eans o f in lersub jee tive  in terac tion , w h ere  a g roup  o f 
people  rem otely  in te rp o la tes  a n o th e r  g roup  th rough  a rep e rto ire  of body  gestu res, w hich 
a lth o u g h  recorded  an d  played back a t ran d o m  to casual passersby, m anages to  m eet th e  
eye o f a n o th e r  subject.
In this statement Cuauhtemoc Medina is not contradicting his earlier observation; 
he is simply accounting for the paradox of this work, which reveals the paradox 
inherent to augmented space in general: communication, which is usually 
understood according to conceptions of face-to-face interaction, occurs in 
augmented space in spite of or because of spatial displacement , heavy mediation, 
and quasi-disembodiment/diffused embodiment.
Lozada and Perea go so far as to state that “The interface can thus be understood 
as a surface, territory, or place where two things touch each other or meet 
enabling people to act together or affect each other.”60 Here we land squarely
(,,> Cuauhtemoc M edina. 117.
w> Priam o Lozada and  B arbara  Perea. 97.
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within the space and lime of the medium, where the pedestrian’s movements 
turned into data by way of surveillance technology affect the data already stored 
in the system’s database. As David Joselit states, “the body becomes an avatar, a 
presence beyond or bene; ' \ e  threshold of identity that, like a sentient cursor, 
projects agency and mobility into a virtual world.”0'' In f hnlcv Scan the 
pedestrian’s projected agency engages with the video-portrait who/which :•wins 
responsive: the portrait gestures at the viewer while it has her attention but turns 
away and eventually disappears if the viewer loses interest and walks away.
Can we call this communication? Medina suggests, yes. lie  writes:
Sure, th is  em ergence is v irtua l o r  hallucinatory  in  p a rt, and  it req u ires  that som e o f its 
“partic ip an ts"  (th e  im ages am i th e  shadow s) be reduced  to a ro u tin e  consisting  in being 
ac tiva ted  by the  step s  o f  a n o th e r person  as they w alk  in the sq u are , an d  then  perfo rm in g  a 
p re -reco rd ed  action . But th is rem oteness, technically  specified a n d  random ly  chosen , 
co n stra in ed  and  physically  ab sen t, is not an y  less po ignan t, f o r  th e ir  ac tio n s...a re  aim ed 
a t an o th er; an d  no m a tte r  how  rem ote  and  delayed, they ough t to  reach  th e ir  d estiny .1’11
However, even if the portrait's message is “received” as Medina suggests, the 
portraits and the pedestrians cannot interact with one another in a more 
significant way than turning each other off or on, technically and figuratively.
This ON/OFF mode of communication is not very effective in itself, but it is 
compensated for by the high degree of illusionism: the video-portraits emerge 
from the concrete underfoot as if we haw  disturbed their grave and released their
D a v id ,Joselit. “N avigating the  New T errito ry : A rt, A vatars, and the C on tem porary  M ediascape. 
“ 77.
(,!i C uauh tem oc M edina, u p .
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data-essences, As Medina writes, “Lozano I Iemmer’s production would seem to 
s u r e s t  that under the present social circumstances, communication is a 
byproduct of an excited and at limes felishistie engagement with media.
As discussed in the second chapter, often the fascination with interactive art 
projects such as I liuler Scan is to discover their underlying algorithm, as with 
computer games, in order to test their limits and capacities. Can 1 walk through 
Under Scan without being detected? If I walk huddled together with another 
person, will our expansive shadow provoke the emergence of a portrait of a bigger 
person? If I protend to turn away, but then turn back, will the portrait re-emerge? 
Will it repeat if I just keep standing there? Questions like these, of which there 
are many, turn the installation into a game, the fun of which is to learn its rules. 
Whether exotic zoo animals appear or humans trying to communicate may 
matter less to the overall effect than we would like to think.
On this count, game theory is particularly pert inent, for although computer 
games are structured around a bare-bone narrative (for example, kill your 
enemies to win the treasure), they are not about complex character 
relationships.'70 Andrew Darlev explains that there is relatively little psychological 
identification or voyeurism, as was the case with classic cinema: “What counts far 
more is the actual playing, and this involves a certain kind of kinaesthetic 
performance that becomes almost an end in itself.""1 (laming is about “learning
l,,> tbiil. 118.
A ndrew  Dnrlev. tf,;u 
Ibid. in i.
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how to become proficient with controls.’’- As Darlev states, “the relative control 
that the player has over time in a game, the dc facto  sense of present-tense 
involvement the impression of being there, responding and being responded to 
is central to the  genre.”-*
In Under Scan, as in computer games, the pedestrian/avatar (or ped/pod) 
explores an unknown territory over which it seeks to gain control. Michele White 
observes that “Narratives ; interactivity produce spectators and replace 
visual contemplation with a discourse about agency and participation.”7! But 
what kind of agency is this? As if answering this question Stephen Ilorne states:
“It may be that our delight in the rhetoric o f‘action’ rests on the modern 
conception of subjectivity as a will-to-power, a part of the modern desire for 
domination regarding any ‘other,”’'"* If in video games we simply do away with 
obstacles and enemies that stand in the way of our assumption of power, in 
Under Scan the domination is more subtle: wo have the power to let the portraits 
“speak" or not, according to our whim. The violence inherent in turning the world 
into “a picture” ~ of externalizing it and objectifying it as a knowable other -  
comes to light in this gesture: the “subject” (passer-by) reigns over the “object” 
(video-portrait). As Rosalvn Deutsche states, “The autonomous subject is 
" produced only by positioning others as object of the look.”';h
Ibid. 13.
■< Ibid. 154.
u  M ichele W hite. T he body  an d  the Screen: T heories o f In te rn e t S p ec la to rsh ip , C am bridge, MA: 
MIT P, e o o d .
■’ S tep h en  H om e. “Acting On: Acted U pon." U n p ub lished  m an u scrip t. M ay 20, 2 0 0 8 . 17.
R osalvn D eutsche. “A goraphobia." Kviclions: Art and  S patia l Politics. C am bridge, MA: M IT P. 
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There is a catch, however. As if wanting to pre-empt this very domination, 
Lozano-Hemmer subjects the viewer to the same process of objectification she 
exerts over the portraits: as she scrutinizes the image, the surveillance system 
scrutinizes her, assessing her size and movement and effectively turning hei mto 
an image, and then correlating this data with information stored in its database.
In this artistic space, the database contains video-portraits that were recorded 
upon the consent and volition of their subjects. However, in real-life applications, 
as previously discussed, a system such as this would he correlating data gleaned 
from the passers-by with known suspects, progrvmmed stereotypes, and other 
prejudicial statistics.
(Poslhuma.il) fiubli Yugmented) Sphere
On a more positive note regarding augmented space, Lev Alanovich states,
if  the m essages co m m u n ica ted  by trad itio n a l a rch itec tu re  w ere  sta tic  an d  reflected  the  
d o m in a n t ideology, today 's e lectron ic  dynam ic in te rac tive  d isp lays m ake it possib le  for 
these  m essages to  change co n tinuously  an d  to be th e  space o f  con testa tio n  an d  dialog, 
th u s  function ing  as the m a te ria l m an ifes ta tio n  o f th e  often invisib le pub lic  sp h e re .'"
This statem ent reveals the assumption that technological information spaces are 
somehow equally accessible to all, rather than limited to the use and control of a 
technological elite; however, what I want to pick up 011 in particular is Alanovich’s 
hope that the plethora of displays can open a “space of contestation and dialog” 
rather than simply stimulation and commercial coercion. If aggregate space is the
' Lev M anev ich . “The T o d ie s  of A ugm en ted  Space.” 87.
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now norm as Manevich suggests both literally (in computers) and 
metaphorically (in the “real” world) 8 then how can it offer a figuration of a 
public sphere?
To ask this question i. to go against the grain of “decline” narratives which 
assume that, for one, “new electronic technologies must invariably have negative 
effects on public life and community," and that, secondly, “a continuing erosion 
of the public sphere goes hand in hand e privatization of city streets and
other ‘public’ spaces.”^' The space most representative of the public sphere, 
according to Jurgen Habermas’ formulation of the term, was the eighteenth- 
centurv European cafe: here white bourgeois m en would gather in order to 
rationally and “impartially” debate “public” concerns, Inn mg left all if their 
“private” interests at home. If we fast forward to a typical expedience of the ’ <eal 
Starbucks, the scene is quite dhierent: given the  prices, it is arguably still elassist; 
however, it is the absence of communication (yet alone debate) between its 
caffeinated occupants that decline theories lament. Kazys Varnelis and Anne 
Friedberg describe the scene well:
A w om an  next to  you is b row sing  the  In te rn e t o n  h e r  lap to p  w hile a la te  c a re e r  executive 
is th u m b in g  his B lackberry, two s tu d e n ts  are  s tu d y in g  toge ther, so m e  teen ag ers  a re  
h an g in g  ou t lis ten in g  to th e ir  iPods a n d  period ica lly  b reak in g  out in  giggles an d  lo u d  
ex c lam ations as they get text m essages from  th e ir  friends on  th e ir  m obile  p h o n es. ...You 
a re  all som ehow  draw n to g e th e r by th e  lu re  o f th e  generically  accep tab le  coffee a n d  the
K Lev M anovich. T he Language o f New M edia. 1157.
J e n n ife r  S. b ight. “Prom  City .Space to C yberspace .” V irtua l G eographies: B odies, Space and  




d e s ire  lo sh a re  a s im ila rly  g en eric , hu t n o n e th e le ss  co m m u n a l space w ith  o th e r  hum .<us 
w ith  w hom  you a rc  likely n o t to  have any  in te ra c tio n .”"
If we consider this generic space filled with interactivity but little interaction as 
representative of today’s public sphere, how can we characterize its political 
salience?
Clearly such a characterization will be an abstraction, but so too was Haberm as’ 
public sphere, and so loo are alternative appeals to some sort of essential 
“publicness” coming from bo th  the left and the right. In her influential essay 
“Agoraphobia" Rosalvn Deutsche counters all of these definitions by drawing on 
political theories of radical democracy. Following Claude Lelbrt, she argues tl t 
the dethronem ent of the French monarchy, which claimed power on absolute 
terms, left an empty space ~ a public space that has no claim to transcendental 
authority. Therefore, society needs to continuously define itseh 1 die present 
tense and decide through continuous, open-ended debate what is and is not 
legitimate lo its rule. She writes, “Conflict, division, and instability, then, do not 
ruin the democratic public sphere; they are the conditions of its existence.”81
Deutsche’s com -ption of the public sphere as volatile and discursive, rather than  
absolute and essential, is m ore amenable to the divided spaces in winch we find 
ourselves in today’s augm ented space than Habermas’ insistence on collective 
experience and consensus: we can now be in two places at once, participating in a
Kazys am i A nne Friedberg. “N etw orked  P lace.” N etw orked  P ublics. A n n en b erg  C e n te r  
for C o n m n tn iea lio n , U niversity  o f  S o u th e rn  C alifornia. h t tp : / /n e lp u b iie s .a n n e n b tT g .e d u /. 
S u bsequen tly  p u b lish ed  as “Place: T h e  N etw o rk in g  of P u b lic  S p are ."  N e tw orked  P ub lics. V arne lis , 
Kazys, etl. C am bridge, M A: M IT P. eooB. i s  .|2 ,
R osalvn D eu tsche. “A g o rap h o b ia .” Kvielions: Art and  S pa tia l Polities. C am b rid g e , MA: M IT  1’, 
U)i)(>. e_8q.
chat room on the web while bargaining the price of an item at the local market. 
However, as with the model of the Internet as the “new" public sphere, the lack of 
dialectical links between all of these different m icro-spheres82 can impede rather 
than foster discourse: they fall short of Deutsche's conception by rem aining 
disconnected. It is precisely to the end of establishing connections that Lozano- 
Hemmer is working, or should I say, positioning his work. He states:
In  c o n tra s t [to  th e  co n cep t o f th e  c o l l e c t i v e ] ,  I rea lly  like th e  concep t o f th e  c o n n e c t i v e  -  a 
m u c h  less p ro b lem a tic  w o rd  b ecau se  it jo in s  re a litie s  w ith o u t a p re -p ro g ra m m ed  
a p p ro a c h  W h a t’s in te re s tin g  is th a t  th is  co n cep t d o e sn 't  co n v ert rea litie s  in to  
h o m o g en e ity . ...I w o u ld  even  go so  fa r  as to  define  th e  connective as  th o se  ta n g e n ts  th a t 
p u ll us o u t o f the  co llective.8:*
According to Lozano-Hemmer, connection does not lead to consensus or 
establish a stable space. Rather, it is more like a principle -  the principle of 
interrupting the space of the status quo in order to  prevent it from ever 
stabilising into an all embracing homogenous spatial totality.
Deutsche asks:
H ow  do im ages o f  p u b lic  space  c rea te  th e  p ub lic  id e n titie s  th e y  seem  m erely  to  d ep ic t?
H ow  do th e y  c o n s titu te  th e  v iew er in to  th e se  id e n titie s?  H ow , th a t is, do  th ey  inv ite
H ew ers  to  take  u p  a p o sitio n  th a t  th e n  d efin es  th e m  as p u b lic  be ings?  H ow  do  th e se
K- See M a rtin  L ister, J o n  D ovev, S e th  G idd ings et a l. N ew  M edia: A C ritical In tro d uctio n . L ondon 
and  N ew  York: R ou tledge, 2 0 0 3 .1 7 6 -8 1 .
8:* In  J o s e  Luis B arrios. 147.
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im ag es create  a  "we," a public, a n d  who do  w e im ag in e  ourse lves to  be w h en  we occupy 
th e  p resc rib ed  site?8 *
If we ask these questions of Lozano-Hemmer’s Under Seem, we can deduce two 
answers, one of which is seemingly ideal from a Habermasian perspective, while 
the  other is more in tune with Rosalvn Deutsche’s understanding of radical 
democracy.
Consider the person who portrayed themselves to the camera, and by extension 
to the viewers, any way they wished  (within the param eters of the project). Some 
danced, some stripped, and some made political statem ents by holding up a 
poster or flaunting a T-shirt. The premise is self-expression, self-representation 
and the freedom of expression -  concepts based on subjective autonomy. In 
return, a respectful, equally autonomous viewer tries to discern the “essence” of 
th is portrayed “se lf’ from the representation. This is the m odern model of art 
viewership: the medium delivers the message immediately, as though it were a 
window the viewer could look through and see the soul of the person in the 
portrait. Medina suggested this transparency when he stated that the  message 
ought to  reach its destination no matter how rem ote or delayed. Here then, is a 
model of two autonom ous subjects meeting in public space to communicate face- 
to-face, thereby overcoming social alienation.
Alternatively, consider the fact tha t the person represented by the video portrait 
is dependent on the viewer, in fact needs the viewer, in order to come into being 
in public space at all. A viewer respectful of the person’s/portrait's vulnerability 
**•» R osalyn  D eutsche. 28b.
and her/its  radical contingency on the viewer's own shadow plays with this 
interface, thus interacting as much (or more) with this process of subjective co­
production as with the portrait’s “m es1" ge.” As Lozada and Perea suggested.
Under Scan opens and “interstitial terrain” that reconfigures the aesthetic 
equation: subject and object are mutually constituted. In some cases a reverse 
puppetry even occurred similar to Campus' work, where the viewer aligned her 
shadow with the moving limbs of the portrait in order to allow it to come into full 
visibility. Here then, is a model of public space that occurs without recourse to 
essentialism. The portrait’s and the viewer’s partial “selves” are negotiated, 
aligned, incorporated, or disavowed. As Rosalvn Deutsche states, "In the 
phantom  public sphere, m an is deprived of the objectified, distanced , knowable 
world on whose existence he depends and is presented instead with 
unknowability, the proximity of otherness, and, consequently, uncertainty in the 
self."8:"
Furthermore, given that the surveillance system has an eye on the viewer just as 
the viewrer has an eye on the portrait, there is no way out: the viewer is fully 
implicated in the space. As such, Under Sean calls attention to the potential of 
surveillance technology to “capture” the entirety' of urban space through an 
interlinked digital network. This network has the computing power to integrate 
various sources of data into an accurate real-time simulation of the activities -- 
and identities -  of the people who come under its scanner, It is this simultaneous 
experience of objectification that Lozano-Hemmer has built into the installation
*5 Ibid. 3 2 5 -6 .
that, I suggest, encourages the viewer to recognize her status an object of the gaze 
as well as its subject, a dual status she shares with the video-portrait. As both 
subject and object, the “ideal" viewer that Under' Scan establishes is thus 
contingent not essential, and discursively constituted not autonomous -  that is, 
this viewer is public.
It is for th is reason -  how it invites viewers to take up a position that then  defines 
them as public beings -  that Under Sean is "public art," not because the space in 
which it is installed is de facto  public for being outdoors, and certainly not 
because it suggests some sort of mythical coherence of the “public” or equal 
accessibility to “the" public, Lozano-Hemmer states, “Although I am conscious 
that the scale was ‘spectacular,' I am happier to compare the work to a public 
fountain or to a park bench than to  a ‘son et lumiere’ show.’’86 He stresses inter­
hum an exchange and the singularity of individual experience rather than  
immersive spectacles in which audience members meld into a collective 
experience of the given show. The viewers of Under Sean are not part of a crowd, 
nor are they feeding off its esthetic energy like a flaneur: it is experienced in 
small micro-spheres in which two partial image-selves overlap and the dynamics 
of the exchange can be negotiated. To cite Deutsche once again, “Publicness 
emerges as a quality that constitutes, inhabits, and also breaches the interior of 
social subjects. It is a condition of exposure to an outside that is also an 
instability* within.’’8?
In  ( k v r t  Lovink. 310. 
s ' Rosalvn D eutsche. 303 .
288
However, regardless of its status as a public art project that is installed in situ,
I huicr Scan is not site-specific. The project was designed to he flexible so that it 
can he installed in very different urban settings. In fact, it can range in size from 
500 to izooo square metres and the staging is independent of architectural 
support. The only criteria for its location are that it be “a large pedestrian space 
with clear, accessible ground surfaces... in close proximity to areas of cultural 
redevelopment."88 In both Derby and Northampton, the main Market Square 
areas were chosen; in Leicester it took place in a busy pedestrian thoroughfare; in 
Nottingham a location adjacent to the court was chosen; and in Lincoln, it was 
installed on the university campus.81’ Furthermore, the projection “towers” and 
surveillance devices are discrete enough to almost disappear during the day. As 
such, they purposefully do not interfere with the functions and symbolic 
resonance of the chosen sites and the entrenched daytime habits of its occupants.
But Under Scan can be thought of as site-specific in one particular way: its 
antagonism to habitual uses of site. Lozano-Hemmer states, “I look for the 
‘special defects’ that allow me to activate the imperfections, the disruptions; ‘to 
disrupt’ seems to be the most precise term for describing what I want to do.’’l)0 In 
Under Scan this “disruption" is played out by turning a substrate for movement -  
the concrete underfoot ~ into a screen for moving images, and by forcing “perfect 
strangers” to interact by way of their respective projected images -  the shadow 
and the video. As Lozano-Hemmer states, Under Scan sought “to question the
David H ill an d  E m m a Jo n es. “P roduc tion ,"  U nder Sean: Rafael T.ozano -IIem nier. T im olhv  
D ruekery, M irjatn  S truppek , Beryl G raham  et al. R afael L ozano-IIem m er and D avid Hill, eds. 
N o ttingham . UK: E ast M idlands D evelopm ent Agency, 2007. 21.
8l> Ibid.
1,11 I n  J o s e  L u is  B a r r io s .  151.
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predatory nature of visual technology or to invert the paradigm where the virtual 
takes place on the other side of the mirror and instead invades our own corporeal 
space."*'1 By instigating this invasion, we could say that Lozano-Hemmer 
continues the avant-garde tactic of "shocking” the audience into a new 
understanding of then’ implication in public space (not a specific site) and their 
engagement with imaging technologies.
Media Ecology and tlic Return o f Subjectivity
In the words of Theodor Adorno, “Homesickness results from distancing. T h e  art 
would be to experience it at the same time as staying at home, which requires 
illusionistie virtuosity.”tW As Under Sean illustrates, his wish is now 
technologically supplied: we can now be 011 both sides of the “m irror” at once, in 
virtual and actual space. Contemporary homesickness, which is no longer 
saturated with modern connotations of “inauthent’V ’ experience, is part and 
parcel with the spatial decentring, weak temporalization and quasi­
disembodiment/diffuse embodiment that results from our engagement with 
virtual technologies. As Pierre Huyghe states, “You need to be corrupted by the
*» Rafael L ozano-H em m er. “In sp ira tion  am i P receden ts."  U n d e r S canL R afm di,pzano-IIen im er. 14.
In A nthony  V idler. T he.arch itec tu ra l.tm ennny : essays in  th e  m odern  unhom ely , C am bridge, MA: 
MIT P, lone. 243.
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context but without forgetting that you’re not from il.”‘):i That is, some distance 
from the site, whether virtual or actual, must he maintained.
This kind of mediated contemporary homesickness results, in part, due to the 
changed context of reception that artworks such as Under Scan engage. Ron 
Burnett states, “embodied forms of interaction through augmented reality 
systems, CAVKs, and immersive forms of entertainment suggest that some 
fundamental changes are underway, re-creating notions of audience and 
participation."1’i In the later half of the twentieth-century, assumptions about the 
corrosive effects of the mass media prevailed in the art w'orld, defining a clear 
role for the neo-avant-garde in opposition. Now, however, as Burnett asserts, 
“critical strategies derived from the study of mass communications in the 1960s 
and 1970s may not be useful in understanding the breadth and impact of this new' 
media ecology."<w
There are several reasons for this. For one, the audience itself is 110 longer 
“mass;" it is intensely differentiated. As Burnett explains,
T his change in the  aud ience reflects both th e  rise in im p o rtan ce  of netw orked  
technologies an d  the W orld  W ide W eb and  th e  frag m en ta tio n  o f the  very  no tio n  of 
aud iences in to  sm aller an d  sm alle r in te rest g roups. ...C onventional no tions o f aud ience
w In T im  G riffin, m o d era to r, w ith C laire B ishop, Pam ela M. Lee Lynne Cooke et al. "R em ote 
Possibilities: A R ound tab le  D iscussion on  Land A rt’s C hanging T erra in ."  A rtforum  (S um m er 
2005): 292.
*>t Ron B urne tt. 310.
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break  a p a rt w ith u n p red ic tab le  resu lts  because  th ere  a re  so m any d ifferen t ways in w hich 
ind iv iduals can now estab lish  sm all com m unities w ith  shared  eoncerus.'"’
Rafael Lozano-1 Iemmer’s Under Scan demonstrates this well by stressing the 
intimacy of encounter rather than group spectacle, by creating the opportunity 
for thousands of mini-narratives rather than an overarching one, and by speaking 
one-to-one, as it were, rather than one-to-m assrt’ In so doing, he also departs 
from the site-specific model.
Secondly, in this new media ecology, audiences’ expectations “are closely linked 
to greater control and participatory activity,”,,H which art* now part and parcel 
with everyday life: gadgets such as multi-media cell phone devices and pod 
casting have given ever-greater creative means in the hands of ever-greater 
numbers of people. (Not to mention the contemporary penchant for interactive 
multi-media exhibitions in museums and trade fairs alike, as well as for location- 
based entertainment such as Disneyland.) Again, Lozano-IIemmer is keenly 
aware of this new ecology, He purposefully allots viewers a participatory role in 
the artwork as instigators of their own experience rather than as consumers of 
another’s. Furthermore, he provides viewers with the opportunity to understand 
the workings of the technological systems involved rather than sealing them off in 
a black box, thereby empowering them to engage with the technology on their 
own terms.
Ib id . 330.
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Thirdly, as Gavin Hull state's, the “immersion of the spectator within the spare of 
the work has been seen as heralding a dissolution of the very conditions of 
critique.”'1'’ Thus he seeks models of aesthetic spectatorship that “might 
encourage a long overdue, and productive, opening out of critical subjectivity to 
its embodied and performative condition of production.”"10 One such model 
is established by Irit Rogoff in her essay Looking Away: Participations in Visual 
Culture. She state's,
It seem s to m e that w ith in  the space  o f a re la tively  sh o rt period  we have been able to  
m ove from  criticism  to c ritique  to critieality  fro m  find ing  fault, to exam in ing  the 
underly ing  a ssu m p tio n s  th a t m ight allow  so m eth in g  to a p p e a r as a convincing  logie..,to 
o p e ra tin g  from  an u n certa in  g round w hich, w h ile  bu ild ing  on critique, w an ts nevertheless 
to in h ab it cu ltu re  in a re la tion  o th e r th a n  one o f  critical analysis; o th e r th an  one' of 
illu m ina ting  Haws, locating  elisions, a llocating  b lam es.""
The shift that Rogoff articulates emphasizes the positive, creative potential of 
critical engagement with art. She is explicitly concerned with how “empirical” 
viewers become the subject of the work itself, rather than “following the roles 
allotted to  us as [“ideal”] viewers and listeners.”102
This goes hand-in-hand with IIniler Sean, as well as many of Lozano-1 lem m er’s 
other projects. Neither the self-portraits’ nor the; public’s participati 1 is scripted 
or censored. Unlike site-specific works, there is no didactic narrative and no
(Savin B utt. “In troduction ; T he Paradoxes of C ritic ism .” After C riticism : New R esponses to  Art 
a n d  P erform ance. G avin Butt eel. M aiden, MA: Blackwell Pub lish ing  Ltd., 2 0 0 4 . p.
1(10 Ibid. i) it),
"" Irit Rogoff. “Looking Away; P artic ipa tions in  Visual (.’u llu re .” A fter C riticism : New R esponses 
to  Art and  Perfo rm ance, lip .
Ibid. 121.
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privileged viewpoint that positions the viewer ;\s an “ideal.” As such, it is not “to]) 
down” as urban planners would have it but rather, in Lozano-I lemmer’s words, 
“side-by-side.”,()3 What is of utmost importance to the success of project is that 
viewers can build their own relationships with the work and with the portraits it 
contains. As the* artist states, “The piece was intended as a public takeover of a 
city by its inhabitan ts, linking high technology with strategies of self­
representation, connective engagement and urban entitlement.”1'^ The viewer’s 
understanding of the particular site is not crucial, only their temporary 
performance within it. That is, for the durat ion of the project (ten nights in each 
location), the day-to-dav functions of the site are overshadowed, literally, by an 
opportunity to engage with the city and its inhabitants in a more fantastical way. 
For each individual, the project transpires in an acute present-tense, making and 
remaking partial “selves” continuously.
This shift in emphasis off of the discrete art object and onto the subject’s 
subjective experience of the project is not new to the history of art, I have already 
outlined the “theatrical tu rn” pace Michael Fried and its more contemporary 
appearance in the literature on installation art. However, this emphasis on the 
subjective engagement goes much further back to the origins of aesthetics and 
this history is key to understanding the implications of this shift. In his book 
Songs o f  Experience Martin Jay discusses how, in the eighteenth century, the 
long-standing assumption that beauty was an objective quality of objects began to 
fade in favour of locating aesthetic value in the bodily responses of the viewers
R atai’l Lozano I le n n n o r. “C oncept." 11. 
‘°i Ibid. ().
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and their consequent “tasteful” assessments. Furthermore, during the 
Enlightenment objects of political power or religious worship were described in 
terms of artistic merit alone. But, paradoxically, in this new taxonomy of “a rt” 
they also lost “their integrity as self-sufficient entities in the world” replete with 
eultio “aura,”lu'> The object was no longer considered to be “an incarnation of 
ultimate value that was prior to the beholder’s response to  it.”U)6 Consequently, 
the door was opened to subjective judgments of the beholder “and away from 
objective; criteria of value.”10? With David Hume’s 1757 essay O f the Standard o f  
Taste, aesthetic discourse was firmly located in the subject and his experience, 
rather than in the object.
Now that the subject reigns, there is a subsequent trifurcation to consider 
between aies thesis, noesis, and poiesis. Aiesthesis implies subjective sensual 
responses to objects. By contrast, noesis implies pure conceptual thought 
separated from the senses, and poiesis implies the active production of objects.108 
As .Jav explains, of these three approaches, aiesthesis was privileged in aesthetic 
discourse:
Hut even here  the  em p h asis  rem ain ed  on th e  em otional, even  irra tiona l, recep tio n  o f  a rt 
ep itom ized  by the “j e  n e  s a i s  q n o i "  a ttitu d e  of ineffable felicity  and  m y ste rio u s g race th a t 
becam e em blem atic  o f th e  re trea t from  concep tualiza tion  a n d  p roduction . It s tre ssed  
w hat h as  been called the “m u tism ” o f the  in itia l e n co u n te r  w ith art, th e  “sense  o f  ru n n in g  
o ld  of w ords o r  o f not know ing  how  o r w hore to begin  sp eak in g  in th e  face o f th e
Jay , M artin . Songs o f  K xperienee: M odern A m erican an d  K uropean V ariation 011 a U niversal 





a r t w o r k . ” A lo n g  w i th  t h e  l o s s  o f  w o r d s  w e n t  a  c e r t a i n  w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  b e  o v e r w h e l m e d  b y  
t h e  e n c o u n t e r . " ’'1
In brief, (desthcsis renders aesthetic experience as perceiving rather than 
performative, as passive absorption of an art object rather than a creative self- 
fashioning, and as immersion in the (allegedly) autonomous realm of art rather 
than an encounter with the world at large.
Clearly Lozano-1 lemmer is not proposing a renaissance of the./e ne sais quoi 
attitude. Ilis interest in performative engagement confirms his interest in 
discourse. In Under Scan the “self” opens itself to the encounter: as in aies thesis, 
the subject subjects itself to the object. However, the opposite is equally true: this 
“self” subjects the object to the dictates of the subject, as in poiesis. As Irit Rogoff 
states,
B eing  so active an d  vo latile  an e n tity  we, as v iew ing aud ience , can  no lo n g er be  p o sitioned  
as th e  observers of w o rk  from  th e  ou tside , a n d  having  u n d e rs to o d  how  we rem ak e  w ork  in  
re la tio n  to  th e  sub jectiv ity  we p ro jec t upon it, we can n o t u n lea rn  th is  w hen co n fro n ted  
w ith  th e  w ork o f “a r t ,”11'1
As such, it is useful to position Under Scan bet ween aiesthesis and poiesis: the 
creative contribution of the subject to the evaluation of the object is considered to 
be transformative of both that object and the subject. As Mark Poster states, 
“subjects now1 float, suspended between points of objectivity, being constituted 
and reconstituted in different configurations in relation to the discursive
I b id .
1111 Irit Rogoff. 123.
2q6
arrangem ent of the occasion.”111 This is precisely the kind of involvement that, 
according to Michael Fried, threatens to obliterate the integrity of the artwork 
altogether. Under Sean , contra Fried, is premised on this complicity.
Angelika Rauch articulates this shift in reception as follows: “If the exterior 
(beautiful) object is abandoned for the subject as the object o f reflection, the 
‘object’ must be the subject’s body as it ‘suffers’ the affects.”112 At the end of the 
preceding chapt er, I discussed Martin Jay’s criticism of the contemporary 
penchant for immersion in (virtual) sufferance. Vivian Sobchack, however, moves 
the idea of sufferance in a different direction: “insofar as it suggests a lack of 
intentional agency, the passion of suffering brings subjective being into intimate 
contact with its brute m ateriality”.” 3 This seems to be exactly what Lozano- 
IIemmer wishes to affect in Under Scan: a return  of the subject to an embodied 
awareness of the specific relations in which it is embedded. Sobchack continues:
f T’jh e  passion  o f  su ffering  n o t  only forces reco g n itio n  o f  o n e se lf  as  an  o b j e c t i v e  s u b j e c t  
alw ays irm n an en tly  an d  su b s ta n tia lly  “h e re ” a n d  o pen  to  b e in g  ex te rn a lly  ac ted  on 
reg a rd less  o f  o n e’s  volition  -  b u t it a lso  en h an ces  th e  aw aren ess  o f  o n ese lf  as a s u b j e c t i v e  
o b j e c t :  a m a te ria l b e ing  th a t  is none the less cap ab le  of f e e l i n g  w h a t it is to  be tre a te d  o n l y  
as an o b jec t.111
The peril involved in sufferance is clear: on the one hand, it implies a reversibility 
of subjects and objects that, upon reflection, can lead to ethical behaviour toward
111 M ark P o ste r. “In tro d u c tio n : W o rd s w ith o u t T h in g s.” T h e  M ode o f  In fo rm atio n :
P o sts tru c tu ra lism  an d  Spend C ontext, Chicago: U o f C hicago P, 1990.11.
11:1 In M artin  Jay . 142-3.
m  Vivian Sobchack. “The Passion  o f  th e  M ateria l: T ow ard  a P henom eno logy  o f In te ro b jec tiv ity .” 
C arnal T h o u g h ts: E m bodim ent an d  M oving Im age C u ltu re . Berkley: U o f C alifornia P, 2 0 0 4 . 287. 
"4 Ib id . 2 8 8 .
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other “objective subjects” and “subjective objects” like us. Under Scan 
dem onstrates this reversibility well in its combination of surveillance and 
simulation. But on the other hand, it implies a “dim inution of subjectivity”11'’ that 
can also lead to sufferance plain and simple. With regard to the video-portraits, 
tlv peril is adequately clear: they can be robbed of subjective agency entirely and 
objectified by passers-by.
What becomes apparent 111 this shift in the critical discourse of reception and the 
artworks, like Under Scan, that actively engage it, is the emphasis on non-unitary 
subjectivity: reception in the crossover zone is necessarily an inter- 
siibjeetive/inter-objective encounter. As Rogoff explains, “we affect a creative 
bricolage of art works and spaces, and modalit ies of attent ion and subjectivities, 
that break down the dichotomies of objects and viewers and allow for a dynamic 
manifestation of the lived cultural m om ent.”116 Lozano-IIemmer emphasizes this 
“lived-ness” by st ressing the  present-tense of the viewer’s engagement with 
Under Scan and the  project’s ephemeralitv, rather than its historical significance 
in a specific site at a specific time.
To close, I want to  suggest that this idea of bricolage also echoes N, Katherine 
Hayles’ definition of contemporary subjectivity: “The posthum an subject is an 
amalgam, a collection of heterogeneous components, a material-informational 
entity whose boundaries undergo continuous construction and reconstruction.”11^ 
Reception, therefore, can be thought of as a feedback loop that flows between  the
ll?> Ibid.
> u' Irit Rogoff. c r y
n "  N. K a th e rin e  H ayles. How W e B ecam e PosU ium am  V irtu a l B odies in C ybernetics, L ite ra tu re , 
an d  In fo rm atic s . C hicago and  L ondon: U o f Chicago P, m n p . ;y
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viewer and the artwork. As Hayles states, "the idea of the feedback loop implies 
that the boundaries of the autonom ous subject are up for grabs, since feedback 
loops can flow- not only within  the subject but also between the subject and the 
environm ent.”118 Rafael Lozano-Hemmer’s Under Scan establishes a feedback 
loop tha t is endemic to  posthum an spatial experience: the portrait’s and the 




w h e n  so m eth in g  called  ‘a r t - becom es an  open  in te rco n n ec tiv e  field, th e n  th e  p o ten tia l to 
en g ag e  w ith it as a fo rm  o f cu ltu ra l p a rtic ip a tio n  -  ra th e r  th a n  as a fo rm  o f e ith e r 
re ifica tion , re p re se n ta tio n , o r  con tem pla tive  ed ifica tio n  -  com es in to  b e in g .1
In the interconnective field of the crossover, artists and critics as discourse- 
makers participate in the process of establishing and debating new figurations for 
space and subjectivity. Given the “theatrical” premise of each of the artworks in 
question in this thesis, participation is mandatory. In each installation, the  viewer 
is on stage, so to speak, and the artist has called “action.” Roles are ascribed for 
the “ideal” viewer to follow, which I have described in detail in the previous 
chapters in order to evaluate the types of subjectivity' the artworks encourage. As 
Rosi Braidotti states, “subjectivity is a socially mediated process... Consequently, 
the emergence of new social subjects is always a collective enterprise, ‘external’ to 
the self while it also mobilizes t l r  se lf s in-depth structures.”2 By positioning the 
viewer in  a particular way in relation to the artwork -  by demanding a certain 
type of physical engagement and psychological investment -  these five case 
studies dem onstrate a homology between conceptions of space and conceptions 
of subjectivity.
1 Irit R ogoff. “L ooking Away: P a rtic ip a tio n s  in  V isual C u ltu re .” A fter C riticism : N ew  R esponses to  
A rt an d  P e rfo rm a n c e . G avin B utt ed . M alden , MA: Blackw ell P u b lish ing  Ltd., 2 0 0 4 .1 2 6 .
2 B ra ido tti, Rosi. M etam o rp h o ses: T ow ards a M ate ria lis t T heory  o f B ecom ing, C am bridge . UK: 
Polity, 2 0 0 2 . 7,
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W hether or not we accept the particular subjectivities they propose as a relevant 
model for our “selves," however, is a question each of us will answer for ourselves: 
Olafur Eliasson's Notion M otion  functions like a maquette of the process of trying 
to  extricate the “se lf’ from the “site": we enter into the mysterious waves and 
then step back to rationalize them. Philip Beesley's Hylozoic Soil, by contrast, 
does not provide such easy handles for the comprehension: as we (unsuccessfully) 
try  to distinguish cause (our physical presence) from effect (the system’s ticks 
and twitches) we come to realize our mutual production. Mike Nelson’s Triple 
B lu ff Canyon precludes systematic analysis altogether and relies instead on the 
sparkles of an “autistic lucidity" that joins disparate stimuli into a meaningful 
amalgam rather than a totalizing narrative. Gregor Schneider’s Weisse Folter 
similarly precludes our attem pts to  grasp its structure and overwhelms the viewer 
with the relative rawness of the space, which penetrates us and threatens to 
dissolve subjectivity altogether. Last but not least, Rafael Lozano-Hemmer's 
Under Scan  casts digital spectres onto our path who address us directly, coming 
into being and fading again as image-objects subject to our actions.
Caroline A. Jones wTites, “The blandishm ents of present-day technologies are 
usually subtle, some w:ould say insidious. Artists play with this edge and help us 
develop critical theory around it ."3 These five artworks pushed at the edge of our 
comfort-zone with technology, exploring aspects we may not (yet?) be so cosy 
with, such as the threat of sublime dematerialization, bio-mimetic technologies 
sm arter than ourselves, “autistic” re-orderings of the W'orld of bits and bytes,
*  C aroline A. Jo n e s . “T he M ed ia ted  S ensorium ." S enso rium : E m bodied  E xperience, T echnology, 
an d  C on tem porary  A rt. C aroline A. Jo n e s , ed. C am bridge, MA: M IT P, 2 0 0 6 . 43 .
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sensual overload, and tracking “eyes “ As such they made us strangers at home, 
so to speak, and the preceding chapters articulated how this enables us to gain 
perspective on the contemporary actual/virtual sites in which we are immersed.
Regarding these sites, Jonathan Crary remarks that “Unavoidably, our lives are 
divided between two essentially incompatible milieus; on the one hand, the 
spaceless electronic worlds of contemporary technological culture and, on tl 
other, the  physical extensive terrain on which our bodies are situated."» He is 
commenting on their alleged exclusivity. However, as the artworks by Eliasson, 
Beesley, Nelson, Schneider, and Lozano-Hemmer demonstrate, it is the very 
discrepancy between them  and the impossibility' of one eclipsing the other that 
opens a zone where the two can negotiate a relation of collusion rather than 
incompatibility’. As such, we can think of these artworks as enabling us to 
establish a site-specific relationship within  immersion -  a relationship that is 
critical bu t not negative, challenging but not oppositional, engaging but not 
overwhelming.
In order for the discourse of new media immersion and site-specificity to 
be able to  join forces in this way, significant changes occurred in the 
assumptions and ambitions of both. Site-specificity needed to  relinquish 
the idea that a more “real” site is somewhere hidden under the mediating 
(ideological) layers, an authenticity’ of site that only the artist as a marker 
of “presence" can reveal. New media immersion, by contrast, needed to
In  Nicolas Do Oliveira, Nicola Oxley, and Michael P etty . In s ta llation A rt in .the N ew Millennium ; 
T he E m p ire  of th e  S en ses. F orew ord  Jo n a th a n  Crary, L ondon: Thames & H udson , 2 0 0 3 . 8.
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moderate its endeavour to instate a new site altogether and seek, instead, a 
less totalizing relationship between the user/viewer and the artwork.
Furthermore, in the zone opened up by the crossover of these two 
discourses, we see an effort on the behalf of artists to understand, 
challenge and configure contemporary spatial experience in a way that 
privileges neither th- agency of the viewer nor that of the artistic site they 
inhabit. In the words of Martin «Jav,
red eem ed  experience, u n d am ag ed  experience, au th en tic  experience, if indeed  
su ch  a cond ition  can  ever be  a tta in ed , w ould  not m ean  a re sto ra tio n  o f innocence 
befo re  th e  fall in to  language o r a h a rm o n io u s  reconcilia tion  in  a u to p ian  fu tu re , 
b u t ra th e r  a n o n -d o m in a tin g  re la tio n sh ip  betw een  sub jec t an d  ob ject.1’
Different ways in which this non-dominating relationship between subject and 
site is or can be negotiated are proposed by the artworks discussed in this thesis: 
Eliasson oscillates between them; Beesley demonstrates their behavioural 
contingency; Nelson frustrates the subject’s attem pt to integrate the objects in a 
totalizing narrative; Schneider exaggerates the object’s potency but provides a 
conceptual safety railing; and Rafael Lozano-IIemmer presents objects in the 
guise of subjects in order to probe the promise of intersubjectivity and its limits.
I would like to explore the implications that these artistic configurations hold for 
subjectivity in a more speculative way by looking at two opposing anecdotes of a 
dominating  relationship, Jean Paul Sartre’s account of the “horrible ecstasy” that
’ M artin  Jay . S ungs of Experience: M odern  A m erican  a nd  K uropoan V aria tion  on a U niversal 
T hem e. Berkeley: U of C alifornia P, aoofj. 359-
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his protagonist in Nausea, Roquentin, felt when in the grips of unmediated 
sensations is perhaps even more gripping today, now that immersive 
technologies promise to deliver spatial relocation and “authentic’' experiences at 
the push of a button:
So I w as in the  park  ju s t now ...T he ch es tn u t tre e  p re ssed  itse lf against m y eyes. G reen rust 
covered it half-w ay up; th e  bark , b lack  and sw ollen, looked like boiled lea th e r. T he so u n d  
of th e  w ater in  the  M asq u ere t F oun ta in  sounded  in m y  ears, m ad e  a n est th e re , filled 
them  with signs; my n o strils  overflow ed w ith  a g reen , pu trid  odour...I d id  no t sim ply see 
th is  black: sigh t is an  a b s tra c t invention , a sim plified  idea, one  o f m an 's  ideas. T hat b lack  
am o rp h o u s, w eakly p resence , far su rp assed  sight, sm ell and  ta s te ...1 san k  dow n on the  
b en ch , s tupefied ,..m v very  flesh th ro b b ed  an d  o p ened , ab an d o n ed  itse lf to th e  un iversa l 
bu rgeon ing . It w as rep u g n an t...I  h a ted  th is  ignoble m ess...I sh o u ted  “filth! w hat ro tte n  
filth!’’ and  sho o k  m yself to  get rid  o f th is  sticky filth ...”
This account of the emergence of the subject in Roquentin’s refusal to let the 
object penetrate and in his deliberate preference for mediation seems to go 
against the grain of contemporary thought, in which the breakdown of all sorts of 
boundaries is celebrated. But imagine for a moment what would happen if he had 
surrendered to the tree. Then the object would dominate and mould the subject 
to its contours, consequently obliterating the subject as a definable agency.
At the other extreme, in “The Age of the World Picture” Martin I leidegger 
explains how the world is replaced by its picture when the object of 
representation is reduced to the subject’s explanations:
” Jen n -P au l S artre , N ausea. T ran s . Lloyd A lexander. In tro . Ilav d en  t 'a r ru th . New York: Now 
D irections, 19(14. 12P-34.
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Thi' in terw eav ing  of th ese  two even ts, w hich for th e  m odern  age is decisive th a t the 
w orld is tran sfo rm ed  in to  p ic tu re  and m an into s i i h i c c t u t v  th row s light at the  sam e tim e 
on  the g round ing  even t of m o d ern  history, an event that at first glance seem s alm ost 
ab su rd . Nam ely, the m ore  extensively an d  the m ore  effectually the w orld  s ta n d s  a t m an 's 
d isposal as conquered , and  the  m ore  objectively th e  object ap p ears , all the m ore 
subjectively, i.e., th e  m ore  im portuna te ly , does th e  s i i h i c c t w n  rise up, and  all th e  m ore 
im petuously , too, do observation  of and teaching  abou t the  w orld change in to  a doctrine  
of m an  in to  an th ropology . It is no  w onder that h um an ism  first a rises w here th e  w orld 
becom es p icture.’’
What would Heidegger say seventy years later when pictures have taken on a life 
of their own and no longer offer the human a secure place as their source? Where 
does the posthuman subiectum  stand in the new “world picture”?
.lean Baudrillard asserts that, “Whereas representation attem pts to absorb 
simulation by interpreting it as a false representation, simulation envelops the 
whole edifice of representation itself as a simulacrum.”8 In Heidegger’s 
terminology, this would mean that there is 110 longer a “world” to which the 
“picture” refers; it has been annihilated and, along with it, the hope for an 
immediate or “authentic” experience that would allow Roquentin’s tree trunk to 
press itself upon us. Brushing Baudrillard aside, Lev Manovieh states; “We may 
debate whether our society is a society of spectacle or simulation, but,
” M arlin  H eidegger. "The Age o f the W orld  Picture." T he Q uestion C oncern ing  Technology and  
O ther Kssays. T rans. W illiam  Lovitt, ed, New York: H arp er and Row, 1977. 115-54. 
ht t p : / / www.cul tu rahvnnom irs.a tfreew cb .im m /A m io /H eidegger" >ncn’he"iu<>Age">u<)o(c,ci:!olhe% 
uoW orld  V jo P ie lu re .h tm . eg .
H In M arcus A. Doel and  D avid lb C larke. “V irtual W orlds: S im ulation, Supp letion , S (ed)uclinn  
and  S im ulacra ." V irtual G eographies: Bodies, Space and  R elations. Mike C rang , Phil ( ’ran g  and  
don M ay, eds. London and  New York: R outledge. 1999.
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undoubtedly, it is a society of screen.”'1 H ie screen stands between us and that 
gnarled chestnut tree either literally, ideologically, or even perceptually, given 
that the senses, too, are “never thems .• s and nothing but themselves,” as 
Roquentin discovered.
Screens can never screen-out the actual world entirely, no matter how small or 
large or seductive or coercive, and, like the black root, the world resists being 
explained away. It is this resistance of the world that theorists such as Baudrillard 
exclude from their account of a world that has become entirely “picture.”10 
Although the “real” world may seem dilapidated in comparison to the 
dematerialized realm of digital phenomena, even “humiliating” as Crary 
suggests,11 the fact that it can neither dominate nor be dominated opens a gap 
where the relationship between subject and object can be re-envisioned.
Such gaps speak of trauma (the fact that our “selves” are never completely 
congruent with the world), and they speak of utopia (as long as things do not 
match up exactly, things can always be different). Somewhere between 
melancholy, wishful thinking and the fear of annihilation, a theoretical 
investment in the potential of the gap as a site of transformation -  a creative zone 
where the “picture” of the world in which we live is reconfigured according to 
ways we deem ethical, just and nourishing - brings with it an acceptance of the
11 M anovieh, L ev .T he Language o fN ew  M edia [L eonardo . Roger F. M alina and  S ean  Cub it t, eds.J. 
C am bridge, MA: M U ’ I’, e o o i ,  04.
Jo n a th a n  C raw . “Fclipse o f the  S p e c ta c le " Art after M odern ism : R eth inking  R epresen ta tion . 
Brian W allis, ed. Forew ord by M arcia T ucker. New York: New M useum  o f C on tem porary  A rt, 
1984. apt).
" In  N icolas Do O liveira, Nicola Oxley, an d  M ichael Retry. 8.
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collusion of the dematerialized realm of information and the actuality of the ROL 
on the “terrestrial horizon.”
It is this investment in the gap that the artworks in this thesis articulate: by 
offering five different ways in which a model of subjectivity can be spatially 
established, Kliasson, Beesley, Nelson, Schneider and Lozano-IIemmer 
demonstrate the constant negotiation that occurs between subject and object, 
viewer and artwork, in the crossover zone. The particular consequences of this 
inter-connective process varied front work to work, but in every case both the 
viewer’s and the artwork’s participation in the cultural negotiation of subjectivity 
was explored and neither was reduced to a shadow of the other. Instead, they 
crossed-over in ways that demonstrate the stakes involved and the potential for 
creativity that arises in non-dominating relationships.
To return to the summary of the overall achievements of this thesis, let me state 
again that it provides much-needed precision to the literature on contemporary 
art: it defines and re-evaluates two central ideas -  new media immersion and 
site-specificity -  thus discovering their respective usefulness and limitations, as 
well as investigating the dynamics of the relation between them. I argue against 
their discursive exclusivity and propose, instead that they have created a 
“crossover.” I demonstrate this by way of detailed cases studies which each 
contribute to an understanding of this new zone and how the theoretical issues it 
implies play out in particular artworks. As such, this thesis reinvigorates 
formalist analyses of art by insisting that artworks are theoretical objects that can 
articulate very specific ideas through their formal configurations. In particular,
3«7
this thesis discusses at length three* points at which the crossover bears the most 
implications for art history: interactivity, spatial facsimiles and augmented places.
Through my demonstration of how t he crossover is articulated by five 
contemporary art projects, this thesis provides scholarship on the consequences 
of the artistic paradigm shift that has occurred over the last decades. It also 
enacts a critical theorization of the hegemonic status of the crossover, thereby 
challenging revisionist and over-simplified accounts of contemporary art. 'Phis is 
achieved by stressing the importance of media competence at a historical 
moment when media art* seemingly interchangeable or transparent. In so doing, 
it emphasizes the subjective agency that art objects exercise on their interpreters, 
thus working against the tendency to reduce art objects to the interpreter’s 
personal “feeling.” Overall, it suggests that art history must establish a non­
dominating relationship between subject and object.
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FIGIJRKS
Figure 1: Diagram: The Crossover of New Media Immersion and Site-Specificity
in Contemporary Art
Fii^mire 9\: OSafur Eliassom. Motion motion. 2005. (first room)
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Figures 10-11: Philip Beesley. Hylozoic Soil. 2007.
Figures 12-14.: Philip Beesley. Hylozoic Soil 2007. (details)
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F ig u re  20; Mike Nelson, Triple Bluff Canyon, 2004. (catalogue cover)
F ig u re  2 1: Mike Nelson. Triple B luff Canyon. 2004. (“woodshed”)
s 22 : Gregor Schneider. Weisae Falter, 2007. (entrance)
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Figures 25-1*6: Gregor Schneider. Weisse Falter. 2 0 0 7 .
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F ig u re s  2Q-3Q: Gregor Schneider. Weisse Falter. 2007.
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Fig u re s  a i- f ta : Gregor Schneider. Weisse Falter. 2 0 0 7 .
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F ig u re s  3 3 -3 7 : Images from the Internet of Camp V Delta, part of the long-term 
detention facility at U.S. Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
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F ig u re  4-Q: Rafael Lozano-Hemmer. Under Scan. 2005. (database)
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